ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services: Ecosystem

2017

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978-92-61-23761-5 (Paper version)

978-92-61-23771-4 (Electronic version)

978-92-61-23781-3 (EPUB version)

978-92-61-23791-2 (Mobi version)

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© ITU 2017

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Foreword

An estimated 2 billion adults are still without access to a bank account, but some 1.6 billion of them have access to a mobile phone. ‘Mobile money services’ show great promise to expand financial inclusion by bringing basic financial services to people that remain on the margins of society.

In 2014, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation joined ITU to establish an ITU-T Focus Group on Digital Financial Services (DFS). The financial-services and information and communication technology (ICT) sectors are converging, and the aim of the Focus Group was to bring all the key players together to build a common understanding of the route to broader financial inclusion.

The Focus Group was successful to an extent that exceeded expectations. After two years of extensive consultation, the Focus Group concluded its work in early 2017 with the publication of 85 policy recommendations and 28 supporting thematic reports.

The Focus Group’s work was driven by the collaboration of more than 60 organizations from over 30 countries. Asked what made the Focus Group unique, all of the group’s participants highlighted its diversity. This was the first initiative to bring together all the actors working in the interests of financial inclusion. We opened new lines of communication to build a strong understanding of the components of the DFS ecosystem.

In the next phase of our collaboration, we will be certain that we are speaking on the same terms.

This next phase of collaboration – the ‘Financial Inclusion Global Initiative’ – will be a three-year programme of collective action led by ITU, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank Group, and the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure.

The new multi-partisan will provide targeted assistance to selected countries in their pursuit of financial-inclusion targets. This implementation work stream will be supported by annual symposia and thematic working groups.

Our Focus Group responded to a diverse set of challenges by mobilizing a diverse set of expertise. We are moving forward in exactly this spirit. The Focus Group demonstrated DFS stakeholders’ commitment to collaboration. ITU was glad to provide a neutral platform for this collaboration and we look forward to our continued work together to achieve universal access to financial services.

Dr Chaesub Lee

Director, ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau

Table of Contents

Foreword

I The Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

Executive summary

1 Introduction

1.1 What is the DFS Ecosystem?

1.2 The Goal of Digital Financial Services

1.3 The Digital Financial Ecosystem and Its Components

1.4 The Evolution of the DFS Ecosystem

1.5 Issues and Challenges in the Ecosystem

2 Products, Services and Use Cases

2.1 Requirements

2.2 Products and Services

II Regulation in the Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

2 Categories of Regulation

2.1 Category 1: Agents

2.2 Category 2: Consumer Protection

2.3 Category 3: Market Access

2.4 Category 4: Payment Systems

2.5 Category 5: Risk Management

2.6 Category 6: Other

3 Managing the Regulatory Environment

3.1 Survey of Regulators

3.2 Survey Conclusions

3.3 Template for an In-Country Memorandum of Understanding

3.4 Cross Country Considerations for a Memorandum of Understanding

Bibliography

III Review of National Identity Programs

1 Introduction

2 Methodology

3 Overview of Selected National Identity Programs

3.1 Program Technical Features

3.2 Stage of Implementation

3.3 Enrolment Methodologies

3.4 Coverage of Target Population

4 Implementation Challenges

4.1 Accountability

4.2 Privacy

4.3 Data Management

4.4 Enrollment

4.5 Coverage

4.6 Cost

4.7 Harmonization of ID Programs

5 Functions Linked To Identity Programs

5.1 Finance

5.2 Health

5.3 Agriculture

5.4 Elections

5.5 Surveillance and Security

5.6 Other Functions

6 Characteristics of ID Programs with Functional Applications

6.1 General Functional Linkages

6.2 Finance

6.3 Health

7 Conclusion

References

Appendix A: Literature Search Methodology

Appendix B: Review Framework Questions

Appendix C: Summary of National Identity Programs

Appendix D: Summary of National Identity Programs in Focus Countries

IV Enabling Merchant Payments Acceptance in the Digital Financial Ecosystems

Executive Summary

Part I: Merchants and Payments Acceptors in the Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

1 Introduction

1.1 Goals of Digital Payments Acceptance

1.2 Assumptions

1.3 Hypotheses

2 The Payments Acceptance Value Chain

3 Merchant and Payment Acceptor Segmentation

3.1 M0: P2P

3.2 M1: Sole Proprietor

3.3 M2: Small Shop

3.4 M3: Small Farmer

3.5 M4: Mid-Sized Retailer

3.6 M5: Utilities and Services

3.7 M6: Transit

3.8 M7: Large/Top Tier Merchants

3.9 M8: Government

4 Payments Acceptance Economic Models

4.1 Merchant Payments Revenue Sources

4.2 Costs to Merchant Services Providers

4.3 Electronic Commerce Platforms

4.4 Priority Segments and Supporting Business Models

5 Policy Considerations for Financial Inclusion

Part II: Driving Acceptance by Merchants and Other Payments Acceptors

6 Introduction

6.1 Overview

6.2 Disruption in Financial Services

7 Hypotheses

8 Overview of Key Model Characteristics

8.1 Business Model

8.2 Overview of Operational Models Observed

8.3 Overview of eMoney Merchant Acceptance Models

8.4 Conclusion and Next Steps

Appendix I: Profiled Models

Appendix II: Additional Profiles

Bibliography

V Merchant Data and Lending: Can Digital Transaction History Help Jumpstart Merchant Acceptance?

1 Introduction

1.1 Situation

1.2 Emerging model

2 Digital financial services and the poor

2.1 Hypothesis

2.2 Use of ACD

2.3 Approach

2.4 Assumptions

3 Survey of In-Market Programs

4 Further analysis of the underwriting and loan process

5 Summary of findings and conclusions

6 Considerations for policy makers

Appendix 1: Glossary of terms

Appendix 2: ACD case studies

VI Impact of Agricultural Value Chains on Digital Liquidity

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

2 Background

3 Are payment-enabled agricultural value chains a solution for digital liquidity?

4 Agricultural Use Cases

5 Policy Considerations

VII Impact of social networks on digital liquidity

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

2 Social networks

2.1 What are social networks?

2.2 User activities

2.3 Mobile access

2.4 Pursuit of revenue

3 BoP not participating

3.1 Low Internet adoption

3.2 Feature phone and smartphone challenges

3.3 Low financial inclusion

4 Potential benefits to the BoP

4.1 Digital on-ramps

4.2 Platforms for BoP ecosystems

4.3 Payment networks

4.4 Marketplaces

4.5 Beneficial data collection

5 Policy considerations

5.1 Encourage adoption

5.2 Protect consumers

Appendix I

VIII The Role of Postal Networks in Digital Financial Services

1 Introduction

2 The Current State of Play

3 The Role of Postal Networks in Digital Financial Services

4 Posts as support services

4.1 BM1: Cash-merchant

4.2 BM3: Partnership

4.3 BM2: Proprietary domestic and cross-border payments

4.4 BM4: Postal savings bank

4.5 BM5: Full-fledged postal bank

4.6 The Post as a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO)

4.7 The Post as an interoperability platform

4.8 The Post as an eCommerce or mCommerce facilitator

IX B2B and the DFS Ecosystem

Executive Summary

1 What are B2B payments?

2 B2B payment requirements

3 Benefits of B2B payments: Small buyers

4 Benefits of B2B payments: Small suppliers

5 Counter examples

6 Trends affecting B2B payments

7 Second order benefits

8 Barriers to B2B adoption

9 Considerations for financial policy makers

X Bulk Payments and the DFSs Ecosystem

Executive Summary

1 What are bulk payments?

2 History: How bulk payments are made

3 Challenges

4 The last 10 years: New ways of making bulk payments

5 Remaining challenges

6 The next ten years: Using the DFSs ecosystem

7 Structuring the future

8 Country stories

9 Considerations for financial policy makers

XI Over the counter transactions: A threat to or a facilitator for digital finance ecosystems?

Executive summary

1 Introduction

2 What and why of OTC transactions?

2.1 Defining OTC transactions

2.2 Prevalence of OTC

3 Are OTC as problematic as we thought?

3.1 Problem 1: OTC increase anti-money laundering (AML) / combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) risks

3.2 Problem 2: OTC limits product evolution

3.3 Problem 3: Beginning with OTC locks you into the model

3.4 Problem 4: OTC reduce provider’s profitability

3.5 Problem 5: OTC creates volatility in market share

4 The irony of OTC: It’s client-centric

4.1 Market segmentation of account adoption

5 Supply-side perspective for banks and third parties

6 Conclusions

XII DFS Glossary

Digital Financial Services (DFS) Glossary

Bibliography

List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 1 – Methodologies, Personal and Biometric Information Involved in the Selected National Identity Programs

Table 2 – Coverage of Target Population

Table 3 – National ID Program Implementation Challenges

Table 4 – Challenges Enrolling Poor and Rural Populations

Table 5 – Key Stakeholders in National ID Programs

Table 6 – Functionalities of National Identity Programs

Table 7 – Case Studies of Agricultural Linkages

Table 8 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Region

Table 9 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Time Period

Table 10 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Technical Features

Table 11 – Digital and Biometric ID Programs Associated with Financial Connections

Table 12 – Digital and Biometric ID Programs Associated with Health Connections

Table C.1 – Summary of National Identity Programs

Table D.1 – Bangladesh Case Study

Table D.2 – Ethiopia Case Study

Table D.3 – India Case Study

Table D.4 – Indonesia Case Study

Table D.5 – Kenya Case Study

Table D.6 – Malawi Case Study

Table D.7 – Nigeria Case Study (1)

Table D.8 – Nigeria Case Study (2)

Table D.9 – Pakistan Case Study

Table D.10 – Peru Case Study

Table D.11 – Tanzania Case Study

Table D.12 – Uganda Case Study

Table D.13 – Zambia Case Study (1)

Table D.14 – Zambia Case Study (2)

Table 1 – Type of Payment System

Table 2 – New Commerce Platforms by Segment

Table 3 – Impact of New Commerce Platforms

Table 4 – Priority Segments for Financial Inclusion and Supporting Revenue Models

Table 5 – High Level Overview of Key Deployment Characteristics

Table 1 – Global social network use and growth by region

Table 2 – Summary of ACD elements

Figure 1 – Branch

Figure 2 – LendingKart

Table 3 – Summary of ACD elements used

Table 4 – Examples of wait times

Table 5 – Summary of application process

Table 6 – Examples of authentication

Table 7 – Examples of collateral requirements

Table 8 – Examples of decisioning

Table 9 – Examples of distribution time

Table 1 – Characteristics of apps

Table 2 – Social network metrics

Table 3 – Social network data collection

Table 1

Table 1 – Country examples

Table 1 – Typologies of OTC transaction and its prevalence

Table 2 – Defining OTC transaction using the parties involved approach

Table 3 – Stakeholder pros and cons

Figures

Figure 1 – The Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

Figure 2 – Reaching Digital Liquidity

Figure 3 – Products and Services

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 1 – Type of National Identity Program

Figure 2 – Type of of Biometric Information

Figure 3 – Status of National ID Program

Figure 4 – Status of National ID Program by Region

Figure 5 – Coverage Rates of ID Programs

Figure 6 – Program Funding Source

Figure 7 – Functional Applications of the 48 Reviewed ID Programs

Figure 8 – Financial Connections to ID Programs

Figure 9 – Social Transfer Connections to ID Programs

Figure 10 – ID Program Registration Ages

Figure 11 – Health Connections of ID Programs

Figure 12 – Linkages with Elections

Figure 13 – Surveillance and Security Connections to ID Programs

Figure 14 – Other Functional Linkages of ID Programs

Figure 15 – Average Number of Linkages by Stage of Implementation

Figure 16 – Percentage of ID Programs with Financial Linkages (by Region)

Figure 17 – Percentage of ID Programs with Financial Linkages by Time Period

Figure 18 – Percentage of ID Programs with Health Linkages (by Region)

Figure 19 – Percentage of ID Programs with Health Linkages by Time Period

Figure 1 – Merchant Services/Payment Acceptor Value Chain

Figure 2 – High Level Merchant and Payment Acceptor Segments

Figure 3 – A Digital Pathway to Financial Inclusion. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Radcliffe, D and Voorhies, R. (2012)

Figure 4 – Key Elements of eMoney Merchant Acceptance Value Chain

Figure 5 – e-Money Merchant Acceptance Models

Figure 6 – Overview of In-House Merchant Acceptance Model

Figure 7 – M-PESA Merchant Acceptance

Figure 8 – Overview of MSP Merchant Acceptance Model

Figure 9 – Easypaisa Merchant Acceptance

Figure 10 – Overview of Merchant Acquirer Acceptance Model

Figure 11 – EcoCash Merchant Acceptance

Figure 12 – ZAAD Somaliland Overview

Figure 13 – M-PESA Kenya Overview

Figure 14 – Easypaisa Pakistan Overview

Figure 15 – EcoCash Zimbabwe Overview

Figure 1 – eMoney lifecycle

Figure 2 – Typical agricultural value chain

Figure 3 – Loose value chain

Figure 4 – Tight value chain

Figure 5 – SHF segmentation

Figure 6 – SHF finances

Figure 7 – SHF borrowing

Figure 8 – Transaction frequency by average ticket amount

Figure 9 – Average MNO fee for low value transactions

Figure 10 – Example eMoney use cases

Figure 11 – DrumNet process flow

Figure 12 – Example of eMoney roadmap

Figure 1 – Screenshot of Facebook Messenger and WeChat Red Envelopes

Figure 2 – Linked payments example

Figure 3 – Chatbot screenshot example

Figure 4 – Types of apps

Figure 5 – Social Network Users v/s Ecommerce Buyers

Figure 6 – Facebook revenues

Figure 7 – Tencent revenues

Figure 8 – LINE Corporation revenues

Figure 9 – Social network use

Figure 10 – Internet affordability

Figure 11 – Ecosystem Facilitation

Figure 12 – Potential adoption path for BoP

Figure 13 – Enabling layers

Figure 14 – Facilitating commerce with physical merchants

Figure 15 – Location based advertising example

Figure 16 – Shared value chain roles

Figure 17 – Nature of chat services

Figure 18 – Chat platofrm and social network size

Figure 19 – Chat as a platform

Figure 20 – Doctor appointment example

Figure 21 – Social networks importance to teens

Figure 22 – Chat providers disruption to the mobile ecosystem

Figure 23 – Chat screenshot – shopping

Figure 24 – Chat screenshot – customer service

Figure 25 – Chat screenshot – news and entertainment

Figure 1 – Traditional Postal Operator (until 80s-90s)

Figure 2 – DFS Operator

Figure 3 – SWOT

Figure 4 – Areas of responsibility

Figure 1 – Formal and informal enterprises

Figure 2 – Business size and resource demand

Figure 3 – The “long tail” of suppliers

Figure 1 – Typical cash program

Figure 2 – Systems integrators

Figure 3 – Addressing payments

Figure 1 – Account registration in Pakistan (Q4, 2011 to Q1, 2015)

Figure 2 – Account registration in Bangladesh (Jan-2014 to Oct-2015)

Figure 3 – Mobile money usage and registrations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Bangladesh and Pakistan

I The Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

About this report

This Technical Report was written by the following authors, contributors and reviewers:

Carol Coye Benson, Charles Niehaus, Mina Mashayekhi, Nils Clotteau, Trevor Zimmer, Bruno Antunes, Yury Grin, Peter Potgieser, Quang Nguyen, Graham Wright, Nathalie Feingold, Ashwini Sathnur, Johan Bosini, Jeremy Leach, Oksana Smirnova, Evgeniy Bondarenko

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive summary

This Report defines the Digital Financial Services ecosystem and describes the players and their roles within the Ecosystem. These players include users (consumers, businesses, government agencies and non-profit groups) who have needs for digital and interoperable financial products and services; providers (banks, other licensed financial institutions, and non-banks) who supply those products and services through digital means; the financial, technical, and other infrastructures that make them possible; and the governmental policies, laws and regulations which enable them to be delivered in an accessible, affordable, and safe manner.

The report recognizes a goal of reaching “digital liquidity” – a state wherein consumers and businesses are content to leave their funds in digital form, therefore reducing the burden of the “cash-in”, “cash-out” process. Various high-level challenges and issues in the ecosystem are acknowledged in the report: many of these are the subject of more detailed reports produced by the Focus Group. Finally, the report looks at the many products and services that comprise the DFS ecosystem.

1 Introduction

The ITU DFS Focus Group is charged with describing the overall ecosystem of digital financial services, identifying the players and within that ecosystem, and identifying the key elements necessary to make the ecosystem develop in such a manner that it encourages and enables financial inclusion policies.

1.1 What is the DFS Ecosystem?

The Digital Financial Services ecosystem consists of users (consumers, businesses, government agencies and non-profit groups) who have needs for digital and interoperable financial products and services; the providers (banks, other licensed financial institutions, and non-banks) who supply those products and services through digital means; the financial, technical, and other infrastructures that make them possible; and the governmental policies, laws and regulations which enable them to be delivered in an accessible, affordable, and safe manner.

The DFS ecosystem aims to support all people and enterprises within a country, and should support national goals including financial inclusion, economic health, and the stability and integrity of the financial systems.

1.2 The Goal of Digital Financial Services

The goal of financial services made available via digital means is to contribute to the reduction in poverty and deliver on the recognized benefits of financial inclusion in developing countries.

Financial inclusion means the sustainable provision of affordable financial services that bring the poor into the formal economy. An inclusive system includes a range of financial services that provide opportunities for accessing and moving funds, growing capital, and reducing risk. Such services may be provided by banks and other traditional financial services organizations, or by non-bank providers.

Many people have pointed out that financial inclusion is a means rather than an end. Financial inclusion contributes to the development goals of poverty reduction, economic growth and jobs, greater food security and agricultural production, women’s economic empowerment and health protection.

The financial inclusion benefits of a digital financial services ecosystem include:

• Safety and security: poor people are able to store and manage value without needing to protect cash as a physical asset.

• Speed and Transparency: given the liquidity and transactional anonymity of cash, cash payments are subject to delay, “leakage” (payments that do not reach the recipient in full), and “ghost” (fake) recipients. This is particularly true in the context of government payments. By moving to digital payments, the traceability of the payment process is improved through more stringent identification procedures, direct transfers that skip current intermediate hands, digital record-keeping, and more immediate funds transfer.

• Increased Flexibility: many poor people, particularly those in rural areas, receive part of their annual income through domestic and international remittances. They may also reach out to their social networks in times of need to obtain additional funds. At times, these monies do not arrive at all or do not arrive in time. The transfer can be costly and it is not clear to the payers that their funds will be directed to the proper purpose. Digital financial services can reduce costs and increase the coverage of remittances transfers, making remittances of small amounts viable. Moreover, digital financial systems can enable remitters to direct funds directly to savings, health, education fees, or other types of targeted accounts that ensures funds are being spent as intended. The increased flexibility of digital systems also allows the poor to pay for goods and services on lay-away, pay-as-you-go, or through other payment options that more closely match their ability to pay.

• Savings Incentives: digital technology facilitates access and interfaces to saving products. Furthermore, digital payments create the opportunity to embed poor people in a system of automatic deposits, scheduled text reminders, and positive default options that help people overcome psychological barriers to saving. Moreover, digital technologies can make available data analytics on users' financial lives and therefore increase the willingness to save.

• Credit Histories: electronic payments create records, allowing transaction histories that can support borrowing by poor consumers and merchants.

• Women’s Empowerment: evidence suggests that digital financial remittances (domestic and international) empower women within their households. The digital nature of the payment enables the recipient to keep financial transactions private, even within a family.

Digital financial services, most typically, are seen within the context of one country, using accounts denominated in that country’s currency, and institutions which are regulated by national regulators. But these services increasingly intersect, on many levels, with those of other countries, on both a regional and a global basis. It is a goal in the development of digital financial services to make sure that services are able, as and when appropriate, to efficiently and safely connect to and integrate with services in other countries.

1.3 The Digital Financial Ecosystem and Its Components

The actors and services that constitute a DFS Ecosystem depend on two fundamental support structures: an enabling environment and a solid level of infrastructure readiness.

Figure 1 – The Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

• Infrastructure Readiness consists of

– Payments Systems available for transaction between and among end users, including consumers, merchants, businesses and governments. These payments systems may be public, semi-public, or private; they may be “closed-loop” or “open-loop”. Security of payments systems is a requirement of infrastructure readiness. In addition, a certain degree of payments system interoperability among participants in payments is a necessary component of infrastructure readiness.

– Voice and Data Communication Networks to support financial messaging among end users and providers. Certain levels of communication network quality and security are a necessary component of infrastructure readiness.

– Energy Availability sufficient to support the users of a digital financial ecosystems.

– Identity Systems capable of identifying end users and their providers, and authentication systems capable of recognizing and validating these identities. Identity systems may be national ID’s, sectorial ID’s (e.g. financial industry identifiers, bank account numbers, mobile phone numbers) or private sector ID’s (e.g. WeChat or PayPal identifiers) are also important in the DFS ecosystem. Some national ID’s in particular are biometrically enabled; this is expected to become a significant part of the ecosystem.

• The Enabling Environment consists of:

– Laws and regulations implementing those laws: these include the basic permissions given to financial institutions in the countries; the authority of financial regulators, and regulation and permissions given to non-bank financial services providers. Similar law and regulation around the role of ICT providers and the authority of telecom regulators may be relevant in a country. Some countries may have specific legislation enabling or constraining eMoney or eMoney. Law and regulation pertaining to competition and consumer protections are also significant in their impact on the development of the ecosystem.

– National policies, particularly with respect to financial inclusion.

– Standards setting bodies and their standards. These bodies may be specific to one industry group (e.g. EMV) or be more broadly applicable (e.g. ITU, ISO, ANSI).

– Industry groups which act on behalf of large numbers of individual providers – these are most typically industry-specific (e.g. GSMA, Mobey Forum).

– NGO’s and Development Organizations working to implement DFS ecosystems (e.g. World Bank, CGAP, UNCAD, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.)

The Ecosystem also includes, of course, the many consumers, businesses, and governments that are involved in the use and provision of digital financial services. This includes:

• Users – this term is used to include all entities which are users of digital financial services. This includes consumers; merchants, billers, and other payments acceptors; businesses; governments; and non-profit agencies. These groups can be collectively thought of as “consumers” of digital financial services.

• DFS Providers – this term is used to include all entities which provide digital financial services to end users. It includes both so-called traditional financial services providers (banks, savings institutions, credit unions, and other chartered financial institutions) and other entities, which may include eMoney operators, postal authorities, and a variety of different commercial providers. These other entities are collectively referred to here as “non-bank providers”. The ability of non-banks to act as DFS providers is constrained by national law and regulation.

• DFS Providers Support Services – this term is used to include all entities which provide services to DFS providers. This includes processors, platform providers, and a wide range of software and hardware (e.g. terminals, ATM’s) providers. It also includes agents (who may work on behalf of either bank providers or non-bank providers), and are an important component of the digital financial services ecosystem.

A note on providers: any given company or organization active in the digital financial services ecosystem may play multiple roles. For example, an eMoney operator may be both a provider of data and voice services (in “infrastructure readiness”) and a direct DFS provider. A card network may be both a provider of a payment system (again, in “infrastructure readiness”) and a DFS Support Service provider.

The end users and providers of the digital financial ecosystem meet in the provision and use of the actual digital financial services: these services then support the use cases within the ecosystem.

The end users and providers of the digital financial ecosystem meet in the provision and use of the actual digital financial services: these services then support the use cases within the ecosystem.

Digital Financial Services include:

• Transaction Accounts for the safe keeping of funds: these include both bank accounts and eMoney accounts. Deposits into a bank account create a liability by the bank to the account holder: this liability is often guaranteed or insured by government agencies. Deposits into an eMoney account (by definition from a non-bank provider) create a liability by the provider to the account holder: this liability is usually covered by a regulatory requirement that the provider hold funds, in aggregate, in an escrow or trust account at a bank. eMoney accounts and bank accounts are both considered “Transaction Accounts” within the ecosystem.

• Payments Services: the ability to transfer money into or out of an account: this may be done through a variety of different payments systems and providers. Remittances, transfers, merchant payments, bill payments, etc. are all examples of payments. Payments may be domestic or cross-border. For the purpose of this report, we concentrate on digital payments: payments initiated or processed electronically, rather than by paper. Bank ACH and RTGS systems, eMoney transfers, and card payments are considered to be digital payments.

• Savings Accounts: services designed to allow consumers to set aside some funds in storage for intended later use. Savings products typically offer some type of interest rate or return. Some savings services have shared or club-like characteristics.

• Investment Services designed to allow consumers or businesses to invest for future financial return.

• Loans: this term encompasses a broad variety of services to extend credit to consumers or businesses. Micro-finance, secured and unsecured lending, and mortgage financing are all included.

• Insurance Services: this term encompasses a broad variety of services to enable consumers and businesses to protect lives and assets.

Use Cases are the situations in which consumers and businesses consume or require digital financial services. A given use case cases may be satisfied by a variety of different digital financial services. Many use cases have two end users: for example, in a “paying bills” use case, both the consumer or business paying the bill, and the biller receiving the payment, are involved. Use cases include:

• Storing Funds – the need to keep funds safely.

• Paying for Purchases – the ability to pay for goods and services purchased: the purchase may be done either locally (“face to face”) or remotely.

• Paying Bills – the ability to pay for services delivered upon receipt of a bill.

• Sending or Receiving funds – the ability to transfer funds to and receive funds from another end user (person or business).

• Borrowing – the ability to borrow funds for later repayment.

• Saving and Investing – the ability to have a short term liquid to semi liquid investment such as an eMoney account, savings account or group savings, and the ability to invest funds for future financial return.

• Insuring Assets – the ability to insure lives or assets.

• Trading – the ability to participate in international trade through the use of digital financial services

1.4 The Evolution of the DFS Ecosystem

The root of the development of the digital financial services ecosystem is, of course, the rapid and wide-spread adoption of mobile phones. In virtually every country, this has created a base of capability among consumers, including the most poor consumers and small businesses, to transact and interact electronically. The equally rapid spread of the phenomenon of “mobile top ups” – the ability to convert cash into airtime minutes – created a second important capability in the eventual development of what is known as eMoney.

In a well-known story, some developing countries allowed non-bank providers, often MNO’s, to create transaction accounts allowing their subscribers to store funds in these accounts, and make transfers to other subscribers. These became “closed-loop” payments systems, and the general model is often referred to as a “non-bank led model”. The primary weakness of these systems has been a lack of interoperability: the subscriber to one system could not pay to the subscriber of another system.

In other countries, regulators chose to support banks as the primary provider of digital financial services. In these countries, either existing or newly formed payments networks, available to banks and, in some cases, their partners, form the platforms on which these providers can deliver services to their customers. In several countries, regulators have tried to achieve financial inclusion goals by broadening the set of providers who are allowed to access these payments networks, either directly or through bank partners. These systems are generally considered to be “open-loop” systems, and the general model is often referred to as a “bank-led model”. The primary weakness of the “bank-led” model has been adoption among the poor of the country.

Both models, when looked at from a financial inclusion perspective, share a common problem: that funds put into these transaction accounts are not left there, but rather withdrawn to cash almost immediately. An ecosystem dependent on networks of agents, branches or ATM’s to support “cash-out” and “cash-in” has obvious problems with costs and with the management of this infrastructure.

The idea of a post-cash state of “digital liquidity” has obvious appeal. Consumers and businesses would leave their funds in electronic form, rather than “cashing out”. What would it take for the ecosystem to evolve to this state? Four principle drivers are commonly recognized. Each of these is the subject of more detailed reports from this ITU Focus Group.

• The delivery of “bulk payments” – either G2P (Government to Person) or B2P (Business to Person) into digital wallets (transaction accounts managed by mobile devices) is seen as a critical enabler for consumer adoption of wallets. Bulk payments can not only deliver funds immediately into digital wallets, but they can also improve the odds that the recipient will get their full intended payment.

• The enablement of merchant services – or, more broadly stated, payments acceptors – to receive payments out of digital wallets is seen as the most important feature in eventually reducing dependency on “cash-out”. People will be more willing to leave funds in a digital wallet if they are able to use these funds as they currently use cash.

• The development of interoperability among providers of transaction accounts is seen as the key capability to enable “ubiquity” – the ability of any one payer (consumer or government or business) to make payment to any receiver, regardless of who is providing the transaction account for that receiver.

• The delivery of additional financial services, such as savings, lending, and investing, through connection to the digital wallet is seen as the key to realizing many of the longer term objectives of financial inclusion. Consumers and small merchants who are able to safely save and invest money, and borrow to support short or long term needs, are more able to stabilize their financial lives and avoid many of the perils experienced in an all-cash economy.

Just as different countries have chosen different early models for digital financial services to support (many developed at a grass roots level), countries will also see different pathways to a full deployment of these services. However, we expect to see increased regional or global coordination on policy issues connected with the ecosystem, which may lead to more convergence among countries on supported models and systems.

1.5 Issues and Challenges in the Ecosystem

Not surprisingly, regulators, providers, and the wide range of parties working to implement and enable the digital financial services ecosystem are dealing with complex issues. Many of these issues are the subject of separate reports from this ITU Focus Group.

• Who should be permitted to be a provider of digital financial services, and how should this be regulated? Although this is often thought of as a question of banks versus telecommunications companies, in fact many other types of entities are either currently or potentially supply digital financial services – including, as one example, social networks. Should regulation be done on a functional basis or by type of provider? What is the regulatory capacity within a country to support additional provider categories?

• What are the business models for digital financial services among providers? Are the business models used in pilot and early launch sufficient to support a scale implementation of the ecosystem? Are transactional costs well understood? What types of systemic controls used in legacy service models (for example, interchange in bank payments systems, or retail price regulation in telecommunications services) are appropriate for new services? Are business models dependent on elements of the ecosystem that may disappear over time – such as “cash-out” fees? What is the role of government as a provider of digital financial services? As a user of the same services? Are the necessary infrastructure investments being made?

• How should national (or industry specific) identity systems be used by the digital financial services ecosystem? Will emerging biometric-based identity systems be sufficient to change the current costs of “KYC” (know your customer) processes for providers?

• How will consumers be protected from abuse by providers and/or other end users? How should this be regulated? How can consumer protection be accomplished without adding costs to the ecosystem that make services too expensive for consumers to use?

• How will the ecosystem balance the need to protect consumer (and merchant) data privacy needs against the value the data may have in helping to support the costs of the ecosystem?

• How should digital financial services providers – and their support services providers – manage the risks in the ecosystem? How should “best practices” be communicated and assimilated? How should this be regulated?

• What standards of quality of service should providers be held to? How should this be defined and regulated?

• Rapidly changing technology presents risks and opportunities within the ecosystem. This includes changes in mobile handset capability, vendor platform capabilities, and changes in the underlying communications networks. How can providers, support services providers, and regulators understand the impact of these changing technologies?

• How aligned to regional or global standards should digital financial services providers be?

• Should digital financial services providers be required to use regional or global standards for payments messaging? Is this necessary in order to conduct cross-border financial services in an efficient and safe manner? How should this be regulated?

• How should the digital financial ecosystem work to improve financial literacy among consumers and small businesses? To what extent is this a government function or a commercial function?

An important over-arching issue in the development of the DFS ecosystem is the need invest in and manage two sides of the eco-system at once. Practically, this means both supporting initiatives to load electronic money into consumer transaction accounts – principally through bulk, or G2P payments and initiatives to enable consumers to spend this money in electronic form, rather than cashing out – principally through the enablement of merchant electronic payment acceptance. Neither initiative can be successful without the other: consumers who accept electronic money will simply “cash-out” if they can’t spend it electronically, thus perpetuating the costly cash management problem of agents. Merchants, on the other hand, won’t accept electronic payments unless there is a significant number of consumers who are ready to make them. Solving this problem is sometimes referred to as reaching a state of “digital liquidity”.

Figure 2 – Reaching Digital Liquidity

2 Products, Services and Use Cases

2.1 Requirements

Products and services in the digital financial ecosystem are delivered to users to satisfy their needs in the use cases described above. All of these systems have to meet the requirements of users. Across the spectrum of consumers, businesses, governments, and other entities that use the digital financial ecosystem, the following high-level user requirements are noted[1].

2.2 Products and Services

Figure 3 – Products and Services

Secure: people need to trust that money held in a digital transaction account is secure, and have assurance that money will go only to the designated recipient, with a record of the transaction.

Affordable: the cost to use the system must be very low. To actually replace the use of cash, the cost to the consumer (as well as to the merchants) will need to be close to zero.

Convenient: the system needs to have accessibility and to be easy to sign up for and to use. Many poor people do not have the identity documents usually required to create financial accounts. The system has to be understood by prospective users with limited or no mediation.

Open: the system needs to be able to reach many (ideally all) counter parties for both making and receiving payments. It should not require special, costly, or time-delayed accommodations. It should make it easy for an individual to integrate into multiple financial systems of the country—including to those systems utilized by higher-income earners.

Robust: a digital payment system needs to have high performance and to satisfy user’s needs. It needs to be available for use as needed, like cash. As the number of participants (and their usage volume) grows, availability should remain high and be able to handle peak volumes without an interruption in service

2.2.1 Transaction Accounts

Users, including consumers and merchants, have a requirement to store their funds safely. Today, poor consumers and merchants in developing countries do this largely through holding cash. Alternative include eMoney wallets, from non-bank providers, or bank accounts. eMoney wallets have been successful in reaching consumers who have not been able to access transaction accounts from bank providers.

2.2.1.1 What is eMoney?

Before defining the details of the respective products and services features and functionality, it is useful to understand the broader eMoney platform in context of where it sits in the traditional banking ecosystem. There is often a misconception as to where the value actually resides (i.e. is it similar to physical cash in a wallet or closer to electronic cash in a savings account at a financial institution).

• eMoney is a liability of an eMoney provider (sometimes called Issuer), who records a value against a transaction account ledger they keep for the depositor. Deposits can either be made in cash (typically through an agent), or by receipt of a transfer from another consumer, business, or government entity. The eMoney provider typically uses a software platform from a support services provider to account for the ledger balances.

• Regulation requires the eMoney provider keep the entire value of accounts on their ledger on deposit in an aggregated account at one or more commercial banks. This account is often structured as a trust account. The total in the trust account must always equal the total on the eMoney provider’s ledgers of customer balances.

eMoney, in one sense, is similar to money in a bank account, in that it represents a liability of the provider to the account holder. Funds held in banks, of course, are typically protected by some form of government insurance, and banks are allowed to lend or otherwise invest a certain amount of balances held on account. Funds held with an eMoney provider do not typically have the same types of government insurance, but they are “100 percent reserved” through the funds held in deposit at the trust bank or banks.

2.2.1.2 Description

A transaction account is an individual account hosted by a DFS services provider (either a MNO, a bank or some other type of provider permitted to do so by regulation). The term “digital wallet” or “mobile wallet” is generally used to refer to a transaction account that is primarily accessed through a mobile device. A transaction account typically allows deposits and withdrawals in cash (discussed below in “Cash-in”, “cash-out”. Prepaid cards may act as transaction accounts in some markets.

2.2.1.3 Attributes

Product attributes for transaction accounts accessed through digital devices include the following:

• Safety (access is through unique PIN code)

• Security (actual store of value ledger is registered on a secure platform, accesses through the handset)

• Speed (balances and transaction occur in real-time)

• Convenience (accessed through the handset)

2.2.1.4 Business Model

The various providers of transaction accounts have different business models. Notably, eMoney wallets and bank accounts have different business models. Banks have a multidimensional business model based, for example, on intermediation of deposits, cross-selling of loans and several fees. For example, banks are sometimes allowed to charge a monthly service fee for banking accounts (depending on regulation, product and segment). An MNO acting as an eMoney wallet provider may have a simpler business model, which will often depend on fees generated through Cash-in and/or Cash-out transactions. An eMoney wallet provider’s business model may also vary depending on whether the MNO is directly licensed or set up as a subsidiary.

The business model is often driven by the lead institutions broader strategy:

• MNO led models: A large percentage of airtime in the emerging markets is pre-paid and sold through third parties. MNO’s thus have a challenge as attrition rates are high and cost of distribution via the third party airtime resellers is also high. An eMoney account adds an element of “stickiness” to the client relationship, solving a portion of the attrition challenge. An eMoney account also enables the MNO to sell pre-paid airtime directly to the consumer, thus eliminating the commission cost associated with distribution through third parties. Traditionally MNO led models have been seen as a loss leader for the their core businesses. As the industry matures, although depending on its structure and licensing arrangements, regulation and management pressures may lead to standalone business units to be formed within the MNO’s. eMoney businesses are therefore becoming standalone profit centers within the MNOs.

• Bank-led models: In some markets regulation has forced bank-led models. From a business perspective, eMoney platforms and associated accounts are often seen by banks as a low-cost hosting alternative to their traditional banking platforms introducing a low cost product “lite” solution to reach the lower end of the market. eMoney accounts are thus seen as an onboarding product by banks.

Independent Models: Independents do not traditionally have the brand and reach which MNO’s and banks have and have generally approached the market by using mobile to compete with existing paper-based remittance products at a domestic level. They vary in their business model with some offering accounts and others offering over the counter money transfer services.

2.2.1.5 Best Practices

The following areas have been identified as best practices for digital wallet providers[2]:

• Overcoming logistics and delivery challenges – a lack of infrastructure creates logistical challenges for agent and cash management. Leveraging local partnerships, flexible agent financing, and smarter transactional data analysis are enabling providers to address these challenges.

• Identifying and communicating a compelling value proposition – understanding the nuances of how consumers earn, save, and spend their money can help providers develop a relevant value proposition.

• Creating a user-friendly service and accessible interface – as poor customers tend to have lower financial and technical literacy levels, the service will require a user-friendly interface to enable access. While technologies such as IVR can be useful for reaching illiterate users, greater investment in customer education and increased “touch points” are also proving successful as a means of on-boarding customers

• Finding solutions to the lack of formal identification documents – the absence of compulsory population registration and identification is a common barrier to wide-scale adoption of digital wallets. In most markets, regulation plays an important role; solutions such as tiered KYC and adjusting acceptable KYC documentation can help providers facilitate customer adoption and increase the success of financial inclusion initiatives.

Current offerings and the Future of Money Accounts

Current offerings are primarily limited to a temporary store of value and over the counter transactions. As the industry matures deeper and richer offerings beyond a basic store of value for the eMoney account will emerge. Money accounts may potentially become closer to traditional bank accounts but could also have nimble and bespoke product features which banks have traditionally struggled with.

2.2.1.6 The CICO Problem: Cash-In and Cash-Out Services

Cash-In and Cash-Out (CICO) services represent both a critical enabling element of the digital financial services ecosystem and a current and long-term problem. As an enabling element, CICO is simply necessary in order to deal with consumers who have cash on hand, and want to use a digital wallet to send the funds to someone else, and to deal consumers who receive electronic credit into a wallet and need to get cash to use. CICO often goes hand in hand with a Person to Person (P2P) transfer, where consumers would Cash In (CI) at an agent, perform a P2P transfer and the recipient performs a Cash Out (CO) at another agent.

The short term problem – often quite severe – is dealing with the liquidity and cash management needs of agents, who at any point in time may have too much or not enough cash on hand to support their business. The long term problem is an economic one: since many providers build their part of their digital wallet business model on cash-out fees, a successful transition to “digital liquidity” (when a consumer leaves funds in their wallet to be spent electronically) would present serious challenges to this model.

In some countries, “Super Agents” or “Master Agents” may be responsible for a set of underlying agents. There are a variety of models within countries for agent regulation. In some countries, agents (or their “Master Agents) are exclusive to one provider (bank or non-bank): in other countries, agents are permitted by providers (and/or required by regulation) to support multiple providers. This can be accomplished either by the agent enrolling and registering with each provider independently, or by some type of agent interoperability system, possibly provided by the “Master Agent”.

Note that in bank-led models, the CICO function is provided primarily by bank branches and by ATM’s. Bank-led models deployed to accomplish goals of financial inclusion normally have agent relationships (and economics) which are similar to those of non-banks.

2.2.1.7 Description

A cash-in transaction requires an eMoney account holder to deposit physical cash at a participating agent of their joint scheme. The agent accepts the cash and transfers e-money to the user’s eMoney account (i.e. mPesa account at an mPesa agent). A cash-out transaction requires an eMoney account holder to transfer e-money to a participating agent of their joint scheme, The agent receives the e-value and gives the user physical cash.

Cash-In and Cash-Out transactions therefore don’t change the total monetary value held on the eMoney provider’s platform (and in the bank trust account), they merely change the ownership of eMoney and physical cash between users and agents of the providers.

Attributes of successful CICO models include: safety (all transactions are PIN based); speed (transaction take place in real-time) and convenience (agent distribution is widespread).

2.2.1.8 Business Model

To attract funds into the system depositing users do not pay to deposit. Similarly, agents are incentivized by DFS providers to attract funds into the system by earning commissions for cash-in transactions. To withdraw funds from the system, users pay a fee to withdraw cash. Agents also earn commissions for cash-out transactions. Therefore, the business model leans towards users performing cash-out transactions funding the bulk of the ecosystem.

2.2.1.9 Best Practices

Agent management is a critical success factor for the CICO service to perform optimally. Factors which contribute to a successful agent management include the following, which should aim to expand and consolidate efficient, effective and trusted networks:

• agent selection and recruitment;

• agent training;

• agent incentives;

• agent liquidity management;

• agent monitoring.

2.2.1.10 Current offering and the future of CICO

• Current business models incentivize CO transactions – thus countering the long term ambition to keep cash digital

• Agents have potential working capital constraints when making trade-off decisions between allocating cash to eMoney (for cash-in transactions), keeping physical cash on hand (for cash-out transactions) or allocating the cash to purchase other goods which may turn a higher profit leading to liquidity challenges

• Providers have aggressively competed on rolling out agent networks and pricing competition has led to reduction in agent commissions

• Competition and pricing pressure may lead to situations where agents may not see value in CICO transactions

• As bulk payment matures the funding side may potentially replace a large portion of the current over the counter cash-in transactions

• As merchant payment matures and a merchant payment business model is defined the cash-out transactions may be cannibalized. There may however be arbitrage issues where agents could encourage cash-out transactions (and exchange the cash for goods) instead of merchant payment transactions as they earn a higher margin from cash-out than they might from merchant payments.

2.2.2 Payments Services

A wide range of payments services are provided to users of the digital financial services ecosystem. These services are almost all bi-party: that is, there is both a sender and a receiver of funds, and the transaction account of each party needs to support the payments processes necessary to accommodate these transactions.

Note that two areas of payments services, of particular importance to the development of the DFS, are described in separate reports from this Focus Group and therefore are not described in detail in this report. These areas are merchant payments (including all forms of commercial payments acceptance such as bill payment) and bulk payments.

2.2.2.1 Domestic Transfers (Remittances)

A domestic digital funds transfer is the exchange of funds from one user to another through a DFS provider using electronic means, including a mobile handset, to either initiate and/or complete the transaction.

A digital funds transfer competes with traditional money transfers services, which are performed in various regulated and unregulated ways. The regulated environment includes licenced money transfer companies such as banks and post offices, the unregulated environment includes both unstructured and structured personal cash-transport services: in some parts of the world, these structured services are referred to as “hawala”. The advent of eMoney accounts has enabled efficiencies to be gained against these traditional streams as cash can be digitised through an agent of a trusted service provider, sent instantly across vast distances, and immediately cashed out at another agent of the trusted service provider. Product attributes include security (all transfers are PIN based, initiated by the sender) and convenience (transactions happen in real-time).

The business model of the domestic transfer provider is a “send” fee to the sending consumer. The business model is tightly coupled to that of the underlying digital wallet and CICO services.

Cash-to-Mobile transfers are often referred to as “Over the Counter” (OTC). In this transfer, a user sends funds from an agent (by giving the agent cash) which is then credited to a recipient mobile subscriber. Much like Mobile-to-Mobile transfers, receivers are alerted through their mobile handset of an incoming funds transfer. The transaction happens in real time with the recipient eMoney account receiving the credit.

Mobile-to-Cash Transfers: value is sent from an eMoney account to a recipient who is not on the same network. The receiver would be alerted via SMS on its handset of an incoming funds transfer. Funds have to be collected from an agent of the sender. Much like Cash-to-Mobile Transfers presented above, the Mobile-to-Cash Transfers rely on the receiving party`s ability to have easier access to the relevant agents.

Interoperable Mobile-to-Mobile transfers: as the industry matures, interoperability between different service providers is becoming a reality. In this transaction the sender sends eMoney from their eMoney account to a recipient who could have an eMoney account at another service provider or potentially a bank. The business model for these transfers is typically based on the sender paying for the transaction, and the receiver paying a fee if they cash-out or perform further transactions. This is offset by fees paid to agents by providers. Interoperability business models are being developed. Although the trend seems to point to sender paying models, these can range from copying an ATM carriage fee (sender pays) model, to a surcharge (sender pays) model, to an interchange model where the receiving institution pays the sending institution and the sender or receiver do not pay any extra for off-us transactions.

Best Practices include having the transactions be credited to the receiver in real time. An emerging best practice is account verification, so that the sender sees a real-time message “Do you mean to send money to [Name]?” before finalizing the transaction: this reduces errors and resulting inquiries and disputes.

2.2.2.2 International Transfers (Remittances)

A transfer sent from a consumer in one country to a consumer in a second country. As these transactions are normally cross-currency as well, the transaction requires someone – either the sending or receiving party, or the providers who are serving them, to effect the currency exchange.

Traditional models for sending cross-border remittances include money transfer services, many of which are specific to certain corridors (pairs of countries); banks, and structured cash transfer “hawala” style services. The advent of eMoney accounts has resulted in a number of experiments with using to the wallets to either receive or, in some cases, send cross-border remittances.

Many DFS Service Providers have built partnerships with the traditional international remittance operators such as Western Union and MoneyGram. This model requires the sender to transfer from a developed market through the provider’s existing process, with the recipient receiving their funds directly onto their eMoney account. The recipient would then cash-out through their local agent.

Cross border remittances have started between regional DFS operators with agreements being announced in West and East Africa. The nature of these agreements are still bilateral and either occur in a cross border “on-us” environment (i.e. from a provider’s company in one country to the same provider’s company in a second country) or in an “off-us” environment.

The cross border environment faces many regulatory challenges including issues such as Exchange Controls licensing, varying AML and KYC policies and central bank policies around clearing and settlement.

Product attributes include convenience, immediacy, and potentially lower costs.

2.2.3 Bulk Payments

This term refers to payments made to multiple recipients. Typically, these are government payments (benefits, cash transfers, salaries), donor payments or payroll payments. Bulk payments are a critical enabling component of the DFS Ecosystem and are the subject of a separate report from this ITU Focus Group.

2.2.4 Merchant Payments

This term refers to payments made to merchants or other payments acceptors (such as billers or governments) for purchases. These payments may be made in person (POS or “proximity payments) or remotely (eCommerce or “mobile” payments. Merchant payments are a critical enabling component of the DFS Ecosystem and are the subject of a separate report from this ITU Focus Group.

2.2.5 Savings Accounts

2.2.5.1 Description

Digital savings products can broadly be defined into two product groups, individual savings and group savings.

2.2.5.1.1 Individual Savings

Individual savings products tend to satisfy two overlapping needs on the part of consumers. One is for a return (interest) on money that is being held. The other is segregation of funds (away from the “everyday spend” of the transaction account) for short term money management. Saved funds may be either earmarked for specific purposes (school funds, the purchase of a bicycle) or be for more general needs (saving for emergencies).

Products in this space may create a partition in the eMoney account to keep a certain amount of funds liquid for daily use and the specific needs are stored in less liquid “partitions” to be released separately when the consumer requires it. Other providers may create separate savings accounts. Some providers create bundled products such as savings and credit combined where the savings sometimes forms part of the security for the loan product.

2.2.5.1.2 Group Savings

DFS providers have designed products to facilitate group savings schemes. These schemes copy many “club savings” products popular in the developed world, where a group of people contribute to a “pool” and that pool is distributed by lottery or formula. In the digital world, the group’s cash is stored on the eMoney platform, which will release the funds to an individual once a set of conditions are met (e.g. three individual PIN’s are entered) to release funds and individuals in the group receive SMS notification when transactions happen.

From a business case perspective DFS providers see savings products as a tool to build balances in the eMoney ecosystem and ultimately earn revenue from transactions generated off the digital wallets.

Current mobile savings products are still in the early phase of the evolution of DFS. Since inception transactions have been nuanced towards over the counter money transfer transactions but indications are that savings products are starting to gain traction.

The advent of interest bearing products and sophisticated technology enabling deferred savings products will potentially drive the uptake of mobile savings accounts. A very important regulatory decision will be to consider whether or not eMoney issuers will be able to lend against balances kept in digital wallets.

2.2.6 Loans

2.2.6.1 Description

2.2.6.1.1 Secured Loans

A form of secured loans that is common across emerging markets is Airtime Credit. Service Providers give users access to Airtime (typically a negative balance on the account) to be paid back when they top-up with Airtime again. The “loan” is thus for airtime and not redeemable for cash. The security is any future airtime purchase and risk models are based up airtime purchase behavior.

More recently cash loans are being offered by DFS providers through banking partnerships. In these models there is often a joint savings and credit account and the loan is secured against a user’s savings. As the models mature they evolve to unsecured lending products. MShwari in Kenya is potentially the most publicized example of this, which is a joint venture between Safaricom and Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA).

2.2.6.1.2 Unsecured Loans

Unsecured loans have been launched more recently in a variety of markets – offering customers’ access to credit with no direct recourse for non-payment. Typically the loan provider will score customers using alternative data sourced from the MNO directly or through other means.

The credit decisions are based on data gathered from entities that collect mobile user data through smartphone apps to build risk models or using MNO GSM and eMoney account data to build dynamic risk models to lend to unbanked customers into their eMoney account. In this model interfaces can be for example USSD to ensure inclusion and all loans have a risk based pricing methodology through rewarding good repayment with lower prices and higher loan sizes. Loans are advanced to key participants in the eMoney Ecosystem: agents, merchant and consumers.

2.2.6.1.3 Merchant Loans

An important part of the emerging DFS ecosystem is the provision of credit to small and medium merchants – many of whom have not had previous access to formal credit. Often, these loans are based on information the provider has from seeing the flow of sales transactions handled through the provider. In some instances, the revenue from loans is sufficient to enable very low cost payments transaction fees to the merchant.

2.2.6.2 Attributes

In emerging markets the providers are often not solving a price problem but rather an access and distribution problem as the majority of the population is excluded from the traditional lending sectors. Digital Financial Services allows these segments access to convenient and simple products. Successful products have the attributes of convenience (products are accessed through the handset, no need for branch visits and paperwork), and accessibility (loans paid to eMoney account and for immediate use).

2.2.6.3 Business Model

Different business models exist:

2.2.6.3.1 Direct to consumer

In this case a lender will approach customers directly, gather information and make a credit risk assessment to lend or not. Distribution is often a problem in this model and the cost of processing and verifying information is important. The provider is not incentivized to process small loan sizes. In addition as this is stand-alone there is no integration to the eMoney account for collections translating to significantly higher risk, which typically reduces the provider from being able to take scale risk.

2.2.6.3.2 Two-Way partnerships

In this model a lender partners with a DFS provider as a distribution partner to leverage the data and eMoney eco-system. The DFS provider provides the user and the lender providers the credit scoring, administration, needed regulatory approvals and importantly the capital. The network is looking for a value added service to drive eMoney liquidity and transactions; the lender is looking for distribution at a low cost. Typically the lender will share revenue, profit or fees with the eMoney service provider to remain aligned.

2.2.6.3.3 Three Way Partnerships or service providers

In this scenario a 3rd party expert will approach an MNO and provide insights into their data using it to build a credit scorecard and intelligence. With this they would then approach a bank to provide the financial services products. The financial service provider will then share profits or fees with both the eMoney service provider and the 3rd party provider. The challenge with this model is getting three parties to agree on a common objective and execution approach.

2.2.6.4 Best Practices

Best practices are still being established in this space, with many iterations outside of these examples being tried and tested in South East Asia, Africa and Latin America. As with all examples, the most likely to succeed and drive real value and scale will be those with collaboration between the MNO, the lender and the regulator.

2.2.6.5 Microfinance

Microfinance is a specialized form of lending with a long history (pre-dating eMoney accounts). Although an important part of the ecosystem, it remains relatively distinct from the eMoney account and the emerging services built from that. There is an important intersection in the use of digital wallets by microfinance providers to disburse loans and/or collect payments from loans. Microfinance providers have traditionally had many challenges in disbursement and more often collection of repayments of loans. eMoney accounts potentially solve some of these pain points but to date have not garnered momentum outside of the key DFS markets. Indications are that MFI’s have refined their collection models and only migrate to integrations with DFS once there is a certain level of DFS ubiquity in a market. Criticism of microfinance suggested that it was used more for consumption than investment and that it could cause moral hazard leading to oversupply of lending to non-creditworthy clients and therefore to over indebtedness. The provision of microfinance through the DFS ecosystem could potentially amplify this effect. Still, there are needs for financial services that are adequately addressed through microfinance services, especially since they evolved from narrower microcredit services, and this positive effect is also augmented by the DFS ecosystem. This debate underlines the importance of an adequate regulatory and institutional framework for digital financial services[3].

2.2.6.6 International trade

The participation in international trade through the use of digital financial services will not be thoroughly analyzed in the context of this report. Notwithstanding, it is relevant to mention how the combined use of several digital financial services facilitates engaging in international trade and thereby it promoted access to trade-related development benefits.

For example, in China the e-commerce company Alibaba opted to establish its own e-payment system, which soon expanded to banking, investment and clearing house for cross border merchandise trade. The company developed a network of affiliated financial entities that enabled business-to-consumer services. One of these entities, Alipay, had in 2013 approximately 300 million users of its online and mobile payment services. This underlines how digital financial services can provide the right ecosystem for the provision of financial services. It also enabled crowd funding initiatives by facilitating contributions from a large number of people. Alibaba's platform allowed e-commerce activities by integrating consumers, manufacturers, custom clearing, transport and several financial services such as credit, foreign exchange and insurance[4].

Digital financial services also facilitate the role of international trade in support rural development by reducing physical and economic barriers to financial inclusion. Small farmers in rural areas benefit greatly from enhanced connectivity to financial services, to reach clients and providers and to obtain updated price information on their products. Access to mobile savings and credit services can allow small farmers to purchase the necessary inputs for their agricultural activities. In addition, mobile credit and insurance services can enable their connection to markets and ultimately alleviate poverty in rural areas.

The introduction of a mobile wallet system in Nigeria increased agricultural productivity in the country, which was previously declining. Smallholder farmers depend on subsidized fertilizer, but often this would not reach beneficiaries. This was addressed by the introduction of mobile technology to transfer fertilizer subsidies directly to farmers, removing the Government from the role of procuring and distributing fertilizer. The transfer system relies on a database with more than 10.5 million farmers who are subsidy recipients, which allows them to have access to formal or regulated financial services. The system is expanding for digital identification systems and biometric signatures, increasing rural financial inclusion[5].

While growing e-commerce creates significant opportunities, lack of security and trust remain barriers to international trade transactions in the DFS ecosystem. Online fraud and data breaches require adequate legal and regulatory measures, including aligning laws for e-transactions; streamlining consumer protection policies, data protection and cybercrime laws; strengthening the capacity of policymakers and enforcement authorities; and enhancing the awareness of consumers and companies[6]. The focus area on fraud on this report will develop some of these issues.

2.2.7 Investment Services

2.2.7.1 Current and future investment products

Investments (defined as investments into financial products such as stocks, unit trusts, ETF’s etc.) in the DFS space have to date not gained much traction. Some DFS operators are starting to investigate medium to long term savings plans linked to money market accounts but very few have implemented anything.

Some of the contributing factors to the immaturity of this product offering is potentially a combination of demand and supply side factors, these include:

• lack of surplus funds for investments at the Bottom of Pyramid

• lack of an investment for retirement culture

• lack of understanding of financial products

• over sophistication of the investment industry

• cost and fee structures in the investment industry

• rouge investment advisors

• lack of regulation in the emerging markets

• limited product offerings in the emerging markets for low value investments

• limited liquidity in emerging market stock exchanges

As the industry matures and a deeper offering develops then investments will potentially emerge as a tool to greater financial health. In particular, the use of various crowd-funding platforms to raise funds for smaller merchants is a topic that will be interesting to watch.

2.2.8 Insurance Services

2.2.8.1 Description

Mobile insurance is insurance whose sale and/or administration and payment is facilitated by a mobile phone. Insurance products are aimed at protecting individuals or families from a variety of risks such as illness, death, crop failures and accidents. The growth in mobile handsets and associated distribution benefits accompanying them has enabled insurance firms to design applicable micro insurance products and reach customers at the Bottom of the Pyramid.

Products currently focus on health (such as hospital plans) and life (death cover). Interesting agro-insurance products which protect small scale farmers against drought and excessive rainfalls have also been developed.

Premium collection models vary with some MNOs using eMoney to collect premiums and others deducting premiums from customers’ purchased airtime. In some instances insurance is provided as a reward for purchasing a specific amount of airtime and in others insurance is being offered as part of a loyalty value proposition.

At the end of 2014, the GSMA reported that there were 100 live mobile insurance services globally, and as of June 2014, the industry had issued 17 million policies and was growing fast.

2.2.8.2 Attributes

Product attributes for mobile insurance include:

• Scale (or at least the potential for significant scale through mobile)

• Typically low value simple products (reflecting the low touch model)

• Convenience (access through the mobile infrastructure)

2.2.8.3 Business Model

The business model for mobile micro insurance products is similar to the traditional value chain and broken down as follows:

• Reinsurer, Insurer (risk carrier): designs appropriate products and pricing based on market and risk assessment, takes a share of risk and premium to cover claims as well as profit margin

• Administrator / Technical service provider: earns commission or administration fee and in some cases a share of profit for claims processing

• Aggregator e.g. MNO: mainly performs sales and client reach functions, earns commission and depending on commercial agreements a share of profit.

Best Practices

The following seven points illustrate some of the keys to the success of these offerings[7]:

• A captive, large market and strong brand

• Simplified product design and processes

• Focus on both quality and quantity

• Offer multiple types of insurance cover to customers

• Build with loyalty models, then upsell with suitable payment mechanisms

• Mix digital sales with high-touch sales

• Enabling regulatory environment

II Regulation in the Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

About this report

This Technical Report was written by the following authors, contributors and reviewers:

Cecily Northup, Carol Coye Benson, Leon Perlman, Thomas Lammer, Sacha Polverini, Paul Shoust, Mariachiara Malaguti, Kathryn Imboden, Jami Solli, Marusa Vasconcelos Freire, Ashwini Sathnur, Ivo Jenik, Kennedy Komba, Ivan Ssettimba, Abdul N. Musoke, Md Rashed, Simone di Castri, Nathalie Feingold, Members of the Interoperability Working Group, Members of the Consumer Protection Working Group and Members of the DFS Ecosystem Working Group.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Regulations may enable or thwart a healthy digital financial services ecosystem and therefore the potential to realize the goals of financial inclusion. Moreover, given the complexity of the DFS regulatory environment, it remains imperative that the two sector authorities involved in these efforts – financial services and telecommunication – collaborate to address these issues. As a result, the DFS Ecosystem working group drafted ‘Regulation in the DFS Ecosystem’ paper.

This paper outlines the categories of regulation, defines the corresponding sub-issues or topics and highlights the financial inclusion of each topic. Key categories include

1) agents,

2) consumer protection,

3) market access,

4) payments systems,

5) risk management and

6) other related issues.

This paper also addresses key issues related to managing the regulatory environment. It outlines a survey of how regulators currently work together, provide a draft memorandum of understanding template for Authorities in a given country to formally outline joint goals and methods of working together, and outline considerations if regulators are interested in formalizing cross-border collaborations.

1 Introduction

The Ecosystem Working Group of the ITU DFS Focus Group was tasked with providing a comprehensive listing of the regulatory issues in the ecosystem. This is a very important part of the ecosystem, as regulations may enable or thwart a healthy digital financial services ecosystem and therefore the potential to realize the goals of financial inclusion.

This report categorizes the issues and highlights the financial inclusion perspectives of each topic. The group also considered the issues of managing the regulatory environment, particularly given the intersecting domains of financial and telecommunications regulation.

Note that the interconnections and effects of one regulation on another were considered outside of scope but should be considered within a country context. Furthermore, the effects of specific country contexts or conditions were not considered in this report.

2 Categories of Regulation

We have categorized regulations related to digital financial services and financial inclusion across 6 categories, including: Agents, Consumer Protection, Market Access, Payment Systems, Risk Management, Other.

2.1 Category 1: Agents

• Governing agent exclusivity (across all digital financial service providers)

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: exclusivity may create barriers to access, vis-à-vis non-interoperable networks. However, allowing exclusivity, for a short period of time, may serve as an incentive to first movers.

• Authorization of agents by the financial services regulatory authority(ies)

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: authorization can be burdensome and may limit agent network development. However, guidelines may need to be issued for proper identification and notification of agents to the regulatory authority to help enable appropriate tracking and monitoring.

• Identifying requirements and restrictions around who can operate and serve as an agent, including security requirements

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: if few limitations are placed on who can serve as an agent, it may allow greater access of services by the unbanked.

2.2 Category 2: Consumer Protection

• Governing the ease of switching between alternative service providers

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: promoting ease of switching may allow end users, particularly the unbanked, the power of choice. Heavy termination fees should likely be avoided.

• Outlining end user privacy of payments and transactions, including governing the use of end user data by entities (both formal and informal) other than the end user

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: allowing access to end user data may allow for improved products/services, but may be used incorrectly, resulting in invasive advertising (e.g. spamming), and aggressive selling. These tradeoffs should be top of mind as regulators determine the appropriate level of privacy.

• Determining information transparency, including those related to fees

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: it is in the end user’s best interest to have a strong understanding of how digital financial services may or may not impact them and their behavior. This transparency is particularly valuable as it relates to fees applied to a transaction. Ideally, fees are communicated before the transaction is submitted.

2.3 Category 3: Market Access

• Specifying the types of entities that can hold a mobile money license or offer digital financial services

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: an open system is beneficial to lower income end users as it likely increases access and drives prices down through increased competition.

• Cross-border money transfer

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: recognizing that many unbanked end users may migrate to support themselves and their families, regulations should also aim to support open, low-value cross border payments.

• Outlining entry and exit controls of digital financial service providers and other entities participating in the scheme

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: increasing entry and exit controls is likely to decrease access, which may limit competition and innovation. However, fragmented markets can be difficult to properly supervise. As a result, regulators should aim for lower entry and exit controls assuming supervision does not suffer.

2.4 Category 4: Payment Systems

• Identifying requirements for e-float to non-bank DFS providers

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: providers should be required to keep 100% of float in liquid assets to ensure refund or redemption by the end users.

• Interest accrued on trust accounts

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: the custodian bank should be required to pay interest on float. Ideally, the providers pass on interest earned on their trust accounts to end users.

• Defining or limiting payment scheme interchange (between providers)

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: low or no fees are preferred for the unbanked. Interchange can create upward pressure on end user pricing. In instances where interchange from one DFS provider to another is required or makes sense, providing a sunset period (where interchange is at first limited than phased in) may avoid higher retail prices in the long run.

• Requiring interoperability of digital financial services providers and schemes

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: fragmented markets may limit access and usability for end users. Regulators should aim to achieve full interoperability across all DFS providers and schemes.

2.5 Category 5: Risk Management

• Specifying Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements for digital financial services providers

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: restrictive KYC prevents undocumented end users from opening accounts; tiered access is preferred. Additionally, connecting to a national identity scheme, if one is in place, may prove beneficial to the unbanked who may otherwise have few forms of identification. National identity scheme with biometric components have a powerful potential for avoiding payments to “ghost” recipients.

• Requiring Anti-Money Laundering (AML) /Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) monitoring of suspicious activity

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: overly tight AML/CFT monitoring can either discourage usage or make the cost of operating a system high; leading to prices unsupportable for poor populations. Regulators should aim to achieve risk-proportionate AML/CFT monitoring.

• Requiring AML/CFT reporting of suspicious activity

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: reporting of suspicious activity should be required even for lower-risk accounts.

• The appropriate identification and registration of end users by agents

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: agents should be properly trained and monitored to ensure they follow all required customer due diligence procedures upon account opening (and as required for cash-in, cash-out, bill payment, etc.)

2.6 Category 6: Other

• Telecommunications regulations setting minimum quality of service requirements

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: end users must feel that digital financial services are as reliable and available as cash. High quality of service is likely to help meet that standard. A minimum standard may encourage that perception.

• Regulations relevant to labor laws around agent banking

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: agents play a critical role in supplying digital financial services, particularly to those who may have previously been unbanked. However, their services may not be commercially viable if the cost to serve becomes too high. Regulators should be aware of this balance and how it may intersect with labor laws.

• Tax policies on merchant sales using digital financial services

– Financial Inclusion Perspective: merchants may be dissuaded to use digital financial services if suddenly they are taxed on gains that, when using cash, went unnoticed and untaxed. Regulators should be cautious of how to implement and message tax policies to merchants who serve lower income end users. Consideration should be given to creating new tax policies that actively encourage merchant participation in the DFS ecosystem.

3 Managing the Regulatory Environment

Given the complexity of the DFS regulatory environment, it remains imperative that the two sector authorities involved in these efforts – financial services and telecommunications – collaborate to address these issues. Below, the Ecosystem Working Group outlines a survey of how regulators currently work together, provide a draft memorandum of understanding template for Authorities in a given country to formally outline joint goals and methods of working together, and outline considerations if regulators are interested in formalizing cross-border collaborations.

3.1 Survey of Regulators

Below we have outlined the results of a recent study conducted by ITU with telecommunications regulators on collaborative efforts. As you will see, various approaches exist to working together, but many have recognized and actualized this need.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

3.2 Survey Conclusions

83% of respondents (telecommunications regulators) say digital financial services (DFS) are currently offered in their country. Of the 17% where DFS are not currently offered, about half say it is likely that these services will be offered in the next 12 months.

Of the countries in which DFS are currently offered, 64% license MNOs to provide DFS, 35% and 32% allow MNOs to offer DFS through joint ventures and wholly controlled subsidiaries, respectively.

For those that mandate DFS, over half address ‘quality of service’, ‘interconnection’, ‘consumer protection’ and ‘access’. Few address ‘intellectual property’, ‘risk management’ and ‘licensing for product design’. For those that supervise DFS, areas of supervision largely mirror the results of mandating.

Over 80% of respondents coordinate with the Central Bank in some form on DFS – over half citing a formal relationship with 20% citing an MOU, and 33% citing a Task Force. Similar results are yielded as it relates to coordinating on financial inclusion. Coordination with the Ministry of Finance also proves common, though more often through occasional consult rather than an MOU or Task Force. Given the frequency through which coordination proves valuable, the Ecosystem Working Group has outlined a template for an In-Country MOU below.

3.3 Template for an In-Country Memorandum of Understanding

The purpose of this document is to provide a template, or starting point, for countries interested in drafting a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the financial services regulatory authority(ies) and telecommunications authority(ies), as it relates to digital financial services and financial inclusion.

Additionally, it may be relevant and/or necessary to include other authorities (e.g. competition authorities, consumer protection authorities) in the agreement.

3.3.1 Parties Involved

The <Authority 1> was established to <formal explanation of authority 1 role>

The <Authority 2> was established to <formal explanation of authority 2 role>

<AS NEEDED>The <Authority 3> was established to <formal explanation of authority 3 role>

<AS NEEDED>The <Authority 4> was established to <formal explanation of authority 4 role>

3.3.2 Basis

In recognition of the growing convergence of telecommunications and financial services in what has been identified as digital financial services, the Regulatory Authorities have identified a need for regulatory interaction and collaboration to ensure the integrity, security, stability and protection of participants and end users as these services are rolled out.

3.3.3 Purpose

This MoU is established in respect to the mandate of the statute regulating each entity. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a framework for the <Authority 1> and <Authority 2> and <AS NEEDED: Authority 3 and 4> to collaborate with one another regarding the regulation and supervision of digital financial services in <COUNTRY>. This MoU aims to promote the integrity, efficiency (for better use of public funds/budget) and efficacy of participants by improving effective regulation and enhancing the supervision of digital financial services. This MoU is entered into on the basis of mutual respect, in a spirit of goodwill and does not affect the independence of the parties herto.

3.3.4 Principles

This collaboration aims to abide by the following principles as allowed by law:

• Digital financial services providers and participants will experience a more coordinated effort through harmonious regulations that are clearly communicated

• End users, particularly the unbanked, will be empowered to use digital financial services, recognizing such services are secure and end users are appropriately protected

This collaboration aims to achieve the following outcomes as allowed by law:

• Implementing effective measures to combat the financing of terrorism, money laundering and fraud, including

i. Facilitating the discovery of and actions against non-compliance or fraudulent practices

ii. Conducting training and awareness programs on cyber security for participants and end users

iii. Ensuring the imposition of effective sanctions

• Fostering competition and promoting a level playing field for all participants of a digital financial services ecosystem including

i. Enabling equitable access to the telecommunications network

ii. Preventing anti-competitive practices

• Promoting interoperability and interconnectivity of digital financial services participants

• Ensuring transactional points, including agents, adhere to relevant regulatory and supervisory requirements

• Ensuring appropriate mechanisms are in place to identify, assess, monitor and control risks related to digital financial services

• Fostering consumer protection and creating an enabling framework to ensure

i. Services are delivered in a fair and transparent manner

ii. Appropriate mechanisms exist to address end user complaints

iii. Appropriate financial literacy programs exists

iv. Participants can accurately track and provide proof of transactions

v. End user data and identity is protected and kept confidential

vi. End user mobility (e.g. no minimum barriers for switching products and/or services providers)

3.3.5 Promotion of a coordinated framework

The Authorities agree to work together to promote a coordinated framework for the regulation and supervision of digital financial services in <Country>. Such collaboration will include but not be limited to:

• Regulating and supervising providers to ensure digital financial services are provided in a safe, sound and sustainable manner that promotes financial inclusion.

i. Collaborating to determine supervision, reporting, research, monitoring and record-keeping requirements

ii. Establishing appropriate systems and clear procedures for the supervision of digital financial services

iii. Developing standards and guidelines as deemed necessary

iv. Implementing strategies and policies aimed at enhancing financial inclusion through digital financial services

v. Inspecting digital financial services participants and providing technical expertise

vi. Sharing information <SEE LATER CLAUSE>

vii. Providing technical opinions and comments on legal and regulatory instruments

viii. Developing and disseminating materials to participants on the regulations

3.3.6 Ongoing contact and meetings

To enable effective collaboration, each Authority may:

• Nominate at least two senior representatives from within their organization to start and serve on a Steering Committee that will hold meetings at least two times per year and when necessary. The Steering Committee will be responsible for providing strategic and policy guidance on matters covered in this MoU

• Nominate one person as the primary contact person and liaison for the purposes of information sharing related to this understanding. If this person changes over the course of the understanding, the Authority will communicate the change to the other party.

• Nominate two persons to serve on a Technical Working Group aimed at collaborating on technical matters, whose terms of reference shall be defined and approved by the Steering Committee.

• Nominate one person to serve on an External Communications Working Group, aimed at liaising with other regulatory bodies and participants, whose terms of reference shall be defined and approved by the Steering Committee.

• Nominate representatives to serve on other working groups if and when the need is identified by the Steering Committee.

3.3.7 Sharing Information

Exchange of information will take place at many levels. Some information available to one regulator (including regularly provided regulatory data) may not be readily available to the other. As a result, the Authorities agree to share information to the extent permitted by law, to enable the regulation and supervision of digital financial services in <COUNTRY>. Such information includes but is not limited to

• Both Authorities will inform each other about an event which has the potential to endanger the stability of digital financial services or a relevant participant operating in the digital financial services ecosystem. This may include complaints data, supervision outputs, risk assessment outputs and enforcement data.

• Both Authorities will consider offering trainings on their expertise to the counterparty as needed to ensure proper understanding.

