Page 11 - Security testing for USSD and STK based Digital Financial Services applications Security, Infrastructure and Trust Working Group
P. 11

Components     USSD and STK related threats and vulnerabilities     Tests/attack scenarios
             Core Network   •  Inherent SS7 protocol vulnerabilities: Insufficient internal con-
             (USSD GW, MSC,   trols can allow insider access to customer data. The GSM MAP
             SMSC)            protocol used for communication between the mobile operator
                              core nodes transmits in clear text, and this can enable an insider
                              view PIN and transaction information due to lack of end to end
                              encryption.
                            •  Information can be spoofed by insiders, particularly in protocols
                              that provide no notion of message integrity like USSD.
                            •  The increased ease of access to the SS7 network allows an
                              attacker to use MAP (Mobile Application Part) operations to
                              insert or modify subscriber data, intercept mobile communica-
                              tion, or identify subscriber location.

            Figure 1 illustrates the different network elements and some of the vulnerable points in the ecosystem for which
            attacks above can be performed.

            Figure 1 - Network elements and vulnerable points


































            3  TESTING ATTACKS TO USSD AND STK DFS BASED IMPLEMENTATIONS

            The following attacks and scenarios for testing the   3�1  Passive and active attacks against DFS transac‑
            security of DFS transactions performed using USSD   tions
            and STK                                            The goal of this test is to determine whether an
                                                               attacker can perform a passive or active attack
            i.  Passive and active attacks against account trans-  against DFS transactions. Whereas the procedure
               actions                                         and equipment needed to perform both attacks are
            ii.  Testing of device authentication              the same, a passive attack mainly involves an attack-
            iii. Testing SIM swap attacks by IMSI verification  er eavesdropping on the DFS transactions, where
            iv. STK testing using SIMtrace                     the attacker captures, decrypts DFS messages as
            v.  SIM card security testing using SIM tester.    they traverse the network. During an active attack,
            vi. SIM clone attack                               the attacker directly interferes with the DFS transac-
                                                               tion, which could be in the form of a denial of service



                                                 Security testing for USSD and STK based Digital Financial Services applications  9
   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16