• The Financial Services Regulatory Authority(ies) will provide the Telecommunications Authority(ies) and <AS NEEDED: Authority 3 and 4>

i. Information related to the licensing and/or authorization of entities able to provide digital financial services and/or participate in the digital financial services ecosystem

ii. Information on funds safeguarding, including isolation, liquidity requirements and deposit protection

iii. Information on emerging business models and services related to digital financial services

• Telecommunications Authority will provide the Financial Services Regulatory Authority and <AS NEEDED: Authority 3 and 4>

i. Information pertaining to regulation or approvals to provide communication services including updates on licensed/unlicensed operations

ii. Data on outreach and coverage of the telecommunications network(s), including network performance metrics like quality and reliability

iii. Data on the security of the telecommunications network and information on relevant security and risk mitigation measures

iv. Information on emerging business models and services related to digital financial services

• Requests for information should be delivered with the following considerations outlined

i. Accurate description of the information needed and the corresponding purpose

ii. Conditions attached to the disclosure

iii. The sensitivity and confidentiality of the information

iv. The recipient parties of the information, including any third parties

v. The date by which the information is needed

• Provision of or request for information will be denied if compliance would result in an unlawful act or interfere with an ongoing investigation

3.3.8 Confidentiality

• Information shared or discussed will be used only for lawful purposes

• Information will not be shared or disclosed beyond the recipient parties identified unless first agreed upon by both Authorities

• Information provided will remain the property of the Authority that provided such information

• All documents related to this MOU will include the following in the footer: ‘Confidential- provided pursuant to the MoU between the <Authority 1> and <Authority 2> and <AS NEEDED: Authority 3 and 4> on the regulation and supervision of digital financial services.

3.3.9 Commencement, Duration and Termination

• This understanding comes into effect on the date signed by the represented Authorities.

• This understanding shall remain in effect until one Authority notifies the other in writing of its wish to revise, amend or terminate from the understanding. <X> days notice of any action will be required. Revisions and amendments must be agreed upon by both Authorities

• An Authority may terminate its participation in this understanding by providing written notice to the other Authority, assuming the termination will not affect the obligations and rights of either Authority with respect to confidential information shared over the course the MoU was active

• This MoU will not affect the rights and obligations of the Authorities under applicable laws and regulations

3.3.10 Other Considerations for establishing an MOU

When drafting an MoU, the Authorities may want to consider additional sections beyond what was outlined above. Those may include

• Dispute resolution: how to manage dispute between the two Authorities

• Manage inconsistencies: what to do if there are inconsistencies between the MoU and other laws or regulations

• Distribution of costs: how to divide costs related to actualizing this MOU including information sharing

• Governing law and legislation: how to ensure the recognition and intersections of law and legislation including banking secrecy, protection of personal information, and confidentiality of communication

• Communications to the public: how to manage external communications to parties outside of this understanding

• Intersections with other authorities: how to properly engage and interact with the competition authorities and consumer protection authorities

3.4 Cross Country Considerations for a Memorandum of Understanding

As national digital payment systems develop and cross-border low-value digital payments scale, regulators may consider drafting an agreement (in the form of a memorandum of understanding) to foster this potential and promote collaboration. If and when this occurs, the following sections should be included:

• Introduction: the introduction outlines the background to the current situation, describes the need and rationale for an MOU, outlines what players or authorities are involved, and the implications of such an agreement.

• Purpose: the purpose is indented to be a concise statement that describes the intention of the MOU, how those involved will use the new capability, including under what circumstances.

• Scope: the scope section of the MOU should include when the policies described in the agreement do and do not apply and to whom the policies do and do not implicate.

• Policy: this section explains what policies have been agreed to by the players involved. Definitions tend to be beneficial to ensure clarity.

• Structure: the structure of the agreement outlines how players intend to work together, including who will be the key points of contact, how often to meet, what the workflow looks like and how to communicate with one another.

• Obligations: as its name implies, this section includes obligations of those included in the agreement. For example, what trainings need to be completed, what party is financial responsible for different aspects of the agreement, how maintenance and oversight will occur, and how to update the MOU.

Bibliography

[1] Bank of Uganda: Mobile Money Guideline, 2013

[2] Central Bank of Liberia: Mobile Money Regulations, 2014

[3] CGAP, GPFI: Global Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor

[4] CGAP: Update on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Brazil, 2010

[5] Homeland Security: Writing Guidelines for a Memorandum of Understanding

[6] NIST, U.S. Department of Commerce: Writing Guidelines to Develop a Memorandum of Understanding for Interoperable Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems, 2013

[7] European Securities and Market Authority: Memorandum of Understanding, 2014

[8] Federal Reserve: Protocol for the Cooperative Oversight Arrangement of CLS, 2015

[9] Central Banks of Sweden and Finland: Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Oversight of the Central Securities Depositories VPC AB and Suomen Arvopaperikeskus Oy, 2006

[10] Central Bank of the Russian Federation and The Commission of the Republic of Latvia: Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Banking Supervision

[11] Central Bank of Jordan and the Qatar Financial Regulatory Authority: Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Banking Supervision, 2005

[12] Bank of England: Memoranda of Understanding between the PRA and the Central Bank of Brazil, 2015

[13] Oliver Wyman: The Digital Disruption Battlefield

[14] GSMA: Mobile Money- Enabling regulatory solutions, 2013

[15] GSMA: Proportional risk-based AML/CFT regimes for mobile money- a framework for assessing risk factors and mitigation measures, 2015

[16] Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper: An Empirical Examination of Why Mobile Money Schemes Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in Most, 2015

[17] Center for Global Development: Enabling Digital Financial Inclusion through Improvements in Competition and Interoperability: What Works and What Doesn’t?, 2015

III Review of National Identity Programs

About this report

This Technical Report was written by Prof. C. Leigh Anderson, Pierre Biscaye, Sarah Coney, Eugenia Ho, Brian Hutchinson, Mia Neidhardt and Travis Reynolds of Evans School Policy Analyses and Research (EPAR), University of Washington.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int.

Abstract

The status and characteristics of 48 national identity programs and initiatives in 43 developing countries were reviewed, including an evaluation of how these programs are being connected to—or used for—service provision . The identity programs reviewed are mainly government-issued national IDs. However, other types of national identity programs with links to various services including voter cards, passports, and two programs targeting the poor and the banking population were also reviewed. Following a brief review of the roles of identity systems in development and recent identity system trends, an overview of the 48 national identity programs, including technical features (such as whether physical identities incorporate an electronic component or are embedded with biometric features), implementation status, population enrollment strategies, and coverage is presented in the report. The implementation challenges around accountability, privacy, data management, enrollment, coverage, cost, and harmonization of identity programs were also reviewed. Finally, the functional applications of national identity programs, reporting how these programs are linked with services in finance, health, agriculture, elections, and other areas, and analyzing whether particular identity program characteristics are associated with functional applications are discussed in the report.

“An illiterate person is one who cannot write his name, and an illiterate state is one that cannot write the names of its citizens” – Plan Nacional Perú Contra la Indocumentación

1 Introduction

The ability to formally identify oneself has increasingly become integral to many aspects of civic participation and inclusion (Gelb & Clark, 2013). Proponents argue that formalized identity management systems have the potential to establish strategic partnerships between the state and citizens (Malik, 2014). Failure to register populations and provide identity documents is believed to have detrimental effects for both the individual and the state (Cunningham, 2013). To both better understand and serve citizens, countries are placing increasing attention on establishing national identification systems and the role they play in strategic political, economic, and social development (ibid.).

Identification systems are becoming more common across Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 48 identity programs we review, 29 have been introduced in the past decade, and 14 of those in the past five years. The driving force behind creating a national identity system varies from country to country.

Key Findings

• Government-issued national IDs are the most common form of national identity program reviewed (38 of 48 programs).

• 28 programs have an electronic component and 37 programs employ biometric information, most commonly in the form of fingerprints. 16 programs incorporate multiple biometrics into their IDs, usually combining fingerprints with face or iris scans.

• 35 of the 48 national identity programs are operational and in use, meaning they have completed initial enrollment and begun using the IDs, though ten of these are still actively enrolling new participants. Three programs are planned initiatives which have not yet begun enrollment, and three are actively enrolling but not yet operational.

• 39 programs report implementation challenges in some form. We identify seven general categories of challenges: accountability, privacy, data management, enrollment, coverage, cost, and harmonization of ID programs.

• Coverage of particular geographic or demographic groups is the most commonly reported challenge (22 programs). 20 programs report challenges in two or more of the categories we identify.

• IDs are most commonly used for Know Your Customer (KYC) purposes, especially for financial transactions and elections. 22 ID programs are mentioned as accepted credentials for banks to verify customer identity, and 21 are accepted forms of identification to vote.

• Five ID programs are linked to digital banking and four have mobile money applications. 13 programs are linked to government transfers, such as relief or welfare.

• 12 programs are connected to health functions. Four programs help enable digital tracking of medical services and treatment, and four others assist with verification of eligibility for health insurance coverage or for medical benefits.

• National ID programs are not well-linked to agricultural functions. Thailand’s “Smart ID” is linked to the provision of extension services. Nigeria’s electronic ID (eID) is used to monitor delivery of farming inputs.

• Other functions that are being applied to national ID programs include surveillance and security, civil service administration, travel, driver registration, and taxes.

• The year a program is introduced is not associated with number of functional linkages, but programs that are still actively enrolling members appear to be linked to more types of services.

• Programs that include electronic cards or biometrics tend to have a greater variety of functional linkages than programs that do not.

Rich countries have a relatively long history of using identification systems for surveillance and security purposes, further motivated over the past decade by the events of 9/11(Bennett & Lyon, 2008; Gelb & Clark, 2013). For developing countries, surveillance, fair and democratic elections, and fostering national unity are all mentioned in the evidence we review as reasons for implementing an identity system. In addition, identification systems’ development potential is reflected in goal 16.9 of the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): “provide legal identity for all including birth registration” by 2030 in order to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (The Division for Sustainable Development, United Nations, 2015; World Bank, 2015).

The complexity of government administration in “the modern world” is a major problem facing developing countries. Often, individual government programs have their own database of beneficiaries that are not digitized and therefore cannot be easily merged (Giné, n.d.). Delivering public services efficiently and providing financial inclusion to the poor in partnership with the private sector depends on accurate identification and authentication of citizens and residents. Government programs must have the capacity to cross-reference databases and information (ibid.).

Technological innovations have opened up new possibilities for governments to develop comprehensive identity management systems that link peoples’ identities through their entire life (Bennett & Lyon, 2008), from birth certificate, civil registration, driver’s license, to marriage certificate, voter registration and national identity card. At the same time, governments in developing countries are expected to carry out many of the same functions that richer countries are capable of performing; these functions include “providing universal access to healthcare and education, implementing know your customer (KYC) rules for financial institutions, and administering a wide variety of transfer programs” (Gelb & Clark, 2013).

As identification technology evolves, so do identification systems. Many of the programs we review are updating their initial systems to incorporate electronic and biometric elements into their ID programs. Gelb & Clark (2013) find that the biometrics industry grew at 28 percent annually between 2005 and 2010 and that the rate was even higher in developing regions, at 34 percent. They also quote estimates which suggest that as of 2012, over 1 billion people in developing countries have had their biometrics captured for one or more purposes. Incorporating biometric technologies in national identity systems is particularly useful for the growth of electronic government (e-government) as well as providing both public and private services (ibid.). As compared to manual, paper-based registers, advanced electronic capture and storage of data are able to reduce costs and human error as well as increase administrative efficiency (World Bank, 2014).

Electronic and biometric identification systems also have the potential to link national identity to multiple functional applications (World Bank, 2015). With electronic identity programs, a wide range of services can be delivered on computers or mobile devices. Besides using fingerprints, PINs, and/or signatures as means of authentication for commercial transactions and for access to financial and social services, more precise digital biometric technology has been used in combination with mobile devices to create “mobile money” for secure and cashless commercial transactions and social transfers (World Bank, 2014; Gelb & Clark, 2013). Biometrics have also been used beyond authentication to secure identities in order to fulfill KYC requirements for opening bank accounts, to register and de-duplicate beneficiaries, to authenticate cash or in-kind transfers at the point of service, and to fulfill various other services such as health, voting and civil service reform (Gelb & Clark, 2013). A World Bank report quoted several projections showing that the number of “digital government/citizen transactions worldwide will grow to about $67 billion by 2020” (World Bank, 2015). As a result of linkages between national ID programs and financial services, these programs are also believe to have the potential to promote financial inclusion.

This literature review aims to answer the following research questions:

1 What developing countries have national identity programs, and what are the characteristics of these programs?

2 What is the level of coverage of these national identity programs, in terms of percentage of a country’s overall population and of particular population groups (e.g., poor populations)?

3 To what extent are national identity programs being connected to and used to support provision of services and products, especially in the finance, agriculture, and health sectors?

4 What characteristics of national identity programs are associated with connections to financial, agricultural, and health services?

Section 2 of this report outlines our search and review methodology. In section 3, we present an overview of the 48 national identity programs, including their technical components, implementation status, and level of coverage. Evidence of implementation challenges these programs face is presented in section 4. In section 5, we describe the functions linked to national identity programs, and in section 6 we evaluate what characteristics of these programs are associated with service linkages. A spreadsheet providing greater detail on the characteristics of each of the national identity programs we review is included as a supplement to this report. In addition, we present summary case studies of the national identity programs of 12 selected focus countries in Appendix D.

2 Methodology

We define national identity programs as government-initiated programs that assign a unique identification number to each targeted participant, which is used for identification verification. We focus on identity programs that have at least one functional authentication purpose, such as voter verification, government transfers, and accessing financial or other services. In addition, we include only identity programs that operate at the national level, except where sub-national government identity programs exist and are the only nationally-recognized program.

We review national identity programs in 43 developing countries with 2013 populations over 15 million and GDP per capita under US$10,000. Among the 43 countries of interest, we further provide in-depth case studies for 12 focus countries based on supplemental searches of the available literature; these include: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.[8]

To analyze coverage and key characteristics of developing countries' national identity programs and evaluate whether and how these programs are being connected to or used for service provision, we conducted a search of both the academic and grey literature on the following databases:

• Google

• Google custom search of International Non-Governmental Organizations

• Center for Global Development

• Scopus

• Google Scholar

We employed a variety of search strings using terms relevant to national identity programs in general and to the specific national identity programs of the countries of interest[9]. We conducted additional searches to target information gaps and complement the findings from the initial search, though evidence was limited for many programs. Appendix A includes more detail on our search process and results.

During the initial search, we identified a total of 397 documents that appeared relevant to national identity programs in the countries of interest. We supplement program-specific documents with articles from the published and grey literature, though note that because of a limited literature in this area, much of the literature cited in this report draws heavily on a few papers and authors. Based on these documents, we identified 48 relevant national identity programs in the 43 countries. For each national ID program, we reviewed the evidence using a framework that contains the following information:

• Basic national identity program information – includes information about the management, funding, target population, and general history of the program.

• National identity program methodology – includes information on enrollment/registration methods, credentials used (e.g., biometrics), and general operation of the program.

• Implementation of the program – includes information on coverage/inclusion of the program, cost of the program, and implementation challenges.

• Functional applications of the program – includes information on uses of the program for health, finance, agriculture, elections, social transfers, civil service administration, surveillance and security, and other purposes.

The complete set of review framework questions is included in Appendix B. In this report, we use information coded according to our framework to summarize trends and gaps among national identity programs. The complete spreadsheet is included along with this report and provides additional detail for all of the national identity programs reviewed.

3 Overview of Selected National Identity Programs

We reviewed literature for a total of 48 national identity programs or initiatives in the 43 countries of interest. These national identity programs or initiatives include 38 government-issued national identity card programs, two passport programs, four voter’s card programs, as well as three special identity programs (Figure 1). A summary table of the 48 selected national identity programs, which presents the country, program name, program type, enrollment approach, year of launch, and implementation status of each program, is included in Appendix C.

Figure 1 – Type of National Identity Program

For most countries, a government-issued national identity card is the main program that is being used for both identification verification and for at least one functional authentication purpose. In five of the countries we review, including Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Zambia, there is more than one prominent national identity program. In addition to their national identity card programs, Burkina Faso and Zambia also implemented voter’s card programs. Burkina Faso had been using their national identity cards as primary documents for registration of voters (The Carter Center, 2013). In 2012, the Burkinabè government began to roll out a biometric voter card program to prevent duplicate voting registrations due to the lack of a reliable civil registration database (University of Florida, 2015). As part of their ongoing commitment to improve the performance of democratic governments, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported Zambia in incorporating biometrics in its Continuous Voter Registration program in 2010 (Government of Zambia & United Nations Development Programme, 2009). The government of Ukraine passed a biometric identification law in 2012 that allows for the incorporation of biometrics in both the national identity card and passport, and a unified state demographic register will be set up to store citizen’s basic personal information (Mayhew, 2012).

The extent of national identity systems and the roles of these systems varies dramatically across countries. Cambodia and Nigeria, for example, both implemented special identification programs in addition to national identification cards. The Cambodian Identification of Poor Households Programme seeks to identify poor households in rural villages and the level of poverty in these villages so that the Ministry of Planning can help lift the poorest households out of poverty by directly targeting services and development assistance to them (Cambodia Ministry of Planning, n.d.). In Nigeria the focus of the special identification program is quite different: in 2014 the Central Bank of Nigeria, in collaboration with all banks in Nigeria, launched the Bank Verification Number (BVN). The BVN is a centralized biometric identification system that provides the banking industry and its customer greater security for access to sensitive or personal banking information (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a).

In Ethiopia, except for passports, we find no evidence of any national-level identity cards. Instead, all regional governments issue their own identification cards (Kebele cards), including in local languages such as Oromifa, Amharic, Somali, Tigregna and English (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014b). All descriptions of the Ethiopian ID program in this review refer to these regional IDs.

3.1 Program Technical Features

Formal identification and authentication to ensure eligibility are important requirements for people’s interactions with both public and private institutions (Gelb & Clark, 2013). Traditional paper-based identification systems have long used a variety of personal information which can include a name, assigned number, date of birth, gender, address, signature, and even a photograph of the individual. Traditional non-digital systems, however, are subject to errors, duplications, forgery, false acceptances (when an unauthorized individual is allowed enrollment), and false rejections (when an authorized individual is rejected for enrollment). Electronic databases, combined with biometric technology, may mitigate some of these errors. Instead of registering target populations manually and storing identity information in paper registers, proponents contend that electronic capture and storage of data “can improve accuracy and security, facilitate fast data processing and collection, and create auditable transaction records; all of which have the potential to prevent fraud, improve service delivery, and aid development planning” (Gelb & Clark, 2013; World Bank, 2014). In addition, modern biometric technologies in identification offer some promise of authentication, establishing confidence in individual claims about identity (Bennett & Lyon, 2008; Gelb & Clark, 2013).

For each of the 48 programs reviewed, Table 1 describes whether authentication involves a physical credential, an electronic component, and different types of personal and biometric information. Physical credentials are usually paper or plastic-based identity cards. Programs with no physical credential are based entirely on electronic systems. Physical credentials with an electronic component include “smart” cards and other types of machine-readable IDs, such as those containing barcodes. Authentication can involve both personal information, such as a name, gender, birth date, and other related information, as well as biometric information which can include fingerprints, a face scan, an eye scan, a voice print, or DNA. Blank spaces in the table indicate areas where we could not find information about a specific program.

Table 1 – Methodologies, Personal and Biometric Information Involved in the Selected National Identity Programs

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Physical credential Involved

Electronic component Involved

Personal Information

Biometric Information

Physical credential includes a photo

Name

Gender

Birth Date

Other (religion, birth place, etc.)

Fingerprint

Face

Eye

Voice

DNA

Afghanistan

e-tazkira

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Algeria

National ID

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Angola

National ID

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Bangladesh

National Identity Card (NID)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Burkina Faso

National ID

Yes

Burkina Faso

Voter Card

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Cambodia

National ID

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Cambodia

IDPoor

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cameroon

National Identity Card

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

China

Second Generation Resident Identity Card

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Colombia

Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Elector's Card

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Egypt

National Identity Card (Current) Personal Verification Card

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ethiopia

Regional ID

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ghana

GhanaCard

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Guatemala

Documento Personal de Identificación (DIP)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

India

Aadhaar

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Indonesia

Kartu Tanda Penduduk Elektronik (E-KTP)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Iran

Karte Melli

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Iraq

Civil Status Identification Card (Bitaka shakhsiyeh)

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Kenya

Third Generation National ID

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Madagascar

National Identity Card

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Malawi

National Registration and Identification System

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mali

National Identification Number (NINA) Card

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Morocco

Carte Nationale D'Identite Electronique

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Mozam-bique

Bilhete de Identidade

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Nepal

National Identity Card (NID)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Niger

Voter Card

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Nigeria

National Identification Numbers (NIN) and National Electronic Identity Cards (eID)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Nigeria

Bank Verification Number (BVN)

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Pakistan

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Peru

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Philippines

Filipino Identification System Act

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Romania

National Identity Card/Carte de identitate eID

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Sri Lanka

National Identity Card (NIC)/e-NIC

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Sudan

National Identity Card
Identity Card

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Tanzania

National ID Program

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Thailand

National Identity Card/National ID Card/Smart ID Card

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Uganda

National Security Information System (NSIS)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Ukraine

Biometric Passport

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ukraine

ID Card/Biometric Identification Card

Yes

Uzbekistan

ePassports/Biometric Passports

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Vietnam

People's Identity Cards

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yemen

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Zambia

National Registration Cards (NRC)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Zambia

Continuous Voter Registration/Voter Registration Cards

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

GRAND TOTAL

45

28

30

25

25

29

34

12

7

0

1

38

Almost all programs (45 of 48) use a physical credential to authenticate an individual’s identity, with three exceptions. In India, the Unique Identification Authority assigns a one-of-a kind ID number to every Indian resident using cloud-based technology without issuing a card (Zelazny, 2012). Nigeria’s Bank Verification Number (BVN) authenticates financial transactions through the use of only biometric features and a PIN (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a). Yemen’s voter registration assigns each resident a unique identification number and records biometric information without issuing a card (Al-Junaid, 2015).

More than half (28 of 48) of the programs we review include an electronic component in their physical credentials. Many of programs use smartcards, where personal information and digital credentials are stored securely on an embedded microchip. For example, the Second Generation Resident Identity Card in China and the Carte Nationale D'Identite Electronique in Morocco both use a type of microchip that contains a radio frequency identification (RFID) module (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007; AGFA, 2015). Other countries which specify the use of smartcards for their national identity program include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand, and Ukraine. The use of smart chip technology creates a “platform to deploy applications needed by different government [and private] sectors,” and is thus “an enabler of new services” (World Bank, 2014).

Machine-readable barcodes that record and protect personal and biometric information are another electronic component of physical credentials used by a small number of countries (Congo, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia). For instance, the NSIS identity card in Uganda is a biometrically enhanced, machine readable card with digitally embedded face scans and fingerprints of the card holder (National Security Information System (NSIS, 2015b; Uganda Convention UK, 2014).

Name (30 programs), gender (25), and birth date (25) of the individual are the most common personal information collected during registration. Other types of personal information collected include individuals’ signatures, ID number, place of birth, and religion. A photograph of the individual on the physical credential is a feature in 38 of the programs reviewed.

Thirty-six programs collect some kind of biometric information for identification and authentication. Modern biometric technologies in identification offer some promise of authentication, establishing confidence in individual claims about identity (Bennett & Lyon, 2008; Gelb & Clark, 2013). Figure 2 provides an overview of the common types of biometric information used in the 48 programs reviewed. The most common type of biometric information used is fingerprints (32 programs). Twelve programs use face scans, and seven use eye (retina or iris) scans. While vocal recognition is among the biometric features being newly developed for identification and authentication (Gelb & Clark, 2013), we do not find evidence that any of the 48 reviewed programs use it.

Figure 2 – Type of of Biometric Information

Sixteen programs use more than one type of biometric information. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) incorporates fingerprints and iris scans in the system as the primary biometrics for identification and de-duplication[10] purposes; it also uses facial recognition to help with human visual inspection and to provide a duplicate check on a small subset of enrollments (Zelazny, 2012). The e-KTP, Indonesia’s electronic national identity card, captures the fingerprint, iris, and face images of the millions of citizens the government is getting to enroll at registration centers (Messmer, 2012). The e-KTP’s fingerprint verification system has a false rejection rate of 3% or lower and a false acceptance rate of .01% or lower (Fahmi, 2012; Fauzi, 2014). In addition, Uganda’s National Security Information System (NSIS) is supported with facial recognition technology (FRS) and an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) to prevent identity forgery or loss (National Security Information System, 2015b). In an address to the nation, Ugandan President Yoweri Musaveni specified that NSIS also plans to capture citizens’ DNA to help combat crimes (State House Uganda, 2014).

We find evidence that programs in India, Nigeria, and Pakistan authenticate financial transactions on site using biometric information. However, we find no evidence of countries having devices available for on-site biometric verification during elections. This limited use of biometric verification is likely because biometric authentication is costly, and may be less cost effective than traditional means of verification such as presenting a physical ID (Gelb & Clark, 2013). As a result, while many programs include a central registry of citizen biometric information, few possess the equipment to verify citizens on site for financial/social transfers, elections, or other functions. Evidence of biometric authentication is discussed further in the sections on functional applications of national ID programs.

Finally, several programs collect and digitise signatures, storing them on ID card electronic chips. Ten countries incorporate this feature (Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ukraine). Castro writes that “digital signatures use a technique known as asymmetric cryptography requiring two components: a private key for the sender to use to sign a document and a public key for the receiver to use to verify the signature. The keys are generated by a certificate authority, a trusted third party such as a private company or the government” (Castro, 2011, p. 4). For example, the Iranian National Organization for Civil Registration states that for its new generation of ID cards an electronic signature will enable document recipients to feel certain that what they receive is not counterfeit (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2015). Digital signatures may facilitate online transactions by creating secure routes to send financial, health, or other types of documents. However, we find no evidence in our literature review of the extent to which digital signatures are used by citizens, nor examples of transactions in which digital signatures are applied.

3.2 Stage of Implementation

Figure 3 – Status of National ID Program

The 48 national identity programs are in various stages of development, though we do not find sufficient evidence to evaluate the implementation status of four of the programs (Figure 3). Three programs are planned initiatives which have not yet begun enrollment, and three are actively enrolling but not yet operational. Of the remaining 38 national identity programs, 35 are operational and in use, though ten of these are still actively enrolling new participants. We define “operational and in use” as programs that have fully scaled up and only enroll newly eligible individuals. Conversely, by “operational and in use / actively enrolling,” we refer to programs which have completed at least their initial or pilot phase of enrollment and issued ID credentials to a portion of the target population, but have yet to be fully scaled up. This implementation stage is common in countries where enrollment is designed to take place in phases by age or by region. Bangladesh, for instance, extended eligibility for the NID cards to 15-17 year olds in 2015 after the cards were introduced in 2008 for all people 18 years old and above, and is still actively enrolling this newly eligible population (Chowdhury, 2015b). IDPoor in Cambodia partially or fully registered poor households in five provinces, and is continuously expanding the coverage area as resources become available (Cambodia Ministry of Planning, n.d.).

Finally, three national ID programs are stalled. Successful implementation of national identity programs requires sustained popular and political support as well as intergovernmental cooperation (Gelb & Clark, 2013). Political and social instability is affecting successful implementation of the e-tazkira in Afghanistan and the ID card in Ukraine, and both programs are now considered stalled. One account in Afghanistan suggests that a decision not to place “ethnicity” on the physical ID card invoked anger from minority groups who perceived that the Pashtun majority was trying to avoid “counting” them in population estimates used to determine political representation. Violence and collapsing political support have contributed to the stalled implementation of the program (Bezhan, 2013). The government of Ukraine had announced the introduction of biometric ID cards in both 2012 (Mayhew, 2012) and 2015 (Censor.Net, 2015), however, we find no evidence of implementation plans. Technical challenges can also stall program implementation, especially ones that involve the use of electronic components and biometric technology. The adoption of the digital biometric ID card in Algeria has been delayed due to difficulties providing logistical and equipment services (Belamri, 2015).

The implementation status of these programs is often related to the years when the programs were initiated. The programs that are currently operational and in use are generally older, often based on physical credentials issued many years ago, including as far back as 1964 (Kenya, Zambia). Uganda’s National Security Information System (NSIS), launched in 2014, is the newest program that is currently operational and in use. Five of the six planned and actively enrolling initiatives were introduced recently, ranging from 2007 to 2015.

Many countries already have existing national identity programs in place but have replaced or are replacing them with the next generation of national ID cards that contain electronic and/or biometric components. For example, China’s first generation of ID card was introduced in 1985; its second generation card was implemented in 2004 and embedded with a microchip using RFID technology (Chen, 2003; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007). In 2015, Egypt’s government signed an agreement with MasterCard to link citizens’ national IDs to an existing national mobile money platform (Security Document World, 2015). Vietnam’s People’s Identity Cards program was introduced in 1999 (Ministry of Justice's Portal, the Government of Vietnam, n.d.). While no information can be found on when the new program will be implemented, the available evidence indicates that the goal of this program is to simplify personal papers by replacing the current IDs and household registers (Tuoi Tre News, 2014). Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are all planning to undergo, or are currently undergoing, a transition to a next-generation ID system.

Figure 4 illustrates national ID programs’ stage of implementation by region.[11] All regions have programs that are operational and in use, and the majority of the programs we review are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. The three planned programs are split among South Asia, South East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, but all three programs that are in the active enrollment stage are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. The concentration of newer programs in Sub-Saharan Africa may be due to this region’s leapfrogging ability enabled by new electronic and biometric technology (World Bank, 2015).

Figure 4 – Status of National ID Program by Region

3.3 Enrolment Methodologies

Enrollment in identity programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Almost all of the national identity programs we review (44 of 48) mandate that their target populations (usually all citizens) register in person at a registration center once they reach the eligible age. Exceptions to this rule are the Elector’s Card program in Congo, the Aadhaar program in India, the National Identity Card (NID) in Nepal, and the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in Pakistan. Gelb & Clark (2013) point out that when a large scale national identity program is mandatory, a country may face a crush of applications, resulting in frustrated recipients and temporary exclusion if capacity is overrun. Pilot programs, iterative development, or phasing-in programs by area or age group may help minimize these problems (ibid).

On the other hand, voluntary enrollment is not without its own problems. A voluntary identity card can quickly become a de facto universal ID card if a program reaches critical mass or is well-integrated with finance, health, and other functions. Citizens without the card then experience difficulty gaining access to public services or even basic goods (Bennett & Lyon, 2008). For instance, while participation in India’s Aadhaar program is voluntary, Aadhaar numbers are legally required for authentication if citizens want to access many services and programs (Gelb & Mukherjee, 2015). Registration for the NADRA is technically voluntary for Pakistani citizens. However, they cannot open a bank account or enter into many transactions with the state without an ID card or a passport (Malik, 2014). We provide more information on enrollment method and challenges in Section 4.4.

A majority of the 48 national identity programs reviewed target all citizens in the country. However, a number of national identity programs target populations beyond citizens. The programs in Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania issue national identity cards to residents living in these countries even if they are not citizens. For example, Tanzania extends its national identity card program enrollment to refugee populations (ID World – ID Community Publications, 2015).

In some cases, the target population for a national identity program is a subset of the total population. The IDPoor cards in Cambodia are issued specifically to poor individual and households in rural areas (Cambodia Ministry of Planning, n.d.). The Bank Verification Number (BVN) in Nigeria targets only citizens who are eligible for banking (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a). Voter’s cards in Yemen are for the voting population only.

The target registration age of the programs, meaning the lowest eligible enrollment age and not the age eligible for the issuance of physical credentials, ranges from birth to age 18. Eighteen is the most common target age for registration (10 programs), followed by birth and age 16 (eight programs each)[12]. Some governments are developing comprehensive identity management system that manage peoples’ identities from birth to death (Bennett & Lyon, 2008). In several cases, however, the age of enrollment and the age for the issuance of physical credentials are different. In Bangladesh, for example, a national identification number is issued to every child at birth, and this number remains through his or her life and is associated with the NID card issued at the age of 15 (Chowdhury, 2015b). Children in Pakistan are required to register with National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) within a month of birth, although they are not eligible to acquire a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) or Smart National Identity Card (SNIC) until they are 18 years old (Khan, 2012). Table 2 presents the target populations and target registration age of the 48 national ID programs.

Table 2 – Coverage of Target Population

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Target Population

Target Registration Age

Year of Launch

Coverage Rate among Target Population

Afghanistan

e-tazkira

All citizens

Birth

2010

0%

Algeria

National ID

Not specified

Not specified

2015

Not specified

Angola

National ID

All citizens

Not specified

2009

25%

Bangladesh

National Identity Card (NID)

All citizens

Birth

2007

60%

Burkina Faso

National ID

All citizens

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Burkina Faso

Voter Card

All citizens

18

2012

58%

Cambodia

National ID

All citizens

15

Not specified

less than 1%

Cambodia

IDPoor

Other

Not specified

2006

Not specified

Cameroon

National Identity Card

All citizens

18

Not specified

Not specified

China

Second Generation Resident Identity Card

All citizens

Birth

2003

Not specified

Colombia

Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil

All citizens

Birth

Not specified

Not specified

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Elector's Card

All citizens

18

2005

91%

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

All citizens

14

2010

59%

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

Not specified

Not specified

2010

Not specified

Egypt

National Identity Card (Current) Personal Verification Card

All citizens

16

Not specified

Not specified

Ethiopia

Regional ID

Citizens and Residents

18

Not specified

Not specified

Ghana

GhanaCard

Citizens and Residents

6

2008

59%

Guatemala

Documento Personal de Identificación (DIP)

Not specified

18

2004

Not specified

India

Aadhaar

Citizens and Residents

5

2008

67%

Indonesia

Kartu Tanda Penduduk Elektronik (E-KTP)

Citizens and Residents

17

2009

97%

Iran

Karte Melli

All citizens

15

1997

99%

Iraq

Civil Status Identification Card (Bitaka shakhsiyeh)

Not specified

1

Not specified

Not specified

Kenya

Third Generation National ID

Citizens and Residents

12

1964

Not specified

Madagascar

National Identity Card

All citizens

18

Not specified

Not specified

Malawi

National Registration and Identification System

All citizens

Birth

2007

Not specified

Mali

National Identification Number (NINA) Card

All citizens

Birth

2008

88%

Morocco

Carte Nationale D'Identite Electronique

All citizens

18

1996

Not specified

Mozambique

Bilhete de Identidade

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Nepal

National Identity Card (NID)

Citizens and Residents

16

2009

Not specified

Niger

Voter Card

All citizens

18

2009

Not specified

Nigeria

National Identification Numbers (NIN) and National Electronic Identity Cards (eID)

All citizens, all residents

Birth

2007

4%

Nigeria

Bank Verification Number (BVN)

Other

Not specified

2014

52%

Pakistan

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

All citizens

Birth

2000

98%

Peru

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

All citizens

Birth

1993

89%

Philippines

Filipino Identification System Act

All citizens

Not specified

2015

Not specified

Romania

National Identity Card/Carte de identitate eID

All citizens

14

Not specified

Not specified

Sri Lanka

National Identity Card (NIC)/e-NIC

All citizens

16

2014

Not specified

Sudan

National Identity Card
Identity Card

Citizens and Residents

16

2011

Not specified

Tanzania

National ID Program

Citizens and residents, other

Not specified

2008

24%

Thailand

National Identity Card/National ID Card/Smart ID Card

All citizens

7

2005

47%

Uganda

National Security Information System (NSIS)

All citizens

16

2014

99%

Ukraine

Biometric Passport

Not specified

Not specified

2015

Not specified

Ukraine

ID Card/Biometric Identification Card

Not specified

Birth

Not specified

Not specified

Uzbekistan

ePassports/Biometric Passports

All citizens

16

2011

Not specified

Vietnam

People's Identity Cards

All citizens

14

1999

Not specified

Yemen

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)

Other

Not specified

2014

Not specified

Zambia

National Registration Cards (NRC)

All citizens

16

1964

Not specified

Zambia

Continuous Voter Registration/Voter Registration Cards

All citizens

18

2010

79%

3.4 Coverage of Target Population

The national identity programs we review also vary widely in their coverage of the target population. Figure 5 provides an overview of the coverage rates (also summarized in the last column of Table 2). We are able to uncover evidence of coverage rates for 20 of 48 programs. Among the national identity programs that are active—meaning either they have completed their initial rollouts, are actively enrolling, or are operational and in use—the level of coverage ranges from eight percent of the target population for the National Electronic Identity Cards (eID) in Nigeria to 99 percent for both the Karte Melli program in Iran and the NSIS program in Uganda.

Figure 5 – Coverage Rates of ID Programs

Other ID programs that have high levels of coverage among their target population include Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) (98% – see Section 4.5 for detail on NADRA’s extensive registration efforts), the Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC) program in Peru (98%), the e-KTP program in Indonesia (97%), the Elector’s Card program in the Democratic Republic of Congo (91%), the National Identification Number (NINA) card program in Mali (88%), the Continuous Voter Registration in Zambia (79%), and India’s Aadhaar program (67%). The ID programs that have the lowest level of coverage are the ID card programs in Nigeria (8%), Tanzania (24%), and Angola (25%).

We do not observe any particular factors that appear to be associated with coverage levels. Theoretically, older program would have had more time to increase their coverage rate, but we find no association between year of launch and coverage. For instance, the NSIS program in Uganda has a 99 percent coverage rate despite being a relatively new program established in 2014 while eID of Nigeria, which was launched in 2007, only covers 4 percent of its target population. We also find no clear associations between coverage and geographic size, population size, or GDP per capita. This lack of association may be due to implementation challenges affecting the levels of coverage of ID programs. A majority of the programs we review (32 of 48) report some form of implementation challenges. Section 4 details the various implementation challenges experienced by all programs reviewed.

4 Implementation Challenges

Establishing a national-scale identification system is complex, which leads to a wide range of challenges (Gelb & Clark, 2013). We identify seven main categories of implementation challenges: accountability, privacy, data management, enrollment, coverage, cost, and harmonization of ID programs (Table 3). Coverage, including geographic and demographic characteristics, is the most reported challenge (22), and of the 39 programs for which we find evidence of challenges, 20 report challenges in two or more categories.

Table 3 – National ID Program Implementation Challenges

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Implementation or Program Challenges

Accountability

Privacy

Data Management

Enrollment

Coverage

Cost

Interoperability

Afghanistan

e-tazkira

--

--

--

--

X

--

X

Algeria

National ID

--

--

--

X

--

--

--

Angola

National ID

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Bangladesh

National Identity Card (NID)

--

--

X

--

--

--

--

Burkina Faso

National ID

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Burkina Faso

Voter Card

--

--

X

--

--

--

--

Cambodia

National ID

--

--

--

X

X

X

--

Cambodia

IDPoor

--

--

--

--

--

X

--

Cameroon

National Identity Card

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

China

Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil

--

X

--

--

--

--

--

Colombia

Cedula de Ciudadania

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Congo

Elector's Card

X

--

--

--

--

--

--

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

--

--

--

X

X

X

--

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Egypt

National Identity Card (Current Program) / Personal Verification Card

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Ethiopia

Regional ID

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Ghana

GhanaCard

--

--

X

--

X

--

--

Guatemala

Documento Personal de Identificación (DIP)

X

--

X

--

X

--

--

India

Aadhaar

--

X

--

--

--

--

X

Indonesia

Kartu Tanda Penduduk Elektronik (E-KTP)

--

--

X

X

X

--

--

Iran

Karte Melli

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Iraq

Civil Status Identification Card (Bitaka shakhsiyeh)

--

--

--

X

X

--

--

Kenya

Third Generation National ID

X

--

--

X

X

--

--

Madagascar

National Identity Card

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Malawi

National Registration and Identification System

X

--

--

-

--

X

--

Mali

National Identification Number (NINA) Card

--

--

X

--

X

--

--

Morocco

Carte Nationale D'Identite Electronique

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Mozambique

Bilhete de Identidade

X

--

--

--

X

X

--

Nepal

National Identity Card (NID)

X

--

--

--

--

--

--

Niger

Voter Card

X

--

--

--

--

X

--

Nigeria

National Identification Numbers (NIN) and National Electronic Identity Cards (eID)

--

--

--

X

--

--

X

Nigeria

Bank Verification Number (BVN)

--

--

--

X

X

--

X

Pakistan

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Peru

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

--

--

--

X

X

--

--

Philippines

Filipino Identification System Act

--

X

--

--

--

--

--

Romania

National Identity Card / Carte de identitate eID

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Sri Lanka

National Identity Card (NIC) / e-NIC

--

X

--

X

--

--

--

Sudan

National Identity Card
Identity Card

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Tanzania

National ID Program

--

--

--

--

--

X

--

Thailand

National Identity Card / National ID Card / Smart ID Card

X

--

--

X

--

--

--

Uganda

National Security Information System (NSIS)

X

--

--

X

X

X

--

Ukraine

Biometric Passport

--

--

--

X

--

--

--

Ukraine

ID Card/Biometric Identification Card

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Uzbekistan

ePassports / Biometric Passports

X

--

--

--

X

--

--

Vietnam

Identity Cards People's Identity Cards

--

--

--

--

X

--

--

Yemen

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Zambia

National Registration Cards (NRC)

X

--

--

X

--

--

--

Zambia

Continuous Voter Registration/Voter Registration Cards

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

GRAND TOTAL

11

4

6

14

22

8

4

4.1 Accountability

We find reports of a lack of institutional accountability and transparency in 11 of the programs we review, with evidence of corruption occurring on both micro (local/individual) and macro (national/institutional) levels.

Accountability issues at the micro level in six programs (Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Uganda, and Zambia – NRC) include reports of officials and enrollment personnel soliciting money from citizens for program services beyond a required fee or when fees do not exist. In the cases of Kenya and Mozambique where initial citizen enrollment charges were reduced, alleged corruption is attributed to logistical challenges. Registration officers in Kenya acknowledged the unofficial fees and explained that in the face of limited funding, citizens are charged to offset material shortages or supplement the allowances of mobile registration officers (KNCHR, 2007). In Mozambique, the contracted agency Semlex stated that overcharging citizens was an oversight caused by the incomplete update of the computer system after the reduction in charges (AIM News, 2011). Government officials in Zambia suggest that increased public awareness and education about the registration process could be an effective tool to fight local extortion (Malambo, 2015). In Niger local distribution committees lack institutional oversight and members are reported to use the supply of electoral cards as a tool for political manipulation or collusion (University of Florida, n.d.).

Accountability challenges on a macro-level in six of the programs (Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Thailand, and Uganda) relate to the presence or perceived presence of corruption surrounding contracts and/or tenders for the programs. In nearly all cases, limited transparency in the contract bidding and awarding process leads to accusations of collusion and causes significant delays in the implementation of the program. One example is Nepal, which is currently undergoing its second bidding process after it was discovered that a former employee of the initially contracted Gemalto had prepared the tender document (Planet Biometrics, 2014). In Thailand, the implementation of the program has been delayed twice, once in 2006 and again in 2010, both in part due to the suspicion of corruption in the auction process (Gao & Gunawong, 2010).

We find evidence of further challenges with accountability in Uzbekistan, where limited information on regulations and security raise questions about political manipulation (Landinfo, 2013), in Guatemala, with accounts of nepotism and corrupt hiring practices (The Carter Center, 2013), and in Uganda, with repeat government offenses concerning the inappropriate procurement of equipment (Committee-on-Defense, Government of Uganda, 2012; Gelb & Clark, 2013).

4.2 Privacy

Privacy concerns are surfacing as incorporating biometric features in national identification programs has rapidly increased. While biometric features have the potential to strengthen national security and surveillance, they may also impinge on existing privacy rights of citizens, raising questions on how to safeguard citizens from abuse (Malik, 2014). Four countries report privacy challenges (China, India, Philippines, and Sri Lanka), though evidence suggests a general concern over the potential for abuse rather than concrete examples of privacy violations. In China, for example, we find evidence of concern over the increased ability for police to track citizens’ movements and monitor political and religious dissidents, with fears that information linked to the ID program can be used to target or arbitrarily detain certain groups (Chen, 2003; Keane, 2006).

Many countries are adopting accompanying data protection laws along with their ID programs to address privacy concerns relating to widespread and easy access to personal information across government agencies (Gellman, 2013). Certain programs have implemented targeted security measures concerning information access and citizen privacy. For example, strict clearance levels are required to access the UID database in India (UIDAI, 2012), and software has been put in place by NADRA in Pakistan that allows citizens to see what organizations or individuals have accessed their data (Malik, 2014). While these systems have the potential to address some concerns over citizen privacy and information abuse, we do not find supporting evidence that these measures have changed public perception on the security of information and privacy within their respective countries.

4.3 Data Management

Data registries are the foundational element in most national identification programs, and therefore are integral in maintaining a functional and effective program. Six programs (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso – Voter Card, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Mali) report challenges with data maintenance, which we define as to the ability to establish, maintain, and secure updated citizen registries within a central database.

In several cases, programs face challenges with establishing their databases. In Ghana, the central database infrastructure was completed five years after data capture began, which led to a discrepancy between the number of citizens registered for the program and those with their data recorded. Fifteen million Ghanaian citizens registered with the national civil registry, but only nine million were input into the central database (Akrofi-Larbi, 2015). In Bangladesh, Burkina Faso – Voter Card, and Guatemala, the initial data gathered were of mixed quality and coverage which created complications as countries moved to establish their national identification programs (Gelb and Clark, 2013; Eulich 2011). As a result, Guatemala for example had to re-print over 2.9 million cards with data corrections (Eulich, 2011). We find evidence that Mali experienced widespread problems during the distribution of NINA cards leading up to its 2013 national election. Officials failed to properly update citizen information following the initial registration. Without updated information, cards were distributed by mail to the localities where citizens enrolled in 2009 or 2010, making collection difficult or even impossible for some citizens, especially those that had since been internally displaced by the war in Northern Mali (Duval Smith, 2013).

We find evidence of some form of data protection in 16 programs, but these measures range in their level of security in terms of data safety and preventing the creation of fake documents. Indonesia briefly halted its e-ID program in late 2015/early 2015 when reports of fake circulating ID cards indicated a possible security breach (AntaraNews, 2014b). Nigeria’s NIMC has a security unit to physically guard personnel and assets (NIMC, 2013), while the UIDAI in India has data encryption software and is stored in a reportedly highly secure data vault (UIDAI, 2012). These data protection measures are also connected to concerns over privacy of enrollment data.

4.4 Enrollment

We find evidence that 14 programs experience general challenges enrolling citizens. We define enrollment challenges as those that directly affect the ability to carry out a comprehensive and successful registration drive. Broadly, these failures tend to result from inadequate access to resources and complex enrollment procedures.

We identify limited access to resources as a barrier to carrying out effective registration campaigns in several programs. Resource challenges include: broken or insufficient equipment and/or material (Cambodia – National ID, Indonesia, Nigeria – NIN, Peru, Thailand, Ukraine – Biometric Passport); undertrained staff (most commonly regarding language diversity) and/or limited human resources (Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uganda); and lack of logistical support, guidelines, or public awareness regarding the enrollment process (Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria – BVN, Nigeria – NIN, and Zambia – NRC).

In addition, we find evidence that the complexity and/or high centralization of enrollment procedures causes challenges with enrollment in three countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Iraq, and Kenya). The enrollment process in Kenya, for example, involves in-person verification at the National Registration Bureau, and printing and physical mailing of applications and ID cards. One review states that “This process, according to the NRB, is supposed to take approximately 30 days. But residents from the sample districts (with the exception of Nairobi) reported that in reality the feedback process could take as long as 2 years” (KNCHR, 2007). Complex and lengthy registration procedures can have a larger impact on cost, data management, and coverage (The Carter Center, 2011).

4.5 Coverage

Twenty-two programs report challenges associated with coverage, which we define as the extent to which a program is able to penetrate different geographic and demographic populations. In many cases, limited geographic coverage strongly impacts demographic coverage as populations living in remote areas or far from program facilities are disadvantaged and excluded from enrollment (see Table 4 for further analysis).

Six programs (Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria – BVN, and Peru) report geographic barriers as a limitation to comprehensive coverage. We find evidence that a lack of enrollment, printing, or distribution centers is a central barrier for five of these programs (Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria – BVN, and Peru). One example is Ghana, where the production of identification cards only occurs in the Greater Accra and Ashanti regions, and distribution of cards is limited to the Greater Accra region. Citizens outside of these regions are not restricted from using the facilities, but the high cost of travel to the locations is a barrier to enrollment (Akrofi-Larbi, 2015). In Peru, lack of available registry centers is identified as a potential reason for low enrollment, and itinerant registration drives (meaning traveling teams and mobile registration) were initiated to help reach more populations. While mobile registration may increase enrollment of citizens living in remote areas, itinerant registration teams experience challenges with data management and enrollment through technical and human resources (Reyna, 2014).

NADRA in Pakistan runs one of the most effective campaigns aimed at reaching full geographic (and demographic) coverage. The program included procuring mobile registration vans and motorcycle units, and hiring man-pack units of hikers, mountaineers, and skiers to hike into remote areas to both educate and enroll citizens in the program. While this program helped NADRA reach a 98 percent coverage rate, it is relatively resource intensive (Malik, 2014). Some countries may therefore be precluded from using similar measures to increase coverage.

The cost of enrollment varies depending on the resources used for registration. Reported unit costs – the total cost per individual for enrollment, registration, production, etc. – range from US$0.37 (Ghana) to US$79.80 (Peru). This wide range in costs range can be attributed in part to the heightened costs associated with itinerant registration and enrollment in areas with low population density. For example, the cost to register an individual in Peru at a service office costs US$10.32, but registration costs rise to US$21.83 in the coastal region, US$42.05 in the highlands region, and US$79.80 in the jungle region (Reyna, 2014). Financial resources may therefore limit a program’s ability to address challenges with geographic coverage. Kenya’s national identification program coverage is constrained by budget allocation decisions. Funding is equally distributed between all districts without attention to size, population, or geographic features. This practice leaves areas with greater need for funding without the means to implement enrollment drives, disadvantaging populations in those districts (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2007).

In addition to geographic barriers to coverage, nineteen programs have evidence of limited coverage of particular demographic groups. For many developing countries previously lacking any official identification systems, Gelb & Clark (2013) argue that establishing new national identity programs represents an opportunity for economic, social, and political development. However, certain populations, such as people living in poverty, women, and minority groups, are vulnerable to exclusion from these programs. Obstacles are rarely put in place deliberately to block particular populations, but in practice, various administrative procedures (including the location of administrative offices and the languages spoken by implementing agency staff) or other challenges can create hurdles and/or indirect costs that prevent certain groups from participating (The Carter Center, 2011). Exclusion effectively cuts off these populations from many of the services linked to national identity programs. People who lack any official documentation are deprived of public transfers and services, financial services such as opening bank accounts or registering property, and health care (Gelb & Clark, 2013).

None of the evidence we review for the 48 national identity programs includes information for the percentage of the enrolled who are poor and the percentage of the poor in the target population who are enrolled. However, we find some evidence of challenges faced by the poor in enrolling or using the national identity programs. The two main barriers or deterrents faced by poor populations are expensive fees for ID card registration (Cambodia – National ID, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Peru), and the costs associated with obtaining the prerequisites for registration, such as birth certificates or housing certificates (Angola, Iraq, and Peru). General poverty and economic vulnerability is also cited as a challenge in some countries (Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire). In addition, we find links between geographic and demographic challenges in terms of coverage of the poor (Table 4). Limited registration centers can especially impact poor, rural communities without the resources or time to travel long and/or challenging distances to register in person.

Table 4 – Challenges Enrolling Poor and Rural Populations

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Poor Individuals Lack Access

Challenge Enrolling Rural Residents

Angola

National ID

X

X

Cambodia

National ID

X

Cameroon

National Identity Card

X

X

Congo

Elector's Card

X

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

X

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

X

X

Guatemala

Documento Personal de Identificación (DIP)

X

Iraq

Civil Status Identification Card (Bitaka shakhsiyeh)

X

Kenya

Third Generation National ID

X

Mozambique

Bilhete de Identidade

X

X

Pakistan

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

X

Peru

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

X

X

Sudan

National Identity Card

X

X

Zambia

National Registration Cards (NRC)

X

Women are another group at risk of exclusion from national ID programs. We are able to find information on the percentage of the enrolled who are women for just three countries: Cote d’Ivoire (51 percent), Indonesia (51 percent), and Pakistan (44 percent). Nevertheless, several of the documents reviewed describe challenges that women face with enrollment or use of the national identity programs in their countries. For example, to obtain a Tazkera ID in Afghanistan a married woman must submit her husband’s Tazkera or that of one of his male relatives in order to complete her own application (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005). An Iraqi woman can only be granted a Civil Status ID if a male relative vouches for her (OWFI, 2015). In Egypt, the biggest obstacle facing women in obtaining a national ID is the lack of a birth certificate, which is a requirement in national ID registration (National Council for Women, n.d.).

Besides the poor and women, we find evidence of other populations experiencing challenges with enrollment or use of the national identity programs in 13 countries[13]. In some cases, exclusion is a direct result of legal or institutional frameworks, as seen in the cases involving indigenous or minority exclusion (five programs), and religious exclusion (four). Select religious groups and ethnic minority populations are the most commonly excluded groups. Bennett & Lyon (2008) warn that identity cards, especially those that are related to the function of surveillance, may contribute to “social sorting” because “once cards are mandatory, then they may be used to single out or even to harass visible minorities and those with alternative lifestyles.” In Egypt, requiring an individual to list his or her religion as either Muslim, Jewish, or Christian on the national identity card created a barrier for Baha’is, though a 2008 court ruling allowed Egyptian citizens, including Baha’is, to decline to state a religion and to use a dash on the identity card instead (Farivar, 2012). Other similar cases of religious exclusion include Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan. We also find concerns with minority populations vulnerable to exclusion with mandatory ID programs in five countries (Colombia, Guatemala, Kenya, Peru, and Sudan). Colombia and Guatemala had enrollment incidents relating to the discrimination of indigenous populations, while Kenya, Peru, and Sudan have complex registration or enrollment procedures that often require a large number of additional documents for proof of identities that are difficult for certain minority populations to produce. For example, people from certain communities in Kenya need to fulfill sixteen requirements before they can obtain identity cards, while Kenyans from other areas are not subjected to this rigorous and lengthy process (Ogiek Peopes’ Development Programme et al., 2011).

Indirect exclusion can also result from other enrollment or use challenges that impact some populations more than others. Other populations reportedly experiencing challenges in national identity program enrollment include refugees, those that are internally displaced, and stateless and undocumented individuals (three programs), often because they lack pre-requisite materials for enrollment. Additional details on barriers to enrollment for different populations for each national ID program is reported in the review spreadsheet.

4.6 Cost

Figure 6 – Program Funding Source

We identify a range of funding sources and structures connected to the implementation of identity programs. Of the 23 programs we review that have evidence on funding sources, 19 programs receive at least part of their budget from a government agency or donor organization (Figure 6). A number of large international donors embrace national identity projects as part of their development strategies. Table 5 reflects the findings of Dahan & Gelb (2013), who suggest, “Partner financing can [help] to ensure a focused and inclusive identity program. Donors could commit, as far as possible, to the development and use of the core national ID systems for projects that they support, rather than developing new functional registries for every project. This will strengthen demand for the use of the system and encourage registration” (p. 6). In the programs we review, donor agencies include the United Nationals Development Program (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Besides providing financial support, disseminating best practices, offering legal support, and ensuring technology is robust, donors also play a key role in ensuring that the poor do not face cost barriers and systematic exclusion to identification (ibid.). Other funding sources for the programs we review include private firms and public-private partnerships (PPP).

Table 5 – Key Stakeholders in National ID Programs

Type of Stakeholder

Multilaterals (MDBs)

Foundations/NGOs

Other Development Partners/agencies

Key Stakeholders

• African Development Bank (AfDB)

• Asian Development Bank (ADB)

• Inter-American Development Bank

• Organization of American States (OAS)

• UniteCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

• World Bank Group (WBG)

• Data2X

• CRC4D

• World Vision

• International Organization for Migration (IOM)

• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

Source: Adapted from Dahan & Gelb, 2015.

There are two notable examples that deviate from these traditional funding structures: NADRA in Pakistan and RENIEC in Peru. Both programs depend on generating their own revenue, meaning they internalize initial enrollment and production costs and charge fees associated with the cards to earn back revenue (Ahmad Jan, 2006; Harbitz & Boekle-Giuffrida, 2009). In Pakistan, NADRA charges fees to organizations or government bodies when a citizen’s biometric information is used for authentication, for example by a bank (Malik, 2014). While both institutions are under the auspices of a government body, NADRA formed an independent public company, NADRA Technologies Limited, through which it provides services to other countries to implement similar national identification programs (Ahmad Jan, 2006). By independently self-regulating their budgets, NADRA and RENIEC are argued to have developed successful funding structures, and potentially exercise more freedom in their activities as compared to programs that are restricted by the timeline or resources of their funding source (Malik, 2014).

Though most technology costs are generally falling, we find evidence of challenges relating to program costs for eight national identity programs. Since costs impact many aspects of program implementation, we restrict cost challenges to macro-level issues that arise directly from a lack of funding.

The most common financial and capital challenges are associated with delays or indefinite suspensions in enrollment and production (Cambodia – National ID, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda). The National Registration and Identification program in Malawi experienced a one-year delay until it was allocated additional funding from the national budget (Chilunga, 2015), while the program in Cote d’Ivoire was repeatedly suspended due to insufficient funds to deploy and pay the technical enrollment teams (The Carter Center, 2011). Beyond the initial costs incurred, countries must be able to further bear the ongoing costs associated with data management, security, and continual enrollment. Cambodia’s IDPoor program saw great success with initial enrollment in part through partner financial support, but faces uncertainty in the funding needed to maintain systematic coverage long-term (Cambodia Ministry of Planning, n.d.). Countries may also face challenges with the costs of training and building labor and technical capacity for implementing and managing ID programs, but we do not identify any programs that specifically mention this issue.

Cost challenges extend beyond operational delays and we find evidence that limited financial resources affect the relative ability of a country to negotiate the details of national identification program design, as seen in three countries (Mozambique, Niger, and Uganda). While technology costs are falling, developing identification systems with biometric technology is costly (Gelb & Clark, 2013). Mozambique entered a controversial and reportedly disadvantageous contract with the private firm Semlex, speculated to have been driven by financial constraints forcing the country to outsource card development (AIM News, 2010). Niger also reported abandoned biometric features in their voter registration cards due to their cost, despite a consensus that it would be a more reliable option to ensure fair elections (University of Florida, n.d.).

4.7 Harmonization of ID Programs

In all of the countries we review, the identified program(s) are the dominant identification system present in the country. In many cases, the programs are implemented to either establish the first official system of identification in the country or to create one central identity framework to replace multiple forms of documentation (e.g., birth certificates, passports, etc.). However, we find evidence in three countries (Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria) of challenges involving the interoperability of the reviewed identification program(s) with other national systems.

In Nigeria and India, challenges of interoperability relate to a lack of clear, legal frameworks and delegation of responsibilities by governing bodies (Udunze, 2015; Zelazny, 2012). In Nigeria, the legal right of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) program to register citizens using biometric information was contested by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) who claimed the dominant role in identification matters, though an agreement was reached to harmonize the databases (Udunze, 2015). In India, the UID mandate to issue identification numbers is separate from the mandate to issue national identity cards, causing confusion and repeated registration efforts as both groups compete to enroll more citizens in the respective databases (Zelazny, 2012). In the case of Afghanistan, we find evidence that conceptual challenges exist concerning the link between electronic signatures and electronic authentication, and more broadly, how these different elements can be integrated into an electronic multipurpose infrastructure (Danish, 2014).

5 Functions Linked To Identity Programs

Registration of country populations and issuing IDs can benefit both the private and public sectors’ ability to deliver services, potentially increasing efficiency and accountability (Gelb & Clark, 2013). As such, national ID programs have been purposed to serve a wide range of functions, including financial services, health, and agriculture. In addition, ID programs can be valuable in elections, facilitating government social transfers, surveillance and security, aiding civil service administration, and supporting other functions such as travel across jurisdictions (Figure 7).

Figure 7 – Functional Applications of the 48 Reviewed ID Programs

National ID programs may be linked to several types of functions. Table 6 presents the functions connected to each of the programs we review. For each category of functions, we specify the sub-categories of services that are linked to the national ID program. These categories of functional connections are discussed in greater detail in the sections below.

Table 6 – Functionalities of National Identity Programs

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Financial services

Social transfers

Health

Agricultural services

Elections

Surveillance & security

Other functions

Afghanistan

e-tazkira

KYC*

Algeria

National ID

Angola

National ID

KYC

VR

TR

Bangladesh

National ID

KYC

W

KYC

SIM

KYC

Burkina Faso

National ID

KYC

VR

Burkina Faso

Voter Card

KYC

Cambodia

National ID

KYC

VR

KYC

Cambodia

IDPoor

O

VEB

Cameroon

National ID

VR

China

Second Gen. Resident ID Card

KYC

KYC

LE

Colombia

Cedula de Ciudadania

KYC

Congo

Elector's Card

KYC, MM

KYC

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

KYC

TR

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

KYC

TR

Egypt

National ID

DB*, KYC, MM*

KYC, M

TR, O

Ethiopia

Regional ID

KYC

Ghana

GhanaCard

DB*, KYC

KYC*, R*

VR*

SIM*, O*

KYC*, CSAT *

Guatemala

DIP

VR

India

Aadhaar

DB, KYC, MM

CT, W

TST, VEB

M

LE

CSAT, TR

Indonesia

E-KTP

O

KYC, M*

LE

KYC, O

Iran

Karte Melli

O*

Iraq

Civil Status ID Card

KYC

KYC

O

Kenya

Third Gen. National ID

KYC, MM

KYC

VR

P, SIM

Madagascar

National ID

VR, KYC

Malawi

National Registration and ID System

Mali

National ID Number (NINA)

KYC

KYC

KYC

Morocco

Electronic National ID

BM

TR

Mozambique

Bilhete de Identidade

Nepal

National ID Card

Niger

Voter Card

KYC

Nigeria

National Electronic ID Cards

DB, KYC

SS, O

O

DOS, O

VR

KYC, T, O

Nigeria

Bank Verification Number

KYC

Pakistan

NADRA

DB, O

CT, R

TST, O

KYC, M, VR

P, SIM, O

Peru

RENIEC

KYC

KYC, W

KYC

KYC, VR

SIM

O

Philippines

Filipino Identification System Act

KYC*

KYC*

KYC*

KYC*

KYC*, O*

Romania

National ID Card

KYC

O

Sri Lanka

National ID Card (NIC)/e-NIC

KYC

KYC

O

Sudan

National ID Card

KYC

O

Tanzania

National ID Program

KYC

KYC

M, VR

LE, P

O

Thailand

National ID Card/Smart ID Card

KYC

R, W

TST, VEB

MES, O

O

Uganda

National Security Information System

KYC*

KYC*

TST*, VEB*

KYC

BM*, P, O*

KYC*, CSAT *, T*, O*

Ukraine

Biometric Passport

Ukraine

ID Card/Biometric ID Card

Uzbekistan

ePassports/Biometric Passports

KYC

Vietnam

ID Cards (People's ID Card)

Yemen

Biometric Voter Registration

KYC

O

Zambia

National Registration Cards

KYC, DB*

KYC, VR

Zambia

Voter Registration Cards

KYC, VR

O

Note: Under many categories of functions, the service involves using an ID to access services, which we denote as Know Your Customer (KYC). Sub-categories under financial services include digital banking (DB) and mobile money (MM). We separately consider several sub-categories of social transfers as a subset of financial services, including cash transfers (CT), relief (R), social security (SS), and welfare (W). Under health, sub-categories of linkages tracking services and treatment (TST), verification of eligibility/coverage/benefit (VEB). We include monitoring of extension services (MES) and distribution of subsidies (DOS) under agriculture, and monitoring (M), voting (V), and voter registration (VR) under elections. Under surveillance and security we break down linkages into, border enforcement (BM), SIM registration (SIM), and Passport (P). Finally, we include several other types of services linked with identity programs, including, driver registration (DR), student and/or teacher or civil service attendance tracking (STCAT), taxes (T), and travel (TR). For several functional linkages, we also note if there are Other (O) types of services connected to the ID programs.

In many cases, we find national identity programs are linked to several types of services within each category, especially for functions related to finance, elections, and surveillance and security. Know Your Customer (KYC) linkages are often accompanied with connections to other services, such as voter registration, digital banking, and mobile money. Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda stand out as well-integrated ID programs: all cover five or more functional categories. Conversely, we do not find evidence of linkages of national ID programs with any of these types of services in Algeria, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, the Ukraine, or Vietnam.

In the sections below, we provide an overview of the various functions that are found to be connected to the different national identity programs we surveyed, looking at each category of functions in turn.

Key Findings

• We find references to financial connections in 24 of 48 programs.

• 22 of these programs have connections that are KYC-related.

• Five ID programs (India, Kenya, Nigeria e-ID, Pakistan, Zambia) are linked to digital banking, and four (DRC, Egypt, India, Kenya) have mobile money applications.

• 13 programs are connected to government assistance programs, which include cash transfers, relief, and welfare.

5.1 Finance

Our literature review reveals that 50 percent of the 48 ID programs reviewed are linked to financial uses. Four financial “sub-categories” emerged in our search (Figure 8):

• Know your customer – ID used by financial entities to comply with KYC laws

• Digital banking – ID is linked to citizen bank accounts or bank loans, facilitating movement of e-money (often in conjunction with a government social service program)

• Mobile money – ID is used for mobile money registration, access to accounts, and/or payments

• Social transfers – ID is linked to government assistance programs, which include cash transfers, relief, and welfare

Figure 8 – Financial Connections to ID Programs

Know Your Customer

In many countries, certain individuals or populations lack the necessary identity documents to open a bank account. Know-Your-Customer (KYC) laws require banks to be able to confirm a customer’s identity with “reasonable belief” in a four-step process outlined by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council: “collecting credentials from the customer, verifying the credentials and the customer against them, checking the customer against government lists, and record keeping” (Dahan & Sudan, 2015).

Identity cards and the issuance of unique ID numbers can promote financial inclusion by providing unbanked individuals with the credentials banks need in order to verify customer identities (Brewer, Meniers, & Schott, 2015). We find this is the most common financial function associated with ID cards. Of 24 ID programs with financial connections in the literature, 22 are mentioned as helping to facilitate adherence to KYC regulations. In nearly all cases, the card functions simply to verify identity. In Tanzania, for example, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs remarked that the country’s new, biometric electronic ID can guarantee the identity of individuals during any given transaction (iD People, 2015). India is taking implications for KYC a step further by taking the onus off of banks to perform KYC processes each time a financial interaction occurs. Before recent innovations, a customer who had already opened up a savings account would have to repeat the KYC process to open up a fixed deposit account, even if both accounts are at the same bank. Now, however, customer information is being recorded in a central database, using the unique identity number issued as part of India’s Aadhaar national ID program as an identifier. Banks, insurance companies, and others can access the database as part of their KYC activities. The database is expected to cut down bureaucratic processes for both financial institutions and customers (Sikarwar, 2015).

In Nigeria, the connection between KYC for financial transactions and the Bank Verification Number (BVN) initiative poses a possible threat to increased financial inclusion. BVN assigns a single identification number to bank account owners for verification at all banks and points of transaction. The centralized biometric-based system is expected to increase the efficiency of banking operations and establish a single, standard identification form that meets KYC requirements for all customers (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014). However, the BVN will become the only accepted form of verification to access accounts or make transactions following the end of the registration period in 2015. Reports suggests that public confusion over the new system and registration requirements have triggered a panic that could potentially lead to a surge of citizens withdrawing money from formal accounts rather than registering in the BVN program (Okoye, 2015).

Digital Banking

Though only five programs describe functional links to digital banking, the purposes of tying ID programs to digital banking are diffuse. Applications of ID programs include streamlining government payments and targeting delivery of subsidies, providing direct relief to disaster victims, and increasing financial inclusion. Gelb & Clark (2013) write that biometric technology is driving the ability to conduct secure online transactions. All five of the programs tied to digital banking are—or are planned to be—embedded with biometric information.

Two of the digital banking links (India, Pakistan) are related to government cash transfer programs. Theory, and some evidence, suggest that the use of electronic IDs can reduce leakage and improve delivery efficiency (Gelb & Clark, 2013). A 2014 randomized evaluation of subsidy delivery by two welfare programs in Andhra Pradesh, India, found that adding biometric verification to verify recipients’ identity before disbursing funds led to a 35 percent reduction in leakages (Muralidharan, Paul, & Sandip, 2015). However, using biometric scanners to confirm an individual’s identity and authenticate the recipients of subsidies can be problematic.

Pakistan and India are testing similar models on a national scale with their ID programs. During a disastrous period of flooding in 2010 that affected over 20 million people, Pakistan used its already established biometric citizen registry to confirm identities through fingerprint identification. Officials checked known citizen addresses to ensure intended beneficiaries were from the affected area and then disbursed aid on electronic, prepaid debit cards (PR Newswire, 2010; Malik, 2014). The digitized verification system also allowed officials to ensure that poor women were direct recipients of transfers (Dahan & Sudan, 2015).

In India, over 150 million bank accounts are now linked to the national ID. Though many are not consistently used, demand is expected to grow as India continues to link its social programs with direct deposits to beneficiary bank accounts (Dahan and Gelb, 2015). As of 2014, “one out of six consumers of liquid petroleum cooking gas (used widely across India) receives their subsidy” through direct deposits to bank accounts tied to a national ID linked payment system (Chen, 2014). Again, as in Pakistan, directly linking bank accounts to the Aadhaar number and biometric information has assisted efforts to deliver transfers to female recipients (Dahan & Sudan, 2015).

Nigeria is taking a different course to provide financial services to the unbanked. In 2015, the government partnered with MasterCard to produce a national identity card that doubles as a payment card. According to MasterCard, “Nigerians can deposit funds, receive social benefits, save, or engage in many other financial transactions that are facilitated by electronic payment” (MasterCard, n.d.). Plans are in place to deliver social security benefits through the card, and also provide direct cash transfers to program beneficiaries of hydrocarbon subsidies. In addition, MasterCard’s head of business for West Africa stated that the cards could be used to establish credit ratings for the poor (Oxford, 2014). Kenya and Pakistan’s national IDs are also tied to financial inclusion. Links with M-Shwari, a mobile savings and loan platform, facilitate access to digital loans through the Central Bank of Africa (see below Mobile Money section). Pakistan’s national insurance company partnered with NADRA to offer accidental death insurance upon purchase of an ID card for a small additional fee (Malik, 2014).

Within our review, we find a few instances in which financial transactions are dependent on biometric verification of a recipient’s identity on-site. As mentioned previously, Pakistan confirmed relief recipients’ identities by using fingerprint scanners. In India, on a pilot basis, wages paid to beneficiaries of the Rural Employment Guarantee Act were made dependent on fingerprint identification (Jishnu & Sood, 2012). The Central Bank of Nigeria’s BVN program also relies on biometrics. Across all Nigerian banks, customers are issued a unique identity number at the time of their enrollment. At that time, a facial image and fingerprints are also collected. When customers perform a transaction, like applying for a loan or transferring money, they are required to authenticate their identity using biometric scanners (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a).

While programs in India, Nigeria, and Pakistan authenticate financial transactions on site using biometric information, in general, cost considerations may prevent other ID programs from doing the same. Portable fingerprint scanners can be less cost effective than traditional means of verification (e.g. presenting a physical ID), especially if they are distributed at the scale required for use in national programs (Gelb & Clark, 2013). In many cases within our review we find that the initial biometric registration of citizens is carried out by international companies who are contracted specifically for the task. These companies bring scanners and other equipment to register citizen biometric information during the registration process, but the equipment is not typically given over to governments for use after registration is completed. Thus, while governments may have a central registry of citizen biometric information they do not necessarily possess the equipment to verify citizens on site for financial/social transfers, elections, or other functions unless they have separately funded the acquisition of such infrastructure. Even with sufficient equipment, technical problems can sometimes interfere. In India, reports emerged that portable biometric scanners were unable to read the fingerprints of rural residents whose hands were calloused or worn from labor. As a result, beneficiaries of the Rural Employment Guarantee Act were unable to withdraw wages (Jishnu & Sood, 2012). Cost and technical capacity may partially explain why we find many ID programs that incorporate biometric features, but few functions that require biometric authentication on-site.

Mobile Money

In Congo, national identification cards are used to sign-up for and access mobile money accounts (Intermedia, 2013). In Kenya and Egypt, however, mobile money and IDs are more intricately linked. In a deal similar to Nigeria’s digital banking partnership, MasterCard recently partnered with Egypt to integrate the Citizens’ National ID with the country’s national mobile money platform. “The system will allow the government to issue digital ID cards which can be used to pay for a number of services including government fees, mobile bills, merchant purchases and domestic remittances” (Security Document World, 2015).

In Kenya, customers of M-Shwari who have national IDs are entitled to higher maximum savings balances and access to credit. Cook & McKay (2015) explain that first-level identity verification for M-Shwari occurs “using the existing KYC details from the customer registration of the phone number (SIM) and M-PESA account, which requires physical presentation of an ID.” However, a second-level verification can occur if these initial KYC details can be matched against the identification information contained in Kenya’s Integrated Population Registration System (which contains all citizens with national IDs). A successful match means a customer is entitled to accounts that can hold KES 250,000 (instead of the usual KES 100,000). They are also qualified to borrow from the Central Bank of Africa, because they have gone through a stronger verification process (Cook & McKay, 2015). This remote verification method allows the central bank to accurately confirm identity: the biometric database and central registry lend additional confidence that a unique identification has been made. With this confidence, the bank can offer more and higher-quality services, mitigating the perverse cycle whereby identification challenges increase costs for banks and lead to reduced financial service packages for customers (Dahan & Gelb, 2015).

Figure 9 – Social Transfer Connections to ID Programs

Social Transfers

Finally, ID programs are found to link to social transfers and government assistance programs. In many cases IDs verify beneficiary identity for program officials delivering services or goods. If an ID has an identifiable function for social transfer programs beyond KYC, it is categorized into the type of program to which it is linked, including cash transfers, relief, and welfare. Examples of these programs are detailed in previous sections, especially as linkages with KYC and digital banking are often used for social transfers. However, Figure 9 further illustrates the extent to which social transfers and ID programs are tied together.

Key Findings

• Four programs track services and treatment using national identifications registries. India and Pakistan track immunizations, and Thailand and Uganda’s national ID’s facilitate patient management and tracking at hospitals.

• Four ID programs assist with verification of eligibility/coverage/benefits (Cambodia, India, Thailand, Uganda).

• 38 percent of the registries that underpin ID programs begin enrolling children at birth.

5.2 Health

Twelve ID programs are linked to health functions. Common health linkages include the following:

• ID to access services – Entering hospitals, and accessing healthcare or insurance applications.

• Tracking services and treatment – The ID is used to monitor patient services and treatment (i.e. immunizations).

• Verification of eligibility/coverage/benefits – The registry or ID assists medical personnel to verify eligibility, funnels registrants into correct eligibility categories, or itself signals eligibility for a given healthcare program.

Figure 10 – ID Program Registration Ages

The inclusion of “identity” as a proposed Sustainable Development Goal (Goal 16.9 – By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration) is partially rooted in the benefits that a population registry can bring to public health. Dahan & Gelb (2015) include “improvements in maternal and child health, and coverage by vaccines and similar treatments” as health goals that are buoyed by widespread adoption of ID documents, registries, and systems. Challenges with issuing documentation, however, begin at birth. Worldwide, one in every three children under five have never been registered or issued birth certificates. Lack of birth certificates can present challenges to children receiving health care and to government’s ability to track births, marriages, deaths (UNICEF, 2013).

Many of the ID programs profiled in this paper function primarily as voter cards or national IDs that are issued at later stages in life and therefore do not aim to register children. However, 38 percent of the registries that underpin ID programs do incorporate children before age 11 (Figure 10). Colombia’s Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil has a three-tiered system of documentation from birth to age 18. It issues birth certificates to newborns, an identity card to minors at age seven, and its “citizen card” to adults at 18 (Immigration and Refugee Board – Colombia, 2007). India has set its registration age at five, but beginning in May 2015 the state of Haryana began enrolling newborn babies into the Aadhaar program, issuing each unique ID numbers. The goal of such early enrollment is related to both health and education, as it enables the government to centrally track immunization rates and also school admission during adolescence (Economic Times of India, 2015a).

Figure 11 illustrates what health services are linked to national ID programs. In six cases, IDs are necessary in order to access hospital or other health care system services (Iraq, Mali, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan). Four programs track services and treatment using national identifications registries. India and Pakistan track immunizations, and Thailand and Uganda’s national ID’s facilitate patient management and tracking at hospitals. Four countries (Cambodia, India, Thailand, Uganda) are using ID registries to verify eligibility for particular health insurance coverage or for medical benefits. For example, Thailand’s national ID synchronizes with its universal health coverage to automatically separate citizens into one of three possible public health insurance schemes: “a) the civil servant medical benefit scheme for government employees, spouses, and dependents under 20 years old, their parents and government retirees; b) the Social Health Insurance Scheme for private sector employees, excluding their spouses and dependents, and; c) the Universal Coverage Scheme for the 76 percent of the population not covered by a or b” (JointLearningNetwork, n.d.).

Figure 11 – Health Connections of ID Programs

Despite the potential usefulness of national ID programs in centralizing information to inform public health decisions, our literature review failed to return high numbers of demonstrated health links. One possible explanation for low integration of national IDs and health may be that many existing, separate health cards already exist. We found evidence of separate health IDs in five countries (Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, and Mozambique). As discussed in the interoperability challenges section, we find evidence of instances in which government agencies engage in ID turf wars in order to preserve existing powers or oversight (India, Nigeria, Pakistan). This may prevent separate “health card” schemes from folding into overarching national ID programs. In addition, for health agencies, maintaining status-quo operations may be more convenient given the political will and effort that can be required to overhaul existing systems.

5.3 Agriculture

Key Findings

• We find agricultural connections in Nigeria (monitoring subsidies) and Thailand (delivery of extension services).

• ID links to agriculture may be limited by lack of connectivity in rural areas, requiring significant offline infrastructure to synchronize with centralized systems.National ID programs are not well-linked to agricultural functions according the evidence we review. Among the 43 countries, only Nigeria and Thailand are identified as having functional agricultural applications. Nigeria’s program linkages promote more efficient delivery of subsidies, while Thailand’s focus on delivering targeted extension services.

Scarce agricultural applications may be attributable to several challenges. First, we find that ten ID programs have faced challenges enrolling rural residents (Table 4), suggesting barriers to national identity systems may be higher amongst rural populations (more likely to engage in agriculture). These challenges stem from the geographic remoteness of rural populations and poor road infrastructure that makes access difficult for mobile registration teams. In addition, nine ID programs cited high initial fees to obtaining an ID card as a barrier to the poor, with specific impact on rural areas. Difficulty enrolling poor and rural populations, likely including many farmers, may have an impact on desires to link ID programs to agricultural functions. Without strong coverage among farmers, separate registration and card issuance efforts would need to be undertaken to ensure an agricultural ID link could function across the target population.

A second challenge revolves around connectivity. Though increasing, cellular network coverage varies widely in developing nations, with low-coverage and “dead zone” areas still common in isolated areas (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). Yet, the primary agricultural uses for IDs that we came across in the literature are reliant on having intermittent to continuous access to a mobile network or the internet in order to provide their intended benefits:

• Nigeria: Digitally monitoring delivery—and receipt—of subsidies in order to optimize efficiency (see below case study in Table 7).

• Thailand: Digital delivery of extension services based on remote monitoring of farmer practices and crops via satellite (see below case study in Table 7).

• India (potential use): Monitoring supply and demand of grain subsidies, and using the information to better inform farmers, and manage grain storage and distribution (Zelazny, 2012).

Each of these programs benefits from connectivity between the end user and officials administering and monitoring the program. In areas without connectivity, concerted efforts are required to build infrastructure that can operate offline and intermittently synchronize to central databases. Thailand’s government delivers digital extension services through its network of community ICT centers, and Nigeria utilizes tablets that can process subsidy transactions offline at point of sale (Boonoon, 2013; Grossman & Tarzai, 2014).

Table 7 – Case Studies of Agricultural Linkages

Nigeria – Distribution of Subsidies

Thailand – Monitoring Extension Services

Nigeria’s Growth Enhancement Support (GES) scheme distributes subsidies to farmers through links to farmers’ mobile money accounts. In remote areas, however, connectivity issues can prevent users from accessing the funds. In response, an effort is underway to link distribution of subsidies to the new MasterCard national ID, which doubles as a payment card (CGAP –Serving Smallholder, 2014).

Farmers’ biometric information is registered and each is issued an ID card. Agricultural dealers, who manage the sale of fertilizer and other inputs, operate point of sale terminals, compatible so that farmers can pay using their national ID card. Regardless of connectivity, the POS terminals record the sale. All sales information is uploaded to a central database when the agrodealer is again within network coverage. Almost in real-time, GES officials can track sales as they occur by agrodealers (Financial Technology, 2014).

In addition to providing an off-network way to track and distribute subsidies, ensuring farmers receive national IDs also increases financial inclusion. “Farmers will be able to use their ID as a debit card tied to a no-frills Bank of Agriculture account, through which farmers will be able to save and seek access to credit, insurance and other agricultural financial services” (CGAP –Serving Smallholder, 2014).

In 2013, the government of Thailand merged its farmer database – containing records of 7.2 million farm households – with the national identity card, or “Smart ID.” The farmer database holds information on household production, including crops, livestock, and fish. It also contains basic household information (members, location) (Viyakornvilas, 2014). The connection enables the government of Thailand to track and manage farm production, transfer knowledge, and support farmers in the event of natural disasters.

During the program’s rollout, farmers in were given a Smart ID embedded with information already contained in the farmer database. Knowing a farmer’s geographic location, and crops and livestock allows government officials to target assistance to farmers in the event of disease outbreaks, droughts or other natural disasters (Boonoon, 2013).

Thailand’s National Science and Technology Development Agency also detailed how silk farmers benefit from tailored extension services. Government officials can access satellite, overhead views of silk farmers’ property by logging into an Android tablet application. The views provide information on the health and spacing of mulberry trees that support silkworms. The information allows officials to better understand where and when additional mulberry trees should be planted. This knowledge, and other agricultural extension, is dispensed directly to farmers through TV and ICT centers in communities nationwide. Farmers also have access to the application via their Smart ID, allowing them study their property and also see how other silk farmers arrange farms (National Science and Technology, 2014).

5.4 Elections

Key Findings

• 13 ID programs are used for voter registration, and 21 are accepted as identification at polling stations.

• Despite widespread use of biometrics (34 programs are embedded with biometric information), we find no evidence of countries having devices available for on-site biometric verification during elections.

• Five programs are implementing other tools to monitor voting, including use of e-voting infrastructure.

Figure 12 – Linkages with Elections

Elections are the most common service function of ID programs. Thirty of the 48 programs reviewed use their ID or population registry for at least one of the three following functions:

• ID to vote – A card or unique ID number can be used to verify identity in order to vote.

• Monitoring – An ID program is used to monitor elections, either by culling voter registries of duplicate voters or remotely using biometric information to authenticate votes.

• Register to vote – A card or unique ID number can be used to register to vote.

In elections, having strong, secure identification documents can be the difference between fraudulent and clean elections. Voter registration is a cornerstone of certifying that only eligible voters can participate in elections (The Carter Center, 2013). In the literature we surveyed, we found evidence that 13 of 48 IDs are accepted as credentials to register to vote (Figure 12). Still, if an ID lacks high-level security features or can be easily faked then there is risk that a single voter can register under multiple names using fake IDs. In Afghanistan, for instance, The Wall Street Journal reported that voter cards and national IDs are available on the black market for $30 each, with reports that fraudulent cards number in the millions (Abi-Habib and Hodge, 2012).

Incorporating biometric verification into ID cards is believed to be a strong way to limit voter fraud, in part because stronger verification requirements limit the number of times a citizen can register, lessening opportunities to submit multiple votes (Clark & Gelb, 2013). Verification can also proceed a step further by having fingerprint, iris, or other biometric scanners available at polling booths to reconfirm a person’s identity. In practice, however, even with 34 ID programs that incorporate biometric information we see no evidence that biometric verification occurs on site at polling stations. Biometric verification is not available on site for all 21 documented cases of IDs being used to vote. Gelb & Clark (2013) write that this is largely a function of cost. They find that “Large-scale registration exercises that are carried out on a rolling basis can be accomplished with a relatively low equipment/citizen ratio […]. Elections themselves, however, entail a mass, simultaneous mobilization of staff and citizens within a short time period, and would thus require a widespread distribution of technology and connectivity.” They add that biometric verification may not be cost-effective, as cheaper ways to prevent multiple voting exist: “Checking photos and cards against voter lists and using indelible ink to mark voters may be good enough in many scenarios” (Gelb & Clark, 2013).

As a result of cost issues for employing biometric monitoring on site at elections, five countries have enacted – nor plan to enact – other monitoring solutions (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tanzania). For the 2014 election in Egypt, 2000 e-readers were purchased to scan national ID cards at polling booths, and verify the authenticity of the card and its user. The e-readers were also meant to reduce voting time and amalgamate data in one central location to monitor election progress and voter eligibility (Egypt Ministry of Communications, 2014). For the 2013 general elections in Lahor, Pakistan, voters inked fingerprints onto election rolls. The fingerprints were later checked against the National Database and Registration Authority’s (NADRA) registry, allowing the government to see that less than 40 percent of the fingerprints had a match with registered voters on file (Yasif, 2015). In Indonesia, the government is currently working to build e-voting infrastructure for the 2019 elections. Voters will walk into a voting booth where the e-KTP identity card and the information on it will be verified on site. The chairman of the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology claims that it will enable election results to be tallied quickly, and facilitate election audits (AntaraNews, 2014a).

Key Findings

• We find no evidence indicating major violations of privacy, although concerns are prevalent.

• Identity cards are required for SIM registration in Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, and Peru.

• Four national IDs double as “passports” (Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda).

5.5 Surveillance and Security

Figure 13 – Surveillance and Security Connections to ID Programs

In general, developed nations tend to use ID programs for surveillance and security to a greater degree than developing nations (Clark & Gelb, 2013). Nonetheless, security concerns are also an impetus behind the creation and application of ID systems in developing nations. Both Kenya and Indonesia cite terrorism as a motivation behind the development of their ID programs (Kenyatta, 2015; King, 2012).

Our review finds 11 ID programs that are being leveraged for surveillance and security. IDs are purposed for border management, law enforcement, and SIM registration, and four double as international passports (Figure 13).

• Border management – The ID program is integrated with immigration or other border management agencies in order to monitor travel.

• Law enforcement – Registry information is used by police or other enforcement officials for purposes of confirming identity, or investigation, or reporting.

• SIM Registration – Biometric or other verification is required as part of the registration process to acquire a new SIM card or mobile phone, and mobile phones remain linked to the ID.

• Passport – The national ID doubles as an accepted international travel document for certain countries.

We do not find much evidence of the precise ways in which countries are deploying ID programs for border management and law enforcement. Morocco’s ID program has links to border management, and Uganda is planning border management applications, but details are vague for both countries. The Moroccan identity card contains security features that are aimed at “control of migration flows” (Rutherford, 2008). Additional information specifying the card’s capacity to monitor immigration could not be found. Uganda’s National Security and Information Service states that one of the key services to be integrated with its forthcoming national ID is “immigration services,” including border crossings (National Security Information System, 2015b).

In law enforcement, national IDs are assisting governments to track criminal activity. In Maharashtra, India it is now required by law that police include the Aadhaar unique identification number of witnesses and criminals in reports on crimes (Gelb & Raghavan, 2014). Tanzania’s new ID system is intended to support better coordination across police, immigration authorities, the country’s revenue service, and other government agencies by allowing them “to share information and differentiate between Tanzanians, foreign nationals and refugees” (Makoye, 2013).

Instances of national IDs that double as passports are largely the result of a single agreement between East African Community (EAC) member states to allow international travel between member states. We find that citizens of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda can all travel between the five-member EAC using only their respective national IDs.

Finally, as governments seek to cut down on the ability of extremists and criminals to use cell phones to conduct illicit activities like money laundering, some have turned to using identity cards for mobile phone and SIM registrations (Okuttah, 2015). In Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, and Peru IDs are now required in order to buy a cell phone or swap SIM cards. These requirements are also related to identification and authentication efforts for digital banking and mobile money, as discussed previously.

5.6 Other Functions

Figure 14 – Other Functional Linkages of ID Programs

In addition to the categories of functions already discussed, we find evidence of linkages of ID programs with four other categories of services (Figure 14):

• KYC – Government services – The ID is used as a verification document for individuals to receive access to government civil services (Passport applications, driver registration, etc.).

• Student or civil service employee attendance tracking – Identity systems are leveraged to ensure that government employees and students attend work or school.

• Taxes – The unique ID number issued is linked to the issuance of tax identification numbers or the payment of taxes.

• Travel – The ID is used as a document that permits domestic travel (i.e. railway or bus travel).

In keeping with the theme of utilizing ID programs to reduce fraud, streamline administration, and prevent fund leakage, countries have developed applications to track the attendance of civil servants. Both Ghana and Uganda have made this a function of their upcoming national ID registries, and Tanzania is developing a system with links to civil service employees. India has already implemented such a system:

“The Indian government has launched a Biometric Attendance System (BAS) using the Aadhaar number provided through the UIDAI. So far some 50,000 central government employees have been registered across 148 organizations in Delhi. Employees are registered using their Aadhaar numbers and log in and out daily. Their attendance rates can be tracked on a dashboard, aggregated across organizations and accessed by anyone on the BAS public domain: Attendance.gov.in. […] One can access the website without any login constraint, search employees by name, find out whether they were at work that day, what time they arrived and left, and how many work days, sick days and vacation days they have taken in the past month” (Raghavan & Gelb, 2014, p. 1).

Tracking of attendance also has applicatons for education. In Ghana, children are issued personal identification numbers at age six. These numbers are used at every stage of enrollment from primary school to college. Centralized data on school attendance allows the government to allocate resources, build infrastructure, and develop policy interventions (National Identification Authority, 2015).

Another theme that emerged in the literature is national IDs as a document to facilitate travel within countries. Documentation can help guarantee freedom of movement (Cote D’Ivoire) or be used by railways to book travel (India). In addition, as described in the section on surveillance and security, the national IDs of several countries can be used as regional passports.

Key Findings

• We do not find any association between region and number of functional linkages, although national ID programs in South Asia have the highest mean number of connections to different types of functions, driven by well-integrated programs in India and Pakistan.

• The year a program is introduced is not associated with the number of functional linkages, but programs that are still actively enrolling members appear to be linked to more types of services.

• Programs that incorporate cards with electronic components or biometrics have a higher mean number of different linkages than programs that do not.

• In most regions, over half of national identity programs have or plan financial linkages.

• Programs in South and Southeast Asia appear most likely to have health linkages, with over 40 percent of programs connected to a health function.

• National identity programs in Sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be linked to financial services (62 percent) than health services (19 percent).

6 Characteristics of ID Programs with Functional Applications

In this section we consider whether any ID program characteristics, including region, year of introduction, stage of implementation, or technical features, are associated with a greater likelihood of the program being linked with different types of functions, and specifically to finance and health. Our ability to identify associations is limited by the small sample size and by our definition of functional linkages, which only considers whether a linkage exists but not how developed it is or the extent to which it is incorporated into the national ID program. Though we cannot confidently report that many characteristics of national ID programs are associated with particular functional linkages, we do identify a few trends.

6.1 General Functional Linkages

We first consider whether particular types of national ID programs have a greater number of different functional linkages. To measure the linkages, we count how many of the different sub-categories of services[14] presented in section 5 and summarized in Table 6 are linked to each program. Thus, a program with evidence of linkages to mobile money, digital banking, voter registration, KYC for elections, border enforcement, and SIM registration would be measured as having six different functional linkages. These sub-categories may not reflect the full variety of services linked to national ID programs, and for certain programs we were not able to identify much information on linkages. Further, using the number of types of services for which we find evidence of linkages as a proxy for integration of national ID programs into different areas does not tell us anything about how well-developed those linkages are, as a program with many limited connections to different types of services would be rated higher than a program with a few well-developed connections. However, this approach provides us with a rough estimation of how well a national ID program is integrated with different services.

As shown in Table 8, national ID programs in South Asia have the highest mean number of linkages to different functions, with 6.2 types of services on average linked to the five programs in the region. However, this analysis is complicated by aggregating different programs to the regional level and by the small sample sizes. The high average in South Asia is driven by national ID programs in India and Pakistan, which are linked to 11 and 12 different services, respectively, so the high average level of integration does not hold across South Asia. We do not observe any real consistency in the number of linkages for national ID programs by region, as in Sub-Saharan Africa for example it ranges from zero to 12 and in Southeast Asia from zero to eight.

Table 8 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Region

Region

Number of Programs

Mean Number of Service Linkages

Europe

3

0.7

Latin America

4

3.0

Middle East and North Africa

8

2.1

South Asia

5

6.2

South East Asia

7

4.0

Sub-Saharan Africa

21

3.5

Table 9 illustrates that programs introduced in the period prior to 1995 have the highest mean number of linkages, with national ID programs connected to six types of services on average. The three countries with ID programs that launched prior to 1995 – Kenya, Peru, and Zambia – ID programs have all evolved since their inception: each currently incorporates an electronic component and biometric information. The numbers fluctuate between 2 to 4.1 types of services for any other periods, so there is no apparent association between year of introduction and integration with different services.

Table 9 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Time Period

Year of Introduction

Number of Programs

Mean Number of Service Linkages

Prior to 1995

3

6.0

1996-2000

4

3.8

2001-2005

4

3.8

2006-2010

16

4.1

2011-2015

10

2.8

Not specified

11

2.0

This analysis is complicated by the small sample size in many time periods, by the selection of time intervals for grouping programs, and by the difficulty in truly establishing when a program was introduced, as there is often a lag between announcing a program and its actual implementation. In addition, the availability of information on functional applications appears to be related to the year of introducing a program. Four of the seven programs for which we could find no information on functional associations were launched in the past ten years, and for two of the other programs the year of introduction is not specified. Two of the three stalled programs were also launched in the last ten years while the year of launch for the other stalled program is not specified.

Figure 15 – Average Number of Linkages by Stage of Implementation

Analyzing the average number of service linkages by stage of implementation reveals that the national identity programs that are still actively enrolling (including the programs that are operational and in use/actively enrolling) have the highest average number of service linkages, 5.3 and 5.2 linkages respectively (Figure 15). As discussed in section 3.2, the programs that are still actively enrolling participants tend to have been introduced more recently, ranging from 2007 to 2015. These more recent programs that are in the initial or pilot stage of implementation may be more likely to have the technical capacity required to incorporate more diverse types of services, as the majority of programs with digital (17 of 27) and biometric (21 of 36) components were launched in the past ten years. Programs that are fully scaled-up and operational have a mean of 3.3 types of service linkages, which may indicate that the more established programs may have been less ambitious in scope. Stalled programs have the lowest average number of service linkages (0.3). Programs that are still in the “planned” stage have evidence of an average of two types of linkages. This finding highlights a limitation of our analysis, as these linkages are not yet developed but are counted equally with fully-developed large scale linkages.

We find that technical features may be associated with functional applications of national identity programs (Table 10). Programs that are embedded with electronic and biometric features are more likely to be linked to a greater variety of functions. Digitalized ID programs where ID cards include an electronic component or do not contain any physical component are linked with an average of 4.5 different types of services, compared to 1.5 types for non-digital programs. ID programs that collect biometric information have a mean of 3.8 service linkages, compared to 2.3 for programs that do not.

Table 10 – Mean Number of Service Linkages by Technical Features

Technical Features

Number of Programs

Mean Number of Service Linkages

Digital

31

4.5

Non-Digital

17

1.5

Biometrics

36

3.8

Non-Biometrics

12

2.3

In the following two sections, we highlight national identity program characteristics associated with financial and health linkages.

6.2 Finance

As described in section 5.1, 24 national identity programs have or plan to have financial connections. Figure 16 illustrates that in most regions, over half of national identity programs have or plan financial linkages, led by Sub-Saharan Africa (62 percent) and followed closely by South Asia (60 percent) and South East Asia (57 percent). Just one of the four ID programs in the Middle East and North Africa, and none of the three ID programs in Europe, have financial linkages.

Figure 16 – Percentage of ID Programs with Financial Linkages (by Region)

As shown in Figure 17, 58 percent of the 24 programs with financial linkages were introduced in the last ten years. Seven programs with financial linkages were launched in the last five years (Ecuador, Nigeria – Bank Verification Number (BVN), Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan). However, we do not observe any trends in the proportion of programs with financial linkages in each time period. The three programs launched prior to 1995 all have financial linkages while 60 percent of programs introduced from 2011 to 2015 have financial linkages.

Figure 17 – Percentage of ID Programs with Financial Linkages by Time Period

Aside from the issues mentioned in section 6.1 with evaluating the association between ID program linkages and year of program, another concern is that a number of these programs are multi-generational. Kenya’s current ID program, for instance, was developed in 1964. A second generation of the program was launched in 1995, and it eventually developed links to mobile money and digital banking. Rollout of a third generation ID is currently underway.

Advanced electronic and biometric identification systems may allow developing countries to leapfrog the traditional paper-based system and link national identity to multiple functional applications (World Bank, 2015). Besides using fingerprints, PINs and/or signatures as a means of authentication for commercial transactions and for access to financial and social services, more precise digital biometric technology has been used in combination of mobile devices to create “mobile money” for secure and cashless commercial transactions and social transfers (World Bank, 2014; Gelb & Clark, 2013). However, we find no association between program technical features and the likelihood of financial linkages (Table 11). Among the 28 programs which are embedded with electronic components, 18 are linked with financial services. Of the 36 biometric programs, 18 have financial linkages.

Table 11 – Digital and Biometric ID Programs Associated with Financial Connections

Program Technical Features

Financial Connections

No Financial Connections / Not Specified

Programs Embedded with Electronic Component (28 Programs)

18

10

Programs Involving Biometrics (36 Programs)

18

18

For four of the eight programs with digital banking, mobile money, or social cash transfer functions (Congo, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia), we observe that the funding model involves donor support and public-private partnership. Another of these programs, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in Pakistan, has a special funding model where a commercially viable business model is put into place to generate revenue to sustain itself (Ahmad Jan, 2006). As programs are more commonly funded by government agencies, this finding may indicate that programs with external sources of funding are more likely to include financial linkages.

6.3 Health

Figure 18 – Percentage of ID Programs with Health Linkages (by Region)

Figure 18 breaks down the 12 national ID programs with health linkages by region. Programs in South and Southeast Asia appear most likely to have linkages, with over 40 percent of programs connected to a health function in contrast to less than 20 percent of programs in the Middle East, North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Health applications appear to have spread in the last ten years, as 59 percent of the programs linked with health services were established between 2006 and 2015 (Figure 19). However, we do not observe any trends in the proportion of programs with health linkages over time. Half of the programs introduced prior to 1995 are linked to a health service, and the proportion for the other time periods ranges from 25 to 27 percent.

Figure 19 – Percentage of ID Programs with Health Linkages by Time Period

Beyond KYC identification to access health services, functional links involve e-government applications like electronically confirming eligibility benefits and tracking services and treatment. When citizens have a unique ID or ID card, systematically monitoring immunization rates or in-hospital care can become more efficient, especially if digital capabilities allow access to a synchronized central database access of personal health information (Ghen et al., 2013). Electronic or biometric IDs can potentially facilitate such functions. Given the small number of programs with health connections, however, we find that only seven of the 27 digitalized programs and eight of the 36 biometric programs are connected to the provision of health services (Table 12). We also find no association between funding source and the likelihood of linkages to health services.

Table 12 – Digital and Biometric ID Programs Associated with Health Connections

Program Technical Features

Health Connections

No Health Connections / Not Specified

Programs Embedded with Electronic Component (27 Programs)

7

21

Programs Involving Biometrics (36 Programs)

8

28

7 Conclusion

The implementation of identification systems appears to be actively expanding in the developing world. The relatively small literature on identification systems suggests that effective formalized identification establishes a foundation through which development efforts can be facilitated, starting with the political, financial, and healthcare inclusion of all citizens. Almost all countries we review articulate the important contribution a formal national identity system can bring to their countries’ development. Many of them link or have plans to link their national identity programs to a variety of different services, with the most common function being KYC for providing financial services, healthcare, and voting access.

Gelb & Clark (2013) argue that the advancement of electronic and biometric technology has played an important role in reducing the long-term cost of development and opening access to low-income countries, especially as technology and security firms more frequently take on the role of developing and implementing the programs in conjuncture with government agencies. However, in most programs biometrics are used primarily as a foundational element for de-duplication in identification systems and not for biometric authentication during service provision, for example for financial services or voting. Cost is often a contributing factor as the infrastructure needed to fully utilize biometrics and link with authentication is expensive (ibid.). As identification systems evolve and expand, it is possible that biometric links to functions such as finance, health, and elections will become more widespread.

Despite advancing technology and lowering costs, we find evidence that challenges with implementation are widespread and have the potential to cause substantial delays and barriers to reaching full population coverage. Programs like NADRA in Pakistan can provide examples of how to overcome particular implementation challenges, but many challenges discussed in country specific documents are related to issues with program design or are context-specific.

Due to the growth of identification systems in the last decade, our research relies heavily on a limited number of academic sources that review identification programs more generally, and on non-academic sources and grey literature to gather evidence on the particular country programs. Current evidence in English on the various programs we review is not always available, so communication with officials or other sources closer to the programs may be required to obtain more up to date information.

Please direct comments or questions about this research to Principal Investigator Leigh Anderson at eparx@u.washington.edu.

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[201] Zambia Daily Mail. (2015). Sensitise people to get NRCs. Retrieved from https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=30164

[202] Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation. (2015). 2nd phase on NRC exercise ready. Retrieved from http://www.znbc.co.zm/?p=18070

[203] ZambiaLII. National Registration Act, Cap 126. Retrieved from http://www.zamlii.org/zm/legislation/consolidated-act/126

[204] Zelazny, F. (2012). The Evolution of India’s UID Program: Lessons Learned and Implications for Other Developing Countries. CGD Policy Paper 008. Washington, D.C.: Center For Global Development. Retrieved from http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426371

Appendix A: Literature Search Methodology

We used a set of Boolean search strings to capture a broad range of literature related to national identity programs on three main databases: Google, Google custom search of International Non-Governmental Organizations, and Center for Global Development. We also conducted searches on Scopus and Google Scholar for academic literature on national identity programs. The aim of these searches was to return a wide variety of relevant literature and reduce the need for additional targeted searches.

We found that the search string national AND (identity OR identification) AND (program OR system OR card) AND “Country Name” yielded the most relevant results regarding the particular national identity programs in each country. However, we also used customized search strings for each country targeting specific national identity programs and/or specific areas of information. A total of 209 search strings were used in our initial and supplemental searches. Below is a list of the types of major search terms used in our initial and supplemental searches.

• The name of the identity program specific to each country

• Financial: Cash Transfers, Mobile Money, Know your customer (KYC), and Social Welfare Transfers

• Health: Health

• Agriculture: Farming and Agriculture

• Election: Election and E-Voting

• Coverage: Coverage, “Level of Penetration” and “Penetration Rate”

• Poor Populations: Poor, Poverty, and Low-Income

• Women: Women, Female and Gender

• Methodology: Biometric and Electronic

• Program Budget: Budget, Fund, Funding, Cost, and Expense

• Program Security: Security and Secure

• Acceptance: “False Acceptance” and “False Rejection Rate”

During the initial search and supplemental search, we identified a total of 649 documents that appeared relevant to national identity programs in the 43 countries of interest.

• Google: 410 documents

• Center for Global Development: 44 documents

• Google custom search of International Non-Governmental Organizations: 107 documents

• Google Scholar: 13 documents

• Scopus: 68 documents

• Others: 7 documents

397 documents were retained for review after further screening. After the initial search, a targeted supplemental search was conducted to address any existing information gaps for ID programs. Examples of major topics on which we conducted supplemental searches include how programs are linked to financial services, health, agriculture, and elections, the level of coverage with the ID program’s target population, challenges with uptake or use by poor populations and/or women, and program budgets.

Appendix B: Review Framework Questions

Basic National Identity Program Information (9)

• What institution is responsible for managing the program?

• What is the funding source for the program?

• What is the budget for operating the program?

• At what level is the program implemented? (National or subnational)

• What is the target population for the program?

• What is the target registration age for the program?

• In what year did the program begin?

• Is the program currently active?

• Are changes to the program planned or anticipated?

National Identity Program Methodology (10)

• Is enrollment mandatory?

• What is the method of enrollment/ initial capture?

• Does authentication involve a physical credential (e.g., ID cards, eID, mobile ID, smartcard, SIM card) as opposed to all information stored in the cloud?

• Does the physical credential include an electronic component?

• Does authentication involve personal information (e.g., name, gender, birth date, other)?

• Does authentication involve biometric information (e.g., fingerprint, face, eye, voice, DNA, other)?

• Does the physical credential include a photo of the individual?

• Does the program utilize an online system (e.g., immediate connection to central database), an offline system (e.g., periodically synchronized with central database), or a mixture of both?

• What is the risk of false acceptance (unauthorized individuals allowed enrollment/access) or false rejection (authorized individuals denied enrollment/access)?

• What are the security standards for protecting information in this system?

Implementation of the Program (9)

• What is the level of coverage among the target population (e.g., citizens, residents)?

• Are there challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor?

• Are there challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women?

• Are there challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations?

• What is the cost per person of the program?

• How cost-effective is the program?

• Have there been any challenges with implementation or the program (e.g., concerns about accountability, privacy, cost, coverage, data management, enrollment, interoperability with other in-country systems, other)?

• Is there a process for responding to implementation challenges at the micro-level (e.g., individual issues)?

• Is there a process for responding to implementation challenges at the macro-level (e.g., systemic issues)?

Functional Uses of the Program (6)

• Is the identity program used for elections?

• Is the identity program used for surveillance and security?

• Is the identity program used for financial services (including social transfers)?

• Is the identity program used for agricultural services?

• Is the identity program used for health services?

• Is the identity program used for other functions?

Appendix C: Summary of National Identity Programs

Table C.1 – Summary of National Identity Programs

Country

Official Name of National ID Program

Type of National ID Program

Mandatory Enrollment

Year of Launch

Status of Program

Afghanistan

e-tazkira

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2010

Stalled

Algeria

National ID

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2015

Stalled

Angola

National ID

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2009

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Bangladesh

National Identity Card (NID)

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2007

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Burkina Faso

National ID

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

Not specified

Operational and in use

Burkina Faso

Voter Card

Voter's Card

Not specified

2012

Operational and in use

Cambodia

National ID

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Cambodia

IDPoor

Other

Not specified

2006

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Cameroon

National Identity Card

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use

China

Second Generation Resident Identity Card

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2003

Operational and in use

Colombia

Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Elector's Card

Voter's Card

No

2005

Operational and in use

Cote d'Ivoire

National ID

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2010

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Ecuador

Cedula de Identidad

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2010

Operational and in use

Egypt

National Identity Card (Current) Personal Verification Card

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Ethiopia

Regional ID

Other

Not specified

Not specified

Operational and in use

Ghana

GhanaCard

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2008

Operational and in use

Guatemala

Documento Personal de Identificación (DIP)

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2004

Operational and in use

India

Aadhaar

Government Issued National ID

No

2008

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Indonesia

Kartu Tanda Penduduk Elektronik (E-KTP)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2009

Operational and in use

Iran

Karte Melli

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1997

Operational and in use

Iraq

Civil Status Identification Card (Bitaka shakhsiyeh)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use

Kenya

Third Generation National ID

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1964

Operational and in use

Madagascar

National Identity Card

Government Issued National ID

Yes

Not specified

Operational and in use

Malawi

National Registration and Identification System

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2007

Planned

Mali

National Identification Number (NINA) Card

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2008

Not specified

Morocco

Carte Nationale D'Identite Electronique

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1996

Operational and in use

Mozambique

Bilhete de Identidade

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

Not specified

Not specified

Nepal

National Identity Card (NID)

Government Issued National ID

No

2009

Planned

Niger

Voter Card

Voter's Card

Not specified

2009

Operational and in use

Nigeria

National Identification Numbers (NIN) and National Electronic Identity Cards (eID)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2007

Actively enrolling

Nigeria

Bank Verification Number (BVN)

Other

Yes

2014

Actively enrolling

Pakistan

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

Government Issued National ID

No

2000

Operational and in use

Peru

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1993

Operational and in use

Philippines

Filipino Identification System Act

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2015

Planned

Romania

National Identity Card/Carte de identitate eID

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

Not specified

Operational and in use

Sri Lanka

National Identity Card (NIC)/e-NIC

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2014

Operational and in use

Sudan

National Identity Card
Identity Card

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2011

Not specified

Tanzania

National ID Program

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2008

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Thailand

National Identity Card/National ID Card/Smart ID Card

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

2005

Operational and in use

Uganda

National Security Information System (NSIS)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

2014

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Ukraine

Biometric Passport

Passport

Not specified

2015

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Ukraine

ID Card/Biometric Identification Card

Government Issued National ID

Not specified

Not specified

Stalled

Uzbekistan

ePassports/Biometric Passports

Passport

Not specified

2011

Not specified

Vietnam

People's Identity Cards

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1999

Operational and in use

Yemen

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)

Voter's Card

Not specified

2014

Operational and in use

Zambia

National Registration Cards (NRC)

Government Issued National ID

Yes

1964

Actively enrolling

Zambia

Continuous Voter Registration/Voter Registration Cards

Voter's Card

Not specified

2010

Operational and in use

Appendix D: Summary of National Identity Programs in Focus Countries

Table D.1 – Bangladesh Case Study

BANGLADESH – National Identity Card (NID)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The National ID database was established by the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC),1 using citizen information collected in 2007 and 2008 during voter registration.2 The mixed quality and coverage of the information has made the transition to a National ID database difficult.3 A contract for the production of new smart cards was signed with Oberthur Techologies in January 2014, and the distribution of the new cards was planned for August 2015.4,5 The national database is currently in a pilot phase to allow other agencies, such as the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Social Welfare, to access information for services, with the potential to increase linked functions with social welfare and expand beyond current “Know Your Custromer” identification functions.6

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

The Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC)7

Funding Source:

Not specified

Partial funding is received from the World Bank and non-bank sources^8

Budget for Program Operation:

Contract for production – Tk 8 billion, or US $102 million^9

Total project cost – US $219 million^10

Target Population:

All citizens^11

Target Age:

Birth (registration), 15 (registration/physical credential)

Citizens are issued an identification number at birth,12 and given as National Identification Card (NID) at age 15. Citizens are automatically included in the electoral roll at age 18.13

Year Introduced:

2007^14

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use/actively enrolling

Eligibility for citizens under 18 to receive a NID was established in 2015^15

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

• Plans exist to build a Bangladesh Poverty Database (BPD) that will link to the NID system^16

• New smart cards expected to be distributed in August 2015^17

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Not specified

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanners, Camera^18, Manual^19

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes^20

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes

Embedded integrated circuits, microchip,21 bar code^22

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, date of birth, ID number, mother’s name, father’s name, blood type, date of issue^23

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^24

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint, iris (expected)25

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

60% – citizens with national ID cards^26

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified – “There has been some concern regarding taking women’s biometrics in conservative populations, particularly photos and iris scans of Muslim women who wear the veil. In most cases, however, this has been a minor or a non-issue.”27

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Data Management: the information collected during the initial voter registration was of mixed quality and coverage, making the transition into a civil registry and national ID system difficult.28

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: the National Identity Card is required for opening a bank account, as well as verification for other services provided by the Credit Information Bureau or Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU).

• Social Transfers: the national database with citizen information can be accessed by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (Bangladesh Poverty Database), the Ministry of Social Welfare (safety net schemes) and the Access to Information (A2I) program of the Prime Minister’s Office29.

Elections

• Voting: the National Identity Card functions as a voter identity card.30

Surveillance and Security

• SIM registration: the NID is required for establishing a new mobile phone connection.31

Other Functions

• The NID database is used to verify identities of citizens applying for a passport or registering for electronic income tax identification numbers.32,33

1 Khan, 2014, 2 Islam et al. 2012, 3 Gelb and Clark, 2013, 4 World Bank, 2015, 5 Chowdhury, 2015c, 6 World Bank, 2015, 7 Khan, 2014, 8 World Bank, 2015, 9 Chowdhury, 2015c, 10 World Bank, 2015, 11 Election Commission of Bangladesh, n.d., 12 Chowdhury, 2015c, 13 Chowdhury, 2015b, 14 Islam et al., 2012, 15 Chowdhury, 2015b, 16 Khan, 2014, 17 Chowdhury, 2015c, 18 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2010, 19 Gelb and Clark, 2013, 20 Chowdhury. 2015a, 21 Tip Boss, n.d., 22 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2010, 23 Ibid, 24 Islam et al., 2012, 25 Khan, 2014, 26 Chowdhury, 2015a, 27 Gelb and Clark, 2013, 28 ibid, 29 World Bank, 2015, 30 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2010, 31 BBC News, 2012, 32 World Bank, 2015, 33 Ibid.

Table D.2 – Ethiopia Case Study

ETHIOPIA – Regional ID

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: Ethiopia does not have a national ID card. The nine regional states and two administrative states (including Addis Ababa City) each have a regional ID card. Registration and distribution of regional ID cards occurs at the sub-district level. The following information is for the regional card issued in Addis Ababa.

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Regional governments are responsible for issuing ID cards.1

Funding Source:

Not specified

Budget for Program Operation:

Not specified

Target Population:

All citizens and residents 18 years and older^2

Year Introduced:

Not specified

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

In 2012, the national government enacted a law to create two institutions that would implement the national registration of citizens and then issue biometric national identity cards.3 We find no evidence that indicates that the program has been carried through to fruition.

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Not specified

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Not specified

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

No

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Woreda (district), Kebele (neighborhood), house number, mother’s full name, telephone number, date of birth, place of birth, sex, ethnicity, occupation, emergency contact, a signature.4

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^5

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

No^6

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

Regional identity cards are issued by Kebeles, or neighborhoods centers. These centers are well-staffed and widespread, providing the infrastructure for the issuance of identity cards. However, there is no direct information on the coverage level of regional ID cards.7

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

Not specified

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: regional ID cards are accepted as a valid form of identification by some commercial banks and one money transfer organization within Ethiopia.8

1 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014b, 2 Ibid, 3 UNECA, 2012, 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014b, 5 Ibid, 6 Ibid, 7 World Health Organization, 2014, 8 Geda & Irving, 2011.

Table D.3 – India Case Study

India – Aadhaar Unique Identification Numbers

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: Aadhaar is an Indian identification program that currently covers 67 percent of the national population. Citizens are issued a unique 12-digit identification number (UID), and biometric information – fingerprints, iris, facial scan – is recorded and matched to the UID. Aadhaar purposefully avoids issuing a physical ID. Instead, the open, cloud-based system allows government programs and private- or civil-sector third parties to develop applications for its use.

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI)1

Funding Source:

Government of India^2

Budget for Program Operation:

Total expenditure $771,111,833 (as of August 31,2014)3

Target Population:

Citizens and Residents^4 over age five^5

Year Introduced:

2008^6

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use / Actively enrolling^7

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

No^8

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanners, cameras^9

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

No (cloud)10

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

N/A

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, gender, date of birth, and address.11

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

N/A

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

10 fingerprints, face, iris^12

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

67% of national population^13

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Well-disbursed registration centers and an effective communication campaign have fueled Aadhaar’s success in enrolling India’s poor. A 2012 study of new registrants found that 56 percent did not previously carry any form of identification. In addition, of the households that previously did not carry identification, 87 percent of them had annual household incomes less than US $2,000.14

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Aadhaar registrations are relatively evenly distributed between genders.15

• Male=51.8%

• Female=48.1%

• Transgender=.005%

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

72.81 rupees ($1.15 USD – 2015)16

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Harmonization with other in-country systems: There are conflicting mandates between the UIDAI and a second, competing national ID program (National Population Register). At times, this friction has led political parties to favor one ID program over the other.17

• Privacy: In October, 2015, the Indian Supreme Court heard a case concerning privacy concerns over biometric and other information embedded within the Aadhaar ID. The court assented that Aadhaar can be used for social schemes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, but restricted its application for other uses, such as banking. Challenges are pending.18

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: customer KYC information is recorded in a central database using the Aadhaar unique identity number. Banks and insurance companies can access the database to check and verify customer identities.19

• Digital banking: 150 million bank accounts are linked to the national ID.20 Subsidies for various government programs are distributed through this linked payment system. As of 2014, one in six beneficiaries of subsidies for liquid petroleum cooking gas receive payments through direct deposits to bank accounts tied to a national ID linked payment system.21

• Mobile money: Aadhaar has been linked to a text messaging platform that enables users to transfer funds between Aadhaar-linked bank accounts. Transferring money requires only that senders input the recipient’s unique ID number, and specify the amount to be transferred.22

Health Services

• Verification of coverage, and tracking services and treatment: in the state of Haryana, newborn babies are concurrently given a UID number and a birth certificate. The UID will be used to monitor and track childhood progress, including required immunizations.23 Citizens covered by India’s national health insurance for the poor are issued identity cards that can contain the UID number.24 This allows patient data and hospital visits to be tracked.25

Elections

• Monitoring: India’s Electoral Commission linked Aadhaar’s registry with its electoral photo identity card database. This synchronization allows the electoral commission to pinpoint unqualified voters and eliminate them from its database.26

Surveillance and Security

• Law enforcement: in Bombay, by law police are required to record the ID numbers of witnesses and accused criminals in first information reports.27 Additionally, law enforcement agency links to information in the central database – including stored bank account information – is expected to assist in efforts to curb money laundering.28

Other Functions

• A Biometric Attendance System (BAS) has been implemented for federal government employees. Employees register using their UID number. In- and out-times of 50,000 government employees across 148 organizations are tracked and recorded daily. All information is publically available at attendance.gov.in.29

• In Kerala, UID numbers are used to track students’ educational progress.30

• The UID is used to purchase tickets and confirm the identity of travelers on the nation’s railways.31

1 Gerdeman, 2012, 2 Brindaalakshmi, 2013, 3 The Economic Times of India, 2014, 4 Brindaalakshmi, 2013, 4 The Economic Times of India, 2014, 5 Zelzany, 2012, 6 Ibid, 7 The Economic Times of India, 2015, 8 Gelb & Mukherjee, 2015, 9 Zelzany, 2012, 10 Ibid, 11 Ibid, 12 Ibid, 13 The Economic Times of India, 2015b, 14 Martinsson, 2012, 15 Dashboard Summary, 2015, 16 The Economic Times of India, 2014, 17 Zelazny, 2012, 18 Anand, 2015, 19 ibid, 20 Dahan & Gelb, 2015, 21 Chen, 2014, 22 Frisz, 2014, 23 The Economic Times of India, 2015a, 24 Fan, 2013, 25 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 26 Jain, 2015, 27 Hickok, 2013, 28 Sikarwar, Deepshikha, 2015, 29 Gelb & Raghavan, 2014, 30 Center for Internet Society, 2013, 31 Jain, 2015.

Table D.4 – Indonesia Case Study

INDONESIA – Kartu Tanda Penduduk Elektronik (e-KTP)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: In 2009, Indonesia undertook biometric registration of citizens and residents in an effort to improve national security, clamp down on election fraud, and improve public services.1 By 2014, the government had issued unique identity numbers and electronic identity cards to 97 percent of the program’s target population.2

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA)

Funding Source:

Government agency

Budget for Program Operation:

MOHA allocated US $642 million for initial rollout of the program^3

Target Population:

Citizens and residents^4 over age 17^5

Year Introduced:

2009^6

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use^7

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Enrollment Mandatory:

Yes^8

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanner, Camera^9

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes^10

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes. A chip stores biometrics, a signature, and a photo.11

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

The card contains the following: signature, name, date and place of birth, gender, blood type, address, religion, marital status, occupation, citizenship status.12

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^13

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint, iris, face^14

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

97 percent^15

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

In March 2012, of the 44,163,062 people registered, 50.71 percent were women.16

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Minority/Religious groups: Until May 2015, Indonesians were required to either list one of the country’s six official religions (Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Confucian, Hindu, and Muslim) on ID cards or to leave religion blank.17 Minority religious denominations could not be listed. Many chose to leave religion blank, but reports emerged of individual registration officials blocking or choosing to lump these individuals into one of the six recognized religious groups.18 In practice, this led people from minority religious groups to choose not to get national ID cards.19 The 2015 policy change now allows any religion to be written onto the identity card.20

Cost/Person:

US $3.73^21

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Data management: A temporary halt to the project occurred in late 2014/early 2015 over concerns about data security. Reports of fake circulating ID cards indicated a possible security breach.22

• Enrollment: In 2012, equipment failures delayed enrollment. The problem was compounded by the lack of personnel on hand to fix the equipment and a generally inefficient response that resulted in some 5 million enrollment records stuck en route to transfer to a central database.23,24

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• Debtor Information: in 2015, Bank Indonesia and MOHA partnered to link identification information contained in the central database with the bank’s debtor information system. The partnership is expected to enable the bank to “review their prospective and existing customer with less cost and time because of the more valid database” (para 3).25

• Social Transfers: as of 2013, the government was distributing a separate card (Social Protection Card) for social programs. 15.5 million households with this card use it to access some of the country’s largest transfer programs: rice subsidy, unconditional cash transfers, and cash transfer for poor students. No evidence is found of social transfer links with the e-KTP.26

Election

• Voting: the e-KTP is used as an ID to verify identity before casting a vote.27

• Monitoring (planned): in Indonesia, the government is currently working to build e-voting infrastructure for the 2019 elections. Voters will walk into a voting booth where the e-KTP identity card and the information on it will be verified on site. The chairman of the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology claims that it will enable election results to be tallied quickly, and facilitate election audits.28

Surveillance and Security

• Law enforcement: security measures embedded in the ID card and biometric information associated with individuals are purported to make IDs less susceptible to forgery. Government officials cite that mitigating the use of fake IDs will aid in tracking and capturing criminals.29

Other Functions

• Civil Service administration functions: the card is used as citizen identification when applying for passports, driving licenses, taxpayer identification numbers, insurance policies, and certificates of land.30

• Electronic signature: the card contains a bearer’s electronic signature.31

1 Priyanto, 2012, 2 AntaraNews, 2014b, 3 Ibid, 4 King, Rawlson, 2012, 5 Sumner, 2015, 6 Kurnaiati, 2013, 7 Amianti, G2015, 8 Kurnaiati, 2013, 9 Ibid, 10 Priyanto, 2012, 11 Ibid, 12 Ibid, 13 Ibid, 14 Messmer, 2012, 15 AntaraNews, 2014b, 16 Fahmi, 2012, 17 Aritonang, 2015, 18 US Department of State, n.d., 19 Wardah, 2014, 20 Aritonang, 2015, 21 AntaraNews, 2014b, 22 Ibid, 23 Kurnaiati, 2013, 24 Priyanto, 2012, 25 Amianti, 2015, 26 Banerjee, et.al., (2013), 27 Ibid, 28 AntaraNews, 2014a, 29 King, 2012, 30 Kurnaiati, 2013, 31 Priyanto, 2012.

Table D.5 – Kenya Case Study

KENYA – Third Generation National ID

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: Kenya has a long history of registering and issuing identity documents to its citizens. It released its first identification card in 1964 upon gaining independence from Britain. In 1995, it began issuing second generation identity cards and collected fingerprints of citizens. A central registry known as the Integrated Population Registration System (IPRS) became the storage base for biometric and citizen information around 2012.1 In 2015, largely as a response to national security and terrorism concerns, Kenya began roll-out of a third generation card. As part of the process it is registering all citizens, residents, and refugees over the age of 12.2

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service (KCFNMS)

Funding Source:

Kenya’s government, a private Israeli security firm, and donors (likely including USAID, DFID, the World Bank and/or AFDB) will fund rollout of the new ID. The business model is structured so that the fees citizens pay to acquire the card—estimated to raise $33 million annually—are a six year revenue stream for the Israeli firm.3At the end of six years, control of the citizen registry and related infrastructure is given to Kenya’s government.4

Budget for Program Operation:

Contributions from Kenya’s government (US $10 million), donors ($35 million), and an Israeli security firm ($100 million) fund the initial rollout.5

Target Population:

Citizens, residents, and refugees over the age of 12 will all be registered. Iris scans will be administered to children under 12, but no other identification information will be gathered.6

Year Introduced:

1st generation, 1964. 2nd generation, 1995.7 3rd Generation, 2015.8

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use / Actively enrolling^9

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

No

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes^10

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanners^11

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes^12

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes^13

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Information is not known for the 3rd generation ID card. The 2nd generation card contained the following: registration number, name, sex, declared tribe or race, date and place of birth, occupation, address, finger and thumb impressions.14

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^15

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint, Iris^16

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Minority groups & rural residents. No challenges are reported for 3rd generation enrollment; however reports of discriminatory registration practices against Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arab minorities were widespread for the 2nd generation ID.17 In addition, it was reported that limited resources undermined registration efforts in rural communities.18

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

No challenges are reported yet for the 3rd generation program. Challenges with the 2nd generation program included:

• Accountability: Reports circulated that many registration centers charged fees much higher than the official amount set by the government.

• Coverage: Regardless of size or population, all districts received equal funding preventing adequate coverage in especially large districts.

• Enrollment: All registrant ID applications had to be sent by mail to a central registration center in Nairobi. ID cards were then supposed to be sent back to registrants from Nairobi in 30 days. In practice, this process could take as long as two years.19

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• Digital banking/Mobile Money: in Kenya, customers of M-Shwari—a mobile phone savings platform—who have national IDs are entitled to higher maximum savings balances and access to credit. A successful match of a customer identification number against the central IPRS database means a customer is entitled to accounts that can hold KES 250,000 (instead of the usual KES 100,000). They are also qualified to borrow from the Central Bank of Africa, because they have gone through a stronger verification process.20

• KYC: national identity cards are an accepted form of identification at banks, and their presence has been cited as helping to facilitate financial agents’ compliance with KYC regulations.21 In addition, beneficiaries of Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme must present an ID card to verify identity before receiving cash transfers.22

Health Services

• None specified. Kenya’s national ID system does not appear to be well-integrated with health functions. It issues separate identity numbers to track HIV patients.23 In addition, national IDs are not used to track patients through the healthcare system. Instead, a private sector company has developed a standalone health card/infrastructure for that task.24 It is now known whether the 3rd generation ID card will be more effectively linked with health.

Election

• Voter registration: ID cards are required in order to register to vote.25

Surveillance and Security

• Passport: ID cards may be used for as a “passport” for travel between the five members of the East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda).

• SIM Registration: in order to activate a SIM or register for mobile money services, ID cards must be presented and customer identification numbers are required to be confirmed against information in the central registry.26

1 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2007, 2 Ligami, 2014, 3 Ibid, 4 Mutegi, 2014, 5 Ligami, 2014, 6 Ibid, 7 Ibid, 8 Ibid, 9 Ibid, 10 Mutegi, 2014, 11 Ligami, 2014, 12 Ibid, 13 Ibid, 14 Soft Kenya, 2012, 15 Ligami, 2014, 16 Ibid, 17 Refugees International, 2008, 18 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2007, 19 Ibid, 20 Cook & McKay, 2015, 21 Cracknell, 2012, 22 World Bank, 2013, 23 UNAIDS, 2009, 24 Homeland Security News Wire, 2011, 25 Bier, 2013, 26 Mark, 2015.

Table D.6 – Malawi Case Study

MALAWI – National Registration and Identification System

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The National Registration and Identification System has not seen widespread implementation since the National Registration Bureau’s establishment in 2007. While evidence indicates that registration has begun,1 no identity cards had been distributed as of October, 2014.2 New funding allocated to the NRB for the financial year starting July 2015 has potential to allow the procurement of necessary resources and end delays in producing the identity cards.3 There is no indication that the identity cards are electronic or hold biometric information, though there are multiple other programs in Malawi that utilize these features including the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer program.4 This will be the first national identification document in Malawi.5

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

National Registration Bureau (NRB)6

Funding Source:

Government of Malawi^7

Budget for Program Operation:

K1.65 billion or US $3,644,444

The national budget initially allocated K155 million (US$344,444) to the program, and increased that by K1.5 billion (US$3.3 million) for the 2015 financial year.8

Target Population:

All Citizens^9

Target Age:

Birth (registration), 16 (physical credential)10

Year Introduced:

2007 – NRB was established^11

Program Currently Active:

Planning stages: No cards have been issued as of October 2014.12 The NRB was allocated increased funding through the national budget for the 2015 financial year beginning in July,13 which will help to procure the resources needed for the next phase of the program.14

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes. A child’s birth must be registered within six week and failure to register results in a fine of $1 million Kwacha and up to five years in prison^15

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Manual. At birth, parents must complete and deliver a birth report to the district registrar.16 Hard copy registers are eventually computerized.17

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes (identity card)18

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Not specified

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Gender, date of birth, parents’ names, marital status^19

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Not specified

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Not specified

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

Low
Registration has begun but there is no evidence on the level of coverage.20 No cards have been distributed as of October 2014.21

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Accountability: Prior to the establishment of the NRB, a contract was made with Secucom Holdings international of Switzerland that failed due to controversy over how the tender was awarded.22

• Cost: The delay in producing and distributing identity cards has been due to financial constraints and a lack of resources to procure the necessary equipment.23,24

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Not specified

1 Kulemeka, 2013, 2 Masina, 2014, 3 Chilunga, 2015, 4 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 5 Nyasa Times, 2013, 6 DHHS, 2014, 7 Masina, 2014, 8 Chilunga, 2015, 9 The Adolescent Girls’ Advocacy & Leadership Initiative, 2011, 10 Ibid, 11 Masina, 2014, 12 Ibid, 13 Chilunga, 2015, 14 Nyasa Times, 2013, 15 The Adolescent Girls’ Advocacy & Leadership Initiative, 2011, 16 Ibid, 17 Kulemeka, 2013, 18 The Adolescent Girls’ Advocacy & Leadership Initiative, 2011, 19 Ibid, 20 Kulemeka 2013, 21 Masina, 2014, 22 Nyasa Times, 2013, 23 Ibid, 24 Masina, 2014.

Table D.7 – Nigeria Case Study (1)

NIGERIA – Bank Verification Number (BVN)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The Bank Verification Number (BVN) was introduced in 2014 to establish a form of identification for bank account owners and authentication at points of transaction in part to reduce access to blacklisted customers, reduce fraud, and increase the efficient of banking operations.1,2 The program is actively enrolling, and the deadline to register for a BVN has been extended to October 31st, 2015 at which point it will be required for all formal banking and financial transactions in Nigeria.3 Significant challenges with enrollment, most prominently limited public knowledge about the program and regulations, have caused confusion, decreased registration, and even led to customers withdrawing their money from banks out of fear of being shut out.4 There has been additional challenges with the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) that is responsible for issuing national identity cards over who is the dominant institution collecting biometric information.5

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)6

Funding Source:

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)7

Budget for Program Operation:

US $55 million, N8,579

Total budgeted for the BVN scheme^8

Target Population:

Adults eligible for a bank account^9

Target Age:

Not specified

Year Introduced:

2014^10

Program Currently Active:

Actively enrolling

The deadline to enroll for the BVN program was extended to October 31st, 2015, at which point it will be required for all banking and financial transactions^11

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Yes – There is a plan to implement biometric functions on POS and ATM terminals for use with BVN in the future.12 CBN is expected to release revised guidelines for the enrollment of Nigerians who do not live in the country and do not have plans to visit before the deadline^13

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes – Customers will not be able to access or operate their bank accounts without the BVN after the deadline^14

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Not specified

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

No – Authentication involves biometric features and a PIN^15

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

N/A

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

N/A

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

N/A

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Facial image, two thumbs and index fingerprints^16

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

52% – In July 2015, 15 million customers enrolled in the BVN program out of an estimated 28.6 million adults operating bank accounts in Nigeria.17,18

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Enrollment and Coverage: Customers are required to physically present their BVN at each bank they operate accounts at after enrolling, which is costly for some populations as well as inconvenient for traveling anyone out of the country.19

• Enrollment: Nigerians in diaspora are confused about the guidelines and if concessions will be made to them regarding the deadline.20

• Coverage: There is limited public awareness and some rural communities remain unaware of the initiative.21

• Coverage: Confusion over the BVN program is causing citizens to draw funds out of their accounts, decreasing levels of financial inclusion rather than increasing it.22

• Harmonization of ID Programs: the legal right of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) program to register citizens using biometric information was contested by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) who claimed the dominant role in identification matters, though an agreement was reached to harmonize the databases.23

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Participating institutions are responsible for addressing individual issues.24

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: the BVN is used to identify and verify individuals that have bank accounts in Nigeria, and to authenticate them at points of transaction.25

1 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a, 2 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014b, 3 This Day Live, 2015, 4 Okoye, 2015, 5 Udunze, 2014, 6 The Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014, 7 Udunze, 2014, 8 Ibid, 9 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014b, 10 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a, 11 This Day Live, 2015, 12 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014b, 13 This Day Live, 2015, 14 Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a, 15 Ibid, 16 Lee, 2015a, 17 Egwuatu, 2015, 18 This Day Live, 2015, 19 Okoye, 2015, 20 Ibid, 21 Ibid, 22 Ibid, 23 Udunze, 2014, 24 The Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014a, 25 Ibid.

Table D.8 – Nigeria Case Study (2)

NIGERIA – National Identification Number (NIN) and National Electronic Identity Card (eID)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: In 2007, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) was established, tasked with creating and managing an integrated identity program that included both unique National Identification Numbers (NIN) for all citizens and residents, as well as Smart eID cards with biometric features combining 13 applications and government programs^1,2. The centerpiece of the program is a partnership with MasterCard that places a heavy focus on financial inclusion and providing financial services to their population.3 The pilot phase of distributing 13 million eID cards began in August 2014.4 Implementation has faced few challenges, though the authority of the National Identity Management Commission to lead the collection of biometric information was challenged by the Bank Verification Number (BVN) program before an agreement to harmonize the databases was reached.5

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

National Identity Management Commission (NIMC)6

Partners include MasterCard, Unified Payment Services Limited, Cryptovision, and Access Bank Plc.7

Funding Source:

The Federal Government of Nigeria^8

Budget for Program Operation:

US $75,517,600^9, N12,334,450,000

Ongoing administrative costs for financial year 2013^10

Target Population:

All citizens and residents^11

Target Age:

Birth (registration),12 16 (physical credential)13

Year Introduced:

2007^14 – the NIMC was established

Program Currently Active:

Actively enrolling – The pilot phase for registration began in August, 2014^15

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes

The use of the National Identification Number (NIN) is mandatory^16

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanner, Camera, National Database^17

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes

National Electronic Identity Card (eID)18

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

EMV Chip^19

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, age, unique identification number,20 gender, address^21

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^22

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint, iris, facial picture^23

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

4% of total population in 2015^24 – Nigeria is currently enrolling as part of a pilot program^25

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

No^26

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Enrollment: Fake agents have opened unauthorized registration centers and charge citizens fees to participate in the registration process.27 Lacking commitment from front-end partners led the National Identity Management Commission to seek approval for additional enrollment equipment^28

• Harmonization of ID Programs: the National Identity Management Commission contested the legal right of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) program in Nigeria to register citizens using biometric information, claiming the dominant role in identification matters. An agreement was eventually reached to harmonize the databases.29

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Micro-Level (Individual Issues):

• Individuals can receive assistance through a Call Center during the week, or access support at any point through an Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system.30

Macro-Level (Systematic Issues):

• A governing board has the power to establish ad-hoc committees to address matters concerning the National Identity Management Commission and its activities.31

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: Used for verification when opening a bank account; purchasing insurance policies; and purchasing, transferring, or registering land in accordance to the Land Use Act^32

• Digital Banking: The National Identity Card is linked with MasterCard, and acts as a payment tool to deposit, withdraw, or receive funds (in particular social benefits), pay for goods or services, save, or engage in other financial transactions facilitated by electronic payments.33

Health

• Insurance: transactions under the Contributory Health Insurance Scheme will use the NID.34

Agriculture

• Distribution of Subsidies: those eligible for the Nigeria Agriculture Payment Initiative (NAPI) can redeem subsidies at point-of-sale (POS) devices after confirmation of biometric information. Cards can additionally be used as a debit card tied to Bank of Agriculture accounts.35

Election

• Voter Registration^36

Other Functions

• Know Your Customer: National Identity Cards are required for the application and issuance of an international passport.37

• Driving License: the database for driving licenses will be integrated with the National Database.38

• Taxes: NID transactions will include the payment of taxes.39

1 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 2 MasterCard, n.d., 3 Ibid, 4 Business Day, 2015, 5 Udunze, 2015, 6 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 7 MasterCard, n.d.,8 National Identity Management Commission, 2007, 9 2013 conversion rates, 10 National Identity Management Commission, 2013, 11 Ibid., 12 Ibid., 13 National Identity Management Commission, 2013, 14 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 15 Business Day, 2015, 16 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 17 National Identity Management Commission, n.d., 18 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 19 MasterCard, n.d., 20 BBC, 2014, 21 MasterCard, n.d., 22 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 23 Mastercard, n.d., 24 Azeez, 2015, 25 Business Day, 2015, 26 National Identity Management Commission, n.d.; National Identity Management Commission, 2013, 27 Okonji, 2014

28 National Identity Management Commission, 2013, 29 Udunze, 2014, 30 National Identity Management System, 2013, 31 National Identity Management Commission, 2013, 32 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 33 MasterCard, n.d., 34 National Identity Management Commission, 2015

35 Grossman & Tarazi, 2014, 36 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 37 National Identity Management Commission, 2015, 38 BBC, 2014, 39 National Identity Management Commission, 2015.

Table D.9 – Pakistan Case Study

PAKISTAN – National ID Program

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was established in 2000, and since has issued a series of physical credentials including the Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) and the Smart National Identity Card (SNIC) most recently in 2012.1 Pakistan has one of the highest target population coverage rates with 98% of the country registered, and has launched extensive registration campaigns to target traditionally under registered populations such as rural and tribal groups, women, and undocumented children. 2,3 NADRA operates through a self-generating revenue model that charges institutions who use the database for biometric verification, and additionally earns money through services provided by their independent public company, NADRA technologies.4 Their comprehensive biometric database has laid a foundation as a platform to link identity cards to other functions and services, including social transfers, health, and voting.5

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

NADRA acts as an independent corporate body. It was formed when the National Database Organization under the Ministry of the Interior and the Directorate General of Registration (DGR) merged.6

Funding Source:

NADRA is a self-generating revenue authority. NADRA charges fees to organizations or government bodies when a citizen’s biometric information is used for authentication. The institution also formed an independent public company, NADRA Technologies Limited, through which it provides services to other countries to implement similar national identification programs and gains additional revenue.7

Budget for Program Operation:

US $162,243,580, RS10,353,479,580

Ongoing administrative costs for financial year 2013^8

Target Population:

All citizens^9

Target Age:

Registration is required within one month of birth.10 Biometric information is taken starting at age 14 or 15 (when biometrics become stable)11, but the minimum age to acquire a SNIC is 18.12

Year Introduced:

The ordinance and preparation began in 2000^13, the multi-biometric system was released in 2007, and the Smart National Identity Card (SNIC) was introduced in 2012.14,15

Program Currently Active:

The program is operational and in use. Currently, biometric fingerprint information is being linked with cell phone SIM cards to verify mobile phone users.16

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

No (in 2008)17

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Scanner, National Database^18

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes

Smart National Identity Card (SNIC)19

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes^20

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, parentage, permanent and temporary address, registration number, family number,21 gender^22

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^23

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprints, facial image^24

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

98% of the adult population over 18-120 million identities have been registered and 97 million ID cards have been distributed^25.

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Yes – The cost of NADRA verification for mobile money is high, and it limits the commercial viability to offering accounts to poor customers^26.

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified – Cultural inhibitions were thought to be a potential reason for lower female registration rates initially^27, but effective, targeted registration campaigns led to overall growth concerning women registration rates^28 and even some of the most conservative provinces reached overall registration of 99 percent^29.

% of the enrolled who are women:

44%30 in 2014

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified – Nadra launched an extensive campaign to reach out to traditionally underregistered populations, including minorities, rural/tribal groups, transgender groups, orphaned children, those with special needs, those in diaspora, and refugees. The program included procuring mobile registration vans and motorcycle units, and hiring man-pack units of hikers, mountaineers, and skiers to hike into remote areas to both educate and enroll citizens in the program^31. The one group that has not been widely included in registration is Karachi’s Rohingya population^32.

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

Not specified

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Micro-Level (Individual Issues):

Yes – a grievance system was put in place specifically for emergency aid distribution, but there is no indication of a larger system for addressing general challenges.33

Macro-Level (Systematic Issues):

Yes – the parliamentary standing committee oversees the actions of the Nadra board of directors and helps to prevent the misuse of data and address challenges.34

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• Digital Banking: the smart card is used for branchless banking and e-commerce.35

• Other: NADRA partnered with the State Life Corporation of Pakistan to include insurance against accidental death for a nominal charge built into the ID card fee.36

• Social Transfers: The database was used to help distribute emergency aid relief in the wake of floods in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and to internally displaced citizens.37,38 In addition, NADRA supports the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) to identify and deliver aid to poor women through the SNIC.39

Health

• Tracking services and treatment: vaccinations for children are tracked through the SNIC.40

• Other: the SNIC supports biometric-based secure health insurance.41

Election

• Voter registration^42

• Voting: citizens must have an identity card to cast a vote^43

• Monitoring: votes are cross-matched with biometric information to verify correct voting^44

Surveillance and Security

• Passport: the SNIC is acceptable at 100 international airports and adheres to ICAO rules for a machine-readable travel document.45

• SIM registration: owners of SIM cards must submit fingerprints to the Nadra database when registering their SIM cards, or verify themselves against previously submitted biometric information.46

1 Malik, 2014, 2 Ibid., 3 Ibid., 4 Ahmad Jan, 2006, 5 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 6 NADRA, n.d.a, 7 Ahmad Jan, 2006, 8 NADRA, 2013, 9 Kahn, 2012, 10 Ibid., 11 Ibid., 12 Malik, 2014, 13 Ibid., 14 Kahn, 2012, 15 Malik, 2014, 16 Craig & Hussain, 2015, 17 Malik, 2014, 18 NADRA, (n.d.b) Multi-Biometric Card., 19 Malik, 2012, 20 Ibid., 21 Kahn, 2012, 22 Malik, 2014, 23 Ahmad Khan, 2014, 24 NADRA, n.d.b, 25 Malik, 2014, 26 Kumar & Radcliffe, 2015, 27 Pakistan Press Foundation, 2010, 28 Malik, 2014, 29 Pakistan Press Foundation, 2010, 30 Malik, 2014, 31 Ibid., 32 Rehman, 2015, 33 Malik, 2014, 34 Khan, 2012, 35 Malik, 2014, 36 Ibid., 37 Ibid., 38 Zelazny, 2012, 39 Malik, 2014, 40 Ibid., 41 Ibid., 42 Malik, 2014, 43 Ibid., 44 Yasif, 2015, 45 Malik, 2014, 46 Craig & Hussain, 2015.

Table D.10 – Peru Case Study

PERU – Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC) was first established in 1993, but renewed its mission to provide documentation to the citizens of Peru in 2001 following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1 In 2007, an IDB survey concluded that Peruvians have more faith in the RENIEC and the national civil registry than in the Catholic Church,2 and by 2012, 89 percent of the population was registered in the national database.3 The physical credential distributed by RENIEC, the Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI)4 or Documento Nacional de Identidad Electronico (DNIe), is linked to many function uses, but primarily as a means of identification (KYC).5

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Registro Nacional de Identificacion y Estado Civil (RENIEC)6

Funding Source:

The government partially funds RENIEC. Remaining funding is self-generated revenue from fees associated with the national identity documents and renewals.7

Budget for Program Operation:

Not specified

Target Population:

All citizens^8

Target Age:

Citizens are registered at birth. Renewal occurs every eight years, and a new Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI) or Documento Nacional de Identidad Electronico (DNIe) is issued at age 18.9

Year Introduced:

RENIEC was established in 1993, and a new national plan for the restitution of identities was created in 2001.10

Program Currently Active:

Yes^11

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes^12

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Itinerant registration is done manually. There is no evidence for other methods of enrollment.13

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes – Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI)14 or Documento Nacional de Identidad Electronico (DNIe)15

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes – The DNIe has a cryptographic chip, two digital certificates, and a digital signature.16

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, gender,17 and a unique identification number^18

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Not specified

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprints^19

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

89% in 2012^20

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Yes – undocumented and/or poor citizens have difficulty affording the prerequisite birth certificate, the registration fee, or the associated fess such as travel costs to registration center. 21

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Disabled individuals are not permitted identity cards.22

Transgender individuals are not allowed to change their genders on identity cards.23

Rural and indigenous populations are largely undocumented and cannot register without birth certificates.24

Cost/Person:

US $10.32 – US $79.80^25

At service office: US $10.32

In coastal regions: US $21.83

In highlands: US $42.05

In jungle regions: US $79.80

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Enrollment: limited human resources, including trained officials to address cultural or language barriers, impacted the ability to enroll populations in rural areas.26

• Coverage: there is a lack of available registry centers.27 RENIEC deployed itinerant (traveling) registry teams to address this issue, though they were met with high costs and challenges with the lack of resources in remote areas. 28

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

RENIEC was granted Quality Certification from the Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS S.A.) to hold themselves accountable in terms of the technology and IT systems.29

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including Social Transfers)

• KYC: an identity card is required to verify identity when opening a bank account.30

• Social Transfers: An identity card is required to verify identity when receiving social security benefits.31 RENIEC partners with the development organization JUNTOS to register poor citizens, and then the database is used to distribute aid.32

Health

• KYC: an identity card is required to verify identity and access the national healthcare system.33

Election

• Voter registration: the voter registry is based on the civil registry, which citizens are included in once they register for their identity card.34

• Voting: citizens must present their DNI or DNIe to cast a vote.35

Surveillance and Security

• SIM registration: prepaid phones can only be activated after biometric data is used to verify the identity of the user through the national register, RENIEC.36

Other Functions

• KYC: an identity card is required to marry, own or inherit property, or find formal work.37

1 Hartitz & Boekle, 2009, 2 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 3 The Carter Center, 2013, 4 Ibid., 5 High Security Printing, 2015, 6 Hartitz & Boekle, 2009, 7 Ibid., 8 The Carter Center, 2013, 9 Ibid., 10 Hartitz & Boekle, 2009, 11 Lee, 2015b, 12 rennan Center for Justice, n.d., 13 Reyna, 2014, 14 The Carter Center, 2013, 15 High Security Printing, 2015, 16 Ibid., 17 Chase, 2014, 18 The Carter Center, 2013, 19 Ibid., 20 Ibid, 21 Ibid., 22 Cunningham, 2013, 23 Chase, 2014, 24 Cunningham, 2013, 25 Reyna, 2014, 26 Ibid., 27 Cunningham, 2013

28 Reyna, 2014, 29 Hartitz & Boekle, 2009, 30 Cunningham, 2013, 31 Ibid., 32 Reyna, 2014, 33 Cunningham, 2013, 34 The Carter Center, 2013, 35 Ibid., 36 Lee, 2015b, 37 Cunningham, 2013.

Table D.11 – Tanzania Case Study

TANZANIA – National ID Program

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: A national identity system was first envisioned in Tanzania in 1968, but implementation was long delayed by financial constraints.1 In 2008, a national identity project officially launched with the aim of modernizing the national identity management system and linking it with new identity cards that would replace the old paper cards.2,3 The national identification database is expected to be linked together with the vital statistics database and systems from the National Electoral Commission, Tanzania Revenue Authority, President's Office, Public Service Management, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Interpol, as well as health, education, and police databases.4

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

National Identification Authority^5

(Cards are issued by Iris Corporation Berhad, a Malaysian firm) 6

Funding Source:

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and bank loans7,8

Budget for Program Operation:

Total project cost is estimated at 237.6 billion Tanzanian shillings (US$ 149 million) for issuing identity cards to between 23 million and 25 million people.9

Target Population:

All Tanzanian citizens, residents, and refugees,10 with registration occurring first for residents in Dar es Salaam Region in 2012.11

Target Age:

Not specified

Year Introduced:

The project started in 2008;12 registration of citizens began in 2012.13

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use & still actively enrolling as of March, 201514,15

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not Specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes^16

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

National database; cameras17,18

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes (smartcards)19

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes^20

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Not specified

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^21

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint, eye, digital signature, and photograph22,23

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

The ID program has been implemented in Dar es Salaam, Coast, Lindi, Morogoro, Mtwara and Tanga regions of Tanzania mainland and Zanziba,r with Over 6.1 million people registered and 1.7 million issued with IDs as of March 2015 (6.8% of the target population of 25 million).24

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified

Cost/Person:

9,504 – 10,330 Tanzanian shillings (US$5.96 – US$6.48) based on

237.6 billion Tanzanian shillings (US$149 million) for issuing identity cards to between 23 million and 25 million people.25

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

Cost and Human Capacity – High costs and a lack assigned personnel to support the program slowed implementation at the beginning and caused the government to temporarily suspend the issuance of national identity cards.26,27

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services

• KYC: The Managing Director of CRDB, a prominent bank in Tanzania, said that the new national ID would lower the cost of registering new customers and the cost of lending because the ID offers stronger guarantees of customers’ identity and information.28 Where before bank officials had to conduct home visits to verify a customer’s address, now the ID can reliably provide that information. The Director cited that lower costs would be passed on to customers. A national ID has also been cited as necessary to address facilitating easier identification for would-be borrowers of housing loans.29 The national ID system, in conjunction with the credit bureau, is said to be expected to significantly raise credit provision.30

• Social Transfers: The national ID will be used to enable agencies that issue social pension funds to identify beneficiaries.31 The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs said that the government will also use the national ID to “establish efficient and accountable ways to implement social relief projects.”32 The central database also provides a foundation for supporting other citizen-centric services.33

Agricultural Services

The Managing Director of CRDB Bank said that the new national ID would lower the cost of registering new customers and the cost of lending. He cited that lower costs would lead more accessible agribusiness loans for rural populations.34

Election

• Voter registration and monitoring: National IDs can be used to register to vote. Biometric information associated with the IDs will be used to de-duplicate voter databases and ensure only eligible voters participate in elections, preventing voter fraud.35,36

Surveillance and Security – Law enforcement and Passport

• Law enforcement: It is believed that the electronic ID cards will be useful to combat organized crime and illegal trade given that law enforcement, immigration, revenue, and other officials will have access to the citizen registry, thus enabling coordination and information sharing across agencies.

• Passport: The national ID doubles as a passport for travel between East African Community member countries.37

Other

The identification database is the basis for development of a civil servants information system.38 By running government payrolls and pension payments with the help of a national ID system and through systems that require biometric verification of identity when making and collecting payments, the Tanzanian government can weed out ghost workers from the civil system and save an estimate US $6 million.39

1 Makoye, 2013, 2 ID World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 3 Makoye, 2013, 4 African Health Observatory, World Health Organization Africa, 2015, 5 Ibid., 6 Ibid., 7 Ibid., 8 Great Lakes Voice, 2015, 9 Mugwe, 2013, 10 Ibid., 11 African Health Observatory, World Health Organization Africa, 2015, 12 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 13 African Health Observatory, World Health Organization Africa, 2015, 14 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 15 Nachilongo, 2015, 16 Issa, et al., 2015, 17 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 18 Makoye, 2013, 19 Great Lakes Voice, 2015, 20 Ibid., 21 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 22 Ibid., 23 Makoye, K2013, 24 Nachilongo, 2015, 25 Mugwe, 2013, 26 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 27 Nachilongo, 2015, 28 Mugwe, 2013, 29 Kironde, et. Al. 2003, 30 CGAP and McKinsey, 2015, 31 Robertson, et al., 2012, 32 Id World – ID Community Publications, 2015, 33 Ibid., 34 Magomba, 2014, 35 Ibid., 36 Makoye, 2013, 37 President of the Republic of Uganda, 2015, 38 African Health Observatory, World Health Organization Africa, 2015, 39 Zelazny, 2012.

Table D.12 – Uganda Case Study

UGANDA – National ID Program

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: The National Security Information System (NSIS) was implemented by Uganda’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to capture, store and process citizens’ data.1 The NSIS project registers all Ugandan nationals, and issues national ID numbers and ID cards. The system was enacted to help enable national security to facilitate the provision of fair and equitable civil administration services.2

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Ministry of Internal Affairs^3

(The National Information Technology Authority (NITA) and a private company, Muhlbauer ID services, provide technical support.)4,5

Funding Source:

Not specified

Budget for Program Operation:

Not specified

Target Population:

All citizens^6

Target Age:

16^7

Year Introduced:

2014^8

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use/actively enrolling; national ID card registration will resume in 2016 for citizens age 0 to 15 years, after the national general elections.9

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes^10

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Camera, Scanner^11

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes (biometric, machine-readable card)12

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes^13

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Name, gender, date of birth, identification number, and expiry date^14

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^15

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

FingeFinrprint, face, and DNA16,17

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

99%18

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Yes – cost barrier. Although registration is free, there is an indirect cost for obtaining a local council letter, which is a requirement by the verification committees in Akwang sub-county for registering any person.19

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Yes – enrollment assistance to citizens in need – such as the sick, those with language barriers, the physically-handicapped and the elderly – is not being provided in all areas. Prisoners are not eligible to enroll.20

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

Accountability: There are reports of officials soliciting money from Ugandans seeking to register for national identity cards.21 Serious procurement problems delayed the project in 2010, as several former ministers were accused of violating procurement laws by awarding contracts to a private supplier without a due diligence process.22,23

Enrollment: In rural registration centers, staff are reported to be ill-trained on effective use of biometric enrollment kits.24 Cost: The short implementation period for the large-scale registration and enrollment of citizens created labor and cost considerations that delayed the project.25

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Micro-Level (Individual Issues):

• Handicapped or sick individuals can report challenges getting to registration; however, no processes are in place to assist those individuals to physically travel to registration centers.26

Macro-Level (Systematic Issues):

• To address the problem of bribery, Internal Affairs has directed police to arrest local leaders and officials soliciting money from registrants.27

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services

• KYC: National identity cards are becoming a requirement at financial institutions to open bank accounts and acquire loans.28

• Social Transfers: NSIS plans to integrate the national ID with social security benefits delivery.29

Health

• Tracking services and treatment: NSIS plans to integrate National Health Service & Hospitals Delivery – NHIS and patient management with the ID card.30

Verification of eligibility/coverage/benefits: NSIS is linked to the Microcare Medical Access Treatment Card (MTAC).31

Election

• Voting: the national identity card is required in national elections to vote. Voter list generation and voter verification (smart elections) are planned to be integrated with the national ID cards when implementation is complete.32

Surveillance and Security

• Border management: border management will be integrated with the national ID.33

• Passport: the national ID doubles as a passport for travel between East African Community member countries.34

Other Functions

• Education: by 2017, Ugandan citizens will be unable to access school for his/her children without proof of identification using the National Identity Card.35

• Civil Service Tracking: biometric information on all government employees is contained within NSIS. Public employees must have a national ID in order to access payroll.

• Taxes: the Ugandan revenue authority is expected to utilize the NSIS registry for more “effective taxation targeting.”36 National identity cards are mentioned in a 2010 World Bank report as having potential to reduce tax evasion in Uganda.37

1 United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development, 2010, 2 Ibid., 3 National Information Technology Authority – NITA Uganda, 2015, 4 Ibid., 5 Committee-on-Defense, Parliament of Uganda, 2015, 6 Ibid., 7 Tentena, 2015, 8 National Security Information System, 2015b, 9 National Security Information System, 2015c, 10 The Independent Reporter, 2014, 11 Mwesigye, & Nangonzi, 2014, 12 Uganda Convention UK, 2014, 13 ibid., 14 Mwesigye, 2013, 15 Uganda Convention UK, 2014, 16 National Security Information System, 2015b, 17 The State House of Uganda, 2014, 18 National Security Information System, 2015a, 19 Mwesigye & Nangonzi, 2014, 20 Ibid., 21 Nyakairima, 2014, 22 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 23 Committee-on-Defense, Parliament of Uganda, 2015, 24 Mwesigye & Nangonzi, 2014, 25 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 26 Mwesigye & Nangonzi, 2014, 27 Nyakairima, 2014, 28 Ibid., 29 Uganda Convention UK, 2014, 30 Ibid., 31 Gelb & Clark, 2013, 32 Ministry of Finance, The Government of Uganda, 2014, 33 Uganda Convention UK, 2014, 34 President of the Republic of Uganda, 2015, 35 Uganda Convention UK, 2014, 36 Ibid., 37 World Bank, 2010.

Table D.13 – Zambia Case Study (1)

ZAMBIA – National Registration Card (National ID Program)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: Zambia first introduced its National Registration Card (NRC) in 1964.1 More recently, the card has evolved to incorporate electronic and biometric features. Zambia became the first country in eastern and southern Africa to implement digital multipurpose National Registration Cards (NRC) with applications for voting, accessing banking services, and driving licenses.2

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

The Department of National Registration, Passport and Citizenship^3

Funding Source:

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the government of Zambia4,5

Budget for Program Operation:

K25 million (US$3.26 million) for total project cost^6

Target Population:

All citizens^7

Target Age:

16^8

Year Introduced:

1964^9

Program Currently Active:

Actively enrolling^10

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Yes11,12

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Camera, Scanner, and Other^13

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes (Electronic, plastic card)14,15

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes16,17

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Not specified

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Yes^18

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint and face19,20

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Yes, rural residents are reported to have experienced difficulties in accessing NRCs because of distance to registration centers in town.21

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

• Accountability: There are reports that people in some areas were asked to pay a fee to get the NRC.22

• Enrollment: Rural residents cannot be enrolled due to difficulties accessing registration centers located in town.23

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Financial Services (including social transfers)

• KYC and digital banking – identity cards are used at banks to comply with KYC rules. It is the intention of the government to further link the NRCs to the provision of financial services (e.g. online banking),24 but confirmation that this has occurred cannot be found.

Election

• Voting: voters must present their NRC and voter card.25

• Voter registration: to register, voters must produce an NRC.26 Instead of carrying multiple cards, people can present their electronic NRC in the 2016 elections; this card will be to curb electoral malpractices rampant.27

1 Kapambwe, 2015, 2 Malakata, 2010, 3 LusakaTimes, 2013, 4 Ibid., 5 Malakata, 2010, 6 Nyirenda, 2015, 7 ZambiaLII, 2015, 8 Ibid., 9 Kapambwe, 2015, 10 Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, 2015, 11 Zambia Daily Mail, 2015, 12 ZambiaLII. 2015, 13 United Nations Development Programme & Government of Zambia, 2009, 14 Zambia Daily Mail, 2015, 15 Malakata, 2010, 16 Ibid., 17 United Nations Development Programme & Government of Zambia, 2009, 18 Ibid., 19 Ibid., 20 LusakaTimes, 2013, 21 Malambo, 2015, 22 Ibid., 23 Ibid., 24 Malakata, 2010, 25 The Carter Center, 2013, 26 Ibid., 27 Malakata, 2010.

Table D.14 – Zambia Case Study (2)

ZAMBIA – Voter’s Card

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND: Zambia placed democratic governance a priority in the Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010.1 The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), with United Nations’ support, first used continuous Voter Registration for the election in 2006. It began to roll out a biometric multipurpose card 2010.2,3

BASIC NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Institution(s) Managing the Program:

Electoral Commission of Zambia^4

Funding Source:

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)5

Budget for Program Operation:

US$7.3 million for total project cost^6

Target Population:

All citizens^7

Target Age:

18^8

Year Introduced:

2010^9

Program Currently Active:

Operational and in use^10

Are Changes to the Program Planned or Anticipated:

Not specified

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAM METHODOLOGY

Mandatory Enrollment:

Not specified

Method of Enrollment / Initial Capture:

Not specified

Physical Credential Involved in Authentication:

Yes^11

Electronic Component Involved in Physical Credential:

Yes^12

Personal Information Involved in Authentication:

Not specified

Photo of Individual on Physical Credential:

Not specified

Biometric Information Involved in Authentication:

Fingerprint^13

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Level of Coverage:

79%14,15

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by the poor:

Not specified

% of the enrolled who are poor:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by women:

Not specified – the Electoral Commission of Zambia has stated that its goal is to be comprehensive in registering voters, with a goal of registering 100 percent of qualified persons, including women, youth, and rural residents.16

% of the enrolled who are women:

Not specified

Challenges with enrollment or use of the program by other populations:

Not specified – the Electoral Commission of Zambia has states that its goal is to be comprehensive in registering voters, with a goal of registering 100 percent of qualified persons, including women, youth, and rural residents.17

Cost/Person:

Not specified

Challenges with Implementation or Program:

Not specified

Process for responding to implementation challenges:

Not specified

FUNCTIONAL USES OF PROGRAM

Elections

• Voting: the voter’s card is required to vote^18

• Voter Registration: this program is a voter registration program. Registry information will be linked to the national citizen registry used for the National Registration Cards (NRC).19,20

1 United Nations Development Programme & Government of Zambia, 2009, 2 LusakaTimes, 2010, 3 Center For Global Development, n.d., 4 LusakaTimes, 2010, 5 Ibid., 6 United Nations Development Programme, 2009, 7 Ibid., 8 Ibid., 9 LusakaTimes, 2010, 10 United Nations Development Programme & Government of Zambia, 2009, 11 Malakata, 2010, 12 United Nations Development Programme, 2013, 13 Center For Global Development, n.d., 14 Ibid., 15 United Nations Development Programme & Government of Zambia, 2009, 16 Ibid., 17 Ibid., 18 The Carter Center, 2013, 19 Malakata, 2010, 20 Center For Global Development, n.d.

IV Enabling Merchant Payments Acceptance in the Digital Financial Ecosystems

About this report

The first part of this Technical Report was written by Allen Weinberg, as well as the following reviewers and contributors: Dan Salazar, Charles Niehaus, Ashwini Sathnur, Carol Coye Benson

The second part of this Technical Report was written by Dan Salazar, Rebecca Aguilar and Joel Lasko, MasterCard International.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Enabling merchant acceptance of digital payments is increasingly seen as a key element of the overall development of the DFS ecosystem. Broad merchant acceptance will help achieve digital liquidity by enabling poor consumers to spend a meaningful amount of the money they receive or deposit into digital wallets, eliminating or reducing the need to incur cash-out costs.

Countries throughout the developing world, however, are finding that there are considerable challenges in attaining merchant acceptance of digital payments. This Report provides an analysis of some of the challenges, and provides insight into some of the solutions in merchant payments.

The first section of the report defines and describes the merchant payments value chain. This section also provides a definitive categorization of merchant segments, and recognizes that the needs of each merchant segment are quite distinct. Various economic models for the provision of merchant acceptance are defined and discussed, and policy considerations for regulators are noted.

The second section of the report looks at various business models and structures used by providers of merchant services, and includes an extensive list of those services that are currently in the market.

Part I: Merchants and Payments Acceptors in the Digital Financial Services Ecosystem

1 Introduction

The Merchant and Payments Acceptor workstream within the ITU DFS Ecosystem Working Group is charged with describing the merchant services value chain, developing a segmentation scheme for different types of payments acceptors, and identifying the payments-related attributes of each segment. The workstream also identified critical success factors for DFS adoption, and has developed some ideas for policy makers to consider on ways to accelerate the adoption of electronic payments acceptance.

A note on terminology: the term "merchant" is used occasionally throughout this paper to refer to "payments acceptors" in general: any enterprise, large or small, which receives payments for goods or services. The term includes billers, schools, governments, transit, farmers, etc. – not just retail stores. Payments acceptors may sell in-person, remotely, or, very commonly, both in-person and remotely.

1.1 Goals of Digital Payments Acceptance

Enabling merchant acceptance of digital payments is increasingly seen as a key element of the overall development of the DFS ecosystem. Broad merchant acceptance will help achieve digital liquidity by enabling poor consumers to spend a meaningful amount of the money they receive or deposit into digital wallets, eliminating or reducing the need to incur cash-out costs.

Other goals include:

• Helping overall commerce in developing countries grow; helping small and/or poor merchants find new customers (locally and beyond their current geographies) and generate more through participation in new payments-enabled commerce platforms; helping these merchants increase the number of sales from existing customers

• Increasing long term tax collections

• Reducing the risks of merchants carrying and holding cash

The importance of reaching a critical mass of merchants/payment acceptors in the ecosystem cannot be overestimated. Without meaningful places to use/spend monies contained in their digital wallets, consumers (and to some extent any business) will be forced to utilize time consuming and costly cash-out mechanisms, which in turn creates disincentives to receive electronic payments in the first place. In fact, it is generally accepted that the merchant/payment acceptance "leg of the stool" has been an inhibitor to the growth and success of many failed and/or struggling payment system.

Said differently, "digital liquidity" and the associated "network effect" is critical to ensure that the overall goals and growth of any electronic payment system are realized. Keeping electronic money "in the system" – i.e., creating velocity is critical to keeping transaction costs low, not just the economy of scale driven processing costs of the system itself, but also the "all in" costs when factoring in CICO/agent fees. Digital liquidity will reduce the demand for expensive CICO services.

For the poor, merchant acceptance is particularly important since the poor don’t have bank accounts to transfer and hold electronic funds received, while at the same time, can least afford CICO / agent fees. And even if a government or other entity was successful in getting consumers to open accounts via bulk payments, without a robust payment acceptance network, the cash management problem just gets transferred from the payer to the agents.

It is important to note that the notion of critical mass of merchants/payment acceptors entails a sufficient number and type of merchants such that the customer can displace a meaningful portion of their cash-based purchases with electronic payments. For example, while payment schemes anchored in transit have the potential to incent consumers to open accounts and have the potential to generate a large number of transactions, transit applications alone will not make a meaningful impact on the total number cash transactions conducted by the poor.

1.2 Assumptions

The workstream made a number of assumptions about the ecosystem in developing this paper. Assumptions include:

• All but the smallest of merchant segments will have at least "semi-smart" phones

• Most countries will move towards some type of interoperability between domestic mobile wallet schemes

• Most, but not necessarily all, merchants will highly value (and perhaps even require) immediate access to funds

• Most merchant segments have both an in-person (POS) and remote (eCommerce, etc.) component: the balance of these within each segment may shift with the adoption of electronic payments

• User requirements for merchants and other payments acceptors will vary by segment: this includes technology, ERP integration requirements, economics, etc.

• Merchants will want to accept any and all cost-effective payment types that their customers want to use; adding additional payment schemes must be easy for sales staff to understand/work with, and would optimally be accessible through a single device and even have a single/consolidated settlement

• Merchants should not be required to / incented to agree to exclusivity; rather they should be encouraged to accept competing forms of digital payments.

1.3 Hypotheses

In developing the value chain and segmentation scheme, the work stream tested the following hypotheses about the evolution of digital payments acceptance.

• No single factor/benefit will be sufficient to incent merchant adoption of the payment scheme; some combination of benefits such as new customers, more sales from existing customers, reduction of cash on hand, interest earned on eMoney balances, etc. will be required

• Sellers should be willing to pay for those and other features/benefits that produce more revenue

• Broad adoption of electronic payments will enable new types of commerce, particularly for merchants that would then be able to sell products and services remotely

• Payments will eventually become an embedded enabler in broader commerce and/or community platforms that will provide benefits to payment acceptors

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent smaller, and perhaps even larger, merchant adoption

• Very poor merchants will not pay for face-to-face electronic payments, nor will their poor customers

• Participation in electronic payment schemes may help merchants secure some level of credit since lenders will be more willing to lend with better data. In addition lenders’ risk could be reduced and operating costs lowered with electronic loan payments (e.g., payments made from electronic wallet balances/tapping into the settlement stream).

2 The Payments Acceptance Value Chain

There are a number of different terms for those entities that enable merchants to accept electronic transactions. In the card-centric world, these entities are commonly known as "acquirers", "merchant service providers", and other terms. In the context of digital wallets, merchant service providers could be MNOs, banks, or other non-bank financial services providers. These entities, and perhaps others in a typical DFS ecosystem, perform a variety of functions, many or all of which are required to enable merchants to accept transactions. It is important to note that some functions, such as underwriting, may be optional, depending on the payment system design and rules.

There are no hard and fast rules about what types of entities are better positioned to perform the various merchant service functions, although the goal would be to have a robust, competitive merchant services marketplace in order to drive down costs and facilitate innovation. Having said that, there are a number of guidelines that should be considered in evaluating the merchant services value chain.

Figure 1 – Merchant Services/Payment Acceptor Value Chain

2.1.1 Merchant Acquisition

This function focuses on the sales and marketing processes by which merchants are solicited and signed up to accept payments in one or more payment systems. In many parts of the world, merchants will sign up to accept transactions from a number of often competing payment systems, all through a single provider. In other cases, a provider will only sign up and enable the merchant in one, or just a subset of available payment schemes in that market.

Given that assumption, and also assuming that it would not be cost-prohibitive and operationally acceptable to do so, merchants would like to take all popular forms / brands of digital payments. Accordingly, it would make the most economic sense that the sales forces calling on merchants are able to enable multiple, competitive products. Those sales forces could be those of banks, MNOs, and other entities. As noted, merchants should not be required to sign exclusivity agreements for any given payment scheme.

2.1.2 Merchant Underwriting

This can be an optional function, depending on the design and rules of the system. Having said that, merchants can affect the overall quality and integrity of the payment scheme, and thus must be vetted in some fashion. The depth and breadth of that vetting process can vary widely depending on the particular characteristics of the particular scheme. For example, if the merchant is privy to or may somehow gain access to sensitive information (account numbers, passwords, etc.) that would argue for more thorough up front screening of merchants in addition to normal risk management activities described below. Another example of merchant underwriting could be ensuring that the merchant is a legitimate merchant entity (versus a shell company that exists only to perpetrate fraud) and that the principals have not been barred/expelled from that scheme in the past for wrongdoing.

2.1.3 Onboarding

After a merchant agrees to accept payments in the scheme and passes any upfront underwriting processes, they must then be provisioned into the payment system(s). For example, irrespective of where the information is held and by whom, information such as the merchant’s physical address, proprietor’s name and perhaps ID number, type of merchant, expected average transaction amount (important for ongoing risk management), etc. must be gathered and input into the applicable database(s).

Optimally, both the underwriting and onboarding processes should only have to be performed once, versus redundant processes by the various payment schemes. This would require use of a trusted entity with access to relevant information from a variety of sources. In addition, this process could be aided by utilizing a common merchant identifier within and across payment schemes. Also, a common merchant identifier could also make it easier for merchants to switch providers, fostering a more competitive marketplace.

2.1.4 Technology

Payment-related devices and software sales and service – some schemes could require or offer the option of using specialized hardware and software to process transactions – for example, special smart phone applications, phone peripherals, dedicated payment terminals, ecommerce payment modules, etc. In many/most schemes, a provider is need to help configure the merchants’ payment acceptance hardware and software to properly accept, process, and communicate transactions to the system. Sometimes this can be part of the onboarding process or can be performed by a separate entity.

As with some other functions, the notion of which type of organization is best to perform this function is principally driven by who is best positioned to offer the merchant a device and/or software that can accept competing schemes via a single device and/or user interface (i.e., the schemes should be interoperable at the point of sale device level). Ideally, merchants should not have to purchase multiple devices to support multiple payment schemes and sales staff should not have to learn different payment processing procedures; rather, the service and interfaces should be constructed such that it will be transparent to the merchant and clerks which scheme is used by the customer.

This does not mean that the schemes will necessarily need to all agree on a common user point of sale technology for all merchants. Rather, which technology is employed (NFC, bar code, sonic signals, etc.) will likely be a function of the type of device the merchant is using (smart phone, feature phone, etc.) combined with which type of device the customer has.

2.1.5 Pricing

Schemes vary widely in how transaction services are priced to payment acceptors. In some cases, the merchant service provider essentially marks up a wholesale rate from the scheme to generate explicit profits. In other cases, end prices to merchants could be set by the government or by the scheme itself, sometimes varying based on type of merchant, how much volume the merchant processes, etc. Some schemes may have different pricing structures, such as prepaid eMoneys vs. bill to carrier models.

2.1.6 Training

Merchants and their staff will usually need some sort of training/education regarding how to consummate a transaction, issue refunds and adjustments, become familiar with the settlement/funding process, etc.

2.1.7 Processing

While the actual mechanics and flows may be different, at least one entity is responsible for ensuring that the transaction is accurately transported from the point of sale/point of customer interaction to the central processing system. In many card-centric schemes, the acquirer will provide the telecommunications links from the merchant site to the schemes central processing center, directly and/or via the acquirer’s own processing facility.

Note that in some cases, a merchant may accept transactions from more than one payment scheme, and just send all transactions to its merchant service provider; that provider would often be responsible ensuring that each transaction is appropriately routed and settled (see below).

2.1.8 Merchant Servicing

Merchants will invariably have a wide variety of questions regarding products and services, as well as regarding potential problems with funding, equipment, etc. Most questions can generally be handled by first-line customer service representatives on the phone (often the most expensive channel), via email, or via text messages. Automated voice response systems can often be used to answer some basic questions, such as the last x day’s sales.

2.1.9 Risk and Dispute Management

As discussed above and in much more detail in a separate section of this report, merchants can introduce risk into the system, particularly when they accept payment for goods and services delivered at a later time. Payment systems that do not allow for customer disputes (e.g., the customer paid the wrong person, paid the wrong amount, never received the goods) will reduce or eliminate much of the risk and customer service costs.

2.1.10 Reporting

Simple but effective reporting is critically important, particularly when money is involved. While costly paper reports may be necessary in some cases, simple reporting can be provided by SMS (e.g., show the last 10 transactions, day’s total, etc.), automated voice response systems, web interfaces, and live customer service representatives (usually the most expensive option). Clear reporting will also reduce merchant service calls.

As is the theme with the other value chain functions discussed above, organizations best positioned to provide services most aligned with merchant needs will be those that can make the complexity of the underlying schemes as transparent and easy to deal with as possible to the merchant. For example, reporting that takes all the activity from the various payment schemes and consolidates it into an easily digestible format. Similarly, it would be advantageous if the merchant/sales clerks were able to be trained once by a single entity on how to accept digital payments across schemes. It would be advantageous if the merchant had a single point of contact for questions or problems across the schemes.

2.1.11 Settlement/Funding

Merchants can get paid for their sales in a variety of ways and by a variety of entities. In some systems, the acquirer or merchant service provider is paid by the scheme and then passes those funds to the merchants via direct deposit to a bank account, a deposit to mobile wallet, etc. In other cases, the scheme itself may pay the merchant directly. Settlement/funding timeframes (e.g., immediate, T+1, T+2, etc.) will also vary from system to system and may depend on the type of merchant, volume, settlement means, and other factors.

While the timing of when merchants receive their funds may vary by scheme, it would be advantageous if each provider could settle into to a single wallet or account (MNO, bank, etc.). One key issue that payment systems have to consider is what types of entities are, and are not allowed to handle and hold, settlement funds, even temporarily.

2.1.12 Value Added Services

In many cases, the core payment services themselves may not be particularly profitable for the providers, particularly for certain classes of merchants and/or transaction types. Merchant service providers, and even the payment schemes themselves, may offer a variety of ancillary products and services to leverage their merchant relationships. Examples of value added/ancillary services include merchant loans (often facilitated by data generated by electronic transactions and the ability to tap into settlement flows for payment), POS equipment sales and rentals, customer loyalty programs, data analytics, marketing services, as well as payroll and other business services.

2.1.13 Analytics

In general, value-added analytics (versus simple reporting) can be performed by the merchant service providers or by third parties otherwise ancillary to the merchant services value chain. Data mining/analytics is usually an "offline" function that can take place after the actual transactions, and by specialists that just need access to the transaction and other relevant data.

3 Merchant and Payment Acceptor Segmentation

The following is a segmentation scheme for merchants/payment acceptors in a developing marketplace. Some of the segments represent poor merchants, others are larger enterprises. All of them serve poor consumers.

Note that all segments may have both face-to-face and remote commerce transactions; some will have prepaid, post-paid, and/or "pay as you go" models. This is why "eCommerce" or "mobile commerce" is not called out as a separate segment: rather it is a channel used by some merchants within each of the segments.

Figure 2 – High Level Merchant and Payment Acceptor Segments

This section describes the key payment-related attributes and assumptions of each segment:

• Technology (e.g., feature/semi-smart/smart phones, PCs, POS, etc.)

• Key function and feature requirements

• Economics/cost sensitivity

• Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Operational Assumptions

3.1 M0: P2P

This segment represents consumers settling personal goods or services ("P2P"). It recognizes the fact that many poor consumers are merchants: either selling goods or their own labor in exchange for payment. Practically speaking, the payment transactions in this segment are unlikely to be distinguishable from domestic remittances.

3.1.1 Technology

• The lowest common denominator, low cost feature phones, will be the predominant form factor

• Users will likely conduct transactions via SMS and USSD interactions

3.1.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Ease of use (and, if possible, use of icons vs. words)

• Immediate funds availability

• Cross carrier utility (users in this segment will likely carry multiple SIM cards in order to take advantage of the lowest possible rates)

• Must be easy to enrol as a merchant (in the unlikely event that anything beyond P2P processes are required)

• Cash in/cash out agents

3.1.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• We assume that poor people will not pay for electronic transactions, as either payors or payees

• Since costs are so critical, transactions should not utilize much/any data costs (any costs should be somehow subsidized/covered by other revenue streams)

• Low cost CICO transactions are essential, particularly in the early stages of rollout

3.1.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Most transactions will be low value and face-to-face, posing little financial or reputational risk on the system

• Will likely require only "light weight" know your customer account set-up

3.1.5 Operational assumptions

• Must be easy to enrol as a merchant (to the unlikely event that anything beyond P2P processes are required)

3.2 M1: Sole Proprietor

This segment includes merchants selling goods or services, often in a marketplace or stall. This segment may have only slight, often indiscernible, differences from segment M0.

3.2.1 Technology

• Similar to P2P transactions, the lowest common denominator, low cost feature phones, will be the predominant form factor

• Users will likely conduct transactions via SMS and USSD interactions, but some buyers will likely be initiating payments on smart or semi-smart phones

• Single till, single employee such that personal phone can be used for business purposes as well

3.2.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Similar to M0:

• Ease of use (and, if possible, use of icons vs. words)

• Immediate funds availability

• Cross carrier utility (users in this segment will likely carry multiple SIM cards in order to take advantage of the lowest possible rates)

• Must be easy to enrol as a merchant (to the unlikely extent that anything beyond P2P processes are required)

• Cash in/cash out agents

• Could be taking remote (i.e., phone) orders for delivery

• Might also be taking remote payments for small credits extended to customers

• Unlikely to have a bank account, so would not be utilizing any eMoney/bank transfer capabilities

3.2.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Similar to M0

• Since costs are so critical, transactions should not utilize much/any data costs (any costs should be somehow subsidized/covered by other revenue streams)

• Low cost CICO transactions are essential, particularly in the early stages of rollout

• Like M0, we assume that poor people will not pay for electronic transactions, as either payors or payees, BUT may be willing to pay a small amount for remote transactions to the extent that they can generate incremental sales

3.2.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Similar to M0

• Most transactions will be low value and face-to-face, posing little financial or reputational risk on the system

• Will likely require only "light weight" know your customer account set-up

3.2.5 Operational assumptions

• Similar to M0 – must be easy to enrol as a merchant (to the unlikely extent that anything beyond P2P processes are required)

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent merchant adoption

3.3 M2: Small Shop

This segment includes merchants with some kind of shop: there may be family members or occasional employees active in the enterprise.

3.3.1 Technology

• While single till, may have employees/family fill-in working in store/selling when owner not present; therefore, likely to have a separate feature phone dedicated to business (since others will have access/possession of the phone at times)

• Note that any dedicated store phones will likely have cash-out and spending restrictions; this also presumes that the "store" phone number defines a store account that is distinct from the proprietor’s personal account

• May use "merchant wallet" as settlement to buy inventory

• Similar to M0 and M1 transactions, the lowest common denominator, low cost feature phones, will be the predominant form factor. However, in the future, may have access to an inexpensive (US$360 – $6100) smart phone or semi-smart phone

• Users will likely conduct transactions via SMS and USSD interactions, but some buyers will likely be initiating payments on smart or semi-smart phones

3.3.2 Key function and feature requirements

• May have rudimentary ecommerce / remote order transactions in the future

• May place some, but still low value on data

• Immediate funds availability, but perhaps to a slightly lesser extent than M0 and M1

• Cross scheme utility – must be able to accept payments from multiple schemes; should be transparent to the merchant which scheme the customer is using (as feasible)

• Some access to cash in/cash out agents

• Similar to M1:

• Could be taking remote (i.e., phone) orders for delivery

• Might also be taking remote payments for small credits extended to customers

• Some, perhaps small, likelihood that the merchant will have a bank account, so may need to utilize eMoney/bank transfer capabilities

3.3.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Cost sensitive, but perhaps less so than M1

• May be willing to pay a small amount for remote transactions to the extent that they can generate incremental sales

3.3.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Could have more volume and higher value transactions than M1, but still unlikely to pose meaningful financial or reputational risk on the system

• Like M1, will likely require only "light weight" know your customer account set-up

3.3.5 Operational assumptions

• May have access to a bank account for some/all settlement, but not necessarily

Similar to M1

• Must be easy to enrol as a merchant (to the unlikely extent that anything beyond P2P processes are required)

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent merchant adoption

3.4 M3: Small Farmer

This segment represents a mixture of "subsistence" and abundance farmers. Some amount of B2B sales to small and mid-sized markets/resellers; may already be using apps such as mFisheries and MFarm that provide up-to-date market prices for their produce via text messages and dedicated apps, and sometimes act as payment intermediary between buyers and individual/group sellers. It is important to note that many small farmers also have characteristics of individuals – in addition to being farmers, they often hold other jobs such as laborers.

3.4.1 Technology

• Similar to M0, M1 and M2, the lowest common denominator will be a meaningful mix of low cost feature phones; however, more likely to have a growing number of smart or semi-smart phones

• Likely to have a mix of using personal as well as dedicated "business" phones

• May use "merchant wallet" as settlement to buy inputs/supplies

3.4.2 Key function and feature requirements

• May be receiving agricultural subsidies – enabling spend-capabilities from those funds could be a meaningful value-add

• Could have rudimentary ecommerce / remote order transactions in the future

• Ability to interface with growing number of marketplaces and apps that support individual and coop selling

• Immediate funds availability, but perhaps to a slightly lesser extent than M2

• Cross scheme utility – must be able to accept payments from multiple schemes; should be transparent to the merchant which scheme the customer is using (as feasible)

• Some access to cash in/cash out agents

• Similar to M1 and M2:

• Could be taking remote (i.e., phone) orders for delivery

• Might also be taking remote payments for small credits extended to customers

• Some, perhaps small, likelihood that the merchant will have a bank account, so may need to utilize eMoney/bank transfer capabilities

3.4.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Cost sensitive, but perhaps less so than smaller segments

• May be willing to pay a small amount for remote transactions to the extent that they can generate incremental sales

3.4.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Likely to have higher value transactions than M1 and M2

• Unlikely to pose meaningful financial or reputational risk on the system

3.4.5 Operational assumptions

• Largely cash on delivery today

• May have access to a bank account for some/all settlement, but not necessarily

• Similar to M1 and M2

• Must be easy to enrol as a merchant but will likely put up with more friction than other segments

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent merchant adoption

3.5 M4: Mid-Sized Retailer

• Rural and urban retailers with multiple tills

3.5.1 Technology

• Low cost/low feature electronic cash registers

• Today, each till would have a dedicated phone, likely a feature phone

• Owner may have access to a personal computer

3.5.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Could have rudimentary ecommerce / remote order transactions in the future

• May use "merchant wallet" as settlement to buy inputs/supplies or even pay employees

• Immediate funds availability not critical (i.e., next day may be acceptable in many circumstances)

• Cross scheme utility – must be able to accept payments from multiple schemes; should be transparent to the merchant which scheme the customer is using (as feasible)

• Will likely settle to a bank account (versus using cash in/cash out agents)

• Similar to M1 – M3:

• Could be taking remote (i.e., phone) orders for delivery

• Might also be taking remote payments for small credits extended to customers

3.5.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Cost sensitive, but likely less so than smaller segments

• May be willing to pay a small amount for remote transactions to the extent that they can generate incremental sales

3.5.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Likely to have higher value transactions than M1 and M2

• Unlikely to pose meaningful financial or reputational risk on the system

3.5.5 Operational assumptions

• Largely cash today

• Could be surcharging eMoney transactions

• Similar to M1 and M2

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent merchant adoption

3.6 M5: Utilities and Services

This segment includes utility billers, schools, and a wide range of service providers such as hospitals and clinics. This excludes small or personal service providers, who are included in M0.

3.6.1 Technology

• In many ways, a traditional "biller" with PCs and sometimes more sophisticated "enterprise" systems

3.6.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Ability to accept, post, and confirm eMoney payments originating from a range of interfaces – from feature phones, smart/semi-smart phones, mobile and desktop browsers, etc., without the receiving party needing a mobile phone

• Real-time or near real-time confirmations important; next day funding usually acceptable

• Remote transactions

• Pay as you go models

• Direct bank settlement

3.6.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Much less cost-sensitive than small sellers

• May be willing to pay to receive payments (at minimum, unlikely to surcharge sender)

3.6.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Many transactions with senders with ongoing relationships – unlikely to have meaningful levels of disputes

3.6.5 Operational Assumptions

• Payments may be taken over the phone, face-to-face, or remotely

• Need interfaces to billing/receivables systems

3.7 M6: Transit

This segment includes both large mass-transit systems and small operators providing taxi or mini-van services.

3.7.1 Technology

• Technology required to collect fares on a ride-by-ride basis from feature phone users would likely require displaying a QR code on the phone (one time rides, monthly passes, etc.) that could be read and validated by the fare collector; smart phones with NFC be viable technology solutions

3.7.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Transaction processing speeds

• Auto-top up (but may not be relevant in all cases for BoP)

3.7.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• May be willing to pay to be paid assuming eMoney solution could reduce shrinkage and cash handling costs, and increase fares collected

• Payors (riders) unlikely to shoulder transaction costs

3.7.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Considered low risk transactions

3.7.5 Operational Assumptions

• Real time or near real time processing may be required to prevent double use

• EMoney procedures could be slower then cash and paper tickets

3.8 M7: Large/Top Tier Merchants

3.8.1 Technology

• Less willing to keep dedicated phones at each till

• More likely to have card-accepting terminals/ECRs

• PCs and/or store servers

3.8.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Remote orders via phones and PCs, COD

• May offer some credit to customers

• Direct bank settlement

3.8.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• More accustomed to paying for electronic (e.g., card) transactions

• Less likely to surcharge eMoney transactions

• May be willing to pay for customer acquisition and loyalty services

• Next day funds availability acceptable

3.8.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Must be protected against fraud for remote orders

3.8.5 Operational Assumptions

• Will need to be easy to reconcile eMoney transactions with POS systems and bank deposits

3.9 M8: Government

3.9.1 Technology

• Likely a mix of manual and more sophisticated PC and higher systems

• Will need to interact with lowest common denominator of consumers’ technology

3.9.2 Key function and feature requirements

• Ability to accept payments from SMBs could be a big benefit

3.9.3 Economics/cost sensitivity

• Unlikely to surcharge eMoney transactions

• Next day funds availability acceptable

3.9.4 Appetite for risk and need to manage risk

• Low/no risk transactions

3.9.5 Operational Assumptions

• Could reduce cash shrinkage and cash handling costs

• Transactions could occur face-to-face, remotely, and via third party agents

4 Payments Acceptance Economic Models

The question of the economic model, or business case, for merchants and other payments acceptors in emerging markets is challenging. In the developed world, provider revenues from merchant payments – often in the form of merchant discount fees – is sufficient to cover many of the overall costs, and profit requirements, of providers. Some of this is distributed to consumer providers through the mechanism known as interchange.

Applying this business model to developing markets will work in some cases, and not in others. The biggest obstacle is the very large base of small merchants (segments M0 through M3), who are unlikely to pay a fee simply for electronic payments, and may be unwilling to pay a fee under any circumstances. Given a financial inclusion objective of reaching "digital liquidity" and the eventual move away from cash, this is a problem that needs to be solved.

4.1 Merchant Payments Revenue Sources

4.1.1 Merchant Pays

• The most obvious source of revenue is a simple fee charged to the merchant by the merchant services provider. Often, this is expressed as a "percent of value"; sometimes as a combination of a fixed fee and a "percent of value". The merchant, of course, will compare this cost to his or her cost of accepting cash, and may not factor in the "hidden" costs of cash (theft, lost sales, etc.)

• If a merchant is accepting a payment from a digital wallet being used in a P2P mode, or in a merchant payment mode, the merchant may incur "cash-out" fees when turning the received digital payment into cash. (This is why, in another report by this ITU Focus Group, the use of digital funds for B2B supplier payments is investigated as a means of reducing merchant costs and improving digital liquidity.)

4.1.2 Buyer Pays

• In the developed world, there is rarely an explicit fee for a consumer to use a payment method at a merchant. However, in both developed and developing world, a merchant may pass on part of their costs to a buyer – either as a "surcharge" or as a simple increase in the purchase price. These practices may or may not be permissible according to the rules of the payment system the merchant is using, or according to law and regulation.

• If the buyer is using a digital wallet in a P2P mode to buy something at the merchant, the buyer may incur transfer fees for making the payment.

• Note that a related issue is the fact that many merchants also act as agents, and can earn a cash-out commission; this leads some merchants to refuse to take eMoney, as they hope a buying consumer will cash-out, and then pay for a purchase in cash.

4.1.3 Subsidies

There are a number of examples in the payments industry of the costs of payments being absorbed by a provider in exchange for the ability to realize revenues from other customers or from other products sold to the customer (in this case, the merchant) in question. Some of these subsidies are:

• Airtime Subsidy – a merchant services provider may realize sufficient revenue from its voice and data business with a merchant to absorb some costs of providing merchant services.

• Merchant Lending – a merchant services provider may be able to lend to a merchant, or provide various other value-added merchant services. Merchant lending in particular is emerging as an important consideration.

• Consumer Lending – a merchant services provider may be able to lend to a merchant’s customers – either directly or in partnership with another DFS provider.

• Rich/Poor Cross Subsidies – a merchant services provider may be able to accrue sufficient revenue from its larger and more affluent merchants to cover the cost of providing merchant acceptance services to smaller or poorer merchants at essentially no cost to them. Implicit in a strategy to use this kind of subsidization is a belief that it is hard to identify those smaller/poorer merchants who are likely to turn into larger or more affluent merchants over time. A related idea is to have more revenue come from high-value, rather than low value transactions.

• Account Balances – in a high interest rate environment, merchant services providers may be able to obtain sufficient revenue from holding merchant funds for a period of time prior to making the funds available to the merchant.

• Government Subsidies – governments looking to quickly enable large numbers of merchants for payments acceptance may choose to subsidize some costs: this could come in the form of tax incentives of various kinds.

• Provider Bundling – the cost of payments may be absorbed by a commerce platform as part of its costs in supplying the platform. This is emerging as a very significant factor for merchant providers of goods and services in all segments, and is discussed further in a section below.

• Trading and arbitrage – a merchant services provider may, either directly or through partnership with another provider, realize trading profits on currency sufficient to offset the costs of merchant payments. The most obvious example of this is with cross-border (cross-currency) transactions, particularly remote (eCommerce, mCommerce) transactions, where foreign exchange arbitrage opportunities may be considerable. In another example, trading in currency vs. airtime may create arbitrage opportunities.

The various revenue sources may or may not be tightly coupled with a particular payment product or payment system. Interchange, for example, is commonly used in card payments, and is specified as a rule in the private operating rules of many card networks. Other revenue sources may be used or not by individual merchant services providers as a part of their business model. The chart below shows how these revenue sources intersect with payments systems:

Table 1 – Type of Payment System

Type of Payment System

Cards

Digital Wallet

Open Loop

Closed Loop

Closed Loop

Open Loop^1

Bill to Carrier

Credit Transfer

Merchant Discount Fee^2













Merchant cash-out fees





Buyer surcharge











Buyer transfer fees





Airtime Subsidy





Merchant Lending









Consumer Lending





Rich/Poor Subsidy









Account Balances





Government Subsidies

Provider Bundling













FX Arbitrage



Airtime Arbitrage







1 Wih interoperability

2 With or without interchange

4.2 Costs to Merchant Services Providers

The costs of providing merchant payments acceptance is partially determined by the payment system being used by the provider, and partially to choices that the provider makes. Costs include:

4.2.1 Transaction Processing

The merchant services provider needs to process the transaction. This includes delivering it to a payment switch (if required), accounting for the transaction on its own books, and managing the clearing and settlement of the transaction. It may choose to use a processor to do these tasks, or handle the tasks itself (in-house).

4.2.2 Interchange

If the payment system being used specifies interchange as a component, the merchant services provider will be either directly or indirectly responsible for paying this cost to the system (and, in turn, to the buyer’s DFS provider).

4.2.3 Merchant Acquisition

The merchant needs to be signed up for payments acceptance: this can be done either in person or online. Payments system rules may put requirements on merchant services providers governing their responsibilities.

4.2.4 Merchant Onboarding

Once signed up, the merchant needs to be enabled to use the service. There may be technical and training components to this.

4.2.5 Credit

If payment system rules specify that the merchant services provider is responsible to the system for the behavior of its merchants, then the cost of managing this, and making payments on behalf of merchants in certain circumstances, becomes a cost to the merchant services provider.

4.2.6 Fraud

There will be situations in which the merchant services provider is responsible for fraud committed by or against their merchant customers: again, the extent of this is determined by payments system rules.

4.2.7 Float

If the merchant services provider makes funds available to a merchant before collecting them from the payments system, there is a cost of float to the provider.

4.2.8 Customer Service

The merchant services provider needs to be able to respond to and resolve inquiries and problems relating to the service – these may be operational, technical, or related to fraud.

4.2.9 Marketing

The merchant services provider may choose to take actions to promote the use of its products by the merchant community and/or their customers.

4.3 Electronic Commerce Platforms

The advent of electronic commerce platforms is of particular interest to the question of merchant payments economic models. As noted before, merchants and payments acceptors are willing to "pay to be paid" if the new payment method brings them significantly more revenue (new customers or more revenue from existing customers). New platforms, including social platforms, may accomplish this for many types of merchants. In addition, payments may become "embedded" in various forms of electronic commerce platforms. The merchant decides to sell on the platform, and pays some type of commission or fee to the platform, that is not explicitly a fee for the payment, but which covers the platform’s cost in providing the payment. These new platforms are expected to become important in all of the different identified segments.

The two table below demonstrates how, on a segment by segment basis, how new commerce platforms might have an effect on the segment. The first table shows, for each segment, what the current environment for selling – in person and remotely – might look like.

Table 2 – New Commerce Platforms by Segment

Segment

Selling: Current Environment

POS (Face to Face)

Remote (eCommerce, mCommerce)

M0

P2P

Cash is the norm Some use of mobile eMoney on feature phones but constrained due to costs

Minimal

M1

Sole Prop

Cash is the norm. Some use of mobile eMoneys on feature phones but usage discouraged or surcharged, reducing usage

Low/minimal; could be accepting phoned-in orders for delivery

M2

Small Shop

Has booth or shack with dedicated feature phone (others may be working in store)

May have small ecommerce element now or in near term

Probably not serving BOP today with remote sales but could in future

M3

Small Farmer

Likely to have a b2b component selling to coops/stores today (lower case "b’s") but still mostly cash on delivery

May be joining ecommerce platforms of agricultural coops; may also be receiving subsidies electronically or otherwise

M4

Mid Size Retailer

Multiple tills staffed by multiple employees. More likely to accept eMoney transactions today, but still predominately cash. May extend small amounts of credit to customers

Urban stores in particular may have limited ecommerce capabilities incl. shopping carts

M5

Services

Prepaid, postpaid, and pay as you go models

Mostly cash payments requiring travel to office or via third parties

Prepaid, postpaid, and pay as you go models

Limited remote via online banking (not BOP) and some mobile services

M6

Transit

Cash

Electronic payments may reduce speed at point of interaction

Could facilitate prepaid pack of tickets ordered by phone/SMS

M7

Large Retailer

Big box /multi-lane/ upscale retailers, hotels, and restaurants generally accept cash, cards (not universally but much more prevalent), and eMoneys

Omni-channel airlines, and "Amazon equivalents" selling remotely exist in many parts of the developing world, but may not be serving BOP

The second table shows how electronic commerce platforms may change this. It also addresses the issue of how these new commerce platforms may change the ways in which merchants deal with banks.

Table 3 – Impact of New Commerce Platforms

Segment

Possible Impact of Electronic Commerce Platforms

Possible Impact on Banking

M0

P2P

Ad hoc/on demand sale of labor e.g., labor marketplaces such as Task Rabbit where parties discover and contract with each other (may require smart phones)

Neutral/Negative: Would likely reduce the need for / usage of traditional bank accounts for the poor

M1

Sole Prop

Could spark and increase in local remote orders and delivery

Merchants could more easily extend small credits to customers (attract new customers, increase revenue from existing customers)

Neutral/Negative: Would likely reduce the need for / usage of traditional bank accounts for the poor

M2

Small Shop

New payment-enabled commerce platforms should increase ecommerce activity. As with smaller segments, could spur some level of credit extension to customers.

Transaction data may be of value but not clear that it could be monetized; may be just an added incentive for adoption

Neutral/Negative: Would likely reduce the need for / usage of traditional bank accounts for the poor

M3

Small Farmer

Could expand market with ecommerce

Extension of credit more feasible/attractive to lenders with electronic payments data

Neutral/Positive: Could increase bank balances, transfers between bank accounts and eMoneys, and possibly increase SMB lending for banks

M4

Mid Size Retailer

Could spur electronic payments to employees and suppliers

Possible enabling of/increase in remote commerce. Extension of credit more feasible/attractive to lenders with data

Neutral/Positive: Could increase bank balances, transfers between bank accounts and eMoneys, and possibly increase SMB lending for banks

M5

Services

Growth in "pay as you go" for services

Could enable government or third party co-payments or subsidies more easily

Positive: would reduce cash processing and enable more revenue-generating transactions (assuming "receiver pays" scenario)

M6

Transit

If transaction speed problem solved, would likely reduce theft, reduce cash handling costs, and perhaps increase fare collections

Positive: would reduce cash processing and enable more revenue-generating transactions (assuming "receiver pays" scenario)

M7

Large Retailer

Increase in omni-channel marketing and sales likely

Data commerce becomes more powerful and could generate some level of meaningful revenues for providers

Positive: would reduce cash processing and enable more revenue-generating electronic transactions (assuming "receiver pays" scenario)

M8

Government

Could accelerate overall adoption of electronic payments across segments

Positive: would reduce cash processing and enable more revenue-generating electronic transactions

4.4 Priority Segments and Supporting Business Models

Which merchant segments are the most important to pursue, keeping the goals of financial inclusion in mind? The table below presents some suggestions for clusters of segments to pursue.

• Larger merchants where the merchant-discount-fee revenue model used in the developed world may apply

• Mid-sized merchants where revenue from associated lending (merchant or consumer) and/or rich/poor subsidies is likely to form the most significant part of the business model

• Smaller merchants where a combination of rich/poor subsidies and government support may apply

Table 4 – Priority Segments for Financial Inclusion and Supporting Revenue Models

5 Policy Considerations for Financial Inclusion

Policy makers and other organizations in a position to influence how the digital payments ecosystem evolves may want to consider the following points:

• Merchant acceptance of payment from consumer digital wallets will be a critical enabling component in reaching "digital liquidity" amongst consumers, and reducing the costs and risks associated with "cash-in, cash out".

• Interoperability at the payment acceptor level and open payment platforms (standards, APIs, etc.) are key components to not only help achieve digital liquidity, but also to help ensure providers compete on both price and innovation.

• Poor customers of eMoney systems may never be profitable on a standalone basis, but financial inclusion and associated benefits to BoP populations are important to governments for a number of reasons (e.g., building / growing a credit system that can grow the economy). Therefore, government entities that directly and indirectly pay for other payment systems (e.g., cash) should consider analogous support for eMoney systems serving poor payment users (senders and receivers).

• Some tax-related accommodations may be required from governments, particularly in the early stages, so as to not disincent smaller, and perhaps even larger, merchant adoption. Governments should also consider the possibility that once electronic transactions become more prevalent, the visibility of transaction for tax-related purposes will likely increase.

• The merchant landscape is very broad, and the requirements of each segment can be quite different. Policy makers should anticipate and welcome a robust and competitive marketplace of merchant services providers, both large and small. Some of these merchant services providers will be direct participants in payments systems; some may access them through relationships with other participants. But it is essential that easy and open access to interoperable, low cost payments systems is made available to merchant services providers.

• Shared services, such as fraud management, can be a particularly important way to achieve success, particularly for those that benefit all participants, require economies of scale, and which are not thought to be sources of competitive differentiation.

• Successful merchant service providers will likely have a variety of organizational forms and should be allowed to compete on level playing fields.

• Merchant services providers working exclusively with smaller and poorer merchants will not be able to sustain business models from transaction fees alone. These providers will extend their offering to merchants to include a variety of services, most critically the provision of credit to merchants and in some situations to their customers.

• While not in themselves sufficient to achieve digital liquidity, government entities may want to look for opportunities to move bulk payment and related transactions to eMoney systems in order to help those systems reach critical mass.

• Other policy interventions, such as expanded use of digital IDs, could also be important contributors to achieving critical mass and digital liquidity. Two components of digital ID’s are particularly important for the viability of a merchant services marketplace. One is a persistent identity for merchants, enabling the detection and identification of fraudulent merchants. The other is a biometric component to the identity of a business owner, again to enable the control of payments and credit fraud.

Part II: Driving Acceptance by Merchants and Other Payments Acceptors

6 Introduction

eMoney has significantly impacted payment system development around the globe, bringing financial services to populations that were previously excluded. There is widespread recognition of the tremendous potential of eMoney deployments to continue evolving and providing previously excluded populations with economically viable access to a range of financial services. To date the success of eMoney deployments has been driven by Mobile Phone top ups and Person to Person (P2P) payment services. These services have been supported through the establishment by eMoney Operators (MMOs) of extensive Cash-in Cash-out (CICO) networks, the most expensive element in eMoney deployments. Yet, it is merchant payments – which will facilitate commerce – that holds the potential to drive explosive growth and provide additional benefits in eMoney deployments. Some estimates conservatively put the potential at 16 merchant payment transactions for each P2P transaction.[15] Yet, merchant acceptance as formal Person to Merchant (P2M) payments through eMoney is still very nascent, non-existent in many deployments, or is transacted informally as P2P payments. Growth in P2M payments is critical because of the tremendous impact it can provide to the continued development enabled by the creation of digital liquidity – the maintenance by households and firms of electronic stores of value. While the importance of financial deepening through greater access to financial services has long been recognized in economic growth theory,[16] recent studies have shown and estimated the positive impact of electronic payments on Total Factor Productivity and economic growth,[17] reinforcing the value of these efforts.

6.1 Overview

This report seeks to provide a better understanding nascent merchant acceptance in eMoney deployments. Digital Merchant acceptance is critical to its development, most importantly because of the tremendous size of potential acceptance volumes and the Digital Liquidity that acceptance would generate. We advance understanding by providing a structured approach and identifying different models that have emerged to support merchant acceptance and models that could potentially emerge. In examining these models, their characteristics are highlighted, especially those aspects presenting barriers to growth or supporting the scaling of these services. By focusing on nascent acceptance we can better understand the emerging lessons, and glean early insights into opportunities to catalyze additional merchant acceptance. Finally, relevant lessons for the growth of merchant acceptance will be highlighted.

6.2 Disruption in Financial Services

To provide additional context, we need to step back to understand why eMoney has emerged in the first place and how it has evolved. Before the first eMoney scheme was launched by Vodafone, the UK’s Department of International Development (DFID) staff observed that Kenyans were circulating airtime through their mobile phones to remit something that could be converted into money back to their families and friends, leading to the development of a mobile system that allows the remittance of actual money. There are a number of factors that have enabled the emergence of eMoney deployments. First, there continues to be unmet demand for financial services in many countries. Second, the costs of providing these services has limited the ability to meet demand. Furthermore, recent technological developments have reduced the cost of delivering financial services. In addition, regulations have been put in place that enabled the emergence of eMoney. And finally, there has been an adoption of innovative business models that has facilitated the growth of eMoney deployments. This section will briefly touch on each of these factors.

A significant portion of the world’s population remains unbanked, having little access to transaction services and financial products, their unsecured cash continuing to circulate informally. At an individual level financial services would provide safety and convenience while expanding individual choice sets. At a societal level, these services would enable greater factor productivity, deepen financial systems, and improve welfare distribution and tax collection.

Concerted efforts since the 1960s have sought to improve the delivery of financial services. Targeted credit programs emerged to finance the seed packets and fertilizer associated with the Green Revolution.[18] These efforts evolved into a focus on Microcredit, Microfinance and most recently Digital Financial Services.[19] The constant has been a focus on technology and innovative business arrangements to drive cost efficiencies in the delivery of financial services.

The development of mobile phone technology provides an effective and low cost platform for continued efforts to provide cost effective financial services to meet the latent demand of under and unbanked populations around the globe. Feature phones have become almost ubiquitous, while the promise of the low cost smartphones comes closer to becoming a reality. Mobile phones have provided the necessary digital connectivity and a critical mass user base. Leveraging this platform innovators have been able to leverage USSD and SIM card technology to enable low cost eMoney services. Furthermore, smart phones with continuously declining prices and associated computational power, offer tremendous potential because of their ability to deploy new applications and support new capabilities.

Regulators have established enabling environments that have facilitated the emergence and growth of eMoney. First, they established a level playing field of providers, allowing non-financial institutions as well as financial institutions to become mobile wallet providers. This benefited MNOs who are particularly well positioned in their distribution and marketing channels to get at the far reaches of bottom of the pyramid merchant users. Secondly, they created guidelines for successfully mitigating institutional risks and liquidity risks through prudential requirements, consumer protections, and minimum capital requirements. And thirdly, they have established customer due diligence measures for eMoney.[20] This clarity has fostered a willingness by business to invest and innovate.

Figure 3 – A Digital Pathway to Financial Inclusion. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Radcliffe, D and Voorhies, R. (2012)

As pointed out by Radcliffe and Voorhies in their pathways to Financial Inclusion, merchant acceptance is an important evolution of eMoney schemes. In many deployments P2P services have created an active user base. This active user base has begun to develop some degree of digital liquidity and would benefit from additional services, such as merchant acceptance, that leverages this liquidity, thusly setting the stage for the emergence of merchant acceptance.

In considering the emergence of merchant acceptance in eMoney deployments there are several relevant technological and business model innovations to highlight. There has been an emergence of low cost interfaces at the POI (Point of Interaction) to enable merchant payments, these include: USSD technology, In-APP payment, MPOS (Mobile Point of Sale), QR (Quick Response) codes and NFC (Near Field Communication) technology. For example, MPOS has allowed the use of Smart Phones and recently feature phones, for card based merchant payments. With QR codes a consumer scans a merchant code with their phone to enable merchant payments, another low cost POI innovation. These POI technologies provide MMOs the opportunity to expand into merchant acceptance. In addition, they provide merchant acquirers – a critical player in the card centric four party model – a potential opportunity to move down market and profitability reach a previously unserved market.

Other relevant technological advances for expanding merchant acceptance include advances in data processing and transmission, which enable deployment of capabilities to provide more robust merchant value propositions (e.g., working capital loans, inventory management). These and other benefits of electronics payments such as minimizing the risk of theft and greater transparency provide further incentives to the adoption of merchant payments.

These technological advances, while promising, may need to be combined with new business models to realize their full potential. Some of the acceptance technologies can be deployed through push payments, which offers the prospect of a lower payments cost structure. Another innovation is to lever Payment Facilitators to enable acceptance. This business model changes the nature of the merchant relationship, enabling reductions in on-boarding, risk management, and the equipment costs necessary to enable viable acceptance of electronic payments.

These observations about technology and business models have a number of implications for the emergence of merchant acceptance in eMoney deployments. These are outlined in the next section and ultimately examined in models and corresponding deployment.

7 Hypotheses

A number of hypothesis were generated in this work, some of which were answered, others are still outstanding and await further deployment development and insight. The hypotheses include:

• A variety of approaches will emerge to support merchant acceptance, each with its own unique Business Model, Transaction Flow and Pricing;

• Given the recent emergence of merchant acceptance we expect to see various pricing approaches deployed;

• Purchase transactions will be characterized by push and pull approaches;

• Third parties are likely to emerge and play a role in more fragmented markets where they can lower the transaction costs associated with in-house arrangements;

• To expand eMoney services beyond P2P services to enable P2M payments, the deployment of new technology will create an incentive to work with specialized third parties to deploy and service POI capabilities as well as train store staff in their use;

• Movement towards open loop systems, at the POI, will drive the introduction of 3rd party players who can enable merchant acceptance for multiple payment types;

• The drive for scale and its corresponding revenue opportunities, coupled with the improved economics achieved by Payment Facilitators, will drive their emergence in the near further.

8 Overview of Key Model Characteristics

This effort focuses on key model characteristics and the identification of generalizable models in eMoney deployments to drive merchant acceptance. Such models can be used to classify experiences, thereby identifying general characteristics, considerations and potential issues. This would enable us to better understand issues that MMOs are grappling with in nascent merchant acceptance and focus attention on critical issues. Several dimensions are explored below, these include: 1) Business Model; 2) Deployment Openness; 3) Transaction Flow; and 4) Pricing.

8.1 Business Model

Three models (In-House, MSP and Merchant Acquirer) are used to characterize the nature of merchant acceptance that has been observed in MM deployments. The models are based on the execution of necessary tasks across the merchant acceptance value chain. These models are described in more detail in the next section.

Open or Closed Deployment: The MMO deployments examined were for the most part closed loop. In this approach the institution issuing or deploying the wallets is also enabling merchant acceptance. All activity remains on the provider’s rails and there is no interaction or interoperability with other providers. In an open loop deployment, on the other hand, a merchant would not be limited to acceptance by one payment type, but could instead support the acceptance of multiple payment types.

Transaction Flow: There are two approaches to initiating payment transactions, 1) Push Payments; and 2) Pull Payments. In a push transaction, a consumer initiates, the payment for merchant goods or services, by transferring funds to the merchant. This can be done by sending funds to a merchant code or leveraging a merchant QR code. The merchant will then receive confirmation of the transaction activity allowing the transaction to be completed. Pull payments require a merchant to seek authorization that a consumer has funds available. With this authorization the merchant will execute the transaction and funds are ultimately cleared and then settled to the merchants account.

Pricing: In most cases the merchant pays for acceptance. There is no standardized pricing as MMOs have been experimenting with the best pricing approach. But in general the pricing is a percentage rate based on the transaction size, with the fees being split by the actors in the value chain. In some cases there has been some experimentation with consumer pay approaches, but this does not appear to be widespread.

Table 5 – High Level Overview of Key Deployment Characteristics

Deployment

Business Model

Closed or Open Loop^1

Transaction Flow^2

Pricing

EcoCash (Zimbabwe)

Acquirer Model

Open loop

Pull Payments

Merchant pays to accept

(Fee ranges between 1.25% and 2% according to size of transaction)3

ZAAD

(Somaliland)

In-house Model

Closed loop

Push Payments

Free to accept until it reaches 40% activity rate; ZAAD due to revisit pricing model^4

M-Pesa
(Kenya)

In-house Model

Closed loop

Push Payments

Merchant pays to accept

(1% MDR where Kopo Kopo is present; close to 0% MDR where only Safaricom is present due to downward pressure)5

Easypaisa

(Pakistan)

MSP Model

Closed loop

Pull Payments

Merchant pays to accept

(1% MDR)6

1 PYMNTS.com (2015), Financial Inclusion Tracker. Retrieved from http://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Financial-Inclusion-Tracker-August-.pdf

2 Kopo Kopo Representative. Interview. 27 Oct 2015

3 Econet Website https://www.econet.co.zw/ecocash/merchant-charges

4 Pénicaud, C., & McGrath, F. (2013). Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought eMoney to Somaliland. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked blog. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf.

5 MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 12 Nov 2015.

6 Easypaisa Website http://www.easypaisa.com.pk/en/services/easy-pay

8.2 Overview of Operational Models Observed

This section characterizes the key deployment models that have been identified. It focused on the acceptance value chain and leverages some of the key activities necessary to support card acceptance to shed light on nascent eMoney merchant acceptance and in so doing provides a consistent approach to understanding these necessary activities, who performs them and how they are performed. The key elements for defining the model relates to the distribution of key activities across the value chain. The activities include the following:

Figure 4 – Key Elements of eMoney Merchant Acceptance Value Chain

• Merchant Acquisition: The process of finding value creating customers, marketing and selling them suitable products in order to increase the size of the customer base;

• Merchant On-boarding: Validate merchant identity and underwrite merchant potential for risk;

• Fulfillment & Activation: Set up new customer account, install, activate and maintain the merchant POI as well as perform associated support activities for acceptance and provide necessary training;

• Processing and Settlement: Provide connectivity to accepted payment types, process transactions and settle funds;

• Merchant Relationship Management: The activities required to manage, monitor and retain the relationships with a merchant such as complaint or fraud handling;

8.3 Overview of eMoney Merchant Acceptance Models

By applying the value chain, three models supporting merchant acceptance deployments emerge. First is the in-house model, characterized by a MMO performing all activities In-house. The second model leverages a third party, termed here a Merchant Service Provider, to perform activities across the value chain and whose range of activities determines their value proposition. Finally, the merchant acquirer model, in which a MMO contracts with a traditional Merchant Acquirer to drive acceptance at the POI (Point of Interaction). Merchant acceptance is nascent and evolving, driven by both technological innovation and new business models. As some deployments may be pursuing multiple models, these models may not be mutually exclusive and there may be new models that emerge as merchant acceptance continues to gain momentum. The models are highlighted in the table below and are detailed in this section.

Figure 5 – e-Money Merchant Acceptance Models

8.3.1.1 Model One: In-House Model

In-house merchant acceptance deployments are characterized by MMOs performing all activities across the value chain and are typically closed loop deployments. This model is observed where the MMO is a dominant market player or where the deployment is a response to unique market circumstance. Safaricom had significant market dominance before the debut of its eMoney wallet, M-PESA and was able to draw significant funding from DFID to support its inception and piloting phase. Other in-house approaches include Telesom, the only telecommunications provider in Somaliland at the time it launched its eMoney scheme ZAAD, responding to the countries hyperinflationary crisis. ZAAD may be considered an outlier, because in some ways it was a response to unique market circumstances. From another perspective, it was a company dedicated to improving its country’s well-being and growing its own infrastructure, while making itself indispensable by filling the void of a traditional banking sector.[21]

Figure 6 – Overview of In-House Merchant Acceptance Model

In deployments by MMOs with a dominant market position, there is little appetite to outsource merchant activities. In fact, interviews with donor representatives highlighted the strategic importance of merchant relationships as strategic differentiators for MMOs, driving the desire to manage these activities in-house. In deployments, where market dominance is not enjoyed, pressures will emerge to enable acceptance of other payment types to achieve network effects. This will drive inter-operability at the POI and support the emergence of neutral third party players able to cost effectively support the acceptance of several payment types, thereby enabling open loop functionality to expand acceptance.

It should be noted that M-PESA originally pursued the acquisition of merchants leveraging a third party provider, Kopo Kopo, Inc.[22] In this case, the motivation for using a third party may have been the need to define a path forward into merchant acceptance for a first mover. However, a point was likely reached where Safaricom, given its monopoly, could move activities in-house and not have to share revenues. In this case, not having to support another payment type negated the downside of moving these activities in-house. Currently, Safaricom uses its own direct sales representatives (DSRs) and offers them a tiered commission structure tied to merchants acquired and corresponding volume to incent more aggressive merchant acquisition. ZAAD also uses its own employees, known as "dealers" to recruit and supervise merchants, allowing them to quickly identify weaknesses in their supply of services to the merchant and in their value chain.

Pricing within this model varies by deployment. ZAAD does not charge merchants a fee for payment acceptance, though it was poised to change its fee structure and never did. ZAAD also provided its handsets to merchants for free, dropping this approach when merchants demonstrated a willingness to pay for the POI to accept payments. M-PESA charges for Lipa Na M-PESA for the same reason that there is demand from customers to use merchant payments.[23]

With respect to transaction processing and funds settlement, in closed loop systems, MMOs track all transactions in their book of record – credits and debits are tracked and appropriate entries are made to reflect the prices of goods and services as well as subsequent transfer of value. In such a closed loop system, there is no need to transfer funds to another bank. All funds are held in pool accounts and adjustments are made to accounts in the corresponding book of record.

Figure 7 – M-PESA Merchant Acceptance

8.3.1.2 Model Two: MSP (Merchant Service Provider) Approach

New providers have emerged on the acceptance landscape to propel the expansion of eMoney into merchant payments. These third party providers, which we call Merchant Service Providers partner with MMOs to fulfill critical activities across the merchant acceptance value chain to enable merchants to accept electronic payments. The support provided by MSPs can vary and there may be multiple providers supporting activities across the value chain for a single deployment.

A number of potential variations may emerge from this model. The MSP can have responsibility for a narrowly defined set of activities such as acquiring merchants, then passing the relationship and corresponding contract on to the MMO. At the other end of the spectrum that MSP can also play a broad role across the value chain. For example, KEENU, was contracted by Easypaisa, to provide merchant recruiting, on-boarding and education, furthermore they activate merchant POIs, directly manage the merchant relationship, and provide value-added services.[24]

In many cases MMOs don’t have expertise in building merchant networks, managing merchant accounts, or maintaining merchant relationships through value-added services. MMOs that prefer not to heavily invest in building the merchant network themselves benefit from relationships with merchant aggregators. We define a merchant aggregator as an entity with pre-existing merchant relationships, in which supporting merchant acceptance is a natural extension or complement to core activities. This represents another broad approach to outsourcing activities across the value chain.

Figure 8 – Overview of MSP Merchant Acceptance Model

In some countries, the presence of multiple wallet providers may promote a the emergence of third parties to operate between networks as they can connect closed loop eMoney schemes and create interoperability at the POI, driving a network effect. This may occur to satisfy a government initiative to develop a payment ecosystem,[25] a company’s own commitment to generating merchant interoperability, or a company’s desire to expand into a space where merchant payments are already prevalent.

Probably the strongest case, however, for MSPs, has been their provision of value-added services such as working capital or loyalty programs which provide merchants with attractive value propositions for accepting electronic payments, beyond core payment acceptance offerings. They can also provide upgrades to POI technology, a capability requiring skills and expertise that the MMO may not possess. These roles are often difficult for MMOs to fulfill because it may not be core function of their business.

Developed acceptance markets have seen MSPs such as ISOs (Independent Sales Organizations) compensated by their merchant acquirer partners through distinct mechanism and we would expect to see similar approaches emerge as eMoney deployments expand merchant acceptance. To incent high volume or a focus on low hanging fruit MMOs could offer a commission or bounty for acquired merchants. Alternatively, a residual can be paid to the ISO based on the quality of the acquired merchant in turn determined by associated spend volumes. In addition, the merchant may leverage additional services the ISO may supply. It is possible for the ISO to play a role beyond account acquisition, which will affect incentives. Finally, it is possible to have several third parties active across the value chain; a sign of increased specialization in merchant acceptance.

Technological change contributed to the use of an MSP by Easypaisa in Pakistan. Telenor decided to adopt an NFC enabled POS device to enable merchant acceptance. This technology is a material change from that used to enable P2P payments, driven mainly by OTC transactions by agents on behalf of customers. Telenor contracted KEENU for the support necessary to enable acceptance through a technology with which they had no experience.[26] Given its background in payment services KEENU is able to provide this support as well as a number of additional services across the value chain.

In Kenya, Kopo Kopo played a similar role as KEENU and has evolved to play that role in other contexts. Kopo Kopo built and expanded M-PESA’s initial merchant network. It succeeded and continues to provide value-added-services, such as loyalty program and merchant cash advances to the approximately 20,000 merchant it retains a direct relationship with under Safaricom. Kopo Kopo continues to efforts to provide value added products and service to M-PESA merchants. In other countries, such as Ghana, Kopo Kopo has become a white label provider of its Paywith platform to Ecobank.[27] Its basic value merchant acceptance value proposition includes enabling merchants to enjoy greater transaction security and payment settlement services. More sophisticated value-added-services allow merchants to keep on-going transaction records, provide customer tracking (including loyalty) and credit service (Grow), and to provide merchants with visibility into their business.

Figure 9 – Easypaisa Merchant Acceptance

8.3.1.2.1 Evolutionary Pathways for the MSP Model

Because of the potential for variation in the MSP model it is possible to imagine that as eMoney deployments continue to evolve to support merchant acceptance this model will experience some variation as deployments mature. While too early to describe what these variations might look like, several factors can already be identified as drivers of model variation going forward, these include: 1) adoption of new technology to support merchant acceptance; 2) the adoption of open loop approaches; and 3) the use of Payment Facilitators to support merchant acceptance.

One driver of new technology adoption has been the deployment by MMOs of POIs for merchant acceptance. In many cases MMOs have opted for technology that reflects an extension of their P2P capabilities to drive merchant acceptance. However, there are a number of cases where a fundamental change in technological approach has been adopted. Beyond mobile wallets this has meant the adoption of physical terminals, both traditional terminals and NFC enabled terminals. In the case of POS terminals, this has meant the corresponding distribution of companion cards with traditional payment scheme marks. In the case of NFC terminals, there has been a consequent distribution of NFC stickers to customers in lieu of a robust base of NFC phones.

The MSP model is likely to take hold in markets with multiple wallet providers. While closed loop structures remain dominant, processing and settlement can still be expected to be executed in-house by MMOs. However, there will be pressure to accept payment types or acceptance marks to drive acceptance by enabling a more robust merchant value proposition. This move towards open loop structures or interoperability at the POI, will force changes in the current approaches to in-house processing and settlement capabilities.

One such avenue for open loop development is the establishment of Payment Facilitator arrangements. Payment facilitators exist in the card space to drive low cost acceptance, through cost reducing innovations in on-boarding, risk assessment and POI deployment. The operative development in the evolution towards open loop structures would be the provision of processing and settlement capabilities. A technological savvy MSP or Merchant Aggregator would be the ideal PF candidate. In addition to support of processing and settlement, the PF plays several critical roles across the value chain including market development, merchant of record, risk underwriting and management, as well as provider of value added services. The MMO would earn revenue through incremental merchant purchase volumes generated by the partnership while the PF owns the customer relationship, providing processing services to its merchants. Though a merchant acquirer would be necessary, the PF would do the heavy lifting – aggregating merchants and routing authorization requests to its acquiring partner within the market, as well as providing the back-end processing necessary to settle directly with sub-merchants.[28]

In each of these cases the expertise of third parties is likely required. This expertise can both enable the deployment of these technologies as well as the realization of their full potential. Furthermore, there will be adoptions and innovations as these technologies are applied to eMoney deployments to realize their full potential, resulting in further business model innovation.

8.3.1.3 Model Three-Merchant Acquirer Approach

The third model, exemplified by EcoCash in Zimbabwe, illustrates the deployment of the merchant acquisition model found in card acceptance. In this model, a merchant acquirer performs all activities across the value chain to enable merchant acceptance. The MMOs responsibility would end with the issuance of mobile wallets and or companion cards as well as transaction authorization in pull payments. This model supports interoperability by facilitating the acceptance of multiple payment types at merchants. It drives scale by coordinating flows between a number of issuers or MMOs on one side and merchants and their corresponding providers on the other side.

Figure 10 – Overview of Merchant Acquirer Acceptance Model

Unlike M-PESA or ZAAD that have trust accounts with banks or created their own bank much later in the process, Econet Wireless bought Steward Bank (previously TN Bank) early on to leverage its expertise in financial management, underwriting, processing, and funds settlement. EcoCash’s merchant acquisition is driven by a small division of the bank, PayBay, dedicated to recruiting, educating, and acquiring small merchants, and executing all activities across the merchant acceptance value chain.[29] Its POS terminals distributed across 10,000 locations are interoperable and NFC compatible.[30]

Figure 11 – EcoCash Merchant Acceptance

While Steward’s POS device enables interoperability of payment types and mobile wallets at the POI, the bank is primarily focused on card-based merchant payments. Their role as BIN sponsor for EcoCash’s companion debit card was driven by its desire to be connected to the card network’s open loop system and its connection to ACI Worldwide switch enables acceptance from other banking platforms.[31] While the Easypaisa network also offers a companion card, its bank, Tameer Microfinance Bank, does not yet perform the merchant acquiring functions done by Steward Bank. Furthermore, its companion card is an ATM card linked to the national ID scheme, not yet allowing purchases at merchant locations. In many ways, EcoCash is moving towards greater operational standardization and its approach to merchant acquiring allows it to focus on creating scale while complementing other banking services. Finally, similar to the MSP model, market forces may drive merchant acquirers to work more closely with Payment Facilitators.

8.4 Conclusion and Next Steps

This chapter has identified three models currently being leveraged by MMOs to drive merchant acceptance. By identifying and detailing these models we have attempted to create a foundation for better understanding how eMoney deployments are driving nascent merchant acceptance and lessons learned. These models can be expanded to other deployments to create a robust evidence base. Furthermore, initial learnings can help to inform decision about critical paths. Nevertheless, additional work is warranted to improve our baseline understanding as well as provide for the on-going monitoring of new and existing deployments.

The In-House model, while successful, appears to be a response to unique market circumstances. In the case of ZAAD as a mechanism for protecting against hyperinflation. In the case of M-PESA Kenya, a result of Safaricom’s dominant market position. Both situations are uncommon and present barriers to the ability to scale this model. The in-house model does not provide a robust path to scale because it is difficult without with a dominant market player to create the necessary network effect in house to create compelling value for merchant acceptance.

In the MSP model various entities were observed to have emerged providing valuable services to enable MMO’s to drive merchant acceptance. The presence of these third parties reduce the burden for the MMO by not requiring them to support all activities across the value chain. Furthermore, several features of this model may support scaling acceptance as MMOs evolve. These characteristics include: the adoption of new technology, different from that deployed for P2P, to drive merchant acceptance; pressures to move towards open loop or inter-operable structures; and finally, adoption of the Payment Facilitator model.

Finally, we have seen MMOs adopt a merchant acquirer model because of their desire to pursue a card centric approach coupled with a physical POI to drive their evolution into merchant acceptance. While this approach presents opportunities to scale merchant acceptance, question still remain.

All of three of these approaches warrant continued monitoring and further investigation. To build on this effort, there are a number of additional activities considered, these include:

1 assigning the profiled deployments in the appendix of this chapter to a model, create a more robust sample and focus on the points evolution identified in the MSP model;

2 development of merchant acceptance KPIs and their systematic on-going tracking;

3 further investigation into these deployments with a focus on merchant acceptance;

4 identifying, understanding and profiling third parties that have emerged to play a role in the acceptance value chain;

5 identify growth inflection points, drill down and distill key learnings.

Appendix I: Profiled Models

Figure 12 – ZAAD Somaliland Overview

Figure 13 – M-PESA Kenya Overview

Figure 14 – Easypaisa Pakistan Overview

Figure 15 – EcoCash Zimbabwe Overview

Appendix II: Additional Profiles

[This material is available on the ITU Ecosystem Working Group website, file name "ITU Merchant Acceptance Geneva Consolidated Dec 2015.final"]

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[21] Kabweza, L.S.M (2013), Why, Outside Zimbabwe (& Kenya), eMoney in Africa Hasn’t Succeeded. http://www.techzim.co.zw/2013/10/outside-zimbabwe-kenya-mobile-money-africa-hasnt-succeeded/.

[22] Katakam, Arunjay (2014), Setting Up Shop: Strategies for Building Effective Merchant Strategy Networks: Findings based on the State of the Industry Report. GSMA Intelligence. Retrieved from https://gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=186eb9501d96dd0de88ebe189902bc2d&download

[23] Kopo Kopo Representative. Interview. 27 Oct 2015.

[24] Kopo Kopo, Inc. (2014), Kopo Kopo launches "Grow" merchant cash advance service [Press Release]. Retrieved from http://kopokopo.com/press-release-kopo-kopo-launches-grow-merchant-cash-advance-service/

[25] Kopo Kopo, Inc. Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved from http://www.kopokopo.co.tz/faq/

[26] Levin, P. (2013), Big ambition meets effective execution: How EcoCash is altering Zimbabwe’s financial landscape. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked, July, 1. Retrieved from http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EcoCash-Zimbabwe.pdf.

[27] Lyons, B and Schiff, A (2014), "eMoney Merchant Payments-What does the Future Hold?, Helix Series on Digital Finance in the Field, June 2014.

[28] Malik, Omar Moeen (2015), Easypay: Fueling E-Commerce 2.0 for Pakistan. Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/easypay-fueling-e-commerce-20-pakistan-omar-moeen-malik?trk=seokp-company_posts_primary_cluster_res_title

[29] Mangudhla, Taurai (2015), Banks under eMoney pressure. Retrieved from http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2015/07/31/banks-under-mobile-money-pressure/.

[30] Mas, Ignacio and Amolo Ng’weno (2009), "Three keys to M-PESA’s success: Branding, channel management and pricing," Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, http://www.gsma.com/connectedwomen/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/keystompesassuccess4jan69.pdf

[31] MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 12 Nov 2015.

[32] MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 23 Nov 2015.

[33] MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 24 Nov 2015.

[34] McKinnon, R.I. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute

[35] Miles, Ann (2015), MasterCard Foundation, From Microfinance to Financial Inclusion: Reflections on 20 Years, 16 November 2015, Blog Post on CGAP Site.

[36] Millicom (2015). "Millicom’s commitment to pursue all interoperability for all eMoney customers across all service providers has scored another first for Africa, following an agreement with Vodafone’s subsidiary Vodacom in Tanzania [Press Release]. Retrieved from http://www.millicom.com/media/millicom-news-features/tigo-pesa-interoperability/.

[37] Mir, Arsalan (2010), Tameer Microfinance Bank and Telenor Provide Insights on Easypaisa. Retrieved from http://telecompk.net/2010/01/06/tameer-microfinance-bank-and-telenor-provide-insights-on-easypaisa/.

[38] eMoney Pakistan Blog (2015), Easypaisa: Pioneering Branchless Banking in Pakistan [News Desk] Retrieved from http://www.mobileMoney.com.pk/2014/06/

[39] Mupaso, Tendai (2014), Reserve Bank investigating Econet over EcoCash auto-registrations. Retrieved from http://www.techzim.co.zw/2014/02/reserve-bank-investigating-econet-ecocash-auto-registetrations/.

[40] Pénicaud, C., & Katakam, A. (2014). State of the industry 2013: mobile financial services for the unbanked. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked (MMU).

[41] Pénicaud, C., & McGrath, F. (2013). Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought eMoney to Somaliland. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked blog. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf.

[42] PYMNTS.com (2015), Financial Inclusion Tracker. Retrieved from http://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Financial-Inclusion-Tracker-August-.pdf

[43] Radcliffe, D and Voorhies, R. (2012), A Digital Pathway to Financial Inclusion. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

[44] Reuters (2015). "Telepin Software Powers Mobile Financial Services Platform "Tigo Cash", [Press Release]. Retrieved from http://finance.yahoo.com/news/telepin-software-powers-mobile-financial-124408661.html

[45] Riecke, Jeffrey (2013). "Tanzania Launches National Financial Inclusion Framework," Center for Financial Inclusion Blog. Retrieved from http://cfi-blog.org/2013/12/23/tanzania-launches-national-financial-inclusion-framework/.

[46] Salazar, D.G. and Miller, P.M (2013), Expanding Card Acceptance to Small Merchants Globally Through Mobile Point of Sale (MPOS), MasterCard Advisors Global Insights Series

[47] Scharwatt, C., & Katakam, A. Frydrych, J. Murphy, A, & Naghave, N. (2015). State of the industry 2014: mobile financial services for the unbanked. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked (MMU).

[48] State Bank of Pakistan (2015), National Financial Inclusion Strategy Pakistan. Alliance for Financial Inclusion. Retrieved from http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/national-financial-inclusion-strategy-pakistan.pdf

[49] Stremlau, Nicole (2015), Innovation in the Absence of a State: eMoney in the Somali Territories. Civic Media Project, MIT Press. Retrieved from http://civicmediaproject.org/works/civic-media-project/somaliterritories.

[50] Studio D (2015), "Always Moving, Always Sharing: eMoney Practices in Somaliland," Prepared for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

[51] Success Consulting (2013), Impacts of Micropayments on Zimbabwean Economy. Retrieved from http://www.stayfinanciallyfree.com/#!impact-of-micropayments-on-zimbabwean-ec/c3wl.

[52] Telenor Pakistan (2015), Easypaisa and KEENU launch Easypay NFC Payments at Dolmen Mall and Ocean Mall in Karachi [Press Release]. Retrieved from https://www.telenor.com.pk/about-news-events/easypaisa-keenu-launch-easypay-nfc-payment

[53] Uni Bul Merchant Services (2014). "Tanzanians Had Enough of Banks Not Doing Their Job. What They Dod Will Blow Your Mind," Uni Bul Merchant Services Blog. Retrieved from http://blog.unibulmerchantservices.com/from-0-to-90-in-5-years-how-tanzania-does-mobile-payments/

[54] USAID (2013), eMoney Assessment and Case Study: Examining Cash Payment Streams and their Electronic Alternatives among USAID Implementing Partners. Retrieved from http://solutionscenter.nethope.org/assets/collaterals/USAID_-_Tanzania_Mobile_Money_Market_Assessment_and_Case_Study_-_Final.pdf.

[55] Wills, Adams (2011), "Case Study: Kopo Kopo," GSMA Intelligence Mobile for Development, http://www.m4dimpact.com/analysis/case-studies/kopo-kopo

[56] World Bank Representative. Phone Interview. 13 Nov 2015.

[57] World Bank Representative. Phone Interview. 15 Oct 2015.

V Merchant Data and Lending: Can Digital Transaction History Help Jumpstart Merchant Acceptance?

About this report

The authors of this Technical Report are Thomas Hobbs, Allen Weinberg, Carol Benson, Paul Khalil Nelson, Ashwini Sathnur, Cici Northup, and Quang Nyguyen.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int.

1 Introduction

It is widely agreed that digital liquidity is an important goal for developing markets. Digital liquidity enables the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) to receive, retain, and pay with e-money, which provides safety, greater access to credit (and ease of access to related information), income growth, and other documented benefits. This paper explores the hypothesis that BoP merchants may be more prone to accept e-money transactions, and thus help the e-money system achieve “digital liquidity” if doing so would make credit more available/accessible.

The approach employed to inform and test this hypothesis focused on studying the global use of “alternative credit underwriting” methodologies that often leverage one or more of the following factors:

• Mobile device characteristics (make/model, OS installed, etc.)

• Mobile usage data (e.g., data/voice usage, top up behaviour, etc.)

• E-money transactions made and received

• Social media profiles and network activity

• Big data.

This paper specifically explores whether data generated by BoP businesses accepting e-money can be helpful in achieving digital liquidity, which may in turn provide additional incentive for BoP merchants to accept digital payments.

This report is divided into three sections:

• Survey of in-market alternative credit data[32] (ACD) programs to demonstrate diverse approaches and successes of using e-money activity and other alternative credit data.

• Analysis to identify common and best practices, lessons learned, feasibility, as well as impact on BoP e-money acceptance.

• Recommendations on how to further assess these opportunities and how to move forward.

As noted, programs like these, if effective and scalable, could encourage more micro and small businesses to accept e-money payments from their customers with the expectation that it could help these businesses obtain small loans to grow and sustain their businesses.

1.1 Situation

Micro, small, and medium-sized merchants (MSMEs) form the backbone of developing economies.[33] In much of the developing world, however, growth of MSMEs are stifled by lack of access to capital. It is estimated that 50-60 per cent of small businesses around the world are underserved by traditional banks and do not have access to credit.[34] Nearly 70 per cent of the estimated 445 million formal and informal MSMEs in the developing world do not use financing from financial institutions.[35]

Many MSMEs are unbanked, have no collateral, and do not have the requisite credit histories or audited financial statements that traditional lenders use to assess credit risk[36]. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in most emerging and frontier markets, fewer than 1 in 5 MSMEs have access to mainstream and affordable credit.[37] These businesses are sometimes referred to as “credit invisibles”. For example, there are an estimated 30 million MSMEs in India, with only 1.6 million of these having received loans from financial institutions. The remainder have little to no access to formal financing.[38]

Often, these businesses are started with few resources, and their earnings keep the business, their owners, and families, afloat on a day-to-day basis. These BoP businesses typically serve the poor and their owners are usually poor as well.

In many emerging markets, traditional banking institutions have branches in highly populated areas but few-to-none in rural and poor areas, leaving businesses in more remote or poor areas without traditional brick and mortar banking services.

Without history, collateral, or even reasonable access, these businesses have little hope of borrowing funds to grow their businesses or manage cash flow during demand spikes or to sustain them during down cycles. Without access to traditional credit, these businesses often turn to alternatives such as borrowing from friends and family, payday lenders, and shylocks. These alternatives are not universally available, are risky, and are more expensive than traditional lending. Access to finance in emerging markets is believed to be one of the top three obstacles to growth in all emerging markets (except for the Middle East).[39]

1.2 Emerging model

There may be hope for MSMEs in emerging alternatives. While many of these MSMEs do not have traditional credit histories, they are not completely off the digital grid. Most of these merchants possess feature or smart phones capable of transacting on digital payment networks and may already do so for their business or as consumers.[40]

Research ICT Africa surveys revealed that more than 83 per cent of business operators owned a phone.[41] A 2015 Pew Research Center report shows similar penetration of mobile phones and fast growth of smart phone ownership, with 34 per cent of South Africans, 27 per cent of Nigerians and 15 per cent of Kenyans already owning a smartphone.[42]

Data residing on mobile phones, as well as phone use data made available through mobile network operators (MNOs) can yield telling information about their owners’ identity, financial health, habits, relationships, and even their personality, all of which are beginning to help traditional and non-traditional lenders assess creditworthiness.

More and more, small business staff are using phones to conduct commerce through mobile payment and person to person (P2P) schemes, such as M-Pesa and Airtel Money. Still others participate in e-commerce marketplaces, such as Flipkart and Snapdeal. These platforms carry with them rich data that show, for example, a business’ sales over time. For digital-centric companies, e-commerce marketplace data can also be used.

Smartphone penetration, which will continue to grow,[43] provides additional data opportunities. Through smart phones, ACD programs can collect web browser, mobile app usage, and other activity. Smartphone usage is also contributing to significant increases in social network usage. There are a myriad of both emerging and established global and regional social network platforms, and while adoption is not saturated, usage is growing quickly in emerging markets. Social network data can be used to help traditional and non-traditional lenders validate identity and an increasing number of lenders are relying upon social data for identity verification as well as social “cred”, graphing lending applicants by the education, employment, and credit history of their peers.[44]

Multiple studies have shown that when no other traditional credit information was available, use of ACD, such as utility and telecom payments, were found predictive of either future delinquency on traditional credit accounts, or of future derogatory public records.[45]

The benefits of leveraging ACD can be profound. Businesses previously locked out because they had no traditional credit history may gain immediate access to lending by sharing their existing digital footprint. A digital lending solution (application, risk assessment, identity verification, disbursement, and servicing) can help lenders serve a wider audience as it is unconstrained by geographic boundaries and has lower costs associated with it than brick and mortar operations, which means it can extend loans, even extremely small loans (common and highly-valued), at lower cost.

The use of this data can be used to reduce or eliminate the need for customer-entered applications and to verify identity. This reduces the need for documentation and manual review, saves customers time, reduces data-entry errors, and reduces application abandonment. Some believe that the use of this data can be useful in traditional lending as well, as traditional credit scores are increasingly seen as a lagging indicator of financial health.[46]

Table 1 – Global social network use and growth by region

Region

Active social network users
(% of population)1

Growth (YOY)

Africa

11%

25%

Americas

51%

6%

Asia-Pacific

29%

14%

Europe

47%

3%

Middle East

26%

13%

1 Smart Insights, January 2016.

2 Digital financial services and the poor

A recent study by Moody’s found that increased use of digital financial services (DFSs) has positive impacts on GDP, household consumption, and jobs, and supports a “more stable and open business environment”.[47]

Governments, banks, telecoms, fintech companies, NGOs, and others are aligned in trying to grow use of DFS. Yet, full adoption of DFS suffers in many parts of the world. In many markets, even where there is a strong base of consumers with DFS accounts, users often cash out their digital funds as there is not ubiquitous acceptance of them, especially amongst micro, small, and MSME.

In Kenya, often lauded as one of the most successful markets for DFS, over 85 per cent of Kenyans have a mobile payment account, yet only 2.3 per cent of the transaction value is conducted with merchants.[48] In some parts of Kenya, over 90 per cent of retail transactions remain cash-based.[49] It is not just in Africa that acceptance of digital payments suffers. In India, government and private organizations estimate only 4-6 per cent of Indian merchants accept digital payments.[50] Low merchant acceptance, especially amongst MSMEs, is common in all developing countries.

There are a variety of reasons for limited merchant acceptance, including transaction costs, cash-out costs, real or perceived lack of customer demand, and even a desire to remain in the shadow economy in order to avoid taxes. A significant percentage of MSMEs do not accept digital payments because the overall value proposition is not sufficiently strong. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to solve these acceptance challenges. A mix of approaches is necessary to push DFS acceptance forward to digital liquidity until there is a tipping point.

One approach to increasing merchant participation is to introduce propositions that bring additional value beyond that of the traditional benefits of e-money acceptance alone. This paper focuses on one such value-added proposition, specifically the notion that by accepting digital payments, the MSMEs could be providing business-related data that could help in the process of securing small loans and/or other financial services.

2.1 Hypothesis

If MSMEs have a better chance of gaining access to affordable lending by accepting digital payments from their customers and other businesses, as well as utilizing digital payment platforms themselves, that could be a meaningful factor in overcoming many of the hurdles currently impeding adoption and digital liquidity.

Indeed, in a recent study, “credit for business investments and easy/lower cost access to working capital credit” was cited by merchants in the developing world across all geographies, store type, and size as the most attractive value-added proposition to accept digital payments.[51]

2.2 Use of ACD

A number of programs in various markets were studied to determine commonality, feasibility, and potential opportunity for alternative credit approaches as an inducement for micro and small businesses to accept DFS. To this end, the research focused on the following questions:

• What is being done in emerging markets to use mobile devices, e-money, e-commerce marketplace, social media data, and other “leaky” digital data to assess credit worthiness of MSMEs?

• How effective are these programs?

• Which data elements are the most useful?

• What opportunities – economic, standards and regulation, partnership and more – are in place, or could be in place, to help these programs become effective and scalable, thereby encouraging more BoP merchants to accept e-money payments?

2.3 Approach

The focus is on the concerns and capabilities of merchants at the BoP who are typically unbanked, without a credit history, and are poor themselves. Included in this segmentation are the most basic sole proprietors selling goods or services (“the person selling fruit on the corner”), which tend to look much like person-to-person payments. The findings may also apply all the way up to mid-sized retailers, as well as small farmers. See the Glossary for a more detailed definition of these segments.

To ascertain the state of the market, this paper reviews relevant companies and initiatives around the globe to identify commonalities and differences in their methodologies. These case studies were supplemented with interviews of industry experts “on the ground” in these markets.

2.4 Assumptions

• A sizable percentage of micro and small businesses desire, but are not eligible for, loans from traditional lending institutions due to a lack of a bank account, credit history, audited financials, and/or collateral. At the same time, traditional bank loans are also viewed as expensive.

• Most BoP merchants possess feature or smart phones capable of transacting on e-money platforms – and may already do so for their business or as consumers.

3 Survey of In-Market Programs

While multiple factors are incorporated into a traditional credit analysis (e.g., business viability, collateral, intended use of funds, financial statements, bank statements, etc.), traditional credit criteria and scores rely heavily on three key data to determine access to credit:

Business’ or owners’ debt level

• Length of credit history

• Bank account history/behaviour

• Regular and on-time payments (typically of financial products)

Traditional credit history, then, largely reflects payment history and debit service, which is precisely what a significant swath of the MSME population does not have. New credit scoring techniques look at data that try to predict ability and willingness to pay versus traditional methods that rate financial statements and historical repayment behaviour.

There are multiple programs around the globe using ACD to ascertain the creditworthiness of micro and small businesses. As summarized in the table below, ACD programs are using a breadth of data in a customer’s existing digital ecosystem – residing in phones and mobile wallets, e-commerce marketplaces, and social media profiles – to eliminate the need for customer-entered applications. These programs require the involvement/cooperation of the carrier, and, likely, consumer consent.

Table 2 – Summary of ACD elements

Data element

Examples of ACD

Air-time top-up

• Amount and frequency of adding call, text, and data to SIM

Digital payments

• Value, number, frequency, day/time as well as with whom the e-money account is crediting or debiting, use of funds

• Sales data from online marketplaces (e.g., Amazon, Snapdeal)

Phone data

• Phone model, operating system

• Contact list (length)

• Browser data (e.g., pages viewed)

• Installed apps

• Location

• Transaction account balance

Phone usage

• Number and time of day of calls and texts in/out

• Content of communications (grammar, complexity, vocabulary, and subject)

Social media

• Connections

• Content of social media posts (e.g., grammar, complexity, vocabulary, subject)

Psychometrics

• Surveys to assess attitudes, beliefs, honesty, and intelligence

ACD programs are also using customer’s digital data to verify identity. This reduces the need for documentation and manual review, saves customers time, and reduces data-entry errors and application abandonment.

Twelve programs were reviewed that use one or more of these elements in emerging markets around the world. Following are two examples (See Appendix 2 for others).

Figure 1 – Branch

Company

Branch

Overview

Based in San Francisco and with offices in Nairobi, Kenya, Branch (branch.co) allows applicants to login with social media (i.e., Facebook) to improve authentication and reduce application data collection. Branch analyzes mobile wallet data (i.e., M-Pesa activity) as well as calling patterns, contact lists, and social media behaviour.

Loans are issued in 10 minutes. Branch is not a legal deposit institution and partners with KCB (a Kenyan bank) to issue loans. Their average loan is equivalent to $30 USD with repayment of up to 6 months. Default rates hover around 5 per cent.

As of December 2015, Branch has issued over 50,000 loans. Branch is active in Kenya and is currently integrating with MTN in Uganda and Vodacom in Tanzania.

Differentiator

• Uses social media to authenticate

• Analyzes phone contact lists

Screenshots

Figure 2 – LendingKart

Company

LendingKart

Overview

Founded in 2014 and based in Gujarat, India, LendingKart (lendingkart.com) uses more than 1,500 data points to evaluate companies for credit, including ecommerce data, VAT returns, and social media data to produce a financial health score, a marketplace score, a social reliability score, and a statutory compliance score. The marketplace score is derived from e-commerce marketplace sales data, including Flipkart, Snapdeal, Jabong, Amazon, Dehlivery, Power2SME, and M Swipe. Financial health and VAT data is sourced from regulatory websites, such as Registrar of Companies, from banks, and from the Credit Information Bureau Limited (CIBIL). Decisions are made within 4 hours and loans are disbursed within 72 hours.

LendingKart operates in 16 Indian states and disburses about 70 short-term loans monthly.

Differentiator

• Produces multiple scores based on different data sources

Summary: Most programs reviewed use a variety of data to support their credit decisioning, finding that the predictive power and usefulness of the mobile data alone is limited.[52] Those that use e-money data typically supplement their view with phone usage data to develop a behaviour pattern.

Table 3 – Summary of ACD elements used

Company

Air-time top-up

Digital payments

Phone type

Phone usage

Social media

Psycho-metrics

Savings

Repayment and other traditional

Ant Financial Group

X

X

Branch

X

X

X

X

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

X

X

X

EFL

X

Faulu and Airtel

X

Greenshoe Capital

X

X

X

X

InVenture

X

X

X

X

X

KCB M-Pesa and Safaricom

X

X

Lenddo

X

X

X

LendingKart

X

L-Pesa

X

Kreditech

X

Traditional Lenders

X

X

4 Further analysis of the underwriting and loan process

Programs that use e-money data sometimes require a minimum number of days with the same phone number and use of a mobile wallet account. These minimum requirements provide the lender (or credit decision platform) with data over time to establish patterns of behaviour. These limits also serve to reduce fraudulent account setups.

Table 4 – Examples of wait times

Company

Wait time

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

30-day savings or immediate if post-paid phone user

Faulu and Airtel

>6 months mobile service and >2 months mobile money history

L-Pesa

>6 months with mobile carrier and a minimum of 10 mobile money transactions

Traditional banks

3-5 years in business

Several programs are reducing friction in the application process by removing the application step altogether. These programs allow the customer to automatically complete an application by capturing data already known by the customer’s telecom, digital wallet provider, or through their social media account. This saves customers time and reduces data input errors and application abandonment.

Table 5 – Summary of application process

Company

Application

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

None

Faulu and Airtel

Yes

InVenture

5 minutes

Traditional banks

In-person

Many programs require the customer to validate their identity by entering a National ID number. Some programs have customers take a photo of their government-issued ID. Increasingly, programs are turning to social media to validate identity, including name, location, education, and more.

Table 6 – Examples of authentication

Company

Authentication

Branch

National ID

Social media

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

Digital wallet PIN

Greenshoe Capital

National ID

KCB M-Pesa and Safaricom

Digital wallet PIN

Lenddo

National ID

Traditional banks

National ID

Nearly all of the programs reviewed do not require collateral, though some allow the customer to save, which is taken into account when determining the loan amount.

Table 7 – Examples of collateral requirements

Company

Collateral

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

Savings (optional)

KCB M-Pesa and Safaricom

Savings (optional)

L-Pesa

None

Traditional banks

Typically required

The speed at which these programs are able to assess creditworthiness using alternative credit data is blinding. While traditional banks and even microfinance institutions (MFIs) may take days or weeks to make a loan determination, these programs are committing to loans in minutes or even seconds. Some programs are even pre-determining loan eligibility and are waiting for customers to ask for a loan as long as it does not exceed the pre-approved amount.

Table 8 – Examples of decisioning

Company

Decision

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

Immediate

InVenture

Seconds

KCB M-Pesa and Safaricom

Immediate

Lenddo

3 minutes

Traditional lenders

1-6 weeks

In-person

Most programs are leveraging their connection with DFS accounts in order to quickly distribute funds. In many cases, funds are available immediately. This contrasts with traditional banks, which can take weeks for funds to be available.

Table 9 – Examples of distribution time

Company

Distribution time

Branch

10 minutes

Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom

Immediate

Greenshoe Capital

Few days to a week

InVenture

Immediate

KCB M-Pesa and Safaricom

Immediate

Traditional lenders

1-6 weeks

Interestingly, some programs are leveraging their DFS connections to automatically collect on loan payments, providing a piece of mind to customers and increasing collection recovery.

5 Summary of findings and conclusions

1 e-money accounts are tremendously helpful to digital lending programs. From identification, application, security, funds distribution and repayment, and even recovery, e-money accounts make it possible. It’s hard to imagine a digital lending program being successful without the backbone of these programs in place.

2 e-money data is not (yet) as helpful as it could be for several reasons: First, some e-money users only have a portion of their income go through the account – most of their business is still done in cash. In addition, just like their customers, small businesses also cash out their e-money accounts, making spend analytics difficult. To the extent that there is data, e-money providers do not currently identify users as consumers or businesses and do not separate or track their funds in this way, so it is challenging to know how well an existing business is performing, what kind of business it is, etc.

3 Digital lending programs are in their nascent stages and most lenders are keeping their programs simple. Few digital programs are designed for small businesses, but instead offer products designed for the lowest denominator (no differences in data collection, credit criteria, lending amounts, pricing, etc.). For example, lending amounts often are not related to e-money account balances, flow of funds, intended use of funds, etc., but instead have pre-set tiers based that graduate based on repayment and they start extremely low (e.g., US$2.50).

4 There does not appear to be any interoperability, regulations, standards, best practices, or community around alternative digital lending, or organizations seeking to share data with the aim to influence policy. Even facilitating formal discussions focusing on data sharing, best practices, etc. could be helpful, including conferences dedicated to the topic (we are, however, starting to see individual presentations on the topic).

5 e-money providers could provide a set of APIs to make it simpler for new programs to get started. In general, each lender has to do a full integration effort rather than a simple one. Beyond telecoms, there is even less accessibility with billers (utilities), credit bureaus, etc. An integrator that allows these companies to integrate once to get to any and all telecoms, credit bureaus, etc. would be useful (though the business case for each participant is not yet clear).

6 Partnership between providers of mobile wallets, lenders, and other players is critical to the success of these programs. Equity Bank and Safaricom partnered to introduce M-Kesho. However, according to the World Bank, lack of a clear agreement on profit sharing and failure to effectively integrate operating systems led to the program’s demise. Without technical and economic alignment, these new programs will also fail.[53]

6 Considerations for policy makers

We believe policy makers can play a guiding role in helping to ensure the potential benefits of ACD, including the use of e-money, in helping to incent BoP sellers to accept electronic payments, are realized. This, in turn, could serve as a strong factor in effecting digital liquidity. This guidance can come in several forms:

• Encourage the development of ACD in a system open to a wide range of participants – banks, MNOs, alternative lenders, etc. and explicitly address the use of e-money payment data as a meaningful data point in bringing credit to BoP merchants.

• In order to support these ACD systems, policy makers need to get out in front of a range of issues surrounding collection, usage, securing, and sharing of ACD data.

• To the extent policy makers can influence telecom and payment platforms, encourage open and easy to integrate APIs to access data while complying with applicable regulatory policies. The notion of “interoperability” should also address access to data.

• The notion of credit bureaus should be addressed in terms of their potential benefits to BoP populations, particularly the unbanked.

• Develop policies/guidance as to how firms share scores and/or raw data, loan decisions, and repayment and loss histories with other ACD users and/or traditional credit bureaus (it is possible that different data and scoring methodologies could be complementary).

• As further research is conducted and/or as market-specific programs are developed, consider including additional “deep dive” analyses, including:

– How can ACD be used to enable trade credit between BoP businesses?

– Merchant rights to review, dispute, opt out, or seek redress regarding data, decisions, etc.

– How often and from what sources are data updated?

– Who should be liable for loss or misuse of data?

– Permissible use of data and what should these entities be allowed to do with the data?

Appendix 1: Glossary of terms

Term

Definition

Microfinance Institution (MFI)

A financial institution specializing in banking services for low-income groups or individuals not normally supported by traditional banks.

Negative-only reporting

Reporting of information such as delinquencies, defaults, collection, bankruptcies, and liens. Indeterminate information such as credit applications (but not approvals or rejections) may also be included.

Positive data

Reporting of payment and credit information such as the timeliness of payments, credit utilization rates, credit limit, debt ratios, and account balance.

For small businesses, it also includes trade credit data and leasing arrangements.

Shylocking

To lend money at extortionate rates of interest. This term is a reference to a relentless and revengeful moneylender in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice.

Social graphing

A representation of the interconnection of relationships in an online social network. Used in alternative credit data analysis to determine an individual’s reputation and creditworthiness.

Social verification

Use of social media and big data to check the veracity of information.

Trade credit

Extension of credit by one trader to another for the purchase of goods and services as a source of short-term financing.

Appendix 2: ACD case studies

Company

Ant Financial Services Group (Ant)

Overview

Alipay’s Ant introduced a credit scoring agency, Sesame Credit, which is used for individuals and small businesses by combining public records and financial institution data with Alipay’s marketplace data of more than 300 million consumers and 37 million small businesses. Scores are developed based on five criteria:

• Credit history – payment history and indebtedness, including credit card repayment and utility bill payments.

• Behaviour and preference – online history, including product categories shopped.

• Fulfillment capacity – Includes use of financial products and services as well as Alipay account balances. Personal characteristics – personal information, including home address, length of time of residence, mobile phone numbers, etc.

• Interpersonal relationships – reflects a user’s friends and their interactions.

Sesame Credit scores are being tested for use beyond lending, including high-speed VIP check-in at Beijing’s Capital International Airport[0], by hotels to allow customers to book rooms or rental cars without deposits, and by dating sites to allow customers to check potential dates’ scores.

Differentiator

Based on data from its own e-commerce marketplace.

Screenshots

Company

Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA)

Overview

In 2012, in partnership with Safaricom, CBA introduced M-Shawari (cbagroup.com/m-shwari/what-is-m-shwari). In Swahili, M-Shawari means to make something better or smoother. Loan amounts are determined by savings balance (no minimum balance is required), usage on Safaricom services (must be an M-Pesa user for 6 months and an active user of Safaricom voice or data services), and M-Shawari loan repayment history. M-Shawari loans cannot be serviced through CBA branches, only via mobile.

Defaulters lose their Safaricom phone number. CBA is considering integrating a rewards program (Bonga) based on loan repayment behaviour.

Differentiator

Incorporates savings (not required) into loan amount determination.

No loan application; eligibility and amount are determined through automated phone call.

Loans build credit history.

Company

Entrepreneur Finance Lab (EFL)

Overview

EFL (eflglobal.com) provides credit scoring as a service using psychometric testing that can be delivered online or offline. These tests gauge ethics, honesty, intelligence, attitudes, and beliefs. EFL is investigating the use of mobile phone usage, social network, and geolocation data.

EFL operates in 27 countries and has provided scoring for over 450,000 applications.

Differentiator

Uses psychometric analysis to determine willingness to repay.

Company

Faulu

Overview

Launched in 2012 in partnership with Airtel, Faulu (faulukenya.com) offers 10-day loans in 17 counties to customers with at least 6 months of mobile service and 2 months of mobile money transactions.

Default data is shared with the National Credit Reference Bureau.

Company

Greenshoe Capital, Inc.

Overview

Based in Kenya, Greenshoe Capital, Inc.’s Saida (getsaida.com) analyzes SMS digital payments data, top-up data, and phone plan usage.

As of late 2015, Saida has given out more than 8,100 loans and is growing at 47 per cent week-over-week. The company touts retention rates of 84 per cent and has a default rate of 8.5 per cent on their 30 and 60-day loans.

Differentiator

Analyzes the proportion of phone usage on data service, voice or text messaging.

Screenshots

Company

InVenture

Overview

Based in Santa Monica, California, with offices in Nairobi, Kenya, InVenture’s TALA (formerly Mkopo Rahisi) analyzes more than 10,000 data points per user. Data analysis includes deposits and withdrawals of mobile money accounts (M-Pesa), social media updates, demographic data, and phone usage. The application process takes about 5 minutes. A score and decision is produced in seconds. Funds are distributed immediately to the applicant’s M-Pesa account.

As of May 2016, TALA has enabled loans for over 260,000 consumers and businesses in Kenya and Tanzania. They have announced plans to expand in the region.

Differentiator

Analyzes bill payment timeliness.

Analyzes phone usage, including time of data and battery drainage.

Analyzes content of text messages, emails, Facebook, and Twitter posts.

Screenshots

Company

Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB)

Overview

Launched March 2015, KCB M-Pesa (https://ke.kcbbankgroup.com/home/loans/mobile/kcb-m-pesa) is a partnership between KCB and Safaricom. Loan amounts are based upon M-Pesa transaction activity and savings balance (if applicable). Loan repayments range from 1 month (6 per cent APR), 3 months (5 per cent APR), and 6 months (4 per cent APR).

Differentiator

Integrated bank/MNO offering

Screenshots

Company

Kreditech

Overview

Founded in 2012 and based in Hamburg, Germany, Kreditech (kreditech.com) provides credit scoring as a service using 20,000 data points that are processed in real-time. They currently operate in Czech Republic, Poland, Spain, and Central and South America. Kreditech analyzes social media data to assess credit risk.

Kreditech has scored more than 2.8 million customers.

Differentiator

Similar to other offerings in the market.

Company

Lenddo

Overview

Based in the Philippines, Lenddo started out in 2011 as a micro-lending platform in India, Mexico, and Columbia, using non-traditional data to issue nearly 16,000 loans. Lenddo shifted its model in 2014 to provide alternative credit data scoring and social verification as a service to banks, telcos, and credit card issuers and is now active in 15 countries, including USA, Mexico, Columbia, Peru, Brazil, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, and South Korea.

Lenddo’s model uses more than 17,000 variables, including social media, phone, browser, and application data, as well as email and text messages. Lenddo is considering connecting with messaging apps (e.g., WhatsApp) to incorporate their data into their models.

Lenddo reserves the right to share default status on the customer’s social media profile. Because Lenddo’s model uses social graphing, negative reporting impacts the customer’s social circle.

As a credit scoring platform, over 10,000 loans have been issued using Lenddo scores.

Differentiator

Social graphing to predict default – closest relationships matter more than quantity or diversity.

Analyzes the content – grammar, complexity, vocabulary, and subject of email messages.

Screenshots

Company

L-Pesa

Overview

Available in Egypt, Lesotho, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Fiji, South Africa, Mozambique, India, Kenya, and Romania, to apply for an L-Pesa loan (l-pesa.com), customers must register their phone number.

Loans are approved and distributed within 5 minutes.

Loans are initially for $5 USD and repayable in 5 weeks, with weekly repayments. As customers pay back loans, they are eligible for larger loan amounts (up to $3,000 USD), longer repayment periods (up to 140 weeks), and lower interest rates.

If customers are late on repayments, they lose credit points. Multiple missed/late repayments result in a zero score and customers must pay off the original loan and wait one full year to rejoin the program.

As of October 2015, L-Pesa has 32 million registered users who have access to micro loans.

Differentiator

Loans are progressive – as the first loan is paid back, customers become eligible for larger loan amounts and longer repayment periods.

The program is independent of telecom.

Screenshots

[1] Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Level one Project Guide, 2015.

[2] GSMA, “emoney in rural areas”, 2014.

[3] Adapted from UNCTAD, 2014, Impact of access to financial services, including by highlighting remittances on development: economic empowerment of women and youth and from UNCTAD, forthcoming, access to financial services and digital economy for sustainable development.

[4] Adapted from UNCTAD, 2014, Report of the expert meeting on the impact of access to financial services, including by highlighting remittances on development; economic empowerment of women and youth.

[5] Adapted from the World Bank (2016), World Development Report.

[6] Adapted from UNCTAD (2015), Cyberlaws and regulations for enhancing e-commerce.

[7] GSMA, “Seven Keys to Success in Mobile Insurance”, 2015.

[8] The criteria for including countries were determined by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s Digital Financial Services Ecosystems Working Group and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Financial Services for the Poor team, who requested this review.

[9] Our initial search string for each country was national AND (identity OR identification) AND (program OR system OR card) AND “Country Name”.

[10] De-duplication involves reviewing all enrolled program members to ensure that no individual is registered more than once.

[11] “EUR” indicates Europe, “LAC” indicates Latin American and the Caribbean, “MENA” indicates the Middle East and North Africa, “SA” indicates South Asia, “SEA” indicates Southeast Asia, and “SSA” indicates Sub-Saharan Africa.

[12] Figure 10 in the section on linkages with health services further illustrates the breakdown of target registration age among these programs.

[13] These countries include Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Peru, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

[14] These services include: Know Your Customer (KYC) services in several different areas; digital banking, mobile money, cash transfers, relief, social security, and welfare under finance and social transfers; tracking services and treatment, and verification of eligibility/coverage/benefit under health; monitory of extension services and distribution of subsidies under agriculture; monitoring, voting, and voter registration under elections; border enforcement, SIM registration, and passport under surveillance and security; as well as driver registration, student and/or teacher or civil service attendance tracking, taxes, and travel under other functions.

[15] Lyons, B and Schiff, A (2014), “eMoney Merchant Payments-What does the Future Hold?, Helix Series on Digital Finance in the Field, June 2014.

[16] McKinnon, R.I. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute. ; Gurley, J.G. and E.S. Shaw (1967). "Financial structure and economic development". Economic Development and Cultural Change, 15(31): 257-268.

[17] Beck, T., Pamuk, H., Pamarattan, R., and Uras, B. (2015) “eMoney, Trade Credit and Economic Development", CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP 10848, Sept. 2015.

[18] Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) (1973), Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, 20 Volumes. Washington D. C.: A.I.D.

[19] Miles, Ann (2015), MasterCard Foundation, From Microfinance to Financial Inclusion: Reflections on 20 Years, 16 November 2015, Blog Post on CGAP Site.

[20] Di Castri, S. (2013). eMoney: Enabling regulatory solutions. Available at SSRN 2302726.

[21] Camner, G., Pulver, C., & Sjöblom, E. (2009). What makes a successful eMoney implementation? Learnings from M-PESA in Kenya and Tanzania. London: GMSA, available at: www. gsmworld. com/our-work/mobile_planet/mobile_money_for_the_unbanked/, accessed. ; Pénicaud, C., & McGrath, F. (2013). Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought eMoney to Somaliland. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked blog. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf

[22] Wills, Adams (2011), “Case Study: Kopo Kopo," GSMA Intelligence Mobile for Development, http://www.m4dimpact.com/analysis/case-studies/kopo-kopo

[23] Camner, G., Pulver, C., & Sjöblom, E. (2009). What makes a successful eMoney implementation? Learnings from M-PESA in Kenya and Tanzania. London: GMSA, available at: www. gsmworld. com/our-work/mobile_planet/mobile_money_for_the_unbanked/, accessed. ; Pénicaud, C., & McGrath, F. (2013). Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought eMoney to Somaliland. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked blog. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf

[24] Telenor Pakistan (2015), Easypaisa and KEENU launch Easypay NFC Payments at Dolmen Mall and Ocean Mall in Karachi [Press Release]. Retrieved from https://www.telenor.com.pk/about-news-events/easypaisa-keenu-launch-easypay-nfc-payment. ; MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 24 Nov 2015.

[25] Examples, though not explored in this paper, include a handful of central bank led payment platforms; Better Thank Cash Alliance Representative. Phone Interview. 23 Oct 2015.

[26] MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 24 Nov 2015.

[27] Wakoba, Sam (2014), Exclusive: Kopo Kopo Goes International: Ready to Integrate Merchants from Everywhere. Retrieved from http://techmoran.com/kopo-kopo-goes-international-ready-to-integrate-mobile-money-payments-for-merchants-from-everywhere/#sthash.HAqDCNxi.dpbs;

[28] Salazar, D.G. and Miller, P.M (2013), Expanding Card Acceptance to Small Merchants Globally Through Mobile Point of Sale (MPOS), MasterCard Advisors Global Insights Series

[29] Levin, P. (2013), Big ambition meets effective execution: How EcoCash is altering Zimbabwe’s financial landscape. GSMA eMoney for the Unbanked, July, 1. Retrieved from http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EcoCash-Zimbabwe.pdf.

[30] Customer Case Study (2014), “EcoCash from Econet Wireless Zimbabwe." CISCO. Retrieved from http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/vni-service-adoption-forecast/case-study-c36-730961.pdf.

[31] MasterCard Representative. Phone Interview. 12 Nov 2015

[32] Most notably, ACD does not rely on traditional credit bureaus or bank account data.

[33] The World Bank estimates that micro-businesses and SMEs account for an average 47.2 per cent and 15.6 per cent of GDP, respectively, in low income countries.

[34] MSME database, IFC/World Bank, 2011.

[35] “Two Trillion and Counting”, IFC and McKinsey & Company, October 2010.

[36] In some regions, such as the Philippines, there are no centralized credit bureaus. In others, very few people have credit histories. For example, in India, only 25 per cent of the population has a credit history. Source: Lenddo.

[37] Source: PERC.

[38] “With $10M In New Funding, Lendingkart Helps Small Businesses In India Get Loans”, TechCrunch, July 2015.

[39] IFC/World Bank Enterprise Survey 2006–10 and World Bank GDP 2008–10.

[40] With a digital or mobile-centric model, a business’ remoteness may no longer be an impediment, so long as the business phone can connect to a cellular or WiFi network. Business owners can apply any day of the week, day or night, without having to visit a physical location.

[41] “Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation”, Research ICT Africa, 2008.

[42] Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center, 2015.

[43] “The number of smartphones in Kenya is small today, but it is doubling every year. All the best indications say in 2017 most Kenyans will have smartphones.” – Matt Flannery, CEO Branch, “Kiva founder discusses his new for-profit mobile lending business”, How We Made It In Africa, December 2015.

[44] “The Impact of Social Connections on Credit Scoring”, Wei, Yildrim, etc., April 2014.

[45] “Predicting Financial Account Delinquencies with Utility and Telecom Payment Data”, PERC, May 2015.

[46] “As Banks Start Nosing Around Facebook and Twitter, the Wrong Friends Might Just Sink Your Credit”, The Observer, December 2011, http://observer.com/2011/12/as-banks-start-nosing-around-facebook-and-twitter-the-wrong-friends-might-just-sink-your-credit/

[47] “Increase in electronic payments boosted GDP and jobs in 70 countries”, PaymentEye, March 2016, http://www.paymenteye.com/2016/03/10/increase-in-electronic-payments-boosted-gdp-and-jobs-in-70-countries/?utm_source=PaymentEye+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=11ab3d277a-10_03_2016_NL&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3bd2a3a3c5-11ab3d277a-14496341

[48] “Mobile Payments in Emerging Markets”, Robeco, October 2015, http://www.robeco.com/images/mobile-payments-in-emerging-markets-october-2015.pdf

[49] “Sub-Saharan Africa: A major potential revenue opportunity for digital payments”, McKinsey & Co., February 2014, http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/sub-saharan-africa-a-major-potential-revenue-opportunity-for-digital-payments

[50] NPCI, 2014; RBI, 2014; and “Payments Systems in India: Vision 2012-2015”, Reserve Bank of India, October 2012, https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationVisionDocuments.aspx?Id=678

[51] Global Innovations Exchange Report, September 2015, http://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/beyond-cash

[52] PERC interviews with MNOs in East Africa and Southeast Asia, 2012-2015.

[53] M-Kesho growth stalls over hitch on profit sharing”,Business Daily Africa, March 2012, businessdailyafrica.com/M-Kesho-growth-stalls-over-hitch-on-profit-sharing--/-/539552/1373474/-/8e1xlj/-/index.html

[0] “China’s ‘citizen scores’ credit system isn’t as Orwellian as the ACLU thinks…yet”, TECHINASIA, October 2015, techinasia.com/china-citizen-scores-credit-system-orwellian.

VI Impact of Agricultural Value Chains on Digital Liquidity

About this report

The authors of this technical report are T. Hardy Jackson and Allen Weinberg. The reviewers and contributors are Carol Benson, Juan Buchenau, Thomas Lammer, Ajai Nair, Paul Khalil Nelson, Quang Nguyen, and Ashwini Sathnur.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Developing countries can derive more than 30 per cent of their GDP from agriculture, compared to less than two per cent within a developed country, such as the US. [1] A common approach for alleviating poverty is through commercial value chains. In this framework, policy makers and stakeholders examine the spectrum of ‘farm to fork’ activities and identify tactics that will benefit smallholding farmers (SHFs). These tactics include incorporating SHFs into existing value chains or improving value chain performance through financing, better training, better fertilizer, and so on. Commercial value chains differ by crop but often have similar activities such as input supply or warehousing. At one end of the commercial spectrum are ‘loose’ value chains in which growers sell excess crops primarily in local markets. At the other end are ‘tight’ value chains typically focused on exports and cash crops (e.g., coffee, tea, sugar).

eMoney is a good fit for tight value chains because:

• A single entity typically pays the SHFs.

• eMoney provides an audit trail and reduces cash handling costs and leakage.

• Payment flows are often complex: Payments can leapfrog or be split between value chain participants. eMoney with an accompanying management system can automate this process and provide an audit trail.

• Additionally, eMoney facilitates credit, which is a critical component of agriculture due to uneven cash flows.

eMoney in commercial value chains is clearly beneficial, but will it improve digital liquidity for SHFs? For meaningful improvement to occur, eMoney within value chains would need to reach critical mass and continue circulating in digital form. Otherwise, digital liquidity would be small and temporary. For a number of years into the future, critical mass and electronic circulation seem unlikely. Several issues attenuate the potential:

• Limited reach – only seven per cent of SHFs participate in tight value chains.

• Agriculture is only part of SHFs’ lives – for example, diaries from a Pakistani farming community revealed only 39 per cent of all income and expenses were from agriculture. Even if agriculture cash flows were completely electronic, the majority of the cash flow would remain in paper form.

• Digital liquidity requires digital lending – given the SHFs uneven cash flows, credit is essential. Unless loans are disbursed electronically, the proceeds will likely circulate in cash as there is little incentive to convert the disbursement to eMoney.

• Cashing out is better – even if SHFs are paid electronically, cashing out is preferred since they avoid transaction fees and other issues such as interoperability and connectivity.

eMoney within value chains, although more efficient, is clearly not a silver bullet for creating digital liquidity. Besides having limited reach, value chains by themselves do not remove the incentive to cash-out to any meaningful degree.

Given these limitations, is there a role for tight value chains in creating digital liquidity? Is eMoney somehow less important to tight value chains?

One needs to look at payment-enabling these tight value chains as just one part of a holistic approach to digital liquidity – an approach that considers the lifecycle of money and introduces solutions that encourage a digital version(s). A holistic approach gives SHFs and, more broadly, the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) ample opportunity to receive, retain, and pay with eMoney. Within this construct, crop buyers, banks, governments, and urban relatives would inject eMoney into the local BoP economy because it is faster and cheaper than cash. The BoP would retain this money in electronic form until needed because doing so helps them access credit lines, manage household petty cash, and gain other benefits. When the BoP needs to make a payment, they would use eMoney for both local BoP-to-BoP transactions and payments to institutions because doing so provides access to layaway programs, lines of credit, and other benefits. Compelling eMoney use cases are the best way to drive this transition and value chains contribute to this endeavor.

Even if eMoney within value chains will not materially impact digital liquidity, eMoney is still valuable. Some benefits are direct, such as lower cash handling costs. Other benefits are indirect, such as improving access to credit through transaction histories. In some cases, eMoney is part of a much larger solution with broad benefits, such as subsidy programs that improve food security. The justification for eMoney should not and does not need to rest on digital liquidity alone.

What are the implications for strategists and policy makers? For those focused on driving eMoney adoption and achieving digital liquidity, it is important to remember that value chains are just one use case for furthering adoption and digital liquidity. Accordingly, strategists and policy makers should evaluate a range of use cases and evaluate how value chains fit into the roadmap.

1 Introduction

It is widely agreed that digital liquidity is an important goal for developing markets. It enables BoP individuals and businesses to receive, retain, and pay with eMoney – providing safety, greater access to credit, income growth, and other documented benefits. The end goal of digital liquidity involves eMoney circulating within the local BoP economy. This includes BoP-to-BoP transactions, as well as payments from and to entities such as schools, mobile network operators (MNOs), governments, and family members. In this end state, there is much less need to incur costs for cash-in or cash-out transactions. A consumer’s eMoney receipts (salary, remittances received, crop sales, loan proceeds, etc.) align with their eMoney uses (purchases, loan repayments, investments, savings, loans to friends, etc.).

Figure 1 – eMoney lifecycle

Achieving this goal is difficult as it requires eMoney to be better than cash for many use cases. But there has been some progress, eMoney has a strong value proposition for remote person to person (P2P) and person to business (P2B) remittances and airtime top-ups. Continued progress requires eMoney to be better for health care payments, salary payments, grocery purchases, and so on. There is some evidence that eMoney is starting to work for other use cases, such as school payments.

Ensuring more balance between an individual’s eMoney receipts and uses facilitates this transition. As individuals receive eMoney, they need a near-equivalent opportunity to use that eMoney for schools, groceries, loan repayments, and other expenses. These flows must also be synchronized since the BoP does not have the luxury of retaining eMoney for future purchases if they have near term cash needs. Without an equal opportunity, users must cash-out (or cash-in) which mitigates much of eMoney’s core value propositions.

Use cases and the need for balance are mutually dependent since more eMoney use cases make the balance easier to achieve.

Accordingly, agriculture value chains are an interesting topic to study in this regard. A large portion of the BoP participates in agriculture and these value chains bring money into and out of the BoP economy (crop sales, seed purchases, etc.). Therefore, at least in theory, agriculture value chains would allow a large number of individuals to receive and spend eMoney in an important part of their lives.

This report looks at agricultural value chains and whether they are a potential vehicle for increasing digital liquidity:

• How much of the population do they reach?

• How important are agriculture payments to the lives of the poor?

• Would value chain eMoney tend to stay in electronic form?

Note: A variety of research papers explore the intersection of Digital Financial Services (DFSs) and agriculture. An excellent example is USAID and mSTAR’s “Guide to the Use of Digital Financial Services in Agriculture” which provides a framework for using lending, payments, and other DFSs to improve specific agriculture value chains. This report has a different emphasis than the USAID and other papers. This report primarily focuses on the degree to which agricultural value chains can accelerate progress toward digital liquidity and less on the reverse perspective – i.e., whether eMoney is good for value chains. With that said, a strong value proposition is obviously an important consideration, otherwise eMoney implementations will not happen.

2 Background

Importance of agriculture

Agriculture is a critical component of the economy in developing countries and can play an important role in helping to alleviate poverty. Developing countries can derive more than 30 per cent of their GDP from agriculture, compared to less than two per cent within a developed country, such as the U.S. Additionally, there is a close connection between the poor and agriculture. SHFs comprise most of the rural poor in developing countries.

A common approach for alleviating poverty is through commercial value chains. In this framework, policymakers and stakeholders examine the spectrum of ‘farm to fork’ activities and identify tactics that will benefit SHFs. These tactics include incorporating SHFs into existing value chains or improving value chain performance through financing, better training, better fertilizer, and so on.

Commercial value chains differ by crop but often share the activities shown in the diagram below.

Figure 2 – Typical agricultural value chain

It is important to note that commercial value chains vary in terms of formality and sophistication. At one end of the commercial spectrum are ‘loose’ value chains in which growers sell excess crops primarily in local markets. [2]

Figure 3 – Loose value chain

At the other end are ‘tight’ value chains typically focused on exports and cash crops (e.g., coffee, tea, sugar). These value chains tend to be more complex. For example, the value chain for Indonesia palm oil involves multiple input suppliers, post-harvest processing, and private sector and government roles.

Figure 4 – Tight value chain

Actors within tight value chains tend to have strategic goals in mind, such as improving their bargaining power or ensuring a reliable crop supply. Accordingly, these value chains are more formally organized and sophisticated. SHF financing is often a key component in the overall design. These tight value chains are good for effecting change because of their overall sophistication and the availability of aggregation points where services can be delivered or managed.

Value chain models

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations defined four different value chain models, all relevant to tight value chains. [3]

1) Producer-driven

In this model, SHFs join associations or cooperatives that contract with larger buyers. Producer-driven models help SHFs access new markets, obtain higher market prices, secure their market position, and access financing.

Aprocav, a cacao producer association in Peru: 3,500 SHFs are part of the Aprocav producer association. Through Aprocav, SHFs sign a contract pledging to sell their entire cacao crop to a large customer who processes the crop into cacao butter, cacao powder, and glazes. In return for this commitment, SHFs receive bank financing, technical assistance, and above-market pricing. Aprocav enables financing by guaranteeing the loans, identifying loan amounts appropriate for each SHF, repaying lenders from sales proceeds, and remitting the remaining proceeds to the SHFs.

2) Buyer-driven

Buyers such as traders, processors, wholesalers, exporters, and retailers will contract directly with SHFs to ensure a reliable supply of product.

Hortifruti, an institutional buyer in Costa Rica: Hortifruti purchases a variety of crops from SHFs before selling them in bulk to supermarkets. The relationship with Hortifruti helps SHFs manage their cash flow. Since Hortifruti provides a staggered planting and harvesting schedule, SHFs earn money throughout the year. Additionally, farmers can borrow from banks based on their Hortifruti relationship. The banks are willing to lend because they believe Hortifruti will only work with reliable suppliers.

3) Facilitated

SHFs are often unable to participate in tight value chains due to inadequate organizational and technical skills – this creates too much risk for large-scale buyers. To address this challenge, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments intervene to make SHFs viable value chain members. These interventions include organizing farmer groups, training farmers, facilitating financing, identifying market opportunities, or some other gap-filling measure. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Peru Poverty Reduction and Alleviation (PRA) artichoke market opportunity in Peru: In the past, SHFs could not participate in the artichoke export market since exporters primarily worked with larger growers. With a grant from USAID, Peru PRA identified artichokes as an attractive SHF opportunity and then brought together producers, processors, and buyers to bring the vision to fruition. PRA first encouraged a local processor (Agromantaro) to begin artichoke processing. Since the SHFs were unfamiliar with artichokes, PRA and Agromantaro enlisted producer associations to convince the SHFs to grow artichokes. To sweeten the deal, the processor offered the SFHs a contract, fixed price, seedlings, and technical assistance. Since farmers did not pay for seedlings until harvest, this approach also generated a source of SHF financing.

4) Integrated

Supermarkets, multi-nationals, and other large downstream institutions create integrated value chains to ensure low prices, rigid adherence to quality standards, and a lock on supply. Integrated value chain models go beyond just connecting value chain actors. There is more information flow and control throughout the value chain.

Supermarkets: Supermarkets’ purchasing agents will communicate strict product requirements to exporters about variety, quality, volume, hygiene practices, traceability, and residue standards. Exporters and wholesalers then provide this information to producers along with seed and fertilizer inputs, record keeping materials, and technical training to ensure the standards are met.

3 Are payment-enabled agricultural value chains a solution for digital liquidity?

Appealing characteristics

eMoney is a good fit for tight value chains.

• Bulk payments: A single entity typically pays the SHF. This entity may be a farmers’ group distributing payments from a larger buyer or a large buyer that contracted directly with SHFs. eMoney provides an audit trail and reduces cash handling costs. Cash handling costs include theft /shrinkage, lost advances due to lack of proper record keeping, bank withdrawal fees, insurance, employee fuel and time costs for making bank withdrawals and delivering payments, security guards, shortages of appropriate cash denominations to make exact payments, and soft costs such as fear of robbery and physical harm from robbery.

• Payment flow complexity: Value chains do not always follow a simple cash transaction process at each step – i.e., input suppliers sell to farmers, followed by farmers selling to traders, etc. Payments can leapfrog or be split between value chain participants. For example, a contract may require a farmer group to divide sales proceeds between lenders, input suppliers, and farmers. eMoney with an accompanying management system can automate this process and provide an audit trail.

• Importance of credit: There are significant cash flow constraints up and down agricultural value chains. For example, dairy farmers need inputs to better feed their cows, but the input providers don’t necessarily get paid right away. Dairy farmers will sell their milk to collectors and co-ops that will in turn onsell their milk to coolers that will in turn onsell the milk to processors that will in turn sell products to distributors. Every step of this process results in delays in payments after goods are already delivered. Smoothing out uneven payments through credit can have a substantial impact. eMoney can help in various ways. For example, transaction histories facilitate credit decisions. An eMoney platform can also ensure that money lent is actually spent on a borrower’s intended use (e.g., farming inputs). Additionally, repayments can be enforced by automatically deducting payments, or even cutting off access to the market in the event of non-payment.

Not a silver bullet

eMoney is clearly valuable, but will it improve digital liquidity? For meaningful improvement to occur, eMoney within value chains would need to reach critical mass and continue circulating in digital form. Otherwise, digital liquidity would be small and temporary. For a number of years into the future, critical mass and electronic circulation seem unlikely.

Several issues attenuate the potential:

#1 – Low participation in tight value chains

Only seven per cent of SHFs participate in tight value chains – thus, the reach is limited.[4] While there are efforts to increase participation in these value chains, progress will take time. It is noteworthy that 60 per cent of SHFs are non-commercial (i.e., grow food for subsistence), so there is limited cash flow to digitize.

Figure 5 – SHF segmentation

#2 – Agriculture is just a part of BoP financial lives

Financial diaries from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Pakistan show that agriculture is only part of the SHF financial picture. In the tight value chain example (Pakistan), only 39 per cent of all income and expenses were from agriculture. In the loose value chain example (Tanzania), the figure averages 29 per cent. In the non-commercial example (Mozambique), the figure averages only seven per cent – agriculture cash flows from non-commercial farmers are low since they grow primarily for consumption.[5]

Figure 6 – SHF finances

#3 – Digital liquidity also requires digital lending

Figure 7 – SHF borrowing

There are other financial flows to consider beyond income and expenses: loan disbursements and repayments. Credit is essential to the BoP since cash flow tends to be very uneven. Crop sales provide a much needed inflow but the BoP needs money for seeds, fertilizer, and daily living expenses until they can harvest. To fill the financial void, the BoP borrows from many sources: friends, family, advances from agriculture traders, and MFI loans. The commercial SHFs in the diaries borrow the most, possibly because more of their income and expenses are associated with seasonal agriculture.

Using eMoney for receiving and repaying these loans is important for digital liquidity. If an individual receives a cash loan, they are likely to use that money as cash. They have little incentive to cash-in, thus bypassing an eMoney lifecycle – e.g., the individual does not use eMoney at a local merchant who would later use that eMoney to pay employees and suppliers. Additionally, unless an individual can repay their loan with eMoney, they must cash-out, which also breaks the eMoney lifecycle. eMoney for value chain financing will help, but SHF financial diaries suggest loans from friends/family and local stores can be more important sources of funds.

#4 – They will just cash out

Even if value chains use eMoney, currently, farmers will just cash out. Cash is usually cheaper, easier, interoperable, and not reliant on mobile coverage or agent presence.

Accordingly, BoP eMoney usage has been limited to a few use cases: receiving remote P2P payments then cashing out, and buying airtime. Even in Kenya, where mobile money is widely used, BoP diaries revealed that only 0.7 per cent of payment transactions were electronic and 86 per cent of those were for airtime.[6] In these two uses cases, eMoney is cheaper and simpler with mobile money agents solving the interoperability program with their cash-in, cash-out services.

Figure 8 – Transaction frequency by average ticket amount

Cost: Low eMoney usage makes economic sense. Most BoP transactions are for small amounts which have high transaction fees on a percentage basis. 75 per cent of purchases in the Mozambique, Tanzania, and Pakistan financial diaries were less than $2. [7]

Applying a variety of tariff schedules against this collection of low value transactions would cost up to 22 per cent. Fees are also contagious – a recipient will eventually incur their own transaction fees when they use their funds.

Figure 9 – Average MNO fee for low value transactions

The pricing variation is particularly striking – some MNOs do not charge P2P fees between registered users. It is also important to note that MNOs often have a minimum value they will transfer. In Uganda, this amount is ~ $0.14. Under this policy, 23 per cent of the transactions would be ineligible for eMoney.

User experience: The eMoney user experience is not optimal. For remote bill transactions, paying the correct business and ensuring payment is credited to the correct account is error-prone. For face-to-face P2P transactions, it is easier for someone to reach into their pocket than log into a phone and type the recipient’s mobile number. Compelling user experiences are needed for each use case (e.g., ‘bumping’ phones for face-to-face P2P transactions).

Service availability: eMoney is not universally available to all people at all times. Poor or inconsistent mobile connectivity encourages eMoney subscribers to rely on cash as the more reliable alternative. Even where mobile connectivity is solid, the local MNO may not provide an eMoney offering or, if they do, they may not have an adequate agent network to make eMoney a practical offering.

Role of eMoney in tight value chains

eMoney within value chains, although more efficient, is clearly not a silver bullet for creating digital liquidity. Besides having limited reach, value chains do not remove the incentive to cash-out to any meaningful degree.

Given these limitations, is there a role for tight value chains in creating digital liquidity? Is eMoney somehow less important to tight value chains?

Part of a holistic approach to digital liquidity: One needs to look at payment-enabling these tight value chains as just one part of a holistic approach – an approach that considers the lifecycle of money and introduces solutions that encourage a digital version(s). A holistic approach gives the BoP ample opportunity to receive, retain, and pay with eMoney. Tight value chains can encourage eMoney adoption and inject eMoney into the local BoP economy, a requisite step for digital liquidity. Since participating SHFs generate a disproportionate amount of revenue and may employ others, their impact should be larger than their seven per cent market share suggests. But, value chains in themselves are not sufficient vehicles for digital liquidity. It is important to note that for value chains to fulfill their liquidity role, they should use the national payment system and not a proprietary solution (e-voucher, etc.).

eMoney is still important: Even if eMoney within value chains will not materially impact digital liquidity, eMoney is still valuable and offers a range of benefits.

• Direct benefits – These include lower cash handling costs, leakage reduction, greater safety, faster payment, and other benefits.

• Indirect benefits – These include access to credit and insurance through transaction histories, higher merchant sales, or more accurate tracking of accounts receivable.

• Solution benefits – In some use cases, eMoney is a component of a much broader solution, such as input subsidy programs that improve food security, or a contract management system used by value chain participants.

Thus, the justification/motivation for payment-enabling agricultural value chains should not, and does not, need to rest on digital liquidity alone.

Part of a holistic approach

The building blocks of a holistic approach are use cases – specific situations such as paying for school fees, receiving wages, or repaying a loan. Digital liquidity depends on making eMoney better than cash for a wide range of use cases, including agricultural payments.

eMoney is already compelling for remote transfers (quicker and cheaper than transporting cash) and airtime top-up (more convenient than visiting stores and without transaction fees). These solutions were powerful enough to incent mobile money adoption. But, these two use cases have not been sufficient to achieve digital liquidity. P2P recipients typically cash-out upon receiving their funds, and small businesses also tend to cash-out quickly after receiving eMoney payments from their customers.

To achieve digital liquidity, the value proposition must widen to include more use cases. eMoney needs to be better for buying crops, paying school fees, buying household supplies, paying utility bills, paying loans and so on. In other words, value chains are only one category of use cases; non-agricultural use cases are at least as important.

Broadly speaking, digital liquidity requires a balanced portfolio of eMoney use cases that encourages:

1. Injecting eMoney into the BoP economy: Getting money into BoP digital wallets is one of the first steps towards digital liquidity. Remote P2P payments are an excellent source of funds as payments can be quite large but more use cases are needed. Bulk payments from larger organizations such as governments, produce buyers, and NGOs are a good source. These organizations need to pay thousands or even millions of individuals. With their size and influence, organizations can often dictate how payments will be made. Because bulk payments such as subsidies can be universal, these institutional payments can raise eMoney adoption significantly.

2. Retaining funds electronically: Unless a user retains their eMoney in digital form, the digital liquidity cycle breaks. Remote payments aside, why would consumers bother converting their cash back into eMoney? They will just use cash. To avoid breaking the liquidity cycle, users must overcome their current preference for cashing out. Providing interest payments, enabling a line of credit or lowering household petty cash requirements are potential motivators.

3. Conducting BoP-to-BoP transactions: From an income perspective, this activity includes selling produce locally, selling products (entrepreneurs), providing casual labour, and borrowing money from friends. Expenses include income-related expenses such as paying labourers, repaying loans from friends, buying seeds, as well as household expenses such as food, clothing, and transportation. Until BoP-to-BoP eMoney transactions reach a tipping point, the need to cash-in or cash-out will remain high as these transactions are likely the bulk of BoP activity. Getting the BoP to use eMoney in the local economy can be particularly challenging due to high fees, lack of MNO interoperability, and poor user experience. Removing these barriers is a pre-requisite to eMoney adoption, but is not sufficient. One or several compelling reasons to use eMoney are required, this might include: Using eMoney to document the disbursement and repayment of informal loans, or using eMoney transaction histories to secure credit.

4. Paying large institutions with eMoney: While payments to MNOs, schools, governments, and other institutions are a small part of BoP obligations, they may be a meaningful factor in driving eMoney adoption since many individuals use these services. Because these institutions can be quasi-monopolies, government-controlled entities, or otherwise influential organizations, they can mandate eMoney. Examples include registration payments for public schools in The Ivory Coast and tuition payments to the Bridge Academy, an independent school system in Kenya. The often remote nature of these institutions provides an additional catalyst for eMoney adoption.

Figure 10 – Example eMoney use cases

4 Agricultural Use Cases

Although not a silver bullet, agricultural use cases play a role in a holistic approach to achieving digital liquidity. Example use cases for tight value chains include:

• bulk payments to farmers;

• multi-party agriculture payments;

• input subsidy programs;

• trader credit (agriculture items);

• informal store credit;

• savings-based line of credit (LoC).

This section discusses these use cases with the intention of:

• Highlighting the range of benefits eMoney can provide to SHFs, and whether digital liquidity is one of them.

• Illustrating the importance of tailoring solutions to specific use cases. The user experience, value proposition, backend processes, pricing, rollout strategies, and other components must be tailored to each use case.

• Reinforcing the notion of how challenging eMoney adoption can be – how elegant solutions may fail, and how goals such as digital liquidity can be undermined.

Bulk payments to farmers

• Concept: A single entity (farmers group, large buyer, etc.) pays farmers with eMoney, possibly mandating this method.

• E-value proposition: eMoney reduces the payor’s cash handling costs such as theft, security guards, and transportation. Accordingly, these initiatives are often payor-led.

• Example: In 2013, GADCO, a major rice producer and miller in Ghana, piloted mobile money payments for 722 rice farmers with plans to increase to 5,000 farmers.[8] Several aspects are notable:

• GADCO’s primary benefit was lower cash handling costs. Accordingly, GADCO was willing to pay a one per cent fee to Tigo, the MNO providing the service. Half of this fee enabled waiver of farmer cash-out fees.

• Farmer benefits included:

a) GADCO commitment to purchase all of the farmers’ rice;

b) ease of hiring seasonal workers through proof of cash flow;

c) financial privacy which reduces the pressure to give loans and gifts, and;

d) traditional mobile money benefits (safety, 24/7 access, no visits to banks, ease of airtime top-ups, etc.).

• Wide range of training was essential: mobile phone literacy (SMS, PIN codes, balance inquiry) and financial literacy (savings concepts, recent changes to currency).

• Tactics for increasing adoption included:

a) sending $3 to farmers to incent experimentation with mobile phone interface;

b) providing non-Tigo subscribers with Tigo SIM cards;

c) integrating mobile money education/promotion into existing agriculture training done in person or via radio (seed placement, pest control, etc.).

• Digital liquidity impact: Conceptually, these bulk payments improve liquidity by encouraging eMoney adoption and providing a source of funds. However, as discussed earlier, the reach is limited as only seven per cent of SHFs participate in value chains where this bulk payout is most relevant. Also, implementations are very small (e.g., 5,000 farmers) and require hand-holding. This is not a scalable solution at this point in the eMoney adoption curve, but this could change once value propositions and solutions solidify.

• Other issues: Who pays the transaction fees? Farmers do not want to receive eMoney if doing so lowers net proceeds. Payors have been addressing farmer resistance by either paying transaction fees directly or by including additional funds to cover the farmers’ cash-out expenses.

Multi-Party agriculture payments

• Concept: Contracts and payments (purchases, loan disbursements, and repayments) are managed holistically across multiple parties. For example, a crop buyer’s payment can be split automatically between farmer(s) and bank and input supplier(s) instead of through unaffiliated transactions (buyer pays farmer; farmer probably pays bank; etc.).

• E-value proposition: eMoney provides administrative simplicity, encourages lending, lowers credit risks for banks and agro-dealers, and increases production control (ability to specify input packages, etc.).

• Example: Pride Africa, an NGO, started the DrumNet project in 2003 to create an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platform to help value chain partners (buyers, farmers, agro-dealers, and banks) operate more efficiently. DrumNet was a rules-based platform involving “a fixed price purchase contract offered by a buyer, signed by producers and managed by a master contract establishing the roles, rights, and responsibilities of all chain partners. The contractual agreement allowed producers to access credit (first directly from DrumNet and later from partner banks) and purchase farming inputs from certified input retailers. At harvest, contracted produce was aggregated and graded at designated collection points, then sold to the buyer. DrumNet facilitated and tracked payment following a successful buyer-seller transaction, ensuring credit was repaid and payment to producers was both secure and accurate.” DrumNet charged fees for these services.[9]

Figure 11 – DrumNet process flow

Existing and planned capabilities included:

• Payment: Collecting payment from buyer and distributing to farmer groups and banks.

• Information flow: Providing an SMS system that:

a) informed buyers what/when farmers planted, allowed buyers to monitor growing progress and enabled buyers to communicate with farmers;

b) continually updated agro-dealers about stocking requirements;

c) informed farmers about collection dates and locations.

• Control: Allowing supply chain partners to track contract compliance and report/monitor supply chain activities.

• Financial risk management: Collecting a 25 per cent line-of-credit deposit from farmers, and facilitating micro-insurance for crops.

Value propositions vary:

• Farmers: Higher prices (broker disintermediation), fixed price contracts, and access to credit.

• Agro-dealers: Visibility into stock requirements, higher sales, and no need to offer credit.

• Buyers: Lower prices (broker disintermediation), more predictable supply, greater visibility, and lower cash handling costs.

• Banks: New customers and lower cost and risk.

DrumNet was donor funded from 2003 to 2009 and operated in several value chains throughout Kenya. It was serving over 3,000 farmers when the main donor withdrew additional funding. Although certain regions approached break-even, the service was not scaling fast enough in the donor’s opinion. DrumNet leadership evaluated their options, keeping several lessons in mind:

• Valuable solution: Buyers, agro-dealers, and banks valued the service, and farmers could be quickly mobilized to form groups (a group representative interacted with DrumNet). Field costs could be kept relatively low after initial marketing and training exercises. Although value chains differ by crop, they share general processes (produce collection, payment) that an ICT-driven process could improve.

• Platform was not robust enough: The DrumNet platform was not sufficiently ‘hardened.’ Too much time and resources were wasted on personnel transporting paper forms from the field to headquarters and then manually entering data into the DrumNet database. Regular platform breakdown also raised costs and created customer service problems. DrumNet needed significant software re-development.

• Funding: Operating DrumNet as a donor-funded entity left it prone to inconsistent cash flow and requirements which were incompatible with commercial development (e.g., expanding before it was ready).

In need of capital to support a technical upgrade, DrumNet created a JV with a Kenyan ICT firm. The arrangement was essentially a ‘sweat equity’ deal in which the ICT firm would build the next version platform in exchange for equity. Shortly after forming the JV, the ICT firm landed a large contract and redeployed resources to that project. DrumNet did not continue.

• Digital liquidity impact: Solutions such as this are certainly elegant and offer a broad value proposition. The impact on digital liquidity is less clear. Other than injecting eMoney into agro-dealers, a solution of this nature probably does not create any more liquidity than bulk payments to farmers would. But, perhaps this type of platform can eventually "virtually aggregate" farmers? DrumNet launched this service targeting farmer groups in tight value chains. But only seven per cent of farmers are in tight value chains. Another 33 per cent are in loose value chains.

• Could enhancements to these platforms enable independent farmers to graduate into tight value chains?

• Could these platforms help farmers in loose value chains sell in a more sophisticated manner within local markets?

• Other issues: Was the concept simply too early? The service relied on mobile phones extensively. When DrumNet launched, mobile penetration was much lower and functionality more limited. To accommodate this deficiency, farmers had to nominate a point of contact (Transaction Agent) to interact with the DrumNet platform on their behalf. This limitation coupled with a weak platform created a weak stakeholder experience.

Input subsidy programs (ISPs)

• Concept: Governments, NGOs, and other entities encourage usage of fertilizer and high quality seeds by subsidizing part of the cost. In one version, eligible farmers redeem an e-voucher or equivalent token at agro-dealers and pay the remaining balance; agro-dealers collect their funds by submitting e-vouchers to the subsidizing entity. In another version, eligible farmers receive a cash transfer only usable for certain purchases. Non-commercial and commercial SHFs can participate in these programs.

• E-value proposition: Farmers experience the benefits of high-quality inputs for the first time, or at least save money repeating an existing practice. Agro-dealers generate extra sales. Governments improve food security and constituent incomes, and can reduce their involvement in procuring and distributing inputs.

• Example: In 2011, faced with declining agricultural productivity, the Nigerian government announced several remedial measures including the Growth Enhancement Support (GES) scheme, an input subsidy program. Implementation during the first few years relied on mobile money and experienced a variety of problems, some mobile-related (network coverage, low phone/SIM ownership, phone loss, lack of airtime, etc.) and some program-related (no reliable national ID scheme, supplier exploitation of farmers, delayed payments to agro-dealers, etc.). To address the mobile phone deficiencies, in 2013, the government piloted an alternate solution – the Token Authentication Program (TAP) that did not require mobile phone service. This solution addressed some problems such as low mobile coverage, but the overall program remains under significant strain. One major issue has been ‘enumeration’ – uniquely identifying all eligible beneficiaries. It has been very difficult to locate farmers, define an eligible farmer, assign unique identifiers, avoid fraudulent registrations, and so on. Another major issue has been distribution fraud and chaos, worsened by the appointment of new dealers to ensure geographic coverage. Many problems surfaced, including: the appointment of unqualified agro-dealers such as friends/family; government officials requiring bribes to process agro-dealer redemption requests; and new agro-dealers crowding out traditional agro-dealers. To address the enumeration challenge, the government is pursuing the National Agricultural Payment Initiative (NAPI) which includes a farmer database based on biometrics, a no-frills bank account with the Bank of Agriculture, and a chip card for identification, redemption, and access to other services.[10]

• Digital liquidity impact: While the GES program needs improvement to achieve its goals, it offers several valuable lessons, one of which is separating the evaluation of eMoney from overall ISP issues such as distribution network design. eMoney can improve robust ISPs or worsen weak ones by enabling high scale fraud. A well-designed program is therefore critical. With a functioning ISP as an assumption, the key question is whether ISPs can drive digital liquidity (i.e., the propensity to receive, retain and spend money in electronic form). The answer seems to be ‘yes’ but mostly by indirect means.

• ISPs are a good vehicle for encouraging SHF adoption of eMoney (an enabling first step in digital liquidity). ISP programs can be quite large. For example, in Nigeria, GES voucher redemption figures reached eight million in 2014. These programs can be inclusive, targeting both non-commercial and commercial farmers.

• ISPs do not directly increase a SHF’s digital liquidity since the subsidies are not accessible to them. The payments go directly to the agro-dealer or, if sent to the SHF, cannot be used for anything except inputs, at least theoretically.

• ISPs can increase the digital liquidity of agro-dealers, which could result in eMoney payments to BoP employees. However, a flawed ISP implementation can worsen liquidity if agro-dealers experience long redemption timeframes.

Trader credit (agricultural items)

• Concept: SHFs often obtain credit from downstream and upstream partners (e.g., agricultural traders who buy from SHFs and resell to larger buyers). Traders will often provide upfront cash to SHFs and deduct the amount owed from the crop purchase several months later. The eMoney version would involve the trader dispensing funds electronically.

• E-value proposition: It is unclear how strong the value proposition could be. These transactions, although significant in size, do not happen very often. There may be some benefit if the disbursement can be done remotely, or if a digital record is useful (e.g., helping a trader obtain bank loan).

• Examples: Trader credit is primarily relevant to SHFs selling in tight value chains. In the Pakistan diaries, 97 per cent of the SHFs used trader credit, but through cash advances only. It is not known whether an eMoney version is happening in any measurable way in other countries.

• Digital liquidity impact: These payments are relatively large and could be an ongoing source of eMoney for electronic purchases if retained in this form.

Store credit (local suppliers)

• Concept: Farmers transact electronically as a way of recording the purchase and repayment. This would involve the purchaser issuing the merchant an “e-IOU” at time of purchase. Future repayments would reduce the IOU balance. Additional functionality, such as interest charges could be added.

• E-value proposition: Merchants such as local agro-dealers could sell more merchandise, track amounts owed, send automated repayment requests, generate interest income, and access bank credit through proof of receivables. Consumers could buy more, track amounts owed, and access bank credit through a credit history.

• Examples: Store credit is very important. In the Mozambique, Tanzania, and Pakistan diaries, 22 per cent, 60 per cent and 94 per cent of the households respectively used store credit. It is unclear how much, if any, is conducted electronically. Under existing functionality, only repayments would be appropriate for eMoney but tracking store credit disbursement is technically feasible.

• Digital liquidity impact: eMoney for store credit could improve digital liquidity if the borrower can time their eMoney repayments to match their eMoney income.

• Other issues: Store credit highlights the need to think about an end-to-end solution, not just the payment piece. Unlike a cash payment, store credit is a two-step process: Obtaining the credit during a shopping trip; and repaying at a later date. A robust solution needs to create value throughout the entire lifecycle: Simple user experience during the purchase; ability of merchant to assess credit worthiness; ability to monitor balances owed; option to send reminder notices; and ease of repayment.

Savings-based line of credit

• Concept: Mobile money users store excess money in an interest-bearing eMoney account. Those deemed creditworthy can also access a line of credit (LoC), with a maximum loan amount greater than the interest-bearing account balance. The LoC could be used to buy agriculture supplies and possibly even be limited to purchases from agro-dealers.

• E-value proposition: This arrangement provides users with a real-time LoC. Although users must temporarily tie-up money in an interest-bearing account, they are able to borrow a greater amount giving them ‘net leverage.’

• Example: In 2012, Safaricom partnered with Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) to launch M-Shwari, a micro savings and loan product linked to M-Pesa in Kenya. Registered M-Pesa users can establish an account online and then transfer money between M-Pesa and M-Shwari accounts. Balances within M-Shwari earn two to six per cent interest, depending on balance and willingness to lock up funds. Some users can also access a short-term LoC. There is no formal interest rate, but there is a 7.5 per cent facilitation fee for a loan that is due in 30 days. A consumer that wants to extend the term another 30 days has to pay an additional 7.5 per cent fee. LoC eligibility requires submission of a national ID. CBA’s credit decision uses Safaricom data, such as age of account, airtime patterns, and repayment of short-term airtime credits. Low-income borrowers have been less successful at obtaining loans because risk is twice that of the general population. With help from FSD Kenya, CBA tailored their risk models to identify a credit worthy low-income segment. [11]

• Digital liquidity impact: The BoP needs frequent, quick access to short-term credit in general and to avoid cash-in and cash-out requirements. A savings-based LoC provides this type of solution. However, this solution requires an ability to save money to build lender trust. That may be too difficult for the BoP.

• Other issues: This is a complicated product requiring financial and mobile literacy. Registration also involves agreeing to terms and conditions, and acknowledging data privacy conditions. M-Shwari handles these agreements via the web. This may be difficult to achieve in a purely mobile environment.

5 Policy Considerations

As noted, this report explores whether eMoney in agricultural value chains can accelerate digital liquidity. This topic should interest strategists and policy makers developing eMoney roadmaps relying on various use cases (value chains, school payments, etc.).

Value chains are just one use case for furthering digital liquidity. Accordingly, strategists and policy makers should focus on the overall goal of digital liquidity and evaluate a range of use cases (including value chains) when creating a roadmap.

Figure 12 – Example of eMoney roadmap

With that in mind, the authors recommend strategists and policy makers consider the following issues:

• Understand where your constituents are within the eMoney journey and identify primary barriers to further adoption. Barriers could include poor mobile coverage, mobile money fees, interoperability issues, poor agent coverage, lack of compelling use cases, awkward user experiences, and limited merchant acceptance, among other reasons.

• Determine the most appropriate interventions and/or use cases to further drive adoption.

– Are value chains a good fit? Do tight value chains exist to any significant degree within the planner’s region? Is there an eMoney value proposition stakeholders will care about (reduction in theft, safety, lending opportunities, etc.)?

– Are other use cases more appropriate? For example, would school payments or government transfers (e.g., fertilizer subsidies) be more appropriate because of wider reach or alignment with other priorities?

– Can use cases be sequenced to better balance eMoney receipts and uses? As individuals receive eMoney, they need a near-equivalent opportunity to use that eMoney for schools, groceries, loan repayments, and other expenses. Without an equal opportunity, users must cash-out (or cash-in).

• Make eMoney work within targeted use cases. The solution must be robust and tailored to the use case. Ultimately, the eMoney option must be better than cash for all influential stakeholders. Design considerations include:

– defining a ‘complete solution’ (ancillary services like contract management, layaway programs, etc.);

– user experience of key stakeholders (consumers, small merchants, large institutions, agents, etc.);

– front-end and back-end functionality (user interface, reporting, integration with accounting systems, etc.);

– pricing that makes economic sense;

– training and educational requirements.

VII Impact of social networks on digital liquidity

About this report

The authors of this technical report are T. Hardy Jackson and Allen Weinberg. The reviewers and contributors are Paul Nelson and Ashwini Sathnur.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Social networks enable users to chat, share photos, and perform similar social activities. As social networks mature, they continually add commercial services such as person-to-person (P2P) payments, shopping at physical stores, and ‘conversational commerce’ via chat applications.

Social networks have become enormously popular and are themselves bigger than the largest e-commerce companies in the world. Importantly, social networks have determined multiple ways to monetize their user base, including advertising, digital content, and transaction fees. Revenue growth has been impressive: for example, Facebook’s revenue has grown from $2 billion to $18 billion in just five years.

At this point in time, however, this social networking and commercial revolution has largely skipped the bottom of the pyramid (BoP). In general, while social networks are present in most developing countries and view the BoP as a big opportunity, the poor are not participating – primarily due to low Internet adoption. But, increasing Internet adoption will not open the social networking floodgate. Feature phones, the primary device used by the poor, limit the social network value proposition. While smartphones offer the best user experience, they introduce new problems such as a short battery life and higher data costs. Even if social network adoption grows, the commercial aspects won’t materialize for the poor without financial inclusion – a consumer can’t buy unless they link a payment account like M-Pesa to their social network account.

Is this one more example of the digital and financial divide, or can social networks help the BoP economically?

Interestingly, social networks could help close the digital divide by providing various mechanisms, to the extent that they are allowed by regulators:

• Digital on-ramps – Providing a simple, low-cost way of gathering information and communicating with others. For example, chat and VoIP services could reduce spending on SMS and mobile phone calls.

• Platforms for BoP ecosystems – Enabling consumers and entities to create and manage groups, commercially oriented, or otherwise. For example, social network platforms could be used to organize agricultural value chains and enhance how farmers interact with produce buyers, agro-dealers, banks, and other stakeholders. Alternatively, smallholdingfarmers could organize themselves into groups to share knowledge, borrow from banks, or negotiate better prices from crop buyers. Other examples include non-governmental organization (NGO) group lending programs and parent/school groups.

• Payment networks – Providing a global, interoperable, multi-channel and user-friendly eMoney payment network. For example, social networks could resolve mobile network operator (MNO) interoperability issues by integrating with multiple MNO wallets and transferring money between users. Additionally, social networks could provide physical merchants with low cost payment solutions without chip terminal or barcode reader investments.

• Marketplaces – Helping consumers shop better, merchants sell more, and entrepreneurs find more work. This could take the form of selling products to a larger audience, maintaining an ongoing dialogue with existing customers, promoting job skills, discovering employment opportunities, participating in ‘on-demand’ labour marketplaces, or even virtual entrepreneurship (e.g., YouTube celebrity/entrepreneurs).

• Beneficial data collection – Improving access to credit and enabling targeted outreach and advertising. For example, transaction histories and merchant reputation ratings could provide BoP merchants with greater access to credit. Additionally, richer consumer data could allow NGOs and governments to target interventions on a large level, or on a very small level by simply allowing an individual to sell their bicycle within the local community.

That said, policy makers face a tough balancing act. On one hand, social networks can bring significant value to BoP populations and policy makers should therefore consider policies that encourage adoption. On the other hand, social networks are tremendously powerful and regulators should explore policies that protect consumers from potentially harmful effects, paying special attention to data privacy, market power, and other concerns.

In short, social networks have tremendous potential to enable new forms of commerce, benefitting BoP buyers and sellers and helping eMoney systems move towards digital liquidity, but a comprehensive, long-range perspective will be important for optimizing the value for all stakeholders.

1 Introduction

It is widely agreed that "digital liquidity" is an important goal for developing markets. It enables the BoP to receive, retain, and pay with eMoney – providing increased safety, greater access to credit, income growth, and other well-documented benefits. This paper explores whether social networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and WeChat can accelerate digital liquidity – perhaps by enabling new forms of commerce, giving the BoP more opportunities to spend and accept eMoney (and thus reduce costly "cash-out" transactions), and/or by providing other tools to enhance financial inclusion.

2 Social networks

2.1 What are social networks?

Social network sites allow users to:

• Create public or semi-public profiles important for identity, trust, etc. (e.g., name, user photo, location, job skills, education, interests, products offered, hours of operation).

• Establish a relationship network with other users (e.g., Facebook friends).

• Communicate within their network (individually or collectively) by sending messages, sharing media, commenting, etc.

Some social networks have a relatively narrow focus, such as LinkedIn (professional connections), while others are broader, such as Facebook and China’s WeChat.

Social media, by contrast, is a broader term with more emphasis on content creation and consumption in an interactive public forum. Examples include posting videos on YouTube, curating news for Reddit, or microblogging via Twitter. While social media does have commercial aspects (e.g., advertising medium), social networks have more robust commercial capabilities and are therefore the focus of this report.

2.2 User activities

Social networks began as a way for users to communicate with each other – not as consumers or merchants, but just as people. With Facebook in 2003, this meant rating the attractiveness of fellow students. LINE (Japan) began in 2011 as a way for NHN (local ISP) employees to communicate after a devastating earthquake compromised traditional communication systems. Tencent’s WeChat began in 2010 with free texting, walkie-talkie features, and location services.

As these networks matured, they added related services such as chat, location check-in, photo sharing, and sharing of news stories. The early days were all about services to build the user base.

Well-known activities include:

• chat (messaging between users)

• sharing and consuming

– personal content (status updates, photos of friends, family videos, points of view, etc.)

– third-party content (news stories, YouTube videos, etc.)

• playing games with other social network users, or alone (Candy Crush, Words with Friends, etc.)

• following celebrities, businesses, causes, or other topics of interest

• shopping (learning about a merchant, purchasing, etc.

• announcing and managing events.

Several less well-known but commercially important activities include:

• person-to-person (P2P) payments;

• physical world payments;

• conversational commerce via chat.

2.2.1 P2P payments

Some social networks, such as Facebook and WeChat, provide P2P payment services. Besides enhancing the social network’s overall value proposition to consumers, P2P payments grow the number of users with wallets. As a result, users drawn to P2P payments can now buy from social network-affiliated merchants.

In March 2015, Facebook started allowing US-based Facebook Messenger users to pay each other via the Messenger application (see screenshot below). To enable this feature, users link a debit card to their Messenger account.

WeChat’s P2P service has been extremely successful due to cultural traditions and creative marketing tactics. In 2014, WeChat China launched a P2P payment feature called Lucky Money (renamed Red Packets) based on the ‘red envelope’ tradition of giving friends red paper envelopes with cash gifts for special occasions such as weddings, births, graduations, and major holidays. This feature grew very rapidly. On the eve of the 2016 Chinese New Year, 420 million users made 8 billion P2P payments (55 per cent of the 762 million monthly active users at that time).[12] Two marketing tactics contributed to the rapid growth:

• Group feature: Users can send money to a group of friends but limit the number of winners, creating a sense of urgency and generating ‘mindshare.’

• Money give-away: TV giveaways helped drive adoption. During widely viewed programs, users could enter a free lottery by literally shaking their phones at the appropriate time. Winners received money and discount coupons.

This P2P behaviour is no longer limited to holidays. Over 60 million WeChat users in China send Red Packets each day.[13] Money has become a form of social communication, similar to sending stickers or emoji to friends.

Figure 1 – Screenshot of Facebook Messenger and WeChat Red Envelopes

Facebook Messenger payments

WeChat Red Envelopes

2.2.2 Physical world commerce

Social network payment functionality extends to the physical world, a critical step in social network evolution. While social networks are often considered an Internet service, social networks are becoming the digital plumbing for all commerce in both the online and physical worlds.

Figure 2 – Linked payments example

Point of sale

Order ahead (e.g., coffee)

Vending machine

Ordering a taxi

WeChat is the prime example. WeChat users with a linked payment method can purchase from stores, vending machines, and mobile merchants using proximity technologies, such as bar codes, as well as remote technologies, such as phone apps.

2.2.3 Conversational commerce via chat

Users can buy products and services through social network chat applications. To make a purchase, users typically add the merchant as a chat contact and complete the transaction through a chat conversation. Some implementations involve human agents responding to user requests. Other implementations rely on software chatbots[14] mimicking a human agent or providing menu-like functionality (see the example below). Facebook began piloting the chatbot approach in April 2016. See the appendix for additional details on using chat applications for commercial purposes.

Figure 3 – Chatbot screenshot example

2.3 Mobile access

Mobile users primarily access social networks through smartphone apps which offer the richest experience. Some social networks also provide Java apps for feature phones and mobile browser access.

Feature phone Java apps have a significant drawback – they lack push notification capabilities. A push notification displays information on a mobile device even when the relevant application is not running (e.g., a chat message pops up even though the user is logged out of Facebook Messenger). This functionality gap reduces the social network value proposition as a communication platform for receiving calls and sending messages.

Figure 4 – Types of apps

Smartphone app

Feature phone Java app

Mobile browser

All major social networks provide iOS and Android smartphone apps. Support for other platforms varies.

Table 1 – Characteristics of apps

Smartphone apps

Mobile browser

Feature phone Java apps

Basic phone SMS

Apple iOS

Google Android

Microsoft Windows

Facebook









Any Java phone

–

Facebook Messenger







*

Certain Nokia Asha phones

–

WhatsApp





–

–

**

–

WeChat







–

Certain Nokia phones

–

LINE







–

Nokia Asha

–

Snapchat





–

–

–

–

Twitter ***









Nokia phones



* Facebook’s mobile website historically included Messenger but starting in 2016, Facebook has been requiring users to install the Facebook Messenger application. It is unclear if this policy will apply to all users and phone platforms globally.

** WhatsApp is discontinuing support for Nokia phones in 2016.

*** Not technically a social network. Shown to highlight SMS support.

2.4 Pursuit of revenue

Social networks have become enormously popular and are themselves bigger than the largest e-commerce companies in the world.

Figure 5 – Social Network Users v/s Ecommerce Buyers

Social networks have found multiple ways to monetize their user base.

Advertising is a key revenue source, but social networks generate revenue through other sources too: transaction fees, hosting fees, digital content, etc. There are examples in some marketplaces where the seller is charged a bundled fee, most of which is attributable to compensation for bringing the seller a new customer, but that also covers payments-related services..

Social networks will likely collect the most revenue from businesses but will also collect from consumers in some situations, such as P2P remittances and digital content. The revenue model ultimately depends on what makes the most sense for a particular use case. With the breadth of capabilities and users, social networks have significant flexibility to tune their revenue models.

2.4.1 Facebook

In 2007, Facebook aggressively pursued revenue by facilitating a deeper relationship between merchants and Facebook users, including:

• permitting advertising on a user’s page;

• enabling merchants/businesses to create their own customized Facebook pages;

• providing highly-targeted advertising capabilities;

• creating a platform for third-party developers to deliver games and other applications to Facebook users.

Facebook has since added other services, like enabling advertising on third-party websites. Facebook generates revenue primarily from advertisers. Annual revenues have grown from $2B to $18B in just five years.

Figure 6 – Facebook revenues

2.4.2 WeChat

Tencent Holdings owns WeChat along with two other social networking and messaging platforms: QQZone, and QQ. Tencent launched WeChat as a smartphone-focused app (which avoided PC legacy issues). Since its 2010 launch, WeChat has incorporated several revenue models into the WeChat platform, including:

• digital content (e.g., purchasing digital stickers to send to a friend);

• advertising through commercial accounts (analogous to Facebook pages) and on user feeds;

• transaction fees for facilitating commerce (ordering coffee, scheduling taxi rides, etc.).

Tencent does not break out WeChat revenue separately, but their total revenue has grown from $4 billion to almost $16 billion in four years.

Figure 7 – Tencent revenues

2.4.3 LINE corporation

LINE, a popular mobile chat application in Japan, generated $1.15B in 2015 revenue. LINE generates money from advertisers but relies on consumers for up to 70 per cent of revenue.

Figure 8 – LINE Corporation revenues

3 BoP not participating

Despite massive global adoption, social networks have largely bypassed the BoP.

Figure 9 – Social network use

Low Internet adoption is a major contributor in the lack of BoP adoption, as are feature phone and smartphone challenges. However, even if social network adoption grows, the commercial aspects won’t materialize without financial inclusion – a consumer can’t buy unless they link a payment account like M-Pesa to their social network account.

3.1 Low Internet adoption

Low Internet adoption is at the root of low social network adoption. As highlighted in Internet.org’s report, "2015 State of Connectivity," Internet adoption experiences four key barriers:

• Availability: Proximity of the necessary infrastructure required for access. The reach of 2G data networks is relatively high, but 3G or 4G mobile broadband networks that can carry richer data are needed.

• Affordability: The cost of access relative to income. Cost includes the data, device, and battery charging costs (including travel costs).

• Relevance: There needs to be a reason for users to access, such as attractive content in a user’s main language.

• Readiness: The capacity to access, including skills, awareness, and cultural acceptance.

Affordability is particularly striking. The impoverished simply cannot afford Internet access. For example, only 11 per cent of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa can afford 500MB per month (with "affordable" defined as consuming less than 5 per cent of income). As a point of reference, 500MB allows for 8 minutes of video per day. Average data consumption in developed countries is 3X higher, at 1400 MB per month.

Figure 10 – Internet affordability

3.2 Feature phone and smartphone challenges

While some social networks can be accessed via feature phones, the experience is not optimal. For example, unless the user is currently running the social network’s Java app or visiting the mobile web site, they will not receive real-time phone calls or messages. Since low-cost messaging and VoIP calls are very practical BoP use cases, feature phones severely limit social network appeal.

Smartphones address the push notification problem and offer a better overall user experience, but they create other problems:

• Battery life: Smartphones require frequent recharging, perhaps daily rather than one to three times per week for feature phones. This higher energy consumption creates a significant barrier for the 1.1 billion people without electrical grid access and the 1 billion with unreliable grid access. These underserved individuals must use a battery-charging vendor and therefore incur travel costs, travel time, and recharge costs. Recharge costs can be $8 per month for a smartphone.[15]

• Device cost: Smartphones are more expensive than feature phones. A low-cost Android smartphone can be below $50, but that still reflects a sizable investment equal to one month of BoP income. In July 2016, India-based Ringing Bells released a subsidized $4 smartphone branded "Freedom 251" but has been struggling to meet delivery promises and faces scepticism about their business model/economics.

• Data cost: Smartphones tend to use more data, driven by phone characteristics (larger screens, processing power) and user behaviour (such as downloading large applications and visiting graphics-rich websites).

3.3 Low financial inclusion

Unless the BoP link payment and social network accounts together, they are limited to the informational and communication features of social networks. Information can be quite powerful: pricing information, discovery of new suppliers, agro-information, and so on. But, the BoP won’t experience the full value of social networks without the payment component, nor will it boost penetration and usage of eMoney schemes.

WeChat is the benchmark for linking social and financial accounts. Over 300 million of its users have linked a financial account to their WeChat account.[16] Interestingly, governmental regulations have helped increase financial account linkage. Receiving a Red Packet may be a user’s first WeChat payment experience. But, before spending their digital cash, users must verify their identity. Linking a bank account or credit card is one verification method. This option enables the user to enter WeChat’s vast commercial ecosystem.

4 Potential benefits to the BoP

The fundamental issues of Internet affordability, phone design, and financial inclusion need to be solved before social networks can impact a large portion of the BoP. But, paradoxically, social networks may actually become digital on-ramps by offering simple, low-cost communication and information services. Beyond helping the BoP get online, social networks can provide a broad range of benefits, such as making agricultural value chains more efficient, providing a ubiquitous payment network, helping consumers buy more efficiently, and helping the BoP earn more money.

In some cases, social networks’ unique traits (size, network structure, customer insight, etc.) enable these benefits (e.g., broad payment acceptance). In other cases, traditional web sites or mobile apps can also deliver the same benefits (e.g., exposure to new customers). But, since social networks can be the way BoP users experience the web, it is important to include both sources.

4.1 Digital on-ramps

Social networks, and chat platforms in particular, can make establishing Internet access easier, more desirable, and less expensive. Important social network capabilities include:

• Over-the-top (OTT) services: OTT mobile services are voice, messages, video, and other content a third-party delivers without the MNO being able to control the distribution (e.g., prohibit, price differently). This capability is significant because it allows social networks to offer inexpensive messaging and voice. Since these services use an MNO’s data service, messages and calls do not count toward a mobile subscriber’s SMS or voice package. Users can save significantly under this arrangement by arbitraging differences between data, SMS, and voice tariffs.

• Low bandwidth options: On traditional websites, a shopper or site visitor may wade through dozens of pages filled with data-heavy images and videos which leads to unnecessarily high data costs. Contrast that with social network approaches that could reduce data charges:

– Chat scenario in which a shopper reviews several product suggestions a merchant provides.

– Streamlined version of a social network (e.g., m.facebook.com, Free Basics by Facebook).

• Standardized user experience: Social networks usually present a standardized interface to their users. For example:

– Navigation menus are consistent from page to page and from use case to use case.

– Merchant information such as business name, hours, or phone number are in a similar location and format on social network-hosted merchant pages.

– Payment experience is the same across merchants.

– Universe of users and merchants can be found in a single directory.

This standardization makes the learning curve much faster. Essentially, social networks provide a ‘learn once, use always’ experience. Contrast this with the ‘regular’ web in which every website has a different look and feel, particularly on feature phones. A new visitor must pause and spend time understanding the navigational structure before gaining any real value. Additionally, chat platforms may speed up the learning curve through ‘conversational commerce,’ in which several back-and-forth messages between buyer and seller (chatbot, etc.) complete the transaction, much like familiar face-to-face commerce.

• Multiple revenue streams (subsidy potential): Social networks are well-positioned to provide subsidies because they offer a wide range of services to a diverse group of stakeholders. Importantly, these stakeholders are mutually dependent – e.g., increasing consumer adoption creates more monetizable merchant opportunities. By contrast, MNOs have less subsidy flexibility since their offerings are narrower – e.g., lowering data prices to poor populations would not necessarily generate offsetting revenue.

4.1.1 BoP use cases and benefits

For a new Internet/social network user, initial use cases may involve replacing existing activities with lower cost, easier alternatives, and performing basic information gathering (weather reports, etc.).

Low-cost messaging

Chat has been a "killer app" for current social network users. For example, in early 2016, Facebook Messenger’s and WhatsApp’s global user base was sending 60 billion daily messages, three times the global SMS volume.[17] Chat should also appeal to the BoP given: SMS familiarity; OTT cost savings; BoP price sensitivity; and easier interface (e.g., searching for names in a directory, clicking on user pictures).

Low-cost voice calls

Chat applications often include VoIP calling capabilities. Voice service should appeal to the BoP given OTT cost savings, BoP price sensitivity, and easier interface. Service quality may be a challenge, as data networks are not universally reliable. Calls on data networks can experience noticeable delays and drop outs. It is important to note that phone calls are not necessarily limited to other users on the same chat application, as some chat applications permit calls to landlines and mobile phones.

Information gathering

Chat can deliver basic information, such as weather reports, agriculture prices, or community announcements. The BoP could receive this information within a single interface without needing to leave the chat application.

Free or subsidized data plans

It may be economically attractive for social networks to subsidize the BoP’s MNO data costs. In other words, future revenue potential or indirect revenue from advertisers, ecommerce commissions, and other sources may more than offset the data subsidy. Free Basics by Facebook provides free Internet access, however it is unclear whether Facebook or the MNOs provide the subsidy.

4.2 Platforms for BoP ecosystems

Besides being the digital on-ramp for consumers, social networks can also bring merchants and other entities online (e.g., Facebook Pages, WeChat Official Accounts). Additionally, social networks also allow consumers and organizations to organize themselves into communities and ecosystems, such as agricultural value chains, farmer groups, NGO group lending programs, parent/school groups, and any other type of group. Each consumer and entity can participate in ecosystems relevant to them.

Figure 11 – Ecosystem Facilitation

Social networks are well-positioned to facilitate these ecosystems.

• Technology building blocks: Social networks provide payment, event management, hosting, communication tools, privacy management, and other reusable components that ecosystems need.

• Large modular network: Social networks can support many ecosystem types since a wide range of entities participate (lenders, retailers, wholesalers, governments, NGOs, consumers). Essentially, the required players are already ‘in the room’ and can participate in ecosystems relevant to them.

• Fast learning curve: The universal user experience simplifies onboarding new ecosystem members.

4.2.1 BoP use cases and benefits

Agricultural value chains

Social network platforms could be used to organize agricultural value chains and enhance how farmers interact with produce buyers, agro-dealers, banks, and other stakeholders. In this scenario, third-party developers or even social networks, could develop applications related to bidding, contract management, financing, payment management, education, or product certification. Value chain administrators would then integrate these applications into their value chain’s social network group. Using social network platforms would be attractive because of the pre-existing user base and universal functionality such as registration, authentication, communication, and hosting, among others.

Farmer groups

Some smallholding farmers organize themselves into groups to share knowledge, borrow from banks, or negotiate better prices from crop buyers. Social networks can facilitate group creation and management. For example, a lead farmer or NGO could create a Facebook group. Participating farmers could send and receive group messages, review archived materials, buy and/or sell used equipment, document important agreements, etc. There is evidence this is already happening.

Small business websites

Small businesses can use social networks to develop an online presence with a description of services, hours of operation, contact information, videos, photos, etc. This is already happening to some degree.

NGO programs

NGOs often receive ‘restricted funding’ for a specific project, such as "providing financial literacy education to 200 women", and then must measure the impact (e.g., changes in household income vs. a control group). Social networks could facilitate program management by enabling NGOs to recruit participants, disseminate training materials, conduct video training, and monitor the impact through surveys.

4.3 Payment networks

Social networks can enable a global, interoperable, multi-channel and user-friendly eMoney payment network that connects buyers and sellers.

BoP eMoney usage has been limited to a few use cases: Receiving remote P2P payments then cashing out, and then buying airtime. Even in Kenya, where mobile money is widely used, BoP diaries revealed that only 0.7 per cent of payment transactions were electronic and 86 per cent of those were for airtime.[18] Several factors are preventing eMoney from being more widespread. These include:

• Cost: Low eMoney usage makes economic sense. Most BoP transactions are for small amounts which have high transaction fees on a percentage basis. For example, 75 per cent of purchases in the Mozambique, Tanzania, and Pakistan financial diaries were less than $2.[19]

• User experience: The eMoney user experience is not optimal. For remote bill pay transactions, paying the correct business and ensuring payment is credited to the correct account is error-prone. For face-to-face P2P transactions, it is easier for someone to reach into their pocket than log into a phone and type the recipient’s mobile number. Compelling user experiences are needed for each use case (e.g., ‘bumping’ phones for face-to-face P2P transactions).

• Interoperability: Mobile money networks are often not interoperable preventing, for example, a Tigo user from sending cash to an Airtel user. This problem is most pronounced in countries with market fragmentation (i.e., no dominant provider).

Social networks are well-positioned to solve some of these problems.

• Large network: Payment systems are prime examples of the network effect – as more consumers and merchants participate in a payment system, the more useful it becomes to all participants. Social networks have a significant head start, as large numbers of consumers already connect. Social networks must still convince users to link financial accounts, but WeChat proves high adoption is possible. Additionally, many merchants have a social network presence. If these merchants enable social network payment capabilities, it would reduce the need for BoP consumers to cash out.

• Directory services: Social networks often provide robust search capabilities to locate friends and merchants. This feature can remove the challenge of ‘paying the right business’ when using mobile money.

• Ability to decouple payment methods: Decoupling the method by which a consumer pays from the method by which a merchant gets paid increases interoperability, acceptance, and flexibility (e.g., instant credit). For example, a shopper might make M-Pesa instalment payments to the social network with the social network paying the merchant in full via an Airtel account. The concept of decoupling already exists. For example, PayPal uses this arrangement.

• Lower POS infrastructure requirements: Face-to-face environments, where BoP commerce typically occurs, can use the same social network infrastructure that enables e-commerce transactions. For example, a farmer could visit a local food vendor, find that vendor’s Facebook page, and make the purchase through that page. WeChat already uses this approach in China.

• Ability to subsidize: Because social networks target multiple revenue sources and stakeholders, they can incent adoption through subsidized pricing. Options include:

– Offering free payments when using balances already in social network wallets.

– Reimbursing MNO fees for transactions involving eMoney.

– Providing payment rewards (analogous to credit card ‘cash back’ or points to entice consumers to use their cards), thus providing additional incentives for merchants to accept those tender types.

– Bundling payment costs within other costs to remove payment price sensitivity (e.g., sales commission for generating revenue for a seller).

WeChat uses some of these methods. For example, P2P red envelope transactions do not incur fees.

4.3.1 BoP use cases and benefits

P2P payments

With proper licensing and MNO linkages/interoperability, social networks could provide simple and lower cost domestic and cross-border remittances. For example, a U.S. resident with linked bank and social network accounts could send money to an Indonesian relative in their ‘friends’ list. That recipient could store funds in their social network wallet, transfer to their bank account, or cash out by transferring funds to a social network or MNO agent.

Face-to-face purchases

A consumer could pay a merchant if they belonged to the same social network. For example, the merchant’s phone could generate a barcode that the consumer’s phone scans. The consumer would approve the transaction amount and the social network would transfer money to the merchant. Merchants would not need to invest in chip terminals or standalone barcode readers, nor would they need to belong to multiple mobile money networks.

Remote purchases

Similar approaches could be used for remote purchases (e-commerce or order-ahead functionality). This could mimic traditional processes with payment coming from a digital balance within the social network account or from the financial account linked to the social network account.

Lending (digital history)

As more and more transactions become electronic, consumers will increasingly build income and expense transaction histories. These histories can solve the challenge of proving income when qualifying for a loan.

Instant credit

Decoupling also opens up the possibility of social networks providing credit. For example, a social network might allow a farmer to buy equipment on credit while paying the merchant immediately.

4.4 Marketplaces

Social networks have the natural ability to bring buyers and sellers together. Important capabilities include:

• Large network: Social networks have more users than the largest e-commerce marketplaces and already serve buyers and sellers.

• Digital onboarding: Social networks make it easy for merchants to set up an online presence (e.g., site templates) reducing the need to build specialized websites.

• Communication tools: Social networks have private messaging capabilities that consumers and merchants can use for sales and customer service.

• Deep customer insight: Social networks have deep knowledge about their users (see the appendix for details). This can be used to help merchants reach their targets and keep advertising content relevant to users.

• Payment facilitation: Social networks can facilitate payments between consumers and merchants.

4.4.1 BoP use cases and benefits – consumers

Product and merchant search

Social networks can help consumers purchase from a wider array of merchants and discover new products. This may occur through marketplaces where merchants and consumers connect, or may just involve simple search functionality.

Virtual sales and customer service

A BoP customer and merchant could use a chat application to discuss price and availability of a harvested crop. Chatbots could also answer customer questions 24/7 (e.g., prices).

Virtual assistance

Chatbots could advocate for the poor. For example, a BoP shopper could inquire about a merchant’s produce prices. After seeing the price quote, the shopper’s personal chatbot may find better prices from other sellers.

4.4.2 BoP use cases and benefits – merchants / employees

Deeper engagement with existing customers

The BoP could use social networks to better engage their customers. For example, they could announce the arrival of fresh produce to local residents.

Access to new customers

The digital nature of social networks allows merchants to expose their products and services to a wider audience. These might be locals who were simply unaware of what their local merchants offered, or even new customers from neighbouring villages.

Remote commerce/e-commerce opportunities

With wide access to sellers and buyers, social networks can create opportunities that might not otherwise exist.

• Marketplace access: Rural villagers in China have become e-commerce entrepreneurs. Alibaba has created 780 Taobao villages where locals have launched over 200,000 online stores selling anything from camping gear, to auto accessories, to toys.[20] Alibaba trains the rural residents for this entrepreneurial transition. The government also plays a role. With commerce concentrated in geographic areas, the Chinese government can target infrastructure projects like road construction to improve fulfilment capabilities.

• Concierge commerce: Entrepreneurial individuals can act as intermediaries to online commerce. Taobao villages in China also provide a good example. Local representatives who have developed expertise in searching Alibaba marketplaces can search on behalf of less technically-savvy individuals. This concept is analogous to over-the-counter (OTC) payments in which an MNO agent makes an eMoney payment on behalf of a customer.

Market knowledge

BoP merchants could learn about competitors, new markets, market prices, etc.

Access to new products and suppliers

Social networks can help merchants purchase from a wider array of suppliers and discover new products. This may occur in online marketplaces where merchants and suppliers connect, or may just involve simple search functionality.

Virtual entrepreneurship

Some social media sites enable users to earn money by creating content. For example, Google shares a portion of YouTube advertising revenue with video creators. Taringa, a popular social media site in Argentina, recently announced plans to share advertising revenue with writers of articles. Taringa will pay these writers in bitcoin. Micro-revenue sharing wouldn’t be cost-feasible using other payment methods. Social networks could adopt some of these social media business model tactics.

On-demand marketplaces

Networks are enabling a market for part-time employment and asset sharing. For example, Uber’s user network and routing technology made it possible for an individual to transport passengers to unfamiliar locations. This concept is already materializing in developing countries (e.g., Airbnb in Cuba). Social networks could provide or distribute these services.

Exposure to job openings

Organizations can reach a larger pool of candidates via networks and candidates can discover a wider range of opportunities. The social nature of social networks enables a deeper understanding of the candidate and employer (e.g., reference checking).

4.5 Beneficial data collection

Privacy issues aside for the moment, data collection can be quite beneficial. Data can make things ‘free’ by enabling targeted advertising. Imagine the frustration if users had to pay even a nominal amount for each Google search they performed. While this concept may hold true across all populations, the BoP may gain unique benefits, such as greater access to credit.

Currently, relatively little is known about the lives of the BoP, since there are few paper and electronic records. This lack of data hurts the BoP. For example:

• Obtaining credit is difficult without a credit history file or electronic/accessible proof of income.

• Businesses have less insight into consumer needs.

• Medical professionals react less quickly to changing health conditions. For example, Google searches can reveal the outbreak of a virus.

Social networks are uniquely positioned to collect this data:

• Deep insight: Besides simple demographic information like age, gender, and location, social networks collect ‘softer’ data, like interests, behaviours, and attitudes. Social networks also capture all dimensions of a user’s life: leisure, social, work, and school activities.

• Heavy user engagement: Because users visit social networks often, the data are fresh.

MNOs have been touted as a good source of data, particularly for making credit decisions. For example, research has shown that calling behaviour (frequency, length of call, number of contacts, locations, etc.) indicates different levels of credit risk, but, social networks are likely better positioned than MNOs. As more MNO voice and messaging traffic shifts to Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP)/chat platforms, MNOs will lose their insights, with social networks picking up the difference. Social networks can then add these new insights to their already deep user profiles.

4.5.1 BoP use cases and benefits

Consumer credit

BoP consumers have trouble obtaining formal credit. One reason is lack of information (verifiable income, repayment reputation, etc.). Social networks can help solve this problem. First, wallet activity provides valuable data points about income and expenses. Second, social network data (attitudes, friendship references, etc.) create a broader view of an individual’s propensity to pay.

Commercial credit

Social networks can also help businesses borrow. As with consumer credit analysis, data will likely include transaction histories and supplemental data. But, analyses will likely employ different metrics. For example, a downward trend in "Facebook likes" may indicate growing credit risk.

Targeted advertising

While the BoP do not fit the stereotypical ‘big brand micro-targeting’ use case, local merchants may find targeting very valuable. Even simple attributes like location are useful. Someone selling a bicycle may target individuals within a 10 km radius.

Targeted communication

Non-commercial communication also needs targeting. For example, a government may deliver health messages to a drought-stricken region.

New product and program identification

Through sentiment analysis and other techniques, commercial companies, NGOs and governments can identify new products/services and helpful community interventions.

5 Policy considerations

Policy makers face a tough balancing act. On one hand, social networks can bring significant value to the BoP populations, and policy makers should therefore consider policies that encourage adoption. On the other hand, social networks are tremendously powerful, and regulators should explore policies that protect consumers from potentially harmful effects.

5.1 Encourage adoption

5.1.1 Path forward

There is significant potential for social networks to benefit the underserved, but we’ve just scratched the surface. The BoP need a ‘killer app’ to jumpstart adoption. For example, a free and simple OTT communication service may spur initial usage. OTT communication can be cheaper than SMS and a photo-directory interface could be less intimidating. Once the initial usage starts, new use cases and solutions would drive further engagement.

Figure 12 – Potential adoption path for BoP

5.1.2 Enabling layers

Achieving the potential of social networks requires progress within several enabling layers. Efforts could stall at any one of these layers grinding the potential to a halt. Policy makers may need to take action to ensure the potential is reached.

Figure 13 – Enabling layers

Internet access: At a foundational level, the BoP’s Internet access must increase. Progress is needed in several dimensions:

• Availability: Proximity of the necessary infrastructure required for access. The reach of 2G data networks is relatively high, but more 3G or 4G mobile broadband networks that can carry richer data are needed. Traditional MNOs could provide the solution but new entrants such as SpaceX may enable attractive alternatives via micro-satellites and other technologies.

• Affordability: The cost of access relative to income. Cost includes the data, device, and battery charging costs (including travel). Mobile phone decisions have a significant impact. While smartphones offer the best user experience, they have shorter battery lives, use more data, and are more expensive. Technology improvements may make smartphones a more practical solution (e.g., village-based solar charging, batteries that allow rapid charging).

• Relevance: A reason for access, such as attractive content in a user’s main language.

• Readiness: The capacity to access, including skills, awareness, and cultural acceptance.

Social network adoption: The BoP need a reason to start using a social network website or mobile app. The reason need not be commercial in nature. The motivation could be something as simple as low cost, social network-enabled phone calls. The idea is to get anyone with Internet access to also create a social network account. This stage is analogous to the introduction of e-mail in developed countries. The e-mail use case drew people to the Internet. After becoming comfortable with e-mail, most eventually became e-commerce shoppers.

Payment account linkage: Consumers must obtain and link payment methods to their social network accounts. Without a payment account linked to a social network account, users will be limited to the informational aspects of e-commerce. They won’t benefit from transactional aspects such as selling and buying products online, or sending and receiving payments to and from employers, friends, and family. These payment accounts can be mobile wallets, bank accounts, or even social network accounts if a social network has the appropriate licenses. Regional characteristics will influence the type of accounts the BoP can link.

Social network commercial apps: Social networks must enable capabilities relevant to BoP commerce. Internet access, social network adoption, and payment account linkage make it possible for the BoP to transact, but robust commercial apps make it desirable to transact. Technology adoption typically occurs by solving specific pain points. Challenges and solutions will vary geographically. In one country, the opportunity to design, manufacture, and export furniture online may entice the BoP. In another country, farming productivity may be the triggering pain point. As specific problems like ‘higher maize yields’ get addressed, functionality may expand so that solutions become more general (higher horticulture yields) and appeal to larger portions of the BoP.

5.1.3 Metrics and accelerators

Reaching this potential requires monitoring the right metrics and finding ways to accelerate progress. The table below provides a starting point for those metrics and potential accelerators.

Table 2 – Social network metrics

Enabler

Metrics to monitor

Potential accelerators

Social network commercial apps

• Number of locally relevant apps

– Non-agriculture

– Agriculture: Problem addressed (production, transportation, etc.) and crops

– Online vs. physical relevancy

• App usage and volume of commerce

• How value is shared between the BoP, social networks, MNOs, banks, and others

• Pain point research

• NGO-sponsored applications

• Public-private partnerships to create commercial applications

• Universal social network functionality (easy to use e-commerce sites, universal wallets, etc.)

• Consumer protections if the market is not evolving in a pro-consumer way (unionization, privacy, etc.)

Payment account linkage

• BoP adoption of eMoney

• Linking of eMoney accounts to social network accounts

• Fast-track regulatory process for social networks and mobile money operators

• Using social networks to create mobile money interoperability

• Mobile money pricing that would enable BoP digital liquidity

Social network adoption

• BoP enrolment, activity levels

• Types of applications used (voice, text, news, etc.)

• Implementing BoP-friendly OTT services to encourage enrolment

• Designing an identity management system with an eye toward compatibility with social network platforms

Internet adoption (access)

• 3G / 4G geographic coverage

• Beyond the scope of this analysis, but include strategies like "universal service obligation" subsidy programs

Internet adoption (affordability)

• Costs: phone, data, charging

• Adoption metrics

• BoP phone ownership: Smart phone, Internet-enabled, not-enabled

• Data subscription

• Grid access to electricity

• See above

Internet Adoption (relevance)

• Language

• See above

Internet Adoption (readiness)

• Educational attainment

• Literacy

• See above

5.2 Protect consumers

Imagine this potential future state:

• most of the world’s population participates in social networks;

• online identities are inextricably linked to real names;

• user locations are always known;

• most communication travels through social networks;

• social networks can predict and influence an individual’s behaviour

• social networks are payment ‘gatekeepers’ to a significant portion of the economy.

This scenario is not farfetched. WeChat, Facebook, Uber, and others demonstrate movement in all these dimensions. Social networks could become extremely powerful. The answer is not to stop social networks. Rather, the answer is to monitor and manage them judiciously so as to derive as much social benefit as possible for the BoP populations. Key topics include:

• free service vs. net neutrality;

• market power;

• data privacy;

• agency and transparency.

5.2.1 Free service vs. net neutrality

Social networks see an opportunity in developing countries and are tailoring their approaches. For example, Facebook offers Free Basics by Facebook, which provides free Internet access in certain markets. Specifically, no data charge applies when users visit a predefined list of websites and have a subscriber account with a participating MNO. Any website may join if they meet certain technical requirements (i.e., offer a lightweight, mobile-friendly version that will work on both smartphones and web-enabled feature phones). Naturally, Facebook offers a lightweight version of its own site called Facebook 0. The free service is currently available from at least one MNO within 44 countries in the Africa, Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Latin American regions. [21]

Free Basics by Facebook has been controversial. After much public debate, India’s regulatory body determined the service violated net neutrality laws since free access only applied to certain websites. In theory, any website can participate in the Free Basics service but there are technical hurdles and Facebook approves the applications. Additionally, all traffic is routed through (and thus visible to) Facebook, raising privacy and competition concerns.

This controversy does not have an obvious right answer. While free access to any website is ideal and pro-consumer, the reality is that millions of poor Indians lost an opportunity to access the Internet. Given the stakes, regulators and businesses need to find common ground so opportunities are not lost.

5.2.2 Market power

As prime examples of the network effect, social networks are prone to ‘winner-take-all’ market consolidation. This resulting ubiquity, scale, and market concentration can be quite beneficial, primarily by bringing efficiency to a social network’s ecosystem. For example, users can reach all of their friends via a single social network. Additionally, market fragmentation does not stall the adoption of services such as payments.

At the same time, market power creates its own set of risks. Two, in particular, are noteworthy.

• Excessive economic power: Social networks could become the economy’s de facto gatekeeper. Social networks can charge a premium for this very defensible role. Many of the merchants using social network services will be small and do not have any negotiating leverage. Marketplaces with a similar structure can charge very high rates. For example, Google and Apple take a 30 per cent fee on applications sold through their stores. Uber takes up to 28 per cent (and perhaps more) of revenue.[22] While an argument can be made that these fees reflect a reasonable distributor margin, these ‘distributors’ are not other local merchants contributing to and benefiting from the local economy. This distributor margin is exported (or at least transferred) to large foreign-owned companies.

• Discretionary influence: Social networks are information curators. Users do not have time to consume all of the information their friends provide. Social networks must therefore decide what to expose/promote and what to hide. Research shows this responsibility has enormous implications. For example, social networks can influence elections by increasing voter turnout of certain populations (e.g., via "I voted" buttons) or by influencing the attitudes through choice of what articles to display. This influence also has commercial implications. Social networks can influence a user’s mood and that mood influences cosmetics purchases, particularly on Mondays.[23]

Accordingly, we believe regulatory oversight is probably appropriate. Anti-trust laws, truth-in-advertising requirements, and disclosure rules offer a starting point for a regulatory framework. But, these risks tread new ground. For example, the evidence of ‘behavioural impact’ is locked away inside constantly changing databases and software rules (try asking a machine learning algorithm why it showed some user a particular article).

5.2.3 Data privacy

Data collection can benefit the BoP by enabling free services subsidized through advertising and new services such as lending. But, data collection poses inherent risks such as theft, accidental publication, fiduciary abuse, discrimination, and persecution (political, religious, etc.). Consumer fear of these risks can create additional problems, such as:

• avoiding personal research of diseases/health conditions;

• ending friendships to maintain a good credit rating;

• accepting the status quo of societal norms and laws;

• holding back information from friends and family.

Regulators must protect consumers from these risks without perpetuating the digital divide via overly restrictive regulations. Privacy frameworks will be an important tool and there is already a large body of work to draw upon. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Privacy Principles address data collection limits, data quality, usage limits, security safeguards, accountability for violating promises, and other topics. Developing these frameworks within the context of social networks and the BoP will be critical. On one hand, social networks could be life-changing (digital on-ramps, lending, etc.). On the other hand, the breadth and depth of data collected is staggering and introduces risks that BoP markets have not previously needed to address.

5.2.4 Agency and transparency

Social networks could be the digital on-ramp for poor populations and transform how they do business, but there is also room for exploitation, for example:

• a chatbot named "Merchant Deal Finder" steering customers to its owner’s primary business;

• raising prices to certain consumers whose banking activity suggests greater wealth;

• customer service chatbots presenting customers with higher margin but inferior solutions.

These problems already exist in physical and online commerce, but growing software sophistication makes exploitation much easier. Factor in a population with limited technology experience and there is even greater risk to the BoP. At some point a poor farmer may ask himself or herself, "Is my chatbot lying to me?" but until then, they are exploited. The normal deterrent, reputational risk, might not apply. A chatbot with a bad reputation is one brand change away from a clean start.

Regulators can draw upon related topics, such as agency disclosure laws, but regulatory frameworks should reflect the unique context. For example, should chatbots have to send a disclosure message that says, "I receive a commission if you buy the product I just recommended?" Regulations are not the only way of managing the risk. Industry self-regulation, or independent parties such as TrustE can play a role.

Appendix I

I.1 Social network data collection

Social networks have much more knowledge about consumers than traditional marketplaces and even merchants. This deep knowledge enables robust targeting for new customer acquisition. For example, an advertiser can target "men, ages 18 – 24, currently traveling within 13 miles of Atlanta, who donate to animal welfare charities, live in an apartment, like jazz music, cosmetics, tattoos, and are interested in buying an economy car in the next 365 days", but only target them while they are "visiting Instagram via a WiFi-connected Samsung Tablet 2 running the Android 4.0 operating system." This example might appear to be non-sensical, but highlights the precision advertisers can employ. For example, Facebook advertisers can use these attributes:

Table 3 – Social network data collection

Demographics

Interests

Behaviour

Placement

• Basics (age, gender, language, location)

• Education (level, school, fields of study, etc.)

• Ethnic affinity group (Asian, etc.)

• Financial status (income level, net worth)

• Residence (ownership, type, household composition, etc.)

• Life events (marriage, engagement, birth, etc.)

• Parent status (new parents, stay-at-home moms, etc.)

• Political views (conservative, etc.)

• Relationships (status, sexual orientation)

• Work (employer, industry, job title, etc.)

• Business/industry (agriculture, banking, etc.)

• Entertainment (board games, animated movies, etc.)

• Family and relationships (dating, fatherhood, etc.)

• Fitness and wellness (meditation, dieting, etc.)

• Food and drink (French food, recipes, etc.)

• Hobbies and activities (pets, travel, etc.)

• Shopping and fashion (cosmetics, toys, etc.)

• Sports and outdoors (camping, baseball, etc.)

• Technology (servers, camcorders, etc.)

• Automotive (used motorcycle owners, in market for new BMW, etc.)

• B2B (employer size, industry, etc.)

• Charitable donations (animal welfare, arts, etc.)

• Digital activities (recent gamer, event creator, primary browser type, etc.)

• Expats (Argentinians living abroad, etc.)

• Financial (credit union members, real estate investors, etc.)

• Job role (corporate executive, farmer, etc.)

• Media (TV reality show watchers, etc.)

• Mobile device (Samsung Galaxy owners, 2G internet connections, etc.)

• Purchase behaviour (coupon users, beer buyers, etc.)

• Residential profiles (new homeowners, etc.)

• Seasonal and events (Summer Olympics watchers, etc.)

• Travel (business travellers, cruise takers, etc.)

• Ad display location (mobile news feed, Instagram, 3rd party sites, etc.)

• Mobile device type (iPad, Android smartphone, feature phone)

• Mobile device model (Samsung Galaxy 4, etc.)

• OS version (4.4 KitKat, etc.)

• Connection method (WiFi, any)

This data comes from several sources:

• User-provided: Users often provide demographic data such as birthdate, home address, school name, and relationship status. Each action further enriches the user’s profile. For example, liking The House of Nanking restaurant’s Facebook page may indicate an interest in "Chinese cuisine." Other data sources include reading articles on certain topics, checking-in at merchants, commenting on or liking a friend’s post, or joining a Facebook group.

• Third-party sites: Data collection is not limited to user behaviour within a social network. For example, sites send tracking data to Facebook if they use one of their many services: Facebook Login, Facebook Pixel (for conversion tracking), Facebook Audience Network (ads Facebook delivers to other sites), and Facebook social plug-ins (Follow, Save, Like, Share, Send, Quote, Embed, Comment). Essentially, Facebook knows what other sites and/or pages a user visits even if they’re not on the Facebook site.

• Non-web sources: Social networks can enrich user profiles with ‘offline’ data provided by data brokers such as Acxiom. This data includes retail purchasing data, home ownership, voting registration, and other data provided by retailers and government organizations. In some cases, social networks use this data to infer additional characteristics about their users (e.g., people in a certain zip code tend to be wealthy). In other cases, social networks can develop consumer-specific insights by matching/cross-referencing name, physical address, e-mail address, phone number, or some other data element. Note that these types of data are not currently available for all consumers and geographies.

Social networks can also help merchants "remarket" to more deeply engage with existing customers, for example, drive a consumer back to a merchant’s website to complete a prior shopping session, or cross sell new products and services based on prior behaviour, behaviour of their social network friends, or behaviour of those with similar profiles. Using Facebook as an example, to use this feature, an advertiser uploads a customer list to Facebook (based on email lists, phone numbers, or simply tracking cookies/IDs). Facebook will then link those identifiers to specific Facebook users and serve them the appropriate ads. Advertisers can further refine their targets using data only Facebook possesses (age, interests, relationship status, etc.) – Facebook often knows more about a merchant’s customers than the merchant. These customer lists can also be used for lookalike marketing in which Facebook targets new customers similar to existing customers, again based on traits only Facebook knows.

What’s particularly impressive is the ability of advertisers to close the loop between marketing and outcomes. Through browser cookies and other technologies, advertisers can determine which viewers saw ads and returned to the merchant’s website, installed an application, or took some other action. This approach also works for physical merchants. For example, a retailer may deliver an ad to a specific user and later identify the associated transaction on that customer’s loyalty card.

I.2 Reaching users 24/7

Social networks can obviously reach users while on the social network site, but the reach also extends to other venues.

• Social network sites: Social network sites are very popular. For example, Facebook users spend 50 minutes per day on Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger platforms (excluding the globally popular WhatsApp).[24] Facebook’s capabilities for gaining insights about and targeting users are at their peak while its users are on Facebook properties.

• Other websites: Facebook can reach its users and non-users while on third-party websites through the Facebook Audience Network. This ad network allows third-party websites to earn revenue by displaying ads Facebook sells to advertisers. Visitors with Facebook accounts are targeted with great precision because of Facebook profile data. But, Facebook can even target non-Facebook users with some level of precision since Facebook profiles non-users based on visits to sites using Facebook services (Like buttons, etc.).[25]

• Physical merchants: Because social networks interact with many businesses and mobile phones are ubiquitous, social networks can facilitate services between consumers and physical merchants. Essentially, social networks are becoming "virtual plumbing."

Figure 14 – Facilitating commerce with physical merchants

For example, social networks enable location-based advertising that encourages users to visit nearby merchants as shown in the following screenshot:

Figure 15 – Location based advertising example

Social networks can help users find restaurants and make reservations, as described in this WeChat case study.

"The Mei Wei Bu Yong Deng official account lets users search through a directory of restaurants nearby, see how many people are currently waiting in line for a table at those restaurants, and even grab a number to wait in line without being physically present at the restaurant." [26]

Social networks can also facilitate payment with physical merchants.

"With the 7-Eleven official account, users can pay at 7-Eleven and Family Mart physical stores through a breezy, easy payment process where the cashier uses a standard handheld barcode scanner to get the customer’s Quick Pay barcode at the point of sale. 7-Eleven can then also target users with custom promotions at an optimal frequency that doesn’t flood them with unwanted marketing." [27]

• Internet of things (IoT): The ‘physical world’ goes beyond traditional merchants. Social networks can be the integration path with IoT devices.

"Take Chinese toy company Dan Dan Man, which created Mon-Mon, a Bluetooth-enabled stuffed animal toy that integrates WeChat with the offline world. Parents can use the Mon-Mon official account in WeChat to send personal voice messages and pre-recorded English courses or bedtime stories to the toy while they are at work or traveling. Kids immediately get those stories or messages, and can even press Mon-Mon’s belly to reply to their parents’ WeChat account in a message delivered back as a voicemail. While this is just a toy — and funnily enough, a character that started off as a popular digital sticker on WeChat! — it shows the potential of integrating messaging platforms into the physical world." [28]

I.3 Facebook games ecosystem

Social networks can seamlessly offer value throughout a merchant’s value chain. An early example of this full suite of services is Facebook’s launch of its casual game platform. Facebook users could play Solitaire, Words with Friends, Poker, Farmville, and other games while staying on the Facebook site. Facebook brings value to all aspects of the game lifecycle, and in return receives 30 per cent of direct revenues (in-game purchases, etc.) plus ancillary advertising revenue. Facebook has since expanded to iOS and Android games so that Facebook generates advertising revenue when users install games and when game developers display in-game ads from Facebook advertisers. Almost all of Facebook’s 2015 payments revenue of $849M came from games. Facebook does not separate game-related advertising revenue. By having a platform-agnostic strategy (Facebook site, iOS and Android), Facebook continued to monetize games, even as users shifted from Facebook.com to mobile platforms.[29]

Figure 16 – Shared value chain roles

I.4 Chat platforms

Social networks typically offer real-time messaging between users ("chat"). Because social networks are investing heavily in chat as a commerce platform, this topic deserves special attention.

I.4.1 Chat as a feature

Chat applications facilitate real-time and asynchronous communication between two users or a small group of users – a much different method than more public communications like Tweets and Facebook posts. Chat users may send text, photos, voice recordings, videos, animations, and other forms of media. Chat applications often include a VoIP service or vice versa.

Figure 17 – Nature of chat services

Some companies began as chat or VoIP providers and have retained most of that focus so far (e.g., WhatsApp). Others have expanded significantly beyond initial chat/VoIP services (e.g., WeChat). More traditional social networks, such as Facebook, are placing more emphasis on chat (e.g., Facebook Messenger). These chat/VoIP-heritage companies and Facebook Messenger have become very popular with monthly active users rivalling those of traditional social networks.

Figure 18 – Chat platofrm and social network size

I.4.2 Chat as a platform

Chat is no longer just a feature that allows individuals to communicate. Chat is becoming a platform that allows businesses to provide sales, customer service, news, entertainment, or other services to new and potential customers. For example, WeChat users can "hail a taxi, order food delivery, buy movie tickets, play casual games, check in for a flight, send money to friends, access fitness tracker data, book a doctor appointment, get banking statements, pay the water bill, find geo-targeted coupons, recognize music, search for a book at the local library, meet strangers around them, follow celebrity news, read magazine articles, and even donate to charity … all in a single, integrated app."[30]

Businesses are using chat platforms in several different ways:

• Conversational style – Human agents (‘live chat’), software (‘chatbot’), and hybrid approaches.

• Web style – Traditional websites or platform-tailored applications deliver the user experience.

Figure 19 – Chat as a platform

As the screen shot above shows, Facebook Messenger pilots seem geared toward chatbots. Businesses on WeChat emphasize the web style interaction, as shown in the doctor appointment example below:

Figure 20 – Doctor appointment example

I.4.3 Why are social networks emphasizing chat platforms?

Many social networks started as a chat service. For them, the platform approach is part of a monetization strategy. Others (primarily Facebook) gain diversification benefits. For all providers, chat platforms are an opportunity to take economic power from mobile OS providers such as Google and Apple.

#1 – A monetization strategy for chat-heritage companies

Many companies got started as a communication service (chat and/or voice). Examples include WhatsApp, LINE, WeChat, Viber, and Skype. Monetizing the core chat feature is difficult as it is generally ‘table stakes.’ Accordingly, chat providers pursue other forms of revenue. For example, LINE, a popular mobile chat application in Japan, generated $1.15B[31] in FY2015 revenue from:

• Communication (sticker[32] purchases primarily) = 23.9 per cent

• Content (in-game purchases primarily) = 40.9 per cent

• Advertising (mobile primarily and web) = 30.2 per cent

• Other (merchandise primarily) = 5.0 per cent

Other social network revenue models include transaction fees (ordering coffee, scheduling taxi rides, etc.), and facilitating phone calls to individuals outside the social network’s network.

#2 – Diversification strategy for Facebook

Consumers are fickle and can cause social networks to go into a "death spiral" – a reverse network effect in which users leaving the social network worsen the experience for users still on the social network. Facebook has this risk, particularly with the younger demographic who do not consider Facebook ‘cool’ and who do not want ‘grandma commenting on their posts.’

Figure 21 – Social networks importance to teens

But teens do use Facebook Messenger. In 2014, Facebook separated Messenger from the traditional Facebook application. So, a teenager can launch Messenger without experiencing Facebook’s reputational baggage.

To maintain revenue, Facebook must monetize Messenger. In April 2016, Facebook announced the beta version of Messenger platform. In Facebook’s vision, communication between businesses and consumers should occur within Facebook Messenger. Consumers would be able to reach all of the businesses they need and communicate with them in a familiar way. The Messenger platform includes developer tools to facilitate this transition: Templates, user interface controls, and artificial intelligence tools for application development.

#3 – Disrupting the mobile OS and communications industry

Chat platforms could reduce the importance of Google and Apple within mobile ecosystems. Google and Apple’s control of mobile operating systems gives them great power. These giants typically receive 30 per cent of the revenue from mobile apps sold – resulting in an estimated $10B in revenue from the $30B+ in global 2015 sales. Chat providers see an opportunity to change the paradigm so that chat, not the mobile OS, is the platform. Users would no longer download and install apps on their phone, but instead access that same functionality through their chat application. If this happens, the chat platforms become the gatekeepers and monetizers that connect consumers and businesses. The mobile OS essentially becomes an invisible commodity/layer.

Figure 22 – Chat providers disruption to the mobile ecosystem

Chat platforms could also reduce the role of MNOs. MNOs typically charge separately for voice, SMS, and data services (visiting social networks, sending email, etc.). Chat platforms also provide voice and messaging services to their users on top of the MNO’s data service. This arrangement reduces the user’s costs to the detriment of the MNO. MNOs may become commodity data pipes if this trend continues.

I.4.4 Transformational benefits of artificial intelligence (AI)?

Today, chatbots often operate within a structured framework. Users make requests via a menu ("Shop for shoes," "Shop for shirts," etc.) and chatbots retrieve ‘canned’ responses from a database. This approach provides a predictable customer experience but does not scale well – use cases are limited since businesses must determine scenarios and appropriate responses.

Sci-fi movies depict a utopian future in which anyone can ask any question and receive a useful reply. Users have flexibility in how and what they ask, with voice recognition removing literacy requirements. Responses are not limited to pre-defined answers. For example, a consumer might ask "Where can I find a replacement part for my water pump?" After some back and forth clarification, a computer might return "The replacement handle is available immediately at Paul’s Irrigation Supply in Nairobi for 200 Ksh, but if you can wait until next Wednesday, it will be available at the local K&M store for only 180 Ksh."

Two technologies provide a step toward this AI vision: natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning. NLP goals include natural language understanding (deriving meaning from human or natural language input) and natural language generation (communicating back to the user). This extremely complex field includes topics such as speech recognition, name entity recognition (identifying words that are people or places), and part-of-speech tagging (identifying whether words are nouns, verbs, etc.). In the early days, most NLP systems were based on complex sets of hand-written rules (i.e., if you detect the phrases "I need help" or "customer service" or "live person" route the caller to a customer service agent.). Machine learning has made the rule development more robust – e.g., analysing historical data to find phrases that predict the need for a customer service agent.

Despite the progress and level of effort, fulfilling the AI vision is a long way off. Imagine the user frustration if a Google search returned only one sentence from one article. This scenario represents how far we are from a true AI vision. Fortunately, the AI promise is not an ‘all or nothing’ proposition. The journey will likely involve incremental change, producing incremental benefits.

I.4.5 Consumer and merchant value proposition?

Chat platforms are strategically important to social networks, but do they help consumers and merchants? The AI vision has obvious appeal because it lets people communicate in a familiar and natural manner. But, utopia is a long way off. In the meantime, is the current version of chat platforms providing value?

Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg argues that chat offers a superior user experience, "No one wants to have to install a new app for every business or service that they want to interact with. We think that you should just be able to message a business in the same way that you message a friend."[33] This sounds good in theory, but a chat interaction may prove as frustrating as sequentially navigating a cable company’s customer service phone menu. Arun Uday, Tringchat founder and former VC, offers this contrarian view, "Think about it. Why would anybody want to replace an existing setup that is 100 per cent accurate and takes less effort to use (i.e. UI-driven menus) with something that is inaccurate and requires more effort to use (i.e. chatbots)?"[34]

One could argue that WeChat’s popularity proves consumers love interacting with businesses via chat. But, this argument has holes:

• Commercial interactions often do not fit the conversational chat stereotype. Yes, consumers can follow an ‘Official Account’ (e.g., Burberry clothing) and have ‘conversations’ through the chat interface. But, users often start with or are directed to web style pages within the WeChat application (e.g., for ordering a taxi). Essentially, WeChat’s commerce expansion has relied on cross-selling more traditional commerce experiences to its chat base.

• E-commerce in China is different. Shopping is typically done through online marketplaces (analogous to WeChat’s walled garden approach) rather than corporate e-commerce sites. That said, chat platforms may also prove valuable in other developing countries where e-commerce is having a slower start.

In summary, conversational commerce is not a proven model, but importantly, it may be appropriate for some BoP applications (product inquiries, etc.) with users enjoying a simple user interface and low data costs.

Figure 23 – Chat screenshot – shopping

Figure 24 – Chat screenshot – customer service

Structured interaction

Natural language interaction

Figure 25 – Chat screenshot – news and entertainment

[1] World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Agriculture value-add as a per cent of GDP in 2013. Low-income countries (less than $1,045 GNI per capita) were at 32.4 per cent and the United States was at 1.4 per cent.

[2] Although these farmers do not participate in sophisticated commercial value chains, they can adopt best practices such as forming farmers’ groups to share learning and enable group lending, or storing crops in warehouses for sale in the off-season when prices are higher.

[3] Agricultural Value Chain Finance Tools and Lessons. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2010.

[4] Christen, Robert Peck, and Jamie Anderson. Segmentation of Smallholder Households: Meeting the Range of Financial Needs in Agricultural Families. Focus Note 85. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, April, 2013.

[5] World Bank. Tanzania, Mozambique, and Pakistan CGAP Financial Diaries with Smallholder Households 2014-2015. Ref. TZA_2014_FDSH_v01_M, MOZ_2014_FDSH_v01_M and PAK_2014_FDSH_v01_M. All datasets downloaded on March 13, 2016.

[6] Zollmann, Julie and Laura Cojocaru. Cash Lite: Are we there yet? Rethinking the evolution of electronic payments in Kenya based on evidence in the Kenyan and South African Financial Diaries. BFA and FSD Kenya. January, 2015.

[7] The financial diaries in Mozambique, Tanzania and Pakistan identified individual types of items that were purchased (food, airtime, petrol, etc.). Since these items may have been purchased at the same time, all household items purchased by an individual on a particular day were assumed to be part of the same purchase. This approach avoids overstating the number of low value transactions. To isolate purchase activity from financing, the effects of store credit and other financing were ignored (e.g., paying at the end of the month).

[8] Mobile payments: How digital finance is transforming agriculture. Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, Wageningen. May, 2015.

[9] Interview with former DrumNet executive in March, 2016.

[10] Expanding and replicating GES TAP. African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership. October, 2015.

[11] Cook, Tamara, and Claudia McKay. 2015. How M-Shwari Works: The Story So Far. Forum 10. Washington, D.C.: CGAP and FSD Kenya. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0.

[12] New Data Revealed – Spring Festival 2016 on WeChat. Feb 24, 2016. http://blog.wechat.com/2016/02/24/new-data-revealed-spring-festival-2016-on-wechat/ (accessed August 19, 2016). Monthly active users from Tencent Holdings’ financial statements covering the quarter ending March 31, 2016.

[13] Chan, Connie. Money as Message. How WeChat got users to adopt payments as a way to grow its network. July 24, 2016. http://a16z.com/2016/07/24/money-as-message (accessed August 19, 2016).

[14] A chatbot is a software application designed to simulate conversation with human users.

[15] State of Connectivity 2015: A Report on Global Internet Access. Facebook’s Internet.org.

[16] Chan, Connie. Money as Message. How WeChat got users to adopt payments as a way to grow its network. Andreessen Horowitz blog. July 24, 2016. http://a16z.com/2016/07/24/money-as-message (accessed August 19, 2016).

[17] Goode, Lauren. Messenger and WhatsApp process 60 billion messages a day, three times more than SMS. The Verge. April 12, 2016. http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/12/11415198/facebook-messenger-whatsapp-number-messages-vs-sms-f8-2016 (accessed August 12, 2016).

[18] Zollmann, Julie and Laura Cojocaru. Cash Lite: Are we there yet? Rethinking the evolution of electronic payments in Kenya based on evidence in the Kenyan and South African Financial Diaries. BFA and FSD Kenya. January, 2015.

[19] World Bank. Tanzania, Mozambique, and Pakistan CGAP Financial Diaries with Smallholder Households 2014-2015. Ref. TZA_2014_FDSH_v01_M, MOZ_2014_FDSH_v01_M and PAK_2014_FDSH_v01_M. All datasets downloaded on March 13, 2016.

[20] Jing, Meng. Taobao village clusters spreading reach. China Daily. December 26, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2015-12/26/content_22813508.htm (accessed May 2016).

[21] Internet.org website (accessed August 4, 2016)

[22] Uber Increases Commission Fees for New York Drivers. February 10, 2016. http://uberdriverdiaries.com/ubers-pay-cut-a-one-two-punch-for-new-york-drivers/uber-increases-commission-fees-for-new-york-drivers/ (accessed August 19, 2016).

[23] Schneier, Bruce. Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. W. W. Norton & Company. 2015.

[24] Stewart, James B. Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More. New York Times. May 5, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bends-the-rules-of-audience-engagement-to-its-advantage.html?_r=0 (accessed August 16, 2016).

[25] Marshall, Jack. Facebook Wants to Help Sell Every Ad on the Web. The social network will show ads to non-Facebook users on other websites. Wall Street Journal. May 27, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wants-to-help-sell-every-ad-on-the-web-1464321603 (accessed August 23, 2016).

[26] Chan, Connie. When One App Rules Them All: The Case of WeChat and Mobile in China. Andreessen Horowitz blog. August 6, 2015. http://a16z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mobile-first/ (accessed May, 2016).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Facebook 10-K, Facebook developer website.

[30] Chan, Connie. When One App Rules Them All: The Case of WeChat and Mobile in China. Andreessen Horowitz blog. August 6, 2015. http://a16z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mobile-first/ (accessed May 2016).

[31] LINE Corporation prospectus July 11, 2016; based on exchange rate of 105 Yen per USD.

[32] Stickers are graphical images sent via chat typically as a surrogate for text. For example, a user may send an animated animal showing a ‘thumbs up’ sign rather than replying back with ‘OK.’

[33] McMillan, Robert. Facebook Hopes Chatbots Can Solve App Overload. The Wall Street Journal. Updated April 17, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-hopes-chatbots-can-solve-app-overload-1460930220 (accessed August 14, 2016).

[34] Uday, Arun. Bursting the chatbot bubble. Techcrunch website. July 16, 2016. https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/16/bursting-the-chatbot-bubble/ (accessed August 23, 2016).

VIII The Role of Postal Networks in Digital Financial Services

About this report

This Technical Report was written by the following authors, contributors and reviewers:

The author of this Technical Report are Nils Clotteau, David Avsec and Yury Grin. Contributions were received from the members of the FG DFS Ecosystem Working Group and in specific from Antony Chigaazira, Sergey Dukelskiy, Anil Gupta, Viktor Nosov, Alexandre Rodrigues, Ricardo D. Valencia, Graham Wright. The Technical Report was reviewed by the FG DFS.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

1 Introduction

Post offices are very much associated with mail, postmen, and physical delivery. Posts are therefore not the first thing that comes to mind when discussing digital financial services. However, postal operators have a long tradition of offering financial services, which dates back to 1861, when the first postal savings bank was established in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, if we go back some 20 or 30 years, we should remember that in many countries, postal and telecommunication activities were grouped into one single entity: the Post and Telecom (P&T) operator. A large number of those P&T operators were also providing financial services (money orders, telegraphic money orders, savings accounts, etc.). “Traditional” postal operators could therefore be schematically represented as follows:

Today, when we talk about the development of digital financial services (DFS), three complementary elements are needed: a physical network, for the cash-in/cash-out and to act as a front office to engage clients, a digital network, to transport the flow of digital messages (mobile, cards, electronic, etc.), and a financial services provider (which in some cases will be the same as one of the two previous elements), which will ensure regulatory compliance, take care of the back-office, design the products, etc. Such an operator can be represented schematically in the following way:

Figure 1 – Traditional Postal Operator (until 80s-90s)

Figure 2 – DFS Operator

This is where we can see the similarities between the model of the “traditional” postal operator and a DFS operator. Postal operators boast one of the largest physical networks in the world, with a total of more than 660,000 post offices, which can all be used as agents for the provision of DFS. Most postal operators today are also offering some sort of financial services, from domestic and international electronic money transfers to savings, insurance and loans. It is estimated that 1.5 billion people globally access financial services through a post office.[1] In this context, postal operators already possess two of the three key elements necessary to deploy DFS. They are therefore very well positioned to at least play a role in the development of digital financial services.

2 The Current State of Play

Based on data from a questionnaire launched by the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 2015, 91% of designated postal operators[2] in UPU member countries and territories (183 out of 201) provide financial services. Almost all of these provide remittance services, either on their own or in partnership with banks and/or money transfer companies. A large proportion of postal operators also provide bill payments or government payments. In terms of account-based services (current accounts or savings accounts), 87 postal operators are offering them, on their own (in 52 countries or territories), or in partnership with other financial institutions (in 36 countries).[3] This represents a total of 1.96 billion accounts belonging to approximately 1 billion clients.

The UPU established a business model (BM) typology for the provision of financial services by postal operators.[4] In all models, there is a varying level of operational complexity and involvement of the postal operator in the provision of financial services. Five main families of business models have been identified:

• BM 1: cash merchant. The Post acts as a cash-in/cash-out agent for one or various partners (money transfer operators – MTO, mobile money operator, utility companies etc.). The services facilitated by the Post are transactional financial services such as remittances, bill payments, government payments, etc.

• BM 2: proprietary domestic and cross-border payments. The Post operates its own domestic payments or international remittances (for the latter, in partnership with other Posts). This can be done in post offices using paper-based money orders (a model that is progressively disappearing) or electronic transfers, which are now the norm. 88% of the 150 Posts that are operating under this model are offering electronic services. In some countries such as Morocco, such services are also available through mobile phones, for P2P payments.

• BM 3: partnership with a financial services provider. The Post partners with a financial services provider such as a bank, an insurance company, a FinTech, a technology provider, a mobile network operator, or a microfinance institution to offer the financial services of the partner. The main difference with BM 1 is that the Post is not merely providing cash-in/cash-out services but is much more involved in the provision of the services. Products can be developed jointly by the partners and adapted to the postal clientele. The Post is involved in all front-office aspects and postal staff has an important role to play in the promotion of the service. Both partners collaborate to develop the necessary ecosystem.

• BM 4: postal savings bank. The Post offers its own account-based services (savings or current accounts), under a regulatory framework that is specific to the Post. This is the traditional postal savings model, which usually does not allow the Post to offer loan services. Usually in BM 4, the Post is not allowed to offer loan services or any other sophisticated financial product, which is often one of the main reasons why Posts are willing to transition to BM 5.

• BM 5: full-fledged postal bank. The Post offers its own account-based services, but under the supervision of the central bank or financial services regulatory authority. In some cases, postal banks still have some limitations either on the type of products that they can offer (not all types of loans for example) or have limitations on the clientele they can target (for example in Morocco, the Postal Bank has to focus on middle- and low-income clients).

All these business models are not mutually exclusive. For example, a postal operator can offer its own savings accounts (BM4) but also its own domestic payment services (BM2) and the remittance services of an MTO (BM1). Of course, the business model(s) adopted by a postal operator will depend on multiple criteria: regulatory framework, capacity, financial resources, level of competition in the market, etc. Most Posts are non-bank financial institutions and not full-fledged postal banks, with the latter – which represent less than 10% of all Posts – generally having much more experience in providing a wide range of financial services and generally employing more knowledgeable and experienced personnel from the financial services industry.

3 The Role of Postal Networks in Digital Financial Services

In the Digital Financial Services Ecosystem, postal networks can play a role both as DFS providers and as DFS providers support services. The SWOT analysis below helps understand why postal operators developed different business models:

Figure 3 – SWOT

Strengths:

Ubiquitous physical network

Cash management experience (at least for a large number of Posts)

Experience in managing agents

In many countries, trust and proximity to clients

Experience in distributing large volume / low margins products and services

In many countries, financial inclusion mission assigned by governments (explicitly or not)

In a number of countries: regulatory approval

Threats:

Declining traditional postal market => limited possibility to invest

Exponential growth of mobile money operators / card networks / digital financial service providers

Current price structure of postal financial products not always adapted to very small amounts

Weaknesses:

Lack of technological innovation

Lack of customer orientation

Insufficient connectivity of the postal network (and in some cases, lack of access to electricity)

Lack of resources needed to invest in development of a digital financial service

In some cases, challenges with liquidity management

Opportunities:

Experience in financial transactions which can be a building block to expand activities in the field of digital financial services:

– Agents for cash in/cash out

– Super-agent

– Strategic partnerships/joint ventures

– As a trusted public actor, interconnection tool for mobile money providers

– Launch own digital financial service

4 Posts as support services

Posts can act as partners of DFS providers such as banks, card networks, or mobile money providers, and help these offer or distribute their financial services. In this regard, Posts have implemented a variety of business models which are all variations of the BM1 and BM3 models described above.

4.1 BM1: Cash-merchant

• Cash-merchant for a Money transfer operator (MTO) or bank to offer remittance services:

• DPOs from 126 countries or territories have signed agreements with international MTOs or banks whereby they perform cash-in / cash-out services for domestic and/or international remittances. Under this model, the involvement of the postal operator is relatively limited and the role of the Post is mostly to manage liquidity in its network and to ensure that its points of contact are all online, to communicate in real-time with the system of the MTO or the bank.

• Cash-merchant for a mobile financial services provider:

• DPOs from 23 countries or territories have signed agreements with banks (case of 5 Posts), FinTechs (5 posts) or mobile network operators – MNOs – (13 posts) to provide cash-in / cash-out services for the provision of various mobile-enabled services. As for the cash-merchant model with MTOs, the role of the Post is mainly to ensure that liquidity is available throughout its network.

For the bank, FinTech or MNO partner, the interest of signing up a postal operator as an agent is to have access at once to a large number of agents covering all the national territory, often with good cash availability. Given the experience of various postal operators in managing a network of agents for their own postal services (financial or not), Posts could act as super-agents/master agents but this has not been observed so far for mobile financial services.

For the Post, however, this model has some limitations. First of all, the fees are relatively low compared to the costs of ensuring liquidity availability throughout its network. Also, most postal operators offer their own electronic postal money orders,[5]which means that mobile products often come as competitors to their own products and could potentially cannibalize these.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that barring exceptional circumstances (see case of Brazil below), Posts should avoid entering into exclusivity agreements with partners. Indeed such arrangements can considerably impede competition, increase the cost of services, and prevent full exploitation of the potential network of postal access points. This is particularly important for remote and marginalized areas to avoid that only one financial service or remittance service provider be available to that population.

4.2 BM3: Partnership

Partnership model with one or several banks:

39 posts worldwide have concluded partnerships with financial institutions under which the postal branches are used to offer banking services. The partnership can be exclusive, as is the case in Brazil, or non-exclusive with Australia and the UK being good illustrations of current trends.

• In Brazil, back in the early 2000’s, a project was launched to use the post offices as agents for banks. The initial idea was to have various banks provide their services through the post. Separate tender processes were organized in 2002 for different regions of the country and the same bank, Bradesco, won them all. An exclusive partnership was therefore set up between Correios and the private bank at the national level. Under the contract, postal branches acted as banking correspondents, offering all the services of the bank by accessing Bradesco’s information system in real time. Banco Postal, as it was called, was not a real bank but rather the commercial name under which the operation was functioning. In 2006, after 4 years of operation, Banco Postal was live in all 5500 municipalities of Brazil, bringing banking services to regions where they had previously been completely absent. In 10 years, the Post had opened 10 million accounts on behalf of Bradesco. However, in 2012, for legal reasons, a new tender was organized to renew the agreement and unexpectedly, a new partner, Banco do Brasil, presented the highest bids. Banco Postal was therefore re-launched in 2013 as a new alliance, and 4 million new accounts have opened in the last 3 years.

• Australia Post has a total of 4,406 branches, with 3,577 of these offering financial services (the remaining branches are mainly community postal agencies which only sell stamps and collect and distribute mail). Australia Post set up Bank@Post, a service which enables clients of 70+ financial institutions in the country to make deposits and withdrawals, pay bills, or check their balance. Virtually all banks in the country have partnered with the Post, leveraging its rural infrastructure while simultaneously closing shop in small rural areas. From mid-2015 to March 2016, the three biggest bank in Australia have reportedly closed 227 locations in rural areas, most of them being replaced by a Bank@Post agreement.[6]

• In the UK, financial services represent 30% of the revenues of the Post Office Ltd, the company which operates the 11,634-branches postal network. The company has set up a partnership with Bank of Ireland UK to offer postal-branded current and savings accounts to 3 million clients. In addition, the Post Office has signed agreements with all major banks in the UK whereby banks’ clients can perform basic operations, including deposits and withdrawals, in all post offices. 95% of all UK current accounts can now be accessed at Post Office branches.[7] Here again this is an illustration of a trend that can be observed in many high-income countries of banks focusing on major urban areas and relying on partners such as the post to maintain a presence in rural areas.

Partnership model with one or various MNOs or FinTechs:

In these models, there is a real partnership between the MNO/FinTech on one side and the Post on the other. The partners share the responsibilities (and the revenues), based on their respective strengths and competitive advantages. This can be visualized as follows:

Figure 4 – Areas of responsibility

Tunisia Post is the best example of BM3 with an MNO, as the Post has concluded partnerships with the three MNOs in the country (Tunisie Télécom, Ooredoo and Orange). In Tunisia, MNOs are not allowed to offer mobile financial products on their own and therefore need to have a financial institution as a partner. Tunisia Post, which is not a bank per se, is nevertheless the largest financial institution in the country, which explains why all three MNOs decided to select them as a partner.

Compared to the cash merchant model, the Post has more control over product design, operations, and of course revenues. However, the choice of the partner is a fundamental factor of success, as illustrated by the following table:

Table 1

The first service to be launched, in 2010 with Tunisie Telecom, has failed to take off for a number of reasons. Among the problems encountered were the non-alignment of expectations, an unclear separation of responsibilities, and the fact that both institutions had weaknesses in terms of marketing and product development. Lessons were learnt from this and the two subsequent operations are much more successful.

Regarding the partnerships with FinTechs, we can mention here two Posts that have launched innovative alliances:

• In Benin, also in 2015, the Post partnered with e-Savings.club, a FinTech which is trying to digitize and formalize traditional rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). Postal salespeople have been hired to go out in Cotonou’s markets to collect the savings of small informal merchants. Thanks to an app developed by its partner, the post is able to register clients and to send them notifications every time they collect their daily savings. All monies collected during a 30-day period are placed on a savings account at the Post, which is available for clients at the end of the month. This partnership is currently in a pilot phase and will be further expanded in 2016 once customer feedback has been analysed.

• In Kazakhstan, Kazpost has a network of 3,124 post offices compared to a national bank network of only 351 branches and 1917 agents. Leveraging that network, which covers even the most remote areas of Kazakhstan, the Post has traditionally been an important player in deploying financial services throughout the country. To further reinforce this position, Kazpost partnered with another FinTech called Intervale, to offer international and domestic payments (including bill payments) to its clients. Services are available through various channels: card, internet and mobile (both feature phones and smartphones) and the Kazpost network is used for cash-in / cash-out, front office, marketing, etc.

Posts as direct DFS providers

Under BM 2, 4 and 5, postal operators offer their own financial services: payment services, current accounts, bill payments, bulk payments, savings products, loans, etc. Most of the time, the services are now offered digitally, leveraging electronic and mobile networks, which are channels for postal operators to offer their financial products. For Posts, the decision to develop their own financial services or to partner with other financial institutions depends on a number of criteria: market potential, current offer by other institutions, capacity of the Post, resources available, clients’ needs, etc. The section below provides details on several Posts that have decided to offer their own DFS.

4.3 BM2: Proprietary domestic and cross-border payments

This business model essentially concerns domestic and international money transfer services, which Posts have been providing since the first half of the 19th century. One of the first postal administrations to do so was the Post Office, in the UK, which started offering money orders in 1838. In 1878, 4 years after the creation of the UPU, a first UPU treaty on the exchange of international postal money orders was adopted. This treaty, called the Postal Payment Services Agreement, is updated periodically and its latest version is still in effect today. Of course, paper-based money orders have almost completely disappeared and Posts now mainly offer electronic money transfer services. This can be done with partners, as we have seen previously, but many posts also offer such services on their own (at the domestic level) or in partnership with other posts (at the international level).

For international remittances, Posts have started to offer electronic services at least since 1992, when Eurogiro, initially a cooperative of European postal operators, launched its network. In 2000, the UPU has also released its International Financial System (IFS), a software suite that is made available to postal operators that want to exchange electronic money orders. As of today, IFS is used by more than 70 postal operators worldwide, for domestic and/or international transfers. It is available both as a standalone version or as a cloud-based version. Furthermore, a mobile version has been introduced in 2015, which allows posts to connect their branches using smartphones or tablets.

For domestic payments, various Posts have managed to establish significant market shares. This is the case of Al-Barid Bank in Morocco or CTT in Portugal for example. However, for cross-border payments, Eurogiro and IFS operations are generally smaller than those of large international MTOs. Still, their availability in a large number of outlets brings significant competition on the market and is an incentive for all actors to keep their prices competitive. Indeed, on various occasions, it has been observed that the opening of a new postal corridor led to significant price reductions from other market players.

4.4 BM4: Postal savings bank

BM4 is currently implemented by 39 postal operators worldwide. Only 5 of these, or 13%, do not report having a fully automated management information system (MIS).[8] All the other posts have digitized their financial services and offer their current or savings accounts in an electronic format, with all transactions being based on a core banking system or equivalent.

Some Posts still maintain paper passbooks for their clients, but with all operations being stored electronically. This is the case in Burundi, for example, where the country’s payment infrastructure is insufficient. Very few merchants accept card payments and apart from Bujumbura and a few cities, ATMs are non-existent. The Post, which has a strong presence in rural areas, therefore needs to maintain the paper passbooks in parallel with its automated system so that clients can deposit and withdraw cash in post offices.

When electronic networks are more widely available in a country, Posts are trying to get rid of paper-based systems, which are a potential source of error or fraud. In this regard, there are many opportunities for DFS support services to partner with Posts.

Card-based solutions

Card networks could have access to millions of clients in dozens of markets by hooking up with Posts. Visa and Mastercard are already working with various postal financial institutions from high-income or emerging countries and have expressed interest to expand in this market. The Posts in India, Egypt, Algeria, or South Africa, with hundreds of millions of clients, could potentially be very attractive partners for such companies.

Some Posts have also chosen to deploy their own card-based solution. For example, Nampost Savings Bank (NSB), the financial services arm of Namibia’s postal operator, offers banking services to 600,000 people (out of a total population of 2.3 million) through their “SmartCard”. This biometric card-based product enables clients to withdraw money in post offices and at ATMs, to transfer money to an account or to another card, or to make payments in retail shops countrywide using Point of Sale devices.

Mobile-based solutions

Most postal operators having current or savings accounts are now trying to come up with a strategy to make their services available to their clients via mobile phones. Here again, there is a lot of potential for DFS support services to develop partnerships with Posts.

One example of such an alliance emerged in 2015, in Senegal, when the Post joined forces with a start-up called Numherit to launch a service which is available through various channels. All clients get a current account at the Post, which is linked to a Visa card and an e-wallet account, accessible both on feature phones and smartphones. The Post, which handles a number of social transfers on behalf of the government, transferred these cash payments onto the new platform, with 200,000 people benefitting from the system only 3 months after the launch. The interesting point with this alliance is that both organizations are involved in the development of the service, with a special focus being placed on the development of the merchant ecosystem. Retail shops, drugstores, restaurants, gas stations, are all actively targeted to ensure mobile and card payments acceptance. The growth of the service will be interesting to monitor in 2016. In particular, at the moment, the mobile service is only made available to new clients. People who already have an account at Postfinances do not get automatic access to the new system. Ensuring an adequate repartition of both responsibilities and revenues in the venture will go a long way in determining the long-term success of the partnership.

Similar partnerships are already in discussions in various West and Central African countries where the Posts owns accounts, such as Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, or Cameroon.

One major challenge for postal operators under BM4 to further develop as DFS providers is that in a number of cases, they are not connected to the national payments infrastructure. More than half of postal operators which offer their own accounts are in that case, which means they have to operate in closed loops or to access national payment system and/or banking switches through partners. As a consequence, their clients can’t benefit from all the advantages of DFS like transferring their monies to banks or withdrawing money from other financial institutions’ ATMs. This challenge of integration into the “normal” bank infrastructure is one of the main issues to tackle for Posts who want to move forward in the digitization of their financial services.

4.5 BM5: Full-fledged postal bank

There are currently 13 postal operators worldwide that can be classified as postal banks, i.e., a designated postal operator offering account-based services under a banking licence. All of them have a core banking system and offer their services in a fully digital format.

Depending on the national context, the Posts in this group have developed various digital strategies.

Mobile-based strategies

The Postal banks of Gabon or Morocco are both trying to increase their offering through mobile channels. Their strategies are quite similar: the Post builds or buys its own platform and uses MNOs only as communication pipelines. This gives the Post more independence in product development/management as well as the opportunity to digitize their own postal financial products (including savings/current accounts). However, the Post needs to invest more resources and to have good capacities in the following areas: IT, marketing, product development, agent management and risk management.

Al Barid Bank (ABB), the postal bank of Morocco, is a good example of this model. ABB provides banking services to 6 million clients. All 1,800 post offices in the country are interconnected and all services are performed electronically. In mid-2014, ABB launched a suite of mobile banking services which is available on both smartphones and feature phones. To do so, ABB has not concluded any partnership with the mobile network operators as mobile networks are only considered a channel to carry data. As of end of 2015, ABB had 150’000 clients registered on its mobile service, 75% of which were active. In terms of financial inclusion impact, it should be underlined that 42% of mobile clients are new clients which were previously unbanked. After less than two years of operation, the results are still modest but ABB’s management is confident they will improve gradually.

Multi-channel strategies

For postal operators from high-income countries, it is now essential to be able to offer their services to their clients at any time, in a variety of different forms. The Posts in Switzerland, Belgium, France, or Japan for example are therefore trying to deploy multi-channel strategies. Clients can therefore bank in post offices (full-fledged or agents), through ATMs, using credit/debit cards, on their smartphones using banking apps, or online. This is a strategy that a number of banks are following but postal operators still rely a lot more on their physical network, given the obligation that most of them have to maintain a presence throughout the national territory.

What’s next?

A lot of work remains to be done to ensure a full digitization of postal financial services. As an illustration, it should be noted that at the global level, only 46% of the world’s 660,000 post offices are online, which means that more than half of post offices cannot provide real-time electronic services. This is changing fast as Posts realize the importance of digitizing their network. In India, for example, the Post has 155,000 post offices, 90% of which are located in rural areas. Three years ago, only 12,000 of these were connected. But as of early 2016, 25,000 post offices are now online. The Post has embarked on implementing a core banking system (CBS) for its financial services – which represent 63% of India Post’s revenues – and is expected to be 100% on CBS by the end of 2017 including deployment of rural ICT to digitise rural branch post offices.

Of course, it is essential for Posts to upgrade their network. However, the physical network of Posts is not as strong of a competitive advantage as it was five years ago. According to the GSMA, as of end of 2015, mobile money operators now have 271 services live in 93 countries, representing a total of 3.2 million agents.[9] This is more or less five times the size of the postal network. In order to stay relevant as financial service providers, Posts therefore need to extend their own network by developing agent partnerships, just like banks or mobile money providers are doing. This is made easier through mobile technologies, which allow agents’ enrolment in the Posts’ MIS at a minimum cost.

Postal operators also have to come up with innovative business models that leverage some of their unique strengths. A few possible approaches are presented below.

4.6 The Post as a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO)

In this model, the Post buys capacity from a telecom operator to offer its own communication services, including its own SIM cards. The Post is then able to offer all of its financial services on a digital platform. This model was adopted by Equity Bank in Kenya, which launched its own MVNO in 2015 to offer its banking services on a digital platform and compete with mobile money players. However, this model had already been adopted quite successfully by Poste Italiane, the Italian postal operator, back in 2007. The Post now has 3.3 million Poste Mobile active clients, and 75% of these also use their Poste Mobile phone subscription to access their postal financial services (payments, mobile top-ups, account management, etc.).

4.7 The Post as an interoperability platform

In various countries, different mobile financial services providers are offering their services but are not interoperable. Clients cannot send money from one operator to the other in the same country.

The Postal Corporation of Kenya (PCK) set up PostaPesa, a national payment switch through which it processes all public sector payments by connecting various banks (Co-operative Bank, National Bank of Kenya, Kenya Commercial Bank and Credit Bank Ltd). Mobile network operators offering digital financial services are not on the platform, but in the future, PostaPesa could be used as an interoperability tool to connect the different mobile money providers. In this case, the post could use its status as a trusted public entity to connect different financial services actors.

This latest model has not materialized yet in Kenya and only a limited number of Posts would have the necessary capacity to build a national switch. Yet it shows the potential of postal operators to be key actors in the provision of digital financial services, either as direct providers, or as support services for other actors.

4.8 The Post as an eCommerce or mCommerce facilitator

Worldwide B2C e-commerce sales reached $1.7 trillion in 2015, and are growing by double digits. Postal networks are a key component of the global supply chain and Posts deliver a large portion of products bought online. However there is still a large potential for Posts to strengthen their role in this field. For the unbanked, the lack of access to payment solutions means they are de facto excluded from the benefits of eCommerce. However, Posts, which combine logistics and financial services capabilities, can bring concrete solutions to these populations. Services such as payment on delivery (also called cash on delivery), where the postman collects the payment when performing the delivery, are a concrete answer to this issue. Posts can also offer escrow services, holding clients’ payments until the provider has delivered its products. Another option that has been implemented by 33% of Posts (Ivory Coast, Saudi Arabia, South Korea for example) is to develop online stores where they integrate merchants and facilitate client identification, physical delivery, and payments (either online or offline).[10]

This shows that Posts, in addition to facilitating DFS development, have a unique set of capabilities which can be leveraged to contribute to the development of the global economy.

IX B2B and the DFS Ecosystem

About this report

The authors of this technical report are Bennett Gordon, Erin McCune, Allen Weinberg, Carol Coye Benson, Janine Firpo, and Quang Nguyen.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Business-to-business (B2B) payments are often thought of in terms of the large value transactions which occur between and among large enterprises. But, small businesses, even very small businesses, like large ones, have to pay their suppliers and collect from their business customers. The ability to make and receive these payments in a timely fashion is often a critical factor in the success of the small business: a shop unable to buy new inventory won’t be able to sell much. The means to affect these transactions remotely without visiting the customer’s location or enabling employees to handle purchasing are key to growing a small enterprise. The move toward eMoney also creates a digital transaction record which is key to establishing credit.

In this report, we examine the impact of electronic B2B payments on the development of the DFSs ecosystem in developing countries. We look at the requirements of businesses, at the benefits of using electronic payments, and the trends affecting this market. In a section called “Second Order Benefits”, we look at how the use of electronic B2B payments may accelerate the adoption of eMoney and electronic payments in general. We conclude with recognizing some of the barriers to adoption of B2B payments, and outlining some considerations for policy makers.

1 What are B2B payments?

Steve is a shopkeeper in central Nairobi who operates largely in cash. Most of Steve’s payments look the same: two people pass Kenyan shillings to each other. Though many of these transactions appear the same, Steve is actually making different types of payments all the time. When he buys goods for his shop, Steve is making B2B payments. When his customers buy those goods, they make customer-to-business (C2B) payments. If he sends some of the money he has earned to his family, he makes a person-to-person (P2P) payment.

The introduction of digital payment tools and services allow Steve (and others like him) to use payment technologies specifically designed for each of these use cases. The purpose of this report is to explore whether digital B2B payment tools and services can benefit the poor.

All businesses buy from other businesses, which means that all businesses make B2B payments. This is true for small bodegas in rural, sub-Saharan Africa, and large multinationals operating across the globe. Some businesses sell to other businesses (many sell only to consumers). That is why this report will focus on both sending and receiving B2B payments.

We hypothesize that widespread digital B2B payments could have second-order benefits that could strengthen the overall DFSs ecosystem. This report explores potential ecosystem-level benefits and concludes with suggestions for how policymakers can take advantage of the opportunities presented by new digital B2B payment tools and services.

In any B2B payment, there are two parties: a buyer, and a supplier. The buyer receives a good or service from the supplier in exchange for payment. The buyer may immediately use a good as an ingredient or part in goods it manufactures, or stock that good and resell it to a consumer or business customer.

The types of bulk payments relevant to this report include:

• supplier payments (payments from a business buyer to a business supplier);

• bill payments (payments from a business to a utility or other service provider on a regular cadence);

• salaries/payroll (payments to consumers as employees or subcontract labour).

The report will not focus on government payments (taxes, fees, fines), financial market transactions (investments, mergers, and acquisitions), or intra-company transactions (between subsidiaries and headquarters). Agricultural sector payments are also not addressed in this analysis, due to the fact that it is the focus of a different analysis for the ITU[11]. Also, e-commerce transactions are not a part of this report, as we are focused on poor people and the underbanked who are less likely to be purchasing online, either as consumers or businesses.

2 B2B payment requirements

Business transactions are fundamentally different than consumer transactions.

Consumer transactions are often anonymous, particularly at the retail point of sale – whereas businesses tend to have ongoing relationships with their suppliers and know them well.

Consumers usually pay immediately, whereas suppliers typically extend credit – in the form of payment terms – to their buyers (this is closely tied to the fact that they know them and do business with them on a regular basis). For example, a business buyer may have thirty days to pay for goods and services.

Formal businesses typically get an invoice, whereas consumers may or may not receive a bill (when they do it is typically from a utility or other recurring service provider). Consumers pay one bill at a time, whereas businesses often aggregate payment for multiple invoices together in one transaction. As consumers we pay what we owe, businesses, on the other hand, often pay less than the invoice – sometimes they have a legitimate reason for doing so (the product received was the wrong size or colour, the quantity was less than expected, the scope of the project was reduced, etc.), other times they do it because they can.

This means that when a business sends a payment, they also send an explanation of what the payment is for. They send a list of invoices and the amount paid for each, along with some sort of rationale for any short pays. This explanation is called a “remittance” (not the same as a P2P remittance), and for manual forms of payment this remittance is delivered along with the cash or check.

Informal businesses may not furnish invoices, and may not have formal accounting methods, instead tracking obligations in hand written ledgers – or even keeping track of them in their minds. Successful entrepreneurs, regardless of how informal their business practices may be, have means of ensuring that they are paid what they are owed.

As a consumer in the developed world, the cost of payments is limited to the stamp used to mail a check, the monthly fee for a bank account, or an ATM fee to withdraw cash. In the developing world, most transactions are made via cash and the associated costs are indirect: Time queuing to pay bills; potential agent fees to receive cash; transport costs; and, of course, the risk of theft. Whether in the developed or the developing world, consumers do not typically associate cost with payments for their purchases. Yet businesses that sell to consumers are accustomed to paying to be paid – particularly if they accept credit cards. But even those that accept cash recognize the cost of handling cash, ensuring security from internal fraud, and external theft. A business buyer (the company that is paying) may have significant cost associated with making and receiving payments.

All businesses have similar requirements for B2B payments. This is true for a sole proprietorship in Peru, and the biggest stores in London. Companies may emphasize the importance of some features more than others, and the sophistication of the processes and tools used vary. However, all businesses require:

• Control over timing of disbursements and collections: Businesses need to manage their cash flow. They want to control the timing of funds going out as payments to suppliers and to employees as payroll. Also, ideally, they’d like to be able to predict when funds will arrive. Knowing when their customers will pay them enables them to manage their borrowing (or invest excess funds).

• Security of payments: Businesses need to feel secure and safe when making and receiving payments. They want to feel comfortable delegating responsibility to employees. They also want to know that they are protected from fraudsters outside their company. Cash may be convenient, but it is also expensive to secure. The relatively large size of B2B payments means that security measures appropriate for consumer payments may need to be augmented.

• Data: Businesses need to be able to track payments. They need to get payment data into their accounting ‘system’ (whether it is a manual ledger, a spreadsheet, accounting software, or an ERP system) so that they can close out obligations recorded in their receivables. They need to know who paid, what they paid for, and who still owes them money. The sooner they follow up on collections, the more likely they are to be paid. Data that enables tracking customer accounts is also key to recognizing the most valuable customers and attracting more like them. Similarly, expenses need to be allocated to the appropriate categories, projects, product lines, or locations so that businesses can understand the profitability of goods and services. Even tiny, informal businesses operating without digital tools have mechanisms for tracking outstanding payments and often a nuanced understanding of the profitability of the goods and services they sell – even if it means relying on handwritten records or memory. Businesses seeking credit recognize the value of accurate and auditable records when it comes time to borrow funds.

• Efficiency: Most entrepreneurs start businesses because they are enthusiastic about the goods and services they provide – they are passionate about tutoring youth, providing medicine to their village at its first ever pharmacy, installing and maintaining electrical systems, etc. They are often much less enthusiastic about the administrative and financial management tasks associated with running a business. Thus, tools that make bookkeeping and invoicing easier and faster are much appreciated. Digitizing payments often means that the information associated with transactions is in a variety of different formats. Counter intuitively, this may be less efficient and more work for the accounting staff (or business owner herself) than manually tracking payments. Handling payment exceptions can also significantly increase administrative efforts and even interfere with efforts to streamline back office tasks.

• Reasonable costs: Businesses large and small are willing to pay for reliable, low-risk, efficient digital payments. But the direct (transaction fees) and indirect cost (processing, exception handling, converting digital value into cash) should be reasonable given the associated benefits.

Some requirements may be more important for some businesses than others. A previous article for the ITU DFS Focus Group separated merchants and payment acceptors into nine categories. The smallest, M0, are small consumers transferring money to each other in a P2P fashion. The largest, M8, is the government. Each of these user categories has access to different technologies, different appetite for risk, and economic sensitivity.[12]

The size of a business has a large effect on digital B2B payment needs. Smaller businesses (those in the M1-M3 categories) tend to use “just pay” solutions with immediate payment and only informal credit. More complex features, including invoicing, VAT payments, and aggregated payments (for multiple invoice obligations at a time) may not be necessary. On the other hand, larger businesses – those in the M2, M3, M4, or M6 categories – may need solutions that cover VAT payments, invoicing, and aggregated payments. Larger companies also have a stronger propensity to invest in optimizing back office procedures and paying for payment solutions than informal companies.

In developing countries, the divide between formal and informal merchants will also have a large effect on the appropriate digital B2B payment tools and services. In both developed and developing countries, most businesses are small. Ninety-six percent of businesses in the United States have fewer than 10 employees.[13] Similarly, the vast majority of firms in developing countries are considered micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.[14] In developing markets, an estimated 77 per cent of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) lack formal documentation.[15]

Figure 1 – Formal and informal enterprises

Informal businesses have different system requirements than formal merchants. Informal needs may align closely with those of M1 businesses. If structured correctly, however, digital B2B payment services could give informal owners an incentive to gain the necessary licenses to formalize their businesses.

B2B payment tools and services should align to the specific needs of companies at various stages of maturity – regardless of their location – as businesses grow and their back office procedures mature. Entrepreneurs manage their small companies in much the same manner as they manage their personal finances. As companies get larger, control becomes an important factor – the entrepreneur requires safeguards to feel comfortable delegating financial tasks to employees. Financing and credit become very important during growth phases, and often payment services are typically obtained from banks that are willing to extend credit to small businesses. Large enterprises often operate their back offices like factories, with emphasis on process efficiency and cost reduction. These businesses often have multiple banking relationships, and credit and payments are no longer intertwined.

As small companies begin to mature, they face certain bottlenecks: First, companies need capital for startup, then assets, then employees, then scale to support investment in assets, people, and processes. For example, a shop may begin by needing capital to buy goods for inventory. It will eventually need assets, such as a permanent home for the shop. If it gets large enough, the shop owner will need to hire employees to staff the store. Eventually, the company will want to scale to multiple locations, require a warehouse to store inventory, and perhaps a fleet of delivery trucks. These challenges are particularly profound in the developing world, where there are fewer options for small businesses. At each step in this growth trajectory, many businesses fail due to lack of capital for investment. Instead of obtaining assets, many informal owners remain without a physical store location. Others remain without employees, dependent on the time and skills of the owner and his or her family. The growth trajectory has slightly different characteristics for different industries, but all businesses require working capital to accumulate assets and scale.

Digital B2B payment tools and services may be able to help business owners overcome the challenges at each step toward maturity. The rest of this analysis focuses on the potential benefits of digital B2B payment services for small buyers and sellers.

Figure 2 – Business size and resource demand

We acknowledge that many businesses do not grow – they are large enough as is: Large enough to fund the lifestyle and aspirations of the entrepreneur. Their goal may be to earn enough to pay for their children’s education, hire some assistance around the house, and save money to help care for aging parents. The business is optimized for lifestyle, rather than growth. Yet even these purposefully modest businesses can benefit from digital tools and associated increases in efficiency.

3 Benefits of B2B payments: Small buyers

Small buyers are one subset of businesses which could benefit from digitizing B2B payments. These small buyers include small shops owned by BoP. These shops often buy goods from wholesalers or distributors and then resell those goods. If the payment between the buyer and the seller could be digitized, the small buyer could:

• gain more control over the timing of disbursement, and obviate the need to be physically present to pay suppliers at the time of delivery;

• build a digital history of timely payment;

• hire and trust employees to manage day to day operations, and receive goods;

• manage relationships with key suppliers more strategically.

Disbursement timing:

Control over disbursement timing is one of the most essential elements of B2B payments. Suppliers want to get paid as soon as possible, while buyers want to keep control over the payment until they are sure that goods have been delivered.[16] Digital payments can help buyers maintain control. The digital payment provider Oxigen, for example, offers a tool where buyers can pay Oxigen, and the service will then pay suppliers on the due date.[17]

Another example comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where cash is nearly the only option for making payments. When given the option to use eMoney, many small buyers reported that digital payments were more secure and saved time. Digital payments eliminated the need to travel with large amounts of cash. This saved the business owner time, and made the payments significantly less susceptible to theft.[18]

Another example comes from the company Copia Global, a distributor that supplies goods to shopkeepers in Kenya.[19] Copia can use mobile payments to offer shopkeepers a mobile “layaway” plan where they can pay for goods in small instalments. This allows shopkeepers to receive revenue from their own customers before paying the full amount to suppliers for goods.

Digital history:

Every time a buyer makes a payment, that payment can be recorded as a part of that person’s or company’s digital history. While cash leaves no digital trail, a digital history of B2B payments could allow small buyers to gain more business credibility – allowing them to obtain more favourable credit terms from strategic suppliers. Many SMEs lack the stature and bargaining power to negotiate good credit. As a result, their suppliers don’t trust them to pay later, and will not offer them trade terms (pay in 30 days, for instance). As a result, many SMEs are forced to pay immediately without credit.[20]

Digital payment histories could help address this situation. By showing a history of successful transactions, SMEs can establish a willingness to pay on time that indicates creditworthiness. For example, the merchant services company Kopo lends money to merchants who have established digital payment histories.[21] The company builds a credit-scoring algorithm to measure each merchant’s ability and willingness to pay back a loan. The company then offers “business cash advances” where a merchant can accept a bulk payment in exchange for a percentage of future revenue (until the advance, including a fee, is repaid). The size and terms of the advance are determined by the merchants’ digital history of payments. A similar mechanism could be used to provide trade financing and other credit mechanisms using B2B payment histories for small businesses in many other places.

Employees:

Many entrepreneurs have problems delegating tasks to employees, especially tasks related to making payments and getting paid. As businesses grow, however, entrepreneurs need to hire on more employees. They may open multiple locations, and are unable to be in two places at once. Digital B2B payment services can give entrepreneurs the tools they need to delegate more tasks to employees, while maintaining transparency and security.

In this way, digital B2B payments could allow small buyers to hire and trust employees. Internal control features offered by business payment providers, including PINs and passwords, would make it easier for business owners to maintain security over payments. And, according to Rajpal Duggal of Oxigen, digital payments allow business owners to discover problems associated with payments in days instead of weeks. This would give business owners the opportunity to leave their stores and use their time more productively.

Relationship management:

Buyers often source their goods from many different vendors. Digital tools would allow buyers to manage their relationships with each of their suppliers better, rather than rely on the sometimes-faulty recollection of business owners and employees. In the developed world there has been an explosion of small business-focused B2B purchasing tools that use eMoney for payment could bring that type of innovation to poor countries.

For example, the mobile payments platform Beyonic allows payers to store names, phone numbers, and payment histories inside of the platform.[22] This makes it easier for small buyers to track payments to suppliers and manage the overall relationships better by understanding fluctuations in purchasing over time. It also makes repeated payments easier by not forcing small buyers to re-enter information every time they want to make payment.

Over time, small businesses could use this information to make better business decisions. Data on the most frequent suppliers, cost comparisons between suppliers, evolving expenditure patterns, or other data stored in the system could enable enhanced analytics for small businesses. Strategic supplier and procurement management is a key element of business continuity and scalability.

Regulatory compliance:

Digital payment tools could also make it easier for small buyers to keep track of digital payments and create accurate accounting. This ability could enable easier regulatory compliance, including timely and accurate tax payments for small businesses.

Of course, this improved regulatory compliance is a benefit only for those companies that hope to remain compliant. Companies that want to evade taxes or other regulatory obligations would not see this as a benefit.

Example #1, Farmaenlace:

Rural Ecuadorians often have trouble accessing medical equipment and drugs. Many have to spend precious resources travelling to larger cities to visit hospitals. Recognizing this challenge, the drug distribution company Farmaenlace decided to expand into rural markets.

With help from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Farmaenlace set up drug store franchises in rural areas of Ecuador. The franchise operators received training, advertising, and bonuses for sales. All constituents benefitted from the program: For the IDB, the project was part of an inclusive business initiative designed to help poor people; for Farmaenlace, the franchises sold up to 50 per cent more than the company’s own drug stores; for the franchise owners, monthly income went up by $2,400 after expenses.[23]

Digital B2B payment tools could help programs like this in a number of ways. The most basic is that B2B payments services could make payments between Farmaenlace and its franchises more transparent and secure. Each franchise could keep track of its inventory, payments, and sales patterns more effectively, and digital payments would be more secure than cash. It could also give the storeowners the flexibility needed to hire employees and delegate financial responsibilities, as discussed above.

The digital record of successful payments to Farmaenlace could also allow the franchise owners to access credit. The IDB or Farmaenlace could offer subsidized loans to qualifying franchises through digital B2B payment services. These services could enable more efficient disbursement, and the digital histories could be used to enable better credit decisions.

Example #2, Coca-Cola:

Consumer goods companies are investing heavily in emerging markets as a source of future business growth. In 2014, for example, Coca-Cola announced a $500 million investment in Egypt and Pakistan.[24] Coca-Cola products are often sold through local distributors to small shops throughout developing countries.

Digitizing the payments between the buyers and the distributors could result in significant benefits for the entire supply chain. Small business owners could allow employees to pay for products from Coca-Cola, even when the owner wasn’t there. Not only would those payments be easier and more secure, the business owner would not be limited to cash on hand to fund inventory purchases. And, if a small buyer has a digital history of payments to the distributor, the distributor could feel more comfortable offering credit to the small buyers. Other financial service providers could also get involved, offering receivables financing, business cash advances, or more traditional loans to support business growth.

The histories could also be used for enhanced analytics. For example, Coca-Cola could enable accurate “preferred buyer” programs, offering incentives to companies that buy more.

Example #3, Tenoli:

Rural mom-and-pop stores in Mexico often carry products made by large, multinational companies like Pepsi and Nestlé. When small buyers purchase these products, they often pay distributors in cash. These cash payments create inefficiencies in the supply lines, and don’t allow the small shops to capture all of the benefits of digital payments.

The distribution company Tenoli, based in Mexico, is trying to help by enabling large suppliers digitize to their supply chains, and better understand small buyers.[25] The company set up distribution sites, where large suppliers like Pepsi, Cemex, and Nestlé can deliver goods. Tenoli will then deliver the goods to the small buyers and collect the payments.

The data collected from the payments allow Tenoli to create consumer behaviour reports and bottom of the pyramid (BoP) economic profiles, which are then sold to suppliers. The reports give suppliers the ability to better understand small buyers, including mom-and-pop shops, in dangerous parts of Mexico. Large suppliers can then use the data to create loyalty programs that could benefit the small buyers. In the future, Tenoli could offer credit that would enable a more efficient supply chain. These greater efficiencies could also result in lower prices for the small buyers.

4 Benefits of B2B payments: Small suppliers

Digital B2B payments could also have benefits for small suppliers. Common examples of small suppliers in poor countries are independent contractors who supply labour to larger companies. Other examples could include artisanal manufacturers or small wholesalers. Benefits could include:

• faster payments, and, as a result, less cash flow anxiety;

• improved security as a result of avoiding cash;

• more customers by meeting the needs of buyers that prefer to pay digitally or for whom cash payment is inconvenient;

• credit and digital history.

Faster payments:

Every supplier wants to get paid as fast as possible. The faster a supplier can be paid, the more working capital that supplier has on hand to conduct business. Digital money offers immediate transfers. If the supplier currently accepts checks, digital payments would eliminate the need to go to the bank and stand in line to cash the check. If the payments were in cash, digital tools would obviate the need to transport the cash between buyer and supplier.

Cash delivery usually takes three or four days, according to Oxigen. A banker’s check or a draft would still take two or three days for suppliers to receive their payments. Payments through digital money can be made instantly.[26]

Improved security:

Faster payments also allow better security and cash management for the supplier. With wallet-to-wallet transactions, there is no chance that the payment will get lost in transit. With fewer opportunities for payments to get lost, digital payments could give suppliers the transparency and security needed to delegate payments to employees. Or, they could accept payments remotely, without the need to make the deliveries themselves.

Relationship management:

Much like buyers, digital B2B payment tools could help suppliers manage relationships better. The mobile payments firm Beyonic allows companies to both send and receive payments on the platform and save the digital history. This allows small suppliers to track incoming payments and better manage relationships with buyers.

This relationship management would also allow suppliers an easier time following up on unpaid invoices. When payments are made in cash, it is difficult to know which invoices have been paid and which are outstanding. A digital invoicing system would allow suppliers to know exactly when invoices are paid, and which invoices demand follow up.

Gain customers:

For small suppliers, the ability to accept payments digitally could actually increase the customer base. The company PayMate,[27] for example, touts its ability to help businesses accept payments from anywhere in India. This would allow a company to expand its geographic reach and gain more customers.

Another example comes from Copia Global.[28] The company is able to deliver “Right to the village. No address, no problem. Like FedEx, but better.” The business, enabled by digital payments, offers delivery to urban locations within 48 hours and to rural locations within a week.

Establish digital history:

A digital history of payments could be a boon for small suppliers. For example, lenders could use digital histories to offer factoring and other types of receivables financing. That way, instead of waiting for the cash flow to arrive from small buyers, suppliers could sell the invoices to financial service providers in exchange for immediate cash.

Example #1, Visor:

Since January of 2014, Mexico has mandated that all companies must use state-approved e-invoicing services to create all of their invoices. These invoices are then collected and stored by the tax authority. The Economist described the law as “electronic arm-twisting,” to force businesses and individuals to pay more taxes.[29] At the same time, the digital histories provided by these e-invoicing services could actually benefit small suppliers.

One example comes from Visor,[30] a Mexican company that provides credit-scoring services and supply-chain financing aimed at small suppliers. Visor’s business model relies on large, multinational buyers that do business with many small suppliers. The large buyers give Visor access to their e-invoices, including payment information. Visor then uses that data to assign credit scores to all of the small suppliers. Financial institutions then partner with Visor to provide supply chain financing to the small suppliers.

Payments from large buyers could take days or weeks. For small, cash-strapped suppliers, that time can seem like an eternity. Instead of waiting, small suppliers could use that time to buy new goods or hire new employees. Supply chain financing could allow the small suppliers to get paid faster, enabling them to use that capital to expand their businesses. [31]

Example #2: ‘Taobao villages” and Mr. Presta

Small suppliers have begun to tap into marketplaces like Alibaba, Amazon, and Flipkart to sell their goods online. In China, so-called “Taobao villages” have begun to emerge, where communities specialize in specific goods, like socks and shirts, to sell on the online shopping site Taobao. Since 2015, some of these villages have begun to specialize in B2B goods. The city of Zhuji, for example, produced 25.8 billion pairs of socks in 2014, or 30 per cent of the world’s output. Many of these socks are produced by local suppliers, and then sourced to non-local Taobao sellers via the marketplace and funded with digital B2B payments.[32]

In Mexico and Argentina, the company Mr. Presta[33] is using data from MercadoLibre, an extremely popular online commerce marketplace in Latin America, to facilitate lending. Mr. Presta makes working capital loans to small merchants on MercadoLibre that enable small suppliers to expand their businesses. While this is not specifically a B2B loan, it shows how better payments data could enable financial service providers to offer more products and services to B2B companies.

Mr. Presta claims that the small businesses in Mexico and Argentina are currently underserved due to a lack of reliable information, an expensive analysis process, and expensive client acquisition channels. The company helps overcome these barriers by accessing reliable information (from MercadoLibre) and building software that allows them to make credit decisions and disbursements reliably and efficiently. Mr. Presta can then use that data to partner with financial institutions to extend credit into B2B buyers and sellers.[34]

Example #3, Kopo Kopo:

In 2015, Kopo Kopo launched a “payments hub” product that allows companies to schedule and send multiple payments at once. The product was launched as a B2B payments solution for merchants to pay their suppliers.

One business to adopt the product was a courier company that had independent contractors around Nairobi. The company used “payments hub” as a salary payment system to send scheduled payments out to all their contractors at a set time. In this situation, the independent contractors acted as the suppliers of labour, while the courier company acted as the buyer.

The product also helped the courier company by simplifying payments to its contractors. It kept all contractors in a centralized system, and allowed the company to make payments faster and easier. Kopo Kopo charged the payers on a per-transaction basis, with an extra fee for integration into company back offices.

In Kenya, more people have digital money accounts than bank accounts. The “payments hub” product helped the independent contractors by paying them immediately, whether or not they had a bank account. It was also more secure than cash payments and faster than payment by check.

5 Counter examples

Although there are many benefits to making and receiving payments digitally, there are some situations where digital B2B payments will not be widely adopted.

Companies that want to avoid taxes and regulations, for example, would likely resist B2B payments. A survey by the Better Than Cash Alliance found that just 20 per cent of surveyed SMEs in Nigeria paid federal taxes. More efficient tax collection would raise the costs of digital B2B tools and services, which could inhibit uptake.[35]

Another group that could push back is cash-starved businesses. One Kopo Kopo client, a Nairobi-based restaurant, said that it would be very resistant to using digital B2B payments, because of the faster payments enabled by digital money. The restaurant pays suppliers using checks. The suppliers then have to take the checks to a bank, stand in line, and cash the checks. The restaurant uses the time it takes to pay suppliers as a form of working capital. If the payments were to be deposited in the suppliers account immediately, the restaurant would have less working capital, which would hurt the business.

Other businesses in Kenya use post-dated checks as a form of credit. The post-dated check typically allows the merchant a 30 to 90-day grace period before the money is debited from his or her account. There currently is no electronic alternative to a post-dated check, which creates a large barrier to adoption.[36]

Some businesses may not adopt digital payments simply because the status quo is difficult to change. Many entrepreneurs want to focus on their businesses, and payments are not a large priority. Digital payments are sometimes seen as a distraction, rather than an enabler, from core business functions.

Bureaucracy may also thwart other businesses from adopting digital payments. Most payment providers are required to check business licenses and collect other “Know Your Customer” (KYC) information. If these requirements are difficult to meet, many businesses will simply opt out of digital payment tools and services.

Finally, while supply chain financing could enable more efficient businesses, the service is not free. Mr. Presta and other supply chain financing companies offer unsecured credit, meaning that the small businesses do not need to offer assets to access the loans. However, the loans will likely reduce the profitability of each transaction, and there is a danger that low-income users will not fully understand the credit offerings. This could open the door to unscrupulous credit companies to employ usurious practices that could exploit low-income business owners.

6 Trends affecting B2B payments

In the last few years, governments and multinational groups have begun to focus on SMEs as a way to improve the lives of poor people. This focus stems from the growing recognition of the role SMEs play in job creation and economic development. Many of these programs are designed to help SMEs extend credit through lending technologies.

However, access to finance and credit remain a huge barrier for the growth of the SME sector. This access is not evenly distributed. In 2013, an estimated 200 to 245 million enterprises were considered unserved or underserved by the financial sector. Banks in both developed and developing countries tend to avoid the micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) sector, choosing to instead focus on the larger companies. This is due, in part, to an information asymmetry, low per-client revenue, and the expense of setting up branches in different parts of countries.

At the same time, there has been an explosion in digital money innovation throughout the world. There are now 271 digital money services spread across 93 countries, and that number continues to grow. However, there have been varying degrees of adoption of mobile money between businesses. The Groupe Spécial Mobile Association (GSMA) estimates that only 0.5 per cent of total merchant payment volumes are currently online.

These digital money systems could be part of a broader shift in global trade. If global trade continues to increase, the demand for cost-effective cross-border payment options will likely continue to grow. Companies like Alibaba and Western Union are trying to take advantage of this growth with digital cross border payment solutions. In the coming years, some experts have predicted that there will be a shift away from global supply chains and toward more regional procurement and manufacturing operations.

The availability of cloud computing and Software as a Service (SaaS) platforms is transforming both the ability for providers to offer solutions, and the ability of tech-savvy enterprises to incorporate these into their own systems. New low-cost, pay-as-you-go software allows small business owners to access tools previously reserved for larger businesses. It is true that adoption of these platforms has been uneven. One global survey found that only 16 per cent of accounts payable departments receive the majority of invoices electronically, while most receive their payments on paper. However, some companies, including Salesforce and Intuit, have had massive success offering SaaS platforms to small businesses. These hosted software solutions have the potential to change how B2B payments are made in the future, all over the world.

These digital tools have also seen more non-bank actors take major roles in the financial sector, potentially threatening traditional banks. Mobile operators, for example, have become some of the most successful digital money operators in the world. While this led some to fear that banks could be threatened, many of these digital money deployments have led to partnerships between banks and non-banks. For example, Safaricom and the Commercial Bank of Africa created a partnership to offer the M-Shwari micro-lending product. At the same time, this indicates a larger trend toward non-bank actors playing a significant role in the financial system.

Square and many solutions like it throughout the world have democratized merchant acquiring, dramatically expanding card acceptance amongst small businesses. The company, and others like it, now offer a range of complimentary services for small businesses including inventory management, scheduling, payroll, invoicing, etc. Solution providers focused on small businesses throughout the world can follow this precedent, providing holistic, integrated tools that make it easier to do business.

7 Second order benefits

If buyers and sellers were to widely adopt digital B2B payments, there are a number of second-order benefits, beyond the benefits to individual buyers and sellers. In some ways, these could be more important to the ecosystem as a whole than the benefits for individual buyers and suppliers.

Digital liquidity:

B2B payments could also give businesses a powerful incentive to keep value inside of digital money systems. If businesses are paid digitally by their business and consumer customers and have suppliers that accept digital payment, the utility of digital payments is dramatically higher. Right now, digital money is not replacing cash, but rather making cash more efficient. Eighty-five percent of transactions globally are still in cash. Even in Kenya, one of the most active digital money markets in the world, MasterCard Advisors estimated that 98 per cent of transactions were still made in cash.

One factor that holds back widespread adoption of digital money for financial inclusion is the cash in cash out (CICO) network. According to Ignacio Mas, “…cash in/cash out (CICO) points are like tollgates at the edge of the digital payments cloud.” It costs poor people money to take money out of digital money systems, which creates a strong barrier to usage.

If buyers were able to use digital money to pay suppliers using B2B payments, those companies may be more inclined to accept digital payments from consumers. At that point, consumers would have more places to use their digital money, which would make them more inclined to leave value inside of digital money, instead of cashing out. This could create a virtuous cycle, where digital money systems retain more value and are made more efficient.

Lower costs:

Digital B2B payment tools could lower the cost of doing business. Buyers and sellers who adopt digital B2B payments would no longer need to pay someone to transport cash and provide security. If transactions are done by check, buyers and sellers no longer need to stand in line at the bank to cash the check.

These lower transaction costs could translate to lower costs to buyers, sellers, and consumers. Suppliers would not need to charge buyers as much, if their costs were lower. If buyers are purchasing goods and services at lower costs, those savings could be passed on to the consumer.

Economic growth:

MSMEs are a huge factor in any economy, especially in developing countries, where MSMEs generally represent more than 90 per cent of all firms. In Brazil, an estimated 99.9 per cent of all firms are MSMEs. In terms of employment, MSMEs provide 71 to 73 per cent of jobs in Chile and Colombia. Lowering transaction costs through the widespread use of digital B2B payments could make MSMEs more efficient, and could encourage more economic growth generally. Also, as previously discussed, the security provided by digital payments could also allow more MSMEs to hire on more employees, which would boost employment.

Path to formalization:

Many digital B2B payment tools and services require accounts at financial institutions, which require a degree of formalization among businesses. If the benefits of these tools and services were large enough for businesses, they could actually be a factor in motivating businesses to seek out bank accounts, business licenses, and other methods of formalization.

Second-order benefits example, Nigeria:

In 2014, the Central Bank of Nigeria approved new guidelines designed to promote digital payments. The bank stipulated that all businesses with more than 50 employees were required to use approved end-to-end e-payment platforms for all salaries, pensions, taxes, and supplier payments. The central bank doesn’t currently have jurisdiction over non-financial entities, so the regulations are still considered non-binding. However, the moves by the central bank, along with other e-payment efforts, have helped companies stop thinking about “whether or not” to shift to digital payments and begin thinking about “how.”

Now that companies have begun shifting to digital payments, the second-order benefits are becoming clear. The Nigerian Bottling Company (NBC) has found that digital B2B payments have helped the business in a number of ways. NBC drivers were often robbed when they carried cash, and the company began paying high insurance premiums to protect themselves. Digital payments have made the deliveries more secure and less of a target for robbers. Now, NBC has begun helping its domestic suppliers formalize their businesses with bank accounts in order to use digital payments. Some companies have reported lower costs, too, though that is not the primary motivation in going cash-less.

It is still not clear whether businesses are formalizing because of the benefits of digital payments, or whether digital payments are simply an added benefit of formalization. However, the benefits of formalization and electronic payments are strongly correlated.

Second-order benefits example, Peru:

The Association of Banks of Peru (ASBANC) and Pagos Digitales Peruanos (PDP) recently implemented an interoperable mobile payment system called Billetera Móvil (BiM). This system works between banks and mobile operators in the country to extend mobile financial services to the poor. To achieve this goal, however, the system needs to attract “digital liquidity” into the system.

One source of digital liquidity could be B2B payments. BiM is currently running a pilot with three large B2B distributors, including two multinational fast-moving consumer goods companies. PDP, the firm running BiM, is currently exploring three different methods to incentivize merchants to participate in the B2B pilot: training, compromise, and discounts. The organization is sending out trainers to help merchants understand how to use BiM. They’re also relying on compromise, the idea that everyone (suppliers and buyers) will be better off using the B2B system. PDP is also organizing discounts offered by the distributors to merchants who pay using BiM. PDP will then track the pilot activity to determine which tactics are most effective to encourage more payments in the system.

One major barrier to the growth of BiM for B2B payments is the cash-in-cash-out network. There are not enough agents enabling BiM, especially in rural areas of Peru. If merchants cannot conveniently put cash into the digital payment system and, in turn, take cash out of it, they will be unlikely to use the system. This is one reason why pilots, like the one that BiM is running, are so important. If the large distributors benefit from the B2B pilot, the programs will raise the demand for cash-in-cash-out services. At that point, more agents are likely to begin offering services. Companies would then be more inclined to use digital B2B payments, creating a virtual cycle that could benefit the entire BiM system.

Under this system, the distributors will pay to receive payments, and the merchant will not pay to pay. This means that small merchants will be able to access the benefits of digital B2B tools and services without being charged directly. At the same time, with more transactions in the system, BiM will have more revenue. The system can then use that revenue to extend its services more widely, or it can lower the cost of financial services for lower income segments of the population. This could benefit the economy as a whole.

8 Barriers to B2B adoption

B2B payments are notoriously resistant to digitization. In 2011, 75 per cent of B2B payments in the United States (by count) were still made by check. In many parts of the world, cash is the only method of B2B payment available.

An overarching barrier to widespread B2B adoption is how to appeal to the “long tail” of suppliers. Even in developed markets, most businesses tend to concentrate on only their largest suppliers for efficient B2B payments. This means that most suppliers are left with manual, and often inefficient, methods of payments. This problem is more pronounced in poor countries, where many businesses are small and informal.

Figure 3 – The “long tail” of suppliers

To overcome this barrier, B2B payment solutions should be able to work for both formal and informal business owners. This will require a risk-based approach to regulation, meaning that low-risk transactions will face lower regulatory hurdles, no matter where they occur. Examples of regulations could include KYC and screening requirements. If businesses face too many regulations, many will simply use cash, instead of adopting more efficient methods of payment.

Digital B2B payment tools should also work on a wide range of mobile hardware across mobile software platforms. Smartphones accounted for only about 13 per cent of connections in sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 2013. Yet successful entrepreneurs are most likely to have smart phones rather than feature phones, therefore business solutions can partake of the enhanced mobile capabilities to build feature-rich digital payment solutions for B2B use cases.

At the same time, B2B payments may require more security than P2P payments. This is, in part, because B2B payments may be of higher value. The company CopSonic is attempting to provide that higher level of security on basic phones, using audio signals for authentication. However, any solution will need to manage the security of transactions against the ease-of-use.

B2B payment solutions should also include the ability to take out a percentage of payments in order to repay business cash advances, receivables financing, and other lending products. This will allow more credit to flow into B2B payments, enabling faster growth.

All of this must work within a viable business plan. Both small buyers and small suppliers are cost conscious. Any B2B product will need to be inexpensive enough to appeal to both parties, while also making money for the DFS provider.

While it may be attractive to think that even the most thin margin business models can work with sufficient transaction volume, providers should avoid the “network fantasizes” that plague many payment startups. Many of the most successful B2B networks have only a small number of companies signed up. Therefore, providers need to find a way to achieve a sustainable business model without massive scale.

Finally, B2B payments will be more widely adopted when digital payments generally are more widely accepted. This means that a sufficient network of CICO points is a necessity for B2B payments. Also, this is why closed-loop systems present a barrier to widespread use of B2B payments. Many digital payment schemes are so-called “walled gardens,” making it difficult to send money from one digital money system to another. Interoperability would make digital B2B payment tools more widely accepted, and therefore more likely to be adopted.

9 Considerations for financial policy makers

B2B payments are difficult to digitize. There are many informal companies, and some businesses that will generally push back on any digital payments. However, policymakers should consider the relevance and impact of the following factors that may encourage digital B2B payments tools and services, and help the digital financial ecosystem as a whole.

• Evaluate factors that make it easier for informal businesses to make digital B2B payments: Countries are taking a risk-based approach to regulating payments, including, in many countries, creating a tiered structure for KYC regulations. Poor business customers, as well as consumers/purchasers, can benefit from the same approach, enabling them to access digital B2B payment tools.

• Examine how subsidized credit for SMEs can motivate adoption of digital B2B payment tools: In many markets, subsidized credit could provide a strong incentive for businesses to begin moving payments to digital systems. With a tiered KYC structure in place, subsidized credit could also allow businesses to progressively formalize as transactions grow.

• Determine feasibility of interoperability: Digital B2B payments are more useful when they are more widely accepted. As policymakers evaluate the extent to which digital money systems are able to interoperate, consideration may be given to B2B payments as well as other use cases.

• Monitor the role of e-invoicing: Where e-invoicing has been mandated, digital B2B payment and lending providers can take advantage of the widespread digitization necessary for even the smallest businesses to comply. Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have begun mandating that businesses issue e-invoices. The hope is to push businesses to formalize and to pay more taxes. It is too early to know the full effects of these regulations, however, policymakers may want to monitor outcomes in these countries and the extent to which they drive digitization of payment and lending.

[1] Ansón & Toledano, 2010, “Between financial inclusion and postal banking: is the survival of Posts also there?”, Universal Postal Union

[2] « Designated postal operator » (DPO) refers to postal operators that are officially designated by their government to provide a number of postal services and ensure the implementation at national level of various international treaties’ obligations referring to postal affairs. DPOs can be State-owned institutions or private entities. Countries can also designate one or various DPOs on their territory.

[3] One postal operator (POST Luxembourg) is part of both categories as it offers both its own account-based services and the banking services of a partner.

[4] Berthaud & Davico, 2013, “Global panorama on financial inclusion: key issues and business models”. Universal Postal Union (http://www.upu.int/fileadmin/documentsFiles/activities/financialInclusion/globalPanoramaPostalFinancialInclusionFullEn.pdf)

[5] Electronic postal money orders are basically money transfers that are exchanged between Posts. They can be provided under various forms: cash-to-cash, cash-to-account, account-to-cash, or account-to account.

[6] Dale Webster, March 2016, “Bank bush Bash”, The Weekly Times

[7] Post Office Limited Annual Report 2014-2015

[8] These Posts are from the following countries: Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Congo DRC, Nepal and Turkmenistan.

[9] 2015 State of the Industry Report, Mobile Money, GSMA, 2016

[10] Nieto and Donohoe, 2015, “Measuring postal e-services development”, Universal Postal Union

[11] Refer to ITU Focus Group Digital Financial Services Report on “Impact of Agricultural Value Chains on Digital Liquidity.”

[12] Enabling Merchant Payments Acceptance in the Digital Financial Ecosystems. ITU. February, 2016.

[13] US Census, 2012 data.

[14] Transforming Business Relationships: Inclusive Business in Latin America. Inter-American Development Bank. 2015.

[15] Peer Stein, Oya Pinar Ardic, and Martin Hommes. Closing the Credit Gap for Formal and Informal Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises. International Finance Corporation. 2013.

[16] Carol Coye Benson. The Problem with B2B Payments. Payments Views. April, 2009.

[17] Oxigen Wallet: https://www.oxigenwallet.com

[18] Mobile Money in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Market insights on consumer needs and opportunities in payments and financial services. GSMA. July, 2013.

[19] Copia Global Website: http://www.copiaglobal.com/

[20] Anne Marie Van Swinderen and Grace Mungai. Supply Chain Financing for SMEs. July, 2015.

[21] Grow Cash Advance – 5 Frequently Asked Questions. Kopo Kopo. May, 2014.

[22] Based on an interview with with Dan Kleinbaum, COO of Beyonic: http://beyonic.com/

[23] Transforming Business Relationships: Inclusive Business in Latin America. Inter-American Development Bank 2015.

[24] Shadia Nasralla. Coca-Cola invests in Egypt and Pakistan, sees big sales growth. Reuters. June, 2014.

[25] Based on an interview with Thomas Ricolfi, co-founder of Tenoli: http://www.tenoli.org

[26] Based on an interview with Rajpal Duggal, Head of Group strategy and corporate planning at oxigen.

[27] Paymate: http://www.gopaymate.com/.

[28] Copia global: http://www.copiaglobal.com/.

[29] Electronic Arm-Twisting. The Economist. May, 2014.

[30] Visor Website: http://visor.io/

[31] Based on an interview with Valeria Perez Rios, CCO Visor.

[32] Research Report on China’s Taobao Villages, Ali Research. 2015. http://i.aliresearch.com/img/20160126/20160126155201.pdf

[33] Mr. Presta Website: http://www.mrpresta.com

[34] Based on an interview with Carlos Rosso, cofounder of Mr Presta.

[35] Brian Loeb. The response of large corporates and their value chains to government policies to shift to digital payments: Nigeria’s “Cashless” policy,” Better Thank Cash Alliance. January, 2015.

[36] Julie Zollmann, Digital Retail Payments in Kenya: Making them Matter for Merchants. Bankable Frontier Associates. October, 2014.

X Bulk Payments and the DFSs Ecosystem

About this report

The authors of this technical report are Bennett Gordon, Carol Coye Benson, Carolina Trivelli, Daniel Radcliffe, Abi Jagun, Mireya Almazán, Matt Homer, Toru Mino, Charles Niehaus, Satwik Seshasai, Michael Goldfarb, Michael Faye, Niyi Ajao, and Quang Nguyen.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive Summary

Government-to-person (G2P) and employer-to-person payments of all sorts, often referred to as “bulk payments”, are seen by many as key enablers for the growth of the digital financial services (DFSs) ecosystem. In this paper, we examine ways in which bulk payments have been made in the past and look at ways in which this has improved over recent years. We also analyse the remaining challenges which have stymied bulk payment rollouts in many countries.

We then look forward and anticipate ways in which bulk payments may be made in cases where the infrastructure has developed to a point where digital transaction accounts are pervasive, a biometric national ID system is in place, and interoperability among DFSs providers is common. We propose a model of how bulk payments might be made when those conditions are met. Finally, we take a look at three countries: India, Nigeria, and Peru, which all show particular promise of developing in these directions.

1 What are bulk payments?

The DFSs ecosystem, in many developing countries around the world, is entering into a second, post-introduction phase. Many DFSs are available for the unbanked and underserved, and in some countries a significant penetration of these products among the underserved has been achieved.

Many countries, however, suffer from very slow adoption rates with new financial services and products, and even those countries with higher adoption rates suffer from low product usage. It is a common point of view that so-called “bulk payments” could accelerate the adoption of and usage of digital wallets by the underserved by providing an incentive to consumers to open their wallets.

Bulk payments are one-to-many payments that go from one paying agency to many beneficiaries at once. There are always at least three roles in cash payments:

• Paying agency: This is the party that initiates the bulk payment. This could be a non-governmental organization (NGO), government agency, or private company.

• Implementing partner: This is the organization that enrols beneficiaries and records the address to where the payment should be sent. This role may be done by the paying agency, but is often fulfilled by a NGO or other third party.

• Payment provider: This organization routes money from the paying agency and to the beneficiaries. This may be a bank or a third party.

The term “bulk payments” includes a variety of different kinds of payments. Some common types of payments include:

• Salary payments and expense reimbursements;

• pension contributions;

• unconditional cash transfers and crisis payments;

• conditional cash transfers.

One organization could fulfil multiple roles inside of the same cash transfer program. For example, a government could fulfil the role of the paying agency in a disaster relief payment by paying money into the program, and also act as the implementing partner that enrols all of the beneficiaries.

Throughout much of the world, cash is nearly the only option for making these bulk payments. The purpose of the current study is to examine how bulk payments are made in a selected number of countries where digital wallets are either well established or on the brink of expansion.

Much of this report will focus on government-to-person (G2P) payments, because that is one of the most common use-cases for bulk payments in the developing world. However, in the suggestions, this report will outline a bulk payments ecosystem that would serve the needs of all bulk payers, including NGOs, governments, and businesses.

2 History: How bulk payments are made

The bulk payments ecosystem is highly fragmented. In developed payments markets, bulk payments are almost entirely electronic. Governments and businesses have access to efficient electronic payment systems through which they can send transfers. In the United States, for example, the Social Security Administration went entirely digital and stopped sending out paper checks in 2013.[1] Recipient identities are digitized and remain with the government.

Electronic payments are often unavailable to bulk payers in less developed payment ecosystems. Many recipients lack bank accounts and records may not be sufficiently digitized. In many countries with limited payments infrastructure, payers are forced to send physical cash to recipients.

Bulk payments begin with a paying agency hoping to transfer funds to beneficiaries. In private companies, the beneficiaries are often well known. In cash transfer programs, on the other hand, paying agencies rely on “implementing partners” to survey potential beneficiaries and collect addressing information. This information may be collected through digital tools or with pen and paper. The implementing partner then compiles the information into a registry, often stored on Excel, or in more complex database software.

The paying agency then uses the registry to create a list of beneficiaries. In the case of a cash transfer from a national government, the money is often transferred to a state government, along with the list of beneficiaries. The state governments then contract with a payments provider who coordinates the delivery of cash to the beneficiaries.

Figure 1 – Typical cash program

Example:

In response to the 2009/2010 floods in Niger, for example, Concern Worldwide sent cash transfers to beneficiaries in physical envelopes. In this program, Concern Worldwide acted as the paying agency, the implementing partner, and the payment provider. In their role as implementing partner, the NGO registered beneficiaries and classified their eligibility to receive cash transfers. Then, as the paying agency, the NGO delivered envelopes of cash to distribution points that were near to the beneficiaries. The distribution points (contracted by the NGO), then distributed the cash to recipients.[2]

3 Challenges

Delivering cash to thousands of beneficiaries is an enormous technical, logistical, political, and identification challenge. Together, these issues create “leakage” inside of the cash transfer program. For the purposes of this paper, we define “leakage” as money that could potentially reach beneficiaries, but is instead lost in delivery. Studies have estimated that leakage is as high as 70 to 85 per cent of the total funds in some cash transfer programs.[3]

Technical issues:

The technological challenges in cash transfers begin with identification. Many NGOs and governments continue to record beneficiary information by hand on paper. Accessing the information is inefficient and costly, and the process of digitizing that information (if the information is digitized) is cumbersome.

Data on the efficacy of cash transfer programs is also difficult to collect when people receive benefits in cash. Cash is notoriously difficult to track, and does not leave a digital trail. NGOs have, at times, contracted outside auditors to conduct surveys on the effects of the cash transfer program. While data from surveys is better than no data, the process of auditing and collecting data is costly.

If beneficiaries were to move away from the village, change names, or die, this information would be difficult to change inside of the registry. Digital survey tools can make the process easier, but survey teams would still need to travel to people’s homes and collect information. This is a costly process.

Logistical issues:

Cash transfers can also be a logistical nightmare.[4] Transportation infrastructure in many countries is severely lacking, making the journey to beneficiaries costly and difficult. Then, once the cash is delivered, beneficiaries often have to wait to receive the cash. In the Concern Worldwide example, beneficiaries had to wait an average of three hours to receive their money.[5]

Employees or volunteers travelling with large amounts of cash are easy targets for thieves. Improved security and theft protection imposes extra costs onto the cash transfer program. Some cash transfer programs buy insurance and contract with 3rd party transportation and security companies to ensure safety. This raises the overall cost of the program.[6]

Political issues:

Cash transfers can also create political problems. The most basic political problem arises when the paying agency decides which citizens are eligible for benefits. Identification problems can compound this issue. Conflicts of interest can also surface between national governments and state governments over where to disburse cash, and which entity receives the political credit. Finally, cash is notoriously difficult to track. Therefore, transfers in untraceable bills could promote corruption. This could include overpayment to “ghost” beneficiaries, who may not exist, or underpayment to beneficiaries who are entitled to more funds.

4 The last 10 years: New ways of making bulk payments

Bulk payments have taken a step forward in recent years with the introduction of various new capabilities and technologies. These innovations have made it possible to collect more information on the efficacy of the cash transfers, and have made some bulk payment programs more efficient.[7]

The technology advances begin with the collection of addressing information. Implementing partners have begun to make use of digital data collection tools, such as iFormBuilder,[8] RedRose,[9] and Last Mile Mobile Solutions.[10] These tools ease the burden on field teams who collect information on potential beneficiaries. They also help make the data more usable for paying agencies by storing it in a digital format.

Various payment technologies have come into wider use in the past decade, including prepaid cards, vouchers, and eMoney. These advances allow cash transfer programs to scale up more quickly and deliver money to beneficiaries more efficiently.

Players remain the same:

New cash advance programs still require an implementing partner to collect addressing information on beneficiaries. However, new tools make that process more efficient. Survey building tools can automatically collect information into databases that are easily accessible by paying agencies. For example, iFormBuilder can help implementing partners collect information on beneficiaries through survey forms and GPS data. It can also help scan IDs and barcodes. Similarly, WorldVision International has created a tool called Last Mile Mobile Solutions to enable NGOs to collect information on vulnerable populations.

Paying agencies have also begun to incorporate different technologies into funds disbursals. The most basic technological advancement is the introduction of prepaid cards, including smart cards. Paying agencies are able to distribute cards to beneficiaries, loaded with value, instead of cash in envelopes. Beneficiaries then use the cards at ATMs or “cash-out” points to collect the money.

There have been some efforts to incorporate these prepaid cards into the merchant payments ecosystem. Red Rose, for example, offers an “end-to-end payment solution” targeted at helping merchants accept payments from cash transfer programs. In most countries, however, merchants still prefer cash to card payments.

eMoney:

The popularization of eMoney holds massive potential to make bulk payments more efficient. “Electronic payment systems involving smart cards or mobile phones can significantly reduce costs and leakage,” according to the UK development agency, “while promoting financial inclusion of the poor.”[11]

In Kenya, where eMoney is now ubiquitous, cash transfer programs are proving effective. Evidence comes from Give Directly, a nonprofit that specializes in unconditional cash transfers using mobile phone technology. Innovations for Poverty Action found that Give Directly’s cash transfer program increased consumption, assets, food security and improved psychological wellbeing.[12]

Systems integrators:

As cash transfer programs incorporate more technology, systems integrators have begun offering services to governments and NGOs to make the programs more efficient. These companies help the paying agencies, implementing partners, and payment providers work together to construct efficient cash transfer programs and minimize leakage.

Segovia, for example, provides the technology behind many cash transfer programs around the world. The company was started by the co-founders of Give Directly. In Liberia, Segovia is helping United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Save the Children distribute cash transfers to communities affected by the Ebola crisis. USAID (the paying agency) contracts with Save the Children to act as the implementing partner, collecting information on beneficiaries. The telecommunications company Lonestar Cell MTN acts as the payment provider, sending eMoney to beneficiaries. Segovia provides technology, including data analytics, to ensure that beneficiaries are paid in an efficient manner.

Figure 2 – Systems integrators

5 Remaining challenges

New technology has improved bulk payments efficiency. However, various technical, logistical, and political challenges remain. Many of these problems cannot be solved in isolation, but require an ecosystem-wide solution.

Technical issues:

Cash transfer program administrators often underestimate the technological barriers to switching from cash to e-payments, according to a study by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). These barriers include:

i) Cleaning enrolment data;

ii) gathering information for know your customer (KYC), and other regulatory standards, as well as;

iii) reconciling payment records among implementing partners.[13]

The basic elements of technology, including network coverage and electricity, remain unreliable in many parts of the world. This can cause serious problems for payment systems other than cash. If payments are consistently delayed or made impossible due to insufficient infrastructure, many beneficiaries will chose cash payments over a more technologically advanced solution. Even in Kenya, one of the most popular eMoney markets in the world, the World Food Program was forced to abandon eMoney in favour of a card-based program due to technological issues.[14]

Collecting more data can also create data security challenges. Information on refugees and cash transfer recipients can be dangerous if not secured properly. Some companies, including First Mile Geo, have created tools that automatically delete addressing information as soon as it is uploaded into the cloud.[15] Overall, however, organizations should minimize the amount of data that they collect, and be sure not to collect more data than they can secure.

Interoperability:

Interoperability is one of the biggest technical issues facing bulk payment providers. Closed-loop systems, where funds are limited to a single payment provider, provide limited utility. “The system should be an open loop,” according to the Gates Foundation’s Level One Project, “with the objective of encouraging all qualified participants to join.”[16]

When beneficiaries are able to use their own payment system, instead of being forced to use a closed-loop system, training is much easier. And if mobile operators have already enrolled beneficiaries, the job of enrolment is much easier. In this way, interoperability can improve leakage within bulk payment systems by making the system more efficient.

Without interoperability, the task of routing payments becomes much more complicated. For example, paying agencies may have to know the addressing information on the beneficiaries and their preferred financial institution in order to send the payment. If the beneficiary were to change financial institutions, that payment could get lost.

Logistical issues:

The first logistical issue faced by bulk payment providers is how to enrol beneficiaries in the system. New tools have made enrolment more efficient, but sending workers into the field to collect addressing information is still challenging.

Once that information is collected, organizations are forced to consider where to house and how to update the data. For many organizations, the data simply sits in Excel format on the internal servers. These databases can be difficult to access and update. Also, organizations often face a tradeoff between accessibility and security – the more accessible data is, the more difficult it is to secure that data.

Cash transfer programs can also require a massive staff. In the Philippines, cash transfer administrators were forced to hire 10,000 staff in order to manage the program.[17] Managing and training that many people on payments technology and procedures can be difficult.

Staff are not the only parties that require training. Beneficiaries, especially those with high illiteracy rates, may not understand basic security functions, including PIN or passwords.[18] Training is required, both in the technology and on the purposes of the program itself. In some contexts, beneficiaries saw the cash transfers as a “gift” and were loath to complain when the transfer didn’t arrive, or if there was misconduct at the pay points.[19]

Liquidity:

Providing liquidity – usable money – is a difficult but necessary aspect of an efficient bulk payment program. Generally speaking, beneficiaries receiving benefits through eMoney, smart cards, or vouchers – will immediately want to “cash out” the electronic payment. This is understandable, given that beneficiaries often live in a situation where the eMoney – on a card or in an eMoney wallet – cannot be spent at the merchants (shops or service providers) they patronize. (Note, the ITU DFS Focus Group has a number of reports addressing the particular problem of merchant payment enablement.)

This can create a logistical problem of how to reliably provide cash to recipients.

Many cash transfer programs rely on agents to act as intermediaries. In Malawi, Airtel Money relies on its banking partners to provide liquidity to agents during pre-determined days used for distribution. This process is resource-intensive and expensive.[20] The agents may be necessary to help beneficiaries. In this situation, however, “beneficiaries remain only passive users of the technology used to make payments,” according to the CGAP.[21]

Political issues:

The question of beneficiary enrolment is greatly eased in the presence of an effective and pervasive national ID system. National IDs enable more effective beneficiary identification, and provides a building block on which payment systems can build the “know your customer” (KYC) procedures. That said, national ID systems are inherently political. The Aadhaar system in India, for example, has faced pushback in the Indian courts over privacy concerns.[22]

Some countries have created tiered KYC regulations that ease beneficiary registration. Low-value transactions present a small risk to the overall financial system, so minimizing regulatory barriers to registration would allow better identification with very little downside. Colombia, for example, allows remote, paperless account opening for low-value accounts.[23]

The final issue is that governments are often slow to adopt new technology. Governments budget in cycles, and it is difficult to forecast budgets five years into the future. This makes it difficult to pay large amounts of upfront costs for technology. Segovia tries to overcome this hurdle by pricing based on usage, a structure that allows governments to pilot new bulk payment programs and grow the programs incrementally.

Risk management issues:

Systemic risk could become a substantial issue, especially as smaller or less structured entities seek to make bulk payments. Enabling relatively easy electronic disbursements from a central bank account creates a powerful target for others to unlawfully gain access to the cash. For example, an employee could transfer funds to multiple phones in small amounts that could then be cashed out relatively anonymously, or could transfer funds to numerous accounts in such small amounts that they may evade high level audits. External parties could also hack bulk payment systems. Payment system operators, DFSs providers, and regulators should cooperate to ensure appropriate controls against this risk. Note that biometrically authenticated end-user transaction accounts are a powerful mitigant of this risk.

Summary:

The biggest challenges still facing bulk payment programs include:

1) Liquidity: How to get usable money to beneficiaries, either through agent or ATM networks, or by enabling merchant payments acceptance.

2) Logistics: How to enrol beneficiaries.

3) Data management: How to build and maintain a digital registry of beneficiaries.

4) Systems integration: How to integrate the digital registry from the implementing partner into the payment provider network.

6 The next ten years: Using the DFSs ecosystem

New technologies will undoubtedly change how bulk payments are made over the next ten years. This section imagines what a bulk payment program could look like in the future.

There are three aspects of payment ecosystems that, for the purpose of this analysis, we assume will become widespread over the next ten years. Assuming they will be solved, countries could structure more efficient bulk payment programs. Those three aspects are:

Reliable and widespread biometric identification

Governments and bulk payment programs have already begun to incorporate fingerprint IDs and even iris scans into national IDs around the world. Since many poor people lack any other documentation, providing poor people with biometric IDs has become a building block for a bulk payments ecosystem. One study found that 230 programs in more than 80 countries are now deploying biometric information and payment systems.[24]

The Aadhaar program in India, for example, has collected biometric information on millions of people and assigned each person a unique identification number that corresponds to a government registry that includes the majority of Indian citizens. This identification number has already begun to enable payments through mobile wallet payment solutions like Oxigen.[25]

Though biometrics can help collect addressing information on nearly anyone, this data can be difficult to collect reliably. Machines that collect fingerprints and iris scans need to be kept clean, and field workers may require technical training. Once biometric data is collected, systems integrators are often needed to ensure the quality and accuracy of the data.

The consulting firm, Accenture, for example, has developed software for Biometric Identity Management Systems (BIMS) that eliminates duplicate entries from biometric databases, including face, finger, and iris. The Government of India uses Accenture for authentication in the Aadhaar program. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also contracted with Accenture to create the Unique Identity Service Platform (UISP), a biometric identity management system for registering refugees.[26] UISP integrates various biometric technology vendors into a single system that creates registries of refugees.

Over the next ten years, biometric national identification will be far more widespread. As technology improves, the collection of biometric information will be cheaper and easier for national governments. This information will also be used to make national payment systems more efficient.

Pervasive digital wallets reaching banked and unbanked customers

Digital wallets are already commonplace in many countries. At least 19 markets already have more digital money accounts than bank accounts, and the number of registered accounts grew by 47 per cent last year.[27] The number of registered digital wallets will likely continue to grow in the coming years as governments and mobile operators invest in digital money markets outreach.

To solve this issue, payment networks will likely have to incorporate merchants into any digital money system. Until digital money is widely accepted by merchants, beneficiaries will likely “cash out” any money transferred into their accounts. Making sure that cash is available to beneficiaries is one of the biggest logistical issues in cash transfers.

Once digital money is widely accepted, beneficiaries will be more likely to leave value inside of their digital wallets. This “digital liquidity” will allow all payment systems to operate more efficiently. Solving this problem will also make the job of payment providers much easier, by reducing the amount they have to spend on transporting cash to beneficiaries.

This analysis assumes that digital wallets will gain popularity over the next ten years. It also assumes that digital networks and electricity will be sufficient to handle pervasive digital wallets.

Interoperability between digital finance providers

At the end of 2015, seven markets had achieved some form of interoperability between digital money services. Over the next ten years, we anticipate that more countries will foster some type of interoperability between mobile money systems. Some markets may pursue bilateral approaches, while others may create centralized switching.

This analysis assumes that interoperability, pervasive digital wallets, and biometric identification will be commonplace. The question facing policymakers is how to structure a system that incorporates these technological changes to make bulk payment more efficient and effective.

7 Structuring the future

If countries are able to create the assumed changes, financial service providers could pool resources to create a centralized registry for addressing payments and national IDs. For example, when a payor sends a low-value bulk payment through the centralized switch, that switch could keep a constantly updated database of national IDs mapped to the beneficiary’s preferred financial service provider. In that way, the paying agency would need to know only the phone number or the national ID number to send the payment.

This centralized system could then be available to all players in the digital payments ecosystem. While G2P payments are the most likely first step toward growing the ecosystems, businesses with financial service providers could also connect through the same pathway to make salary payments and bulk payments to vendors.

There are a number of different ways this system could be structured. The most logical would be a centralized, cost-covering model, similar to what is envisioned with India’s Aadhaar and “JAM Trinity” program.

Figure 3 – Addressing payments

8 Country stories

Peru, Nigeria, and India are all pursuing payment ecosystems that resemble, in some way, this paper’s vision of an ideal bulk payment system. All three have created centralized switches enabled by national IDS. This section dives deeper into these three countries. The table below allows people to compare different systems, and to see how they compare to an ideal system. The similarities could point to models of how to structure bulk payment systems, while the differences could signal roadblocks or stepping stones on the road to an efficient system.

Table 1 – Country examples

Peru

Nigeria

India

Enabling platform

Billetera Movil (BiM)

Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS)

Immediate Payment Service (IMPS) and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI)

Bulk payment structure

Centralized switch

Centralized switch

Centralized switch

Platform structure

Immediate Push-Payment System

National electronic funds transfer (NEFT): Settled three times per day,
NAPS (Note): Instant Payments via USSD

Immediate push-payment system

Enabling identification

Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI, national ID)

Bank Verification Number (BVN)

Aadhaar National ID

Data collected in system

Phone number, national ID number, issuer code

BVN, bank account number

Phone number, Aadhaar (ID) number, bank account number, biometrics

Biometrics?

Collected on ID, not used in system

Fingerprint and facial image collected with BVN

Ten fingerprints and two iris scans collected with National ID

Database to map IDs to the financial institutions

Information collected at registration, held within BiM

The BVN database is owned by the central bank, housed inside NIBSS

The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) maintains a “central mapper” database that connects Aadhaar, mobile numbers, and bank account numbers

Ownership structure

51 per cent owned by the Peruvian Bankers Association (ASBANC), 49 per cent owned by participating banks

BVN database is housed in NIBSS. NIBSS is owned by all banks, including Central Bank.

Run by the NPCI, a nonprofit organization

Participation

Voluntary

Required for all banks and mobile money institutions

Voluntary

Open participation

Bank-led mobile money

Settlement to commercial banks only

Open to payments banks and regular banks

Platform providers

Ericsson

In house

In house

Financial service providers

15 e-money issuers are connected to the platform. All three major MNOs

All banks and e-money issuers are required to integrate

At least 29 banks have partnered with the NPCI

Current bulk payments usage

Testing platform for G2P payments, but requires agent-network growth

Not yet available for bulk payments to mobile wallets, but functionality planned

Plans to transition in-kind transfers into cash payments via the IMPS/UPI

NOTE – NAPS : Nigeria InterBank Settlement System Automated Payment Service

Peru summary:

Peru’s mobile money network, called BiM, or mobile wallet in Spanish – has been hailed as the first fully interoperable mobile money platform. The system operates as a central switch, connecting mobile networks and financial institutions in a way that closely resembles this report’s vision of an ideal bulk payments system.

Users of any of the three major telecommunications operators (Movistar, Claro, and Entel) can sign up with BiM. Participants are able to accept the BiM terms of service and choose their financial institution remotely from their phones when they register for the service.

The mobile network operators act as the implementing partners for the service, while the participating financial institutions act as the payment provider. Paying agencies will be able to route payments into the BiM system using a phone number or a national ID number. The BiM system will then map that information to the appropriate financial institution, using the issuer code based on the financial institution that participants chose during registration. A database held within BiM associates bank account numbers, phone numbers, and issuer codes.

Once the payment is received, all three MNOs share cash-in-cash-out points, so that the beneficiaries can exchange the credit for cash. The BiM system is currently working on building up this cash-in-cash-out network to enable better payments.

Nigeria summary:

Instead of creating an entirely new central switch, Nigeria chose to build off of the existing Nigerian Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS). This system uses the BVN as the central identifier for payments routed through the system. All bank accounts in Nigeria must be associated with a BVN. In fact, banks deactivated millions of accounts in 2015 in a registration drive to ensure that all bank accounts are associated with a BVN.

To send a bulk payment, a paying agency would simply have to know the BVN of the beneficiaries. The payment would then be routed to the NIBSS in a standardized format. The NIBSS maps that BVN to the appropriate account number by checking it against the BVN database, which is held within the NIBSS. NIBSS would then send the payment to the financial institution associated with that BVN.

Interestingly, while mobile wallets are connected into the NIBSS system, only commercial banks can perform the receiving function. There is no current way to send a bulk payment to a mobile wallet, though that is planned.

India summary:

The best known of the three systems is the IMPS in India. The massive biometric identification program known as Aadhaar, run by the Unique Identification Authority of India, acts as the implementing partner for bulk payments sent through the IMPS system. There are now at least 29 financial institutions currently acting as payment providers and enabling the payments.

With the release of the Unified Payments Interface, paying agencies now have a variety of choices when routing payments, including the bank account number, the phone number, the Aadhaar (national ID) number, and a “virtual payments address.” Virtual payment addresses give beneficiaries an identifier designed to mask people’s payment information for greater security. Hypothetically, the government could use any of these functions, or possibly biometric functionality (captured in Aadhaar) to route payments to beneficiaries.

Any one of these identifiers could be sent to the IMPS to affect a bulk payment. The IMPS then takes advantage of the NPCI’s “central mapper” to identify the beneficiary’s bank account number. Then, the IMPS could route that payment to the appropriate financial institution and account. Direct benefit transfers are one of the primary goals of the Aadhaar system, and the IMPS is already being used to disburse bulk payments. [28]

Overall:

The general use of a centralized, interoperable switch across all three markets points to a preference toward shared services in bulk payments. All three of these countries allow financial service providers to share the infrastructure of the centralized switch. This has the potential to create a more efficient system, where networks don’t need to create new bilateral connections to connect to different financial service providers. It could also allow for more competition in the system, if all financial service providers were to connect.

The three countries are pursuing different approaches to encouraging financial service providers to connect to the system. In Peru, the fact that the switch was created by the ASBANC encourages banks to connect. In Nigeria, the central bank simply mandated the connection. And in India, the immense magnitude of the Aadhaar project will encourage financial service providers to connect.

Finally, the fact that the Nigeria system does not currently allow payments to mobile wallets points to a roadblock on the way to an efficient system. Mobile wallets are expected to become important financial service providers for poor people around the world in the coming years. However, the difficulty in identifying mobile wallet users has prevented the NIBSS from sending money to these beneficiaries so far. That said, the country expects to roll out that functionality soon.

9 Considerations for financial policy makers

• A functioning national ID system appears to be the building block for any bulk payments ecosystem. Incorporating biometrics into the national ID system may be important for avoiding ghost beneficiaries and creating a more efficient bulk payment system. A financial industry ID system, such as in Nigeria, is a good alternative (or complement) to this.

• Governments should consider the value of creating a centralized directory to map national ID numbers to payment system account numbers. This system could incorporate all digital financial service providers, including banks and digital money systems run by mobile network operators. The directory could then update if the beneficiary were to change their preferred financial service provider. This would allow payers to more efficiently direct payments to beneficiaries.

• The “cash-out” problem of digital liquidity will likely remain a logistical issue for bulk payment programs. In the short-term, policymakers may consider ways to encourage the expansion of agent networks throughout markets. The best long-term solution for digital liquidity is that merchants need to accept digital money. Policymakers may want to consider means to encourage merchant acceptance of digital money by subsidizing credit through digital money or giving tax breaks to merchants that accept digital money.

• While the “cash-out” problem remains, governments and other paying agencies should be judicious in choosing the targets for bulk payment programs. Choosing to make supplemental payments, rather than critical-use payments, is a good entry point. Targeting beneficiary populations who live in urban areas, or areas where there are sufficient agent locations and/or ATMs, may also be useful.

Finally, it should be noted that the potential for digital bulk payments is actually much greater than the current volume of bulk payments being made. Many government and other paying agencies today provide benefits in kind (gas canisters, price supplements at merchants, etc.) rather than making cash payments, with all of their costs and complexities. As the digital financial ecosystem evolves to support fully electronic bulk payments, we expect to see some of these programs convert from in-kind benefits to payments.

[1] Hicken, Melanie. No more paper social security checks come March. CNN Money. January, 2013. http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/retirement/social-security-checks/.

[2] Aker, Jenny, Rachid Boumnijel, Amanda Mcclelland and Niall Tierney. Payment mechanisms and anti-poverty programs: evidence from a mobile money cash transfer experiment in Niger. Tufts University. August 2014. http://sites.tufts.edu/jennyaker/files/2010/02/Zap_-26aug2014.pdf

[3] Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. Building state capacity: evidence from biometric smartcards in India. UC San Diego. July 2015.

[4] Zimmerman, Jamie, Kristy Bohling, and Sarah Rotman Parker. Electronic G2P payments: evidence from four lower income countries. CGAP. April 2014.

[5] Aker, et al. 2014.

[6] Pasricha, Nicole and Khurram Revzi. After Watan: the contributions of a G2P payments program to building a branchless banking industry. mennonite economic development associates. September 2013.

[7] Pickens, Mark. David Porteous and Sarah Rotman. Banking the poor via G2P payments. CGAP December 2009.

[8] iFormBuilder website: https://www.iformbuilder.com.

[9] Red rose Website: https://www.redrosecps.com/.

[10] Last mile mobile solutions website: http://www.lastmilemobilesolutions.com.

[11] Arnold, Catherine, Tim Conway, and Matthew Greenslade. Cash transfers evidence paper, department for international development. April, 2011.

[12] Haushofer, Johannes, and Jeremy Shapiro. Household response to income changes: Evidence from an unconditional cash transfer program in Kenya. Innovations for poverty action. April, 2015.

[13] CGAP 2014.

[14] Zimmerman, Jamie and Kristy Bohling. Cash for assets: world food programme’s exploration of the in-kind to e-payments shift for food assistance in Kenya. CGAP. September, 2013.

[15] First mile geo website: https://www.firstmilegeo.com/

[16] The level one project guide. The bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 2015.

[17] Zimmerman, Bohling, and Rotman Parker. CGAP. 2014.

[18] Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar. UC San Diego. 2015.

[19] Zimmerman, Bohling, and Rotman Parker. CGAP. 2014.

[20] Almazan, Mireya. G2P payments & Mobile Money: Opportunity or Red Herring? GSMA. September, 2013.

[21] Linking Electronic Payments and Social Cash Transfers in India. CGAP. December, 2013.

[22] Anand, Utkarsh. Right to privacy concerns: Aadhaar holder can block his biometric info, Govt tells Supreme Court. The Indian Express. October, 2015.

[23] Almazan. GSMA. 2013.

[24] Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar. UC San Diego. 2015.

[25] Oxigen Website: https://www.oxigenwallet.com/

[26] UNHCR: Identity management system uses biometrics to better serve refugees. Accenture. https://www.accenture.com/us-en/success-unhcr-innovative-identity-management-system.aspx

[27] 2015 State of the industry report mobile money. GSMA. February, 2016.

[28] Unified payments interface, API and technology specifications, national payments corporation of India, February, 2016.

XI Over the counter transactions: A threat to or a facilitator for digital finance ecosystems?

About this report

This report is by the ITU DFS Focus Group – Ecosystem Working Group. The authors of this report are Anup Singh and Graham A. N. Wright, with review by Mike McCaffrey, Cecily Northup, and Carol Coye Benson.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Executive summary

The digital finance industry is both young and dynamic, and as it grows, it is constantly innovating to address the issues it faces. One of the key contemporary issues is over the counter (OTC) transactions. The delivery of mobile money over the counter raises a number of questions since it can: 1) limit product and ecosystem evolution; 2) decrease provider profitability; and 3) lead to unregistered transactions, which run the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.

This report explores these questions and, with the help of data from the Helix Institute, InterMedia, and the Groupe Spécial Mobile Association (GSMA), provides an analytical perspective on the pros and cons of the OTC to arrive at conclusions and key considerations which move the industry forward.

The report begins with an all-inclusive definition of OTC which considers the typology of different types of OTCs based on the different usage behaviours. In the next section, key concerns that the industry has, and validity of these concerns with respect to OTC methodology have been analysed. The authors of this report argue that certain types of OTC should be seen as a stepping stone to mobile money account adoption and usage. Lastly, the report presents the conclusion and highlights four key considerations for the industry to mull over which would accommodate the preferences of all stakeholders, namely users, agents, providers and regulators, given the data presented and some of the new developments in the field.

1 Introduction

The digital finance industry is both young and dynamic, and as it grows, it is constantly innovating to address the issues it faces. One of the key contemporary issues is over the counter (OTC) transactions. The delivery of mobile money over the counter raises a number of questions since it can: 1) limit product and ecosystem evolution; 2) decrease provider profitability; and 3) lead to unregistered transactions, which run the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.

OTC is a new work stream effort in the Ecosystem Working Group of the ITU DFS. In this report, we want to look more closely at these questions and, with the help of data from The Helix Institute, InterMedia, and the GSMA, provide an analytical perspective on the pros and cons of the OTC to arrive at conclusions and key considerations to move the industry forward.

2 What and why of OTC transactions?

2.1 Defining OTC transactions

Unfortunately, as with any new concept, OTC transaction is still poorly defined, as the GSMA and MicroSave have pointed this out in previous blogs and reports[1].

In this report we define an OTC transaction as “a transaction that the agent conducts on behalf of a sender/recipient or both from either the sender’s or agent’s mobile money account.” This definition includes both transactions conducted by agents from their own accounts on behalf of senders, as is the case in Pakistan, as well as agent-assisted transactions that are popular in sub-Saharan Africa,[2] where many senders and recipients already have mobile money accounts, but are assisted by the agent to make their transactions. These agent-assisted transactions are made from the sender’s accounts, and do not involve the agent’s account.

We want to further distinguish between “formal” methods approved by the provider and regulator (as is the case in Pakistan and Zambia), and “informal” methods (prevalent in Bangladesh, India and elsewhere), which are frowned upon by regulators and disliked by providers to differing degrees. One informal method common in sub-Saharan Africa is direct deposit, where the sender gives the agent cash, and the agent transfers it directly to a recipient’s mobile money account, thus circumventing the P2P transfer that the user would have made.

We add a second dimension to the definition of OTC, based on whether sender/recipient are identified at the point of transaction either through their mobile money accounts, or an identification card. In Pakistan[3], sender/recipient must bring their original identification document with a copy to make a transaction. In East Africa, many senders conduct agent-assisted transactions where they come to the agent with their mobile phone, they give their mobile phone to the agent, and in many cases disclose their PIN and request the agent to conduct the transaction for them. Such agent-assisted transactions happen usually because either the senders do not have the level of comfort or lack technical literacy to do it themselves[4]. The sender can be considered identified, as the transaction is made over their registered mobile money account and they provide the PIN to authorise it.

To clarify, we have added Table 1 to anchor the discussion and further expand the definition of OTC.

Table 1 – Typologies of OTC transaction and its prevalence

Level of formality

Approved by regulators (formal)

Not approved by regulators (informal)

Sender and/or

recipient’s identification

Identified

OTC services in Pakistan, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras

Transactions done at the bank branch

Agent-assisted transactions in East Africa

Not identified

No known examples

Direct deposits in sub-Saharan Africa, India, and Bangladesh

Another way to look at OTC is to analyse the parties involved in the transaction. Any transaction may take one of the following forms:

Table 2 – Defining OTC transaction using the parties involved approach[5]

Recipient

Mobile money account

No mobile money account

Mobile money account with agent assistance

Sender

Mobile money account

Not OTC

Partial OTC:
Direct withdrawal

Agent assisted OTC:
Wallet transaction

No mobile money account

Partial OTC:
Direct deposits

Pure OTC

Partial OTC: Direct deposits

Mobile money account with agent assistance

Agent assisted OTC:
Wallet transaction

Partial OTC: Direct withdrawal

Agent assisted OTC:
Wallet transaction

While a transaction involving agents (even a person who is not a formal agent) for sender and receiver without a mobile money account is a form of pure OTC, transactions involving the agent’s assistance at either the sender’s or receiver’s end should also be considered as OTC. This framework includes situations where either the sender or recipient, or both, may or may not have a mobile money account. We find the combination of the broad definitions used earlier with the simple frameworks developed a helpful departure point for a deeper discussion on this controversial topic.

2.2 Prevalence of OTC

OTC’s relative ease of implementation and practical usefulness to mobile money users has made it attractive for providers trying to build transaction volumes quickly. OTC transactions are prevalent across deployments in a number of markets, including Bangladesh, Ghana, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

The GSMA reported that in June 2015, at least 37.4 million unregistered mobile money users performed an OTC transaction. Further, 29 service providers reported that most of their transactions were OTC – most of these services (45 per cent) are based in South Asia and 28 per cent are based in sub-Saharan Africa.[6] OTC represented 14.4 per cent of the total global value of mobile money transactions in June 2015, and person-to-person (P2P) transfers remained the predominant use case.[7]

In 2013, the Agent Network Accelerator (ANA) surveys by The Helix Institute showed that 23 per cent of agents in Tanzania[8], 30 per cent in Uganda[9], (although only 3 per cent in Kenya[10]) were offering direct deposits. Direct deposits are also prevalent in West Africa.

3 Are OTC as problematic as we thought?

In the previous section, we created an inclusive definition for OTC, based on the different usage behaviours we see, and then developed a simple framework for thinking about how each of them should be treated. In this section, we highlight the key concerns that the industry has and analyse how valid these concerns are with respect to the OTC methodology.

3.1 Problem 1: OTC increase anti-money laundering (AML) / combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) risks

Informal OTC transactions, where either the sender or recipient or both are not identified, can increase the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.[11] To date, regulators may take two approaches to mitigate this risk: a) formalise this type of OTC so that it can be regulated within a market, or b) ban it altogether. We find the latter option overly prescriptive and favour giving the providers, and the mobile money users, the opportunity to choose. Principle 8 of the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion[12] states that regulators and providers alike should build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks involved in such innovative products and services, and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in existing regulation. Thus, while it is important to stipulate that both the sender and recipient (in a P2P transaction) must be identified to mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing risks, whether or not account registration is part of that process should be left to the market to determine.

3.2 Problem 2: OTC limits product evolution

By registering and activating mobile money users, providers can use mobile money accounts as a conduit to offer mobile money users more products, catalysing a more robust ecosystem. This, in turn, both generates more revenue for the provider, and more value for the client, as these services can better address their financial needs. Furthermore, services that successfully build mature, ecosystem-based deployments can expect healthy profit margins of more than 20 per cent and cash flow margins which exceed 15 per cent.[13] However, there is some industry concern around how OTC limits this product evolution.[14]

In 2015, the GSMA reported that airtime top-ups, bill payments, and P2P transfers globally accounted for 96 per cent of transaction volumes and 87 per cent of values.[15] OTC allows for all three of these transaction types, as long as the transactions are made at the agent.

Other mobile financial services products, such as mobile credit, savings, and insurance, often do require a mobile money account, and are innovative evolutions building on mobile money. For example, in Kenya, sophisticated and successful financial products like M-Shwari, KCB M-PESA Account, Lipa na M-PESA and M-Ledger require an existing M-PESA account. However, these products came five years[16] after M-PESA’s launch. As a result, one may consider OTC an appropriate tool to promote adoption and familiarity with mobile money for early use cases (airtime top-up, P2P, bill payments); and when additional use cases (credit, savings, insurance) are made available that require an account, end users, who have already been familiarised with the early product, may be more compelled and able to register for an account.

This approach would not preclude collecting data on their preferences and usage during an initial period of OTC, either. As mentioned above, formal OTC requires mobile money users to provide identification (to send or to receive), and allows providers to collect similar data that they would be able to, if they were making account-based transactions.

Moreover, in some instances, slow growth rates with new products and services may mean that active agent assistance might be needed[17] to sell the products to the mass market. This may suggest that the optimal time to register mobile money users might actually be upon launch of an account-based product that requires agent promotion. While some argue that agents would not want to do this, given the high revenue[18] they earn from OTC, The Helix 2014 Pakistan Country Report[19] shows that only 26 per cent of agents surveyed felt this way, with the other 74 per cent willing to conduct mobile money user registrations for mobile money accounts.[20] Therefore, given the right incentives, agents may be more willing to help with registrations than commonly thought. They also provide trusted advice to the mobile money users which helps introduce new products and services to the mass market.

3.3 Problem 3: Beginning with OTC locks you into the model

While OTC usage may bring benefits to overcoming the initial mobile money user barriers to using a mobile money account, such as lack of requisite numeracy/literacy, fear and lack of trust in digital financial services (DFSs), complicated user interfaces etc., it is argued that it will be much harder to transition users to mobile money accounts at a later stage, as the OTC users and agents become accustomed to OTC transactions.[21]

In their 2015 report, the GSMA found that the growth of mobile money users transacting OTC has decelerated since 2013.[22] The annualised growth rate for the number of the OTC users was 22 per cent in 2015, compared to 33 per cent in 2014 and 102 per cent in 2013.[23] Further, in South Asia, where OTC usage is especially high, the 19 per cent year-on-year growth of OTC is less compared to the 46.6 per cent growth in registered accounts in the region. Moreover, in Bangladesh, 55 per cent of registered mobile money users started using OTC and then subsequently registered for a mobile money account. [24]To the GSMA, this suggests that the increased focus of providers to migrate OTC users to use mobile money accounts is bearing fruit.[25]

Further, over the past few years we have seen industry-leading numbers of account registrations in both Bangladesh, and Pakistan where OTC is prevalent. These numbers are often overshadowed by OTC usage, but they illustrate that offering OTC does not limit providers from expanding adoption of mobile money accounts. For instance, bKash had an estimated 3.5 to 4.4 million active accounts[26] (30-day basis) in August 2014. Further, Pakistan’s biometric SIM registration drive looks like it could be driving impressive growth in account registrations (see Figure 1). In addition, GSMA has pointed out that providers in Pakistan have also made significant investments in ecosystem and interoperability initiatives to make accounts more compelling to consumers.[27]

Compiling data from The State Bank of Pakistan, we note that in March 2015, account registration grew 39 per cent from the previous quarter, to reach over 7.5 million registered accounts (around 7 per cent of SIM holders in Pakistan). Riding on the same growth wave in October 2015[28], the number of registered mobile accounts in Pakistan increased to about 13.2 million, of which approximately 39 per cent are active on a 90-day basis, and 25 per cent are active on a 180-day basis. These large numbers are certainly buttressed by the large populations in these South Asian countries, but ample credit should also be given to the providers, as other populous countries like India, Nigeria, and Indonesia show us that large populations do not necessarily result in robust growth in digital finance.

Figure 1 – Account registration in Pakistan (Q4, 2011 to Q1, 2015)

Source: Branchless Banking Newsletter, State Bank of Pakistan Available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/branchless.htm

The Pakistan numbers are interesting not only for the steady growth they have shown in branchless banking account registrations since 2011,[29] but also for the last quarter results, where providers showed a marked increase in account registrations, particularly riding on the back of SIM registration drives underway to use SIM KYC to open accounts.[30] MobiCash also issued a press release in December 2015 noting a 20-fold increase in active mobile money accounts on a 30-day basis, growing from 25,000 in April 2015 to 500,000 in December 2015, incentivising mobile money users by giving free airtime on every cash-in.[31]

A similar trend is also seen in Bangladesh,[32] where account registrations have significantly increased (see Figure 2). However, these wallets are not being used: Active accounts appear to have grown more slowly.

Figure 2 – Account registration in Bangladesh (Jan-2014 to Oct-2015)

Source: Mobile Financial Services (MFS) comparative summary statement, Bangladesh Bank Available at: https://www.bb.org.bd/fnansys/paymentsys/mfsdata.php

These account registration numbers in Pakistan and Bangladesh (which are primarily OTC markets) are impressive and illustrate that while OTC is the main method in both of these countries, it does not prevent growth in account registrations.

Registration is important for product evolution, building an ecosystem, and achieving full financial inclusion as previously discussed, but registration campaigns may be most optimally sequenced after launch. This would allow providers to target specific user segments with tailored value added services via the mobile money account, which may well result in much higher levels of revenue-generating use.

3.4 Problem 4: OTC reduce provider’s profitability

GSMA has pointed out that some revenue streams can decrease with OTC[33] however, a comprehensive analysis on the impact of OTC on total revenue and profit is currently missing from the industry discussion. Two important factors impact the profitability of an OTC deployment: 1) Increased costs of operation, including agent commissions in competitive markets like Pakistan, where the OTC methodology has given the agents extraordinary power[34] over the providers and has led to providers having to pay higher commissions than the revenue they earn from cash-in or cash-out transactions[35]. 2) Loss of revenue from other high-revenue transactions in markets like East Africa, where, generally, mobile money account-based service provider operators offer account-based mobile money and earn the highest margins from P2P transfers (as opposed to cash-in or cash-out transactions); so prevalence of direct deposits in such markets lead to decreased margins for the providers.[36] While this might encourage providers not to offer OTC at all, the question remains: If OTC users were not offered the opportunity to transact using OTC methods, would they use the system at all, and if so, how would it affect their rate of adoption?

An accurate analysis of the impact of OTC on total revenues should also consider some of the benefits it offers. Pakistani and Latin American providers have used OTC models from the beginning, and this has resulted in reaching high volumes of transactions relatively quickly.

While there are clear examples of how OTC can decrease profits due to agent commissions[37], it can also help increase the volume of transactions in the short term as no SIM or phone is required to transact, and might even be able to appeal to a larger market of mobile money users who are not interested in accounts because they fear that they might get locked into using one. Both of which would increase revenue for the provider. As a result, a comprehensive analysis on the impact of OTC on total revenue and profit should be undertaken.

3.5 Problem 5: OTC creates volatility in market share

As EasyPaisa[38] realised when it launched in Pakistan, OTC transactions do not require the user to have a specific SIM card in their phone; in fact, it does not require them to have a SIM card, or even a mobile phone. This makes the potential market much larger, and means that providers can conduct transactions for the subscribers of their competitors. While this can be an advantage for an early adopter in the beginning, as their rivals employ the same tactics, it quickly turns into an issue. The barrier to entry for subsequent providers is much lower than it would be if the market ran on a registered account basis. Competitors can approach agents and offer them a better commission for selling their service instead. In economic terms, the service offered is “substitutable”.[39]

This is certainly a disadvantage, and very much how the market has evolved, particularly around agent commissions, in Pakistan.[40] However, in Bangladesh we do not observe this trend at all, and in 2014 when InterMedia interviewed 1,209 unregistered mobile money users, 94 per cent of them reported using bKash, meaning that even in this heavily OTC-based market with many competitors, bKash has managed to maintain extreme dominance. This means while an OTC methodology theoretically could result in high client churn, it is certainly not an inevitable outcome in some markets.

4 The irony of OTC: It’s client-centric

A mobile money user may have a mobile money account, yet forget their identification and decide to ask the agent to conduct an informal OTC transaction. And yet, the next time, the same mobile money user might have their identification, but there is a line at the agent, or the system is down, so they leave their cash with the agent to conduct an OTC transaction for them at a later time. These types of behaviours make trying to understand usage of OTC difficult. Further research into this area is certainly warranted. We have outlined some early conclusions and considerations based on current data below.

In Bangladesh, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda, where OTC is offered in addition to mobile money accounts, the majority of mobile money users seem to prefer OTC.[41] This appears to be driven by two factors: 1) Needs based behaviour: when asked why they prefer OTC,[42] generally users respond by saying OTC fulfils their needs, and do not cite reasons related to the awareness of mobile money accounts, or issues with registering. Indeed many implicitly or explicitly refer to service and risk related issues as the reason why they prefer to use an agent to make the transaction.) Service promotion: In countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, the service providers also promote OTC more than the mobile money account.

To further understand why users prefer OTC to registering for accounts in some markets, a market segmentation of account adoption can provide a helpful context.

4.1 Market segmentation of account adoption

Generally, we can segment the market into three large groups:

1. Innovators and early adopters that are quick to use the service (usually young, urban, salaried males, who are likely to register early when given an OTC option);

2. The early and late majority that usually come later and take some convincing. (A bigger portion of the population, but probably not as wealthy as the innovators and early adopters. They will likely register but it is unclear if an OTC option will increase or decrease that timeline); and

3. Late adopters, or those who are never going to adopt (Impoverished, rural, women, and illiterate populations which in many countries can be the majority of the population), who may not perceive a need for a mobile money account, even once they understand it, but might want to make the occasional transaction over the system, and may be enticed by future, more appropriate, products. They will likely be more comfortable transacting with an agent, may not see utility in registering for a mobile money account, and even if they are forced to, will probably just use it at an agent location anyway for the foreseeable future.

InterMedia[43] (2016), provides a helpful glance across five leading markets, noting digital finance usage as a proportion of the population in the pie charts, and then segmenting further into registered and non-registered (OTC) usage in the figure below.

Figure 3 – Mobile money usage and registrations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Bangladesh and Pakistan

Source: InterMedia 2016, Available at: http://finclusion.org/uploads/file/2016%20InterMedia%20FII%20CONVERTING%20TO%20USE%20poster.pdf

Interestingly, 57 per cent of registered mobile money users in Uganda, and 54 per cent of registered mobile money users in Kenya reported they preferred to “use OTC via an agent”. It is important to note that these are preferences, and that it is still unclear how strongly they translate into action: meaning, while they might prefer OTC, they actually use their m-wallets, because OTC transactions are discouraged by providers in Uganda, and most providers in Tanzania.

Comparing the above figure to the market segmentation of account adoption, we can say that innovators and early adopters in all countries are likely to be already using mobile money. In East Africa, they are likely all registered for mobile money accounts, and in Bangladesh there may be a mix of registered and unregistered mobile money users, while in Pakistan they are still largely unregistered mobile money users transacting OTC.

Examining client demand for the innovators and early adopters in these markets (the first 15-20 per cent of the market to start using the service), in all leading markets, apart from Pakistan, it appears this demographic is mostly registered mobile money users. The InterMedia 2014 Bangladesh Report notes registered mobile money users were young, male, urban, and banked, which is a similar demographic to innovators and early adopters of M-PESA in Kenya.

The reasons why Pakistan’s innovators and early adopters have not registered for accounts are unclear, but probably have to do with a lack of focus on account registration, coupled with aggressive marketing of the OTC model; whereas in Bangladesh, providers do not market the OTC model, as it is informal. We expect the numbers to change in Pakistan, as a result of the large biometric SIM registration drives that have happened since InterMedia’s data was collected.

The early and late majority are much more complicated and important, given that they are a much larger segment. The early and late majority are also mostly registered in East Africa; however, they likely account for the lion’s share of unregistered usage there, too. In Kenya, there are 21 per cent of adults who are still not using the system, of which many would be early and late majority. In South Asia, early and late majority probably account for a small portion of the registered mobile money users. The majority of early and late majority in both Bangladesh and Pakistan are unregistered mobile money users or non-users. Brad Jones wrote an article[44] on this, calling the term “mobile money” a misnomer in Asia, where he notes the reliance is so heavy on OTC that it should really be called, “Agent Money”. He notes that at Wing Cambodia, where he used to work, they introduced formal OTC after launching wallets, and it accounted for an estimated 90 per cent of transactions.

To conclude, in a market-led environment, service delivery should be determined by demand. Because of this, OTC, ironically, is client-centric, as mobile money users prefer it to accounts to fulfil their needs. Mobile money users rarely cite reasons related to the awareness of mobile money accounts, or issues with registering, as their basis for not opening accounts. The innovators and early adopters will likely refrain from registration when it isn’t actively marketed, but may be very willing to do so when it is, even given an OTC option. The early and late majority, when given the ability to choose, will still prefer to conduct OTC transactions at an agent, rather than via an account.

5 Supply-side perspective for banks and third parties

One of the important drivers of OTC in Asia actually comes from the supply side. Many of the Asian regulatory environments dictate that mobile network operators (MNOs) cannot own the DFS. Wing started as part of ANZ Bank, bKash is a subsidiary of BRAC Bank; and, even in Pakistan, where MNOs run the strategic operations of most of the services, they still have to either partner with a bank, or obtain a banking licence.

Most Asian providers have a partnership with a bank or a banking licence and offer fully mapped mobile money accounts. The differentiation between fully mapped mobile money accounts (which banks can offer, along with their value add of branding/trust and product differentiation) and MNOs’ mobile money accounts is that the MNOs cannot intermediate the funds. For banks, it is of particular interest to have people register and save – so that they have more funds to intermediate. However, given the cost of managing an account on a core banking system, banks need substantial deposit balances, typically held in savings rather than transaction accounts, to cover their costs. Banks can generate revenue by holding people’s money and investing it, and therefore do not focus so much on transaction account-based revenue. Thus, they do not put much emphasis on how a transaction is made (whether via OTC or via a mobile money account). However, in the case of OTC, the money is not held in any account.

A similar argument holds true for third-party providers that offer services as that of Asian providers. Third parties effectively control the agents, and are charged a fee when they, or their mobile money users, use an unstructured supplementary service data (USSD) or short message service (SMS) channel to conduct transactions. They, therefore, also have a much lower need to push an m-wallet-based transaction method, and are more likely to choose an OTC model and price their services accordingly.

In contrast to South Asian MNOs, East African MNOs must keep the e-value they hold for mobile money users in a trust account and do not earn revenue from it, so they charge fees on transactions made over the system to generate revenue. To get money into the system, they usually do not change a fee for cash-in, but they still pay the agent a commission, so it is a loss-making transaction. East African providers do make money when the mobile money user cashes out, but it is split with the agent. So the real margins they make are on the P2P transfers, or bill pay transfers that happen from a mobile money account. Perhaps that is why East African operators are aggressive about registering mobile money users and curbing the use of OTC.

6 Conclusions

The industry and stakeholders have expressed concerns around OTC causing: Increased AML/CFT risks, decreased provider revenue, locking providers into the model, limiting product evolution, and creating volatility in market shares for the providers. As analysed in the previous sections, we conclude the following:

• Pure OTC and partial OTC lacking identification of either the sender, the recipient, or both, may increase the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing. However, this should not mean that the regulators should ban OTCs altogether. Instead, the regulators may formalise OTC transactions to ensure that both the sender and the recipient (for a P2P transaction) can be identified. Also, the regulators should let the market decide the nuances of the registration processes.

• OTC is often seen as limiting product evolution. However, OTC may be an appropriate tool to promote adoption and familiarity with mobile money for early use cases. This approach does not preclude providers from collecting data on the preferences and usage of the mobile money users during an initial period of OTC. The data thus collected may be used to develop additional use cases around credit, savings, and insurance and can be pushed through a mobile money account. The end users, thus having already been familiarised with the early use cases, may be more compelled, and able, to register for an account.

• Industry experts argue that it is much harder to transition pure and partial OTC users to mobile money accounts at a later stage, as the OTC users and agents become accustomed to OTC transactions. However, it is noteworthy that most providers offering OTC also offer mobile money account registration at the same time. For most providers, mobile money account use and OTC use grows in tandem. The industry-leading numbers of account registrations in both Bangladesh and Pakistan, where OTC is prevalent, illustrate that OTC does not prevent growth in account registrations.

• Registration for accounts is important for product evolution and building an ecosystem. However, in some cases, depending upon the market conditions, registration campaigns may be most optimally sequenced after launch, as it would allow providers to target specific user segments with tailored value added services.

• Pure OTC transactions lead to a considerable reduction in profits for the providers because of higher operational costs. However, it is compensated for by the fact that OTC models have resulted in an increased number of transactions and is appealing enough for a segment of mobile money users who are not interested in accounts.

Table 3 – Stakeholder pros and cons

Stakeholder

Pros

Cons

Regulators and

policy-makers

OTC can catalyse uptake and access to financial services, which is a common goal of regulators. Further, allowing a formal method to exist can reduce the risks inherent in informal methods.

If there is not a formalised methodology, as mobile money user identity is unknown, and informal ones especially could lead to AML/CFT risks.

Providers

In some markets, OTC may be an easy way to grow usage quickly from the start, especially if the provider’s market share in their core business is not dominant, and could be the only way of reaching early and late majority quickly.

For the subset of mobile money users that would have made a mobile money account-based transaction (as opposed to just not using the system), there is a reduction in profits, as OTC models are easier for competitors to copy and could potentially start an agent commission war. In addition, it can be hard to transition from an OTC model to a mobile money account- based model.

Agents

Agents are able to provide the service in a way that many people are demanding, and it can often mean more revenue per transaction for them.

Mobile money users

If mobile money users feel uncomfortable with the system, agents can conduct the transaction for them, and they are not forced to register for a mobile money account for which they might not perceive a need.

With informal methods, mobile money users are usually exposed to extra charges from agents, and if they do not have an account, they may not be able to access more value-added services as the provider deploys them.

To assess the issues from the perspectives of all stakeholders involved that balance: 1) Existing users’ preference for OTC options; 2) Regulators’ requirements to have such users identified; 3) Providers’ desire to constantly evolve product offerings through an account; and 4) Agents’ need to earn a decent margin from the business. For the industry to systematically address this issue, we have outlined the pros and cons for each of these stakeholders in table 3.

There are four key considerations to accommodate these preferences in existing digital systems to help move the industry forward. These are:

1. Should policy makers and regulators formalise OTC in markets where it is prevalent to avoid unknown transactions and cover AML/CFT risks?

2. Is there a scope for the use of technology to efficiently identify and verify senders and recipients to allow OTC usage?

3. How can the industry introduce and implement mobile money accounts in the markets in parallel to OTC to efficiently migrate the mobile money users?

4. How can the industry segment the market to develop customer-centric products and services to encourage registered usage of mobile money accounts?

XII DFS Glossary

About this report

This report was written by Carol Benson and Nils Clotteau with input from Cecily Northup, Trevor Zimmer and Yuri Grin. The report was reviewed by the DFS Ecosystem Working Group.

If you would like to provide any additional information, please contact Vijay Mauree at tsbfgdfs@itu.int

Digital Financial Services (DFS) Glossary

This glossary is a compilation of terms commonly used in the area of digital financial services and an explanation of what these terms mean.

The terms are grouped by category, rather than alphabetically. There are 7 main categories as shown in the table below.

Category

Scope

Concepts

Ideas or high level abstractions relevant to digital financial services for financial inclusion

Infrastructure

The core systems and capabilities that enable DFS transactions

Products and services

Products and services provided to end-users of digital financial services.

Use cases

Situations in which DFS services are used.

Roles

Entities involved in the provision of DFS products and services.

Processes

Supporting processes which are necessary parts of the DFS Ecosystem

Technology

Enabling technologies used in the DFS Ecosystem

The table below provides the definitions of the terms.

Term

Alternative and Related Terms

Definition

A note on using this glossary: terms are grouped by category, rather than alphabetically. Search within the document to find the term you are looking for.

Concepts

Ideas or high level abstractions relevant to digital financial services for financial inclusion

Ecosystem

Digital Financial Services

Mobile Financial Services

Digital financial services include methods to electronically store and transfer funds; to make and receive payments; to borrow, save, insure and invest; and to manage a person's or enterprise's finances.

Digital Liquidity

A state in which a consumer is willing to leave funds (eMoney or bank deposits) in electronic form, rather than performing a "cash-out".

Financial Inclusion

The sustainable provision of affordable digital financial services that bring the poor into the formal economy.

FinTech

A term that refers to the companies providing software, services, and products for digital financial services: often used in reference to newer technologies.

Bank-Led Model

Bank-Centric Model

A reference to a system in which banks are the primary providers of digital financial services to end users. National law may require this.

Non-Bank-Led Model

MNO-Led Model

A reference to a system in which non-banks (e.g Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)) are the providers of digital financial services to end users. Non-banks typically need to meet criteria established by national law and enforced by regulators.

Identity

National Identity, Financial Identity, Digital Identity

A credential of some sort that identifies an end user. National identities are issued by national governments. In some countries, a financial identity is issued by financial service providers.

mCommerce

eCommerce

Refers to buying or selling in a remote fashion: by phone or tablet (mCommerce) or by computer (eCommerce).

Unbanked

Underbanked, Underserved

Unbanked people do not have a transaction account. Underbanked people may have a transaction account but do not actively use it. Underserved is a broad term referring to people who are the targets of financial inclusion initiatives. It is also sometimes used to refer to a person who has a transaction account but does not have additional DFS services.

Financial Literacy

Consumers and businesses having essential financial skills, such as preparing a family budget or an understanding of concepts such as the time value of money, the use of a DFS product or service, or the ability to apply for such a service.

Agent Till

Registered agent

An agent till is a provider-issued registered “line”, either a special SIM card or a POS machine, used to perform enrolment and cash-in and cash-out transactions for clients. National law dictates which financial service providers can issue agent tills.

Agent Outlet

Access point

A physical location that carries one or more agent tills, enabling it to perform enrolment as well as cash-in and cash-out transactions for customers on behalf of one or more providers. National law defines whether an agent outlet may remain exclusive to one provider. Agent outlets may have other businesses and support functions.

Accounts

Related to transaction accounts which hold end-users funds

eMoney

eFloat, Float, Mobile Money, Electronic Money, Prepaid Cards

A record of funds or value available to a consumer stored on a payment device such as chip, prepaid cards, mobile phones, or on computer systems as a non-traditional account with a banking or non-banking entity.

Access Point

POS ("Point of Sale"), Customer Access Point, ATM, Branch

Places or capabilities that are used to initiate or receive a payment. Access points can include bank branch offices, ATMs, terminals at the POS, agent outlets, mobile phones, and computers.

Liquidity

Agent Liquidity

The availability of liquid assets to support an obligation. Banks and non-bank providers need liquidity to meet their obligations. Agents need liquidity to meet cash-out transactions by consumers and small merchants.

Float

This term can mean a variety of different things. In banking, float is created when one party's account is debited or credited at a different time than the counterparty to the transaction. eMoney, as an obligation of a non-bank provider, is sometimes referred to as float.

Escrow

Funds Isolation, Funds Safeguarding, Custodian Account, Trust Account.

A means of holding funds for the benefit of another party. eMoney Issuers are usually required by law to hold the value of end users' eMoney accounts at a bank, typically in a Trust Account. This accomplishes the goals of funds isolation and funds safeguarding.

Deposit Guarantee System

Deposit Insurance

A fund that insures the deposits of account holders at a provider; often a government function used specifically for bank accounts.

Bundling

Packaging, Tying

A business model in which a provider groups a collection of services into one product which an end user agrees to buy or use.

Transaction Cost

The cost to a DFS provider of delivering a digital financial service. This could be for a bundle of services (e.g. a "wallet") or for individual transactions.

Payments

Related to transactions which transfer value from one end party to another.

Digital Payment

Mobile Payment, Electronic Funds Transfer

A broad term including any payment which is executed electronically. Includes payments which are initiated by mobile phone or computer. Card payments in some circumstances are considered to be digital payments. The term "mobile payment" is equally broad, and includes a wide variety of transaction types which use a mobile phone in some way.

Immediate Funds Transfer

Real Time

A digital payment which is received by the payee almost immediately upon the payer initiating the transaction.

Pull Payments

A payment type which is initiated by the payee: typically a merchant or payment acceptor, whose provider "pulls" the funds out of the payer's account at the payer's provider.

Push Payments

A payment type which is initiated by the payer, who instructs their provider to debit their account and "push" the funds to the receiving payee at the payee's provider.

Open-Loop

A payment system or scheme designed for multiple providers to participate in. Payment system rules or national law may restrict participation to certain classes of providers.

Closed-Loop

A payment system used by a single provider, or a very tightly constrained group of providers.

Interoperability

Interconnectivity

When payment systems are interoperable, they allow two or more proprietary platforms or even different products to interact seamlessly. The result is the ability to exchange payments transactions between and among providers. This can be done by providers participating in a scheme, or by a variety of bilateral or multilateral arrangements. Both technical and business rules issues need to be resolved for interoperability to work.

Interchange

Swipe Fee, Merchant and Discount Fee

A structure within some payments schemes which requires one provider to pay the other provider a fee on certain transactions. Typically used in card schemes to effect payment of a fee from a merchant to a consumer's card issuing bank.

Fees

The payments assessed by a provider to their end user. This may either be a fixed fee, a percent-of-value fee, or a mixture. A Merchant Discount Fee is a fee charged by a Merchant Services Provider to a merchant for payments acceptance. Payments systems or schemes, as well as processors, also charge fees to their customer (typically the provider).

Commission

An incentive payment made, typically to an agent or other intermediary who acts on behalf of a DFS provider. Provides an incentive for agent.

Ubiquity

The ability of a payer to reach any (or most) payees in their country, regardless of the provider affiliation of the receiving payee. Requires some type of interoperability.

Rules

The private operating rules of a payments scheme, which bind the direct participants (either providers, in an open-loop system, or end users, in a closed-loop system).

On-Us Payments

On-net Payments

Payments made in a multiple-participant system or scheme, where the payer's provider is the same entity as the payee's provider.

Off-Us Payments

Off-net Payments

Payments made in a multiple-participant system or scheme, where the payer's provider is a different entity as the payee's provider.

Voucher

A token that entitles the holder to a discount or that may be exchanged for goods or services.

Risk Management

Related to risks in the digital financial services ecosystem

Liability

Agent Liability, Issuer Liability, Acquirer Liability

A legal obligation of one party to another; required by either national law, payment scheme rules, or specific agreements by providers. Some scheme rules transfer liabilities for a transaction from one provider to another under certain conditions.

Irrevocable

Non-Repudiation

A transaction that cannot be "called back" by the payer; an irrevocable payment, once received by a payee, cannot be taken back by the payer.

Recourse

Rights given to an end user by law, private operating rules, or specific agreements by providers, allowing end users the ability to do certain things in certain circumstances (sometimes revoking a transaction).

Fraud

Fraud Management, Fraud Detection, Fraud Prevention

Criminal use of digital financial services to take funds from another individual or business, or to damage that party in some other way.

Anti-Money Laundering

AML; also "Combating the Financing of Terrorism", or CFT

Initiatives to detect and stop the use of financial systems to disguise use of funds criminally obtained.

Combatting Terrorist Financing

Initiatives to detect and stop the use of financial systems to transfer funds to terrorist organisations or people.

Arbitration

The use of an arbitrator, rather than courts, to resolve disputes.

Dispute Resolution

A process specified by a provider or by the rules of a payment scheme to resolve issues between end users and providers, or between an end user and its counter party.

Credit History

Credit Bureaus, Credit Files

A set of records kept for an end user reflecting their use of credit, including borrowing and repayment.

Credit Scoring

A process which creates a numerical score reflecting credit worthiness.

Credit Risk Management

Tools to manage the risk that a borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms.

Operations Risk Management

Tools to manage providers' risks in operating a digital financial services (DFS) system.

Fraud Risk Management

Tools to manage providers' risks, and at times user's risks (e.g. for merchants or governments), in providing and/or using DFS services.

Risk-based Approach

A regulatory and/or business management approach that creates different levels of obligation based on the risk of the underlying transaction or customer.

Systemic Risk

In payments systems, the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or entire market, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual provider or end user.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental organisation to combat money laundering and to act on terrorism financing.

Infrastructure

The core systems and capabilities that enable DFS transactions

Automated Clearing House (ACH)

An electronic clearing system in which payment orders are exchanged among payment service providers, primarily via magnetic media or telecommunications networks, and then cleared amongst the participants. All operations are handled by a data processing centre. An ACH typically clears credit transfers and debit transfers, and in some, cases cheques.

Clearing House

A central location or central processing mechanism through which financial institutions agree to exchange payment instructions or other financial obligations (e.g. securities). The institutions settle for items exchanged at a designated time based on the rules and procedures of the clearing house. In some cases, the clearing house may assume significant
counterparty, financial, or risk management responsibilities for the clearing system.

Payment System

Payment Network, Money Transfer System

Encompasses all payment-related activities, processes, mechanisms, infrastructure, institutions, and users in a country or a broader region (e.g. a common economic area).

Platform

Payment Platform, Payment Platform Provider

A term used to describe the software or service used by a provider, a scheme, or a switch to manage end user accounts and to send and receive payment transactions.

Scheme

A set of rules, practices, and standards necessary for the functioning of payment services.

Settlement System

Net Settlement, Gross Settlement, RTGS

A system used to facilitate the settlement of transfers of funds, assets, or financial instruments. Net settlement system: a funds or securities transfer system which settles net settlement positions during one or more discrete periods, usually at pre-specified times in the course of the business day. Gross settlement system: a transfer system in which transfer orders are settled one by one.

Switch

An entity which receives transactions from one provider and routes those transactions on to another provider. A switch may be owned or hired by a scheme or be hired by individual providers. A switch will connect to a settlement system for inter-participant settlement.

Products and Services

Products and services provided to end-users of digital financial services.

Provided to Consumers

Transaction Accounts

Deposit account, eMoney account, Current account

Transaction account: broadly defined as an account held with a bank or other authorised and/or regulated service provider (including a non-bank) which can be used to make and receive payments. Transaction accounts can be further differentiated into deposit transaction accounts and eMoney accounts. Deposit transaction account: a deposit account held with banks and other authorised deposit-taking financial institutions that can be used for making and receiving payments. Such accounts are known in some countries as current accounts, chequing accounts, or other similar terms.

Bank Accounts and Transaction Services

Mobile Banking, Remote Banking, Digital Banking

A transaction account held at a bank. This account may be accessible by a mobile phone, in which case it is sometimes referred to as "mobile banking".

eMoney Accounts and Transaction Services

Digital Wallet, Mobile Wallet, Mobile Money Account

A transaction account held at a non-bank. The value in such an account is referred to as eMoney.

Prepaid Cards

An eMoney product for general purpose use where the record of funds is stored on the payment card (on magnetic stripe or the embedded integrated circuit chip) or a central computer system, and which can be drawn down through specific payment instructions to be issued from the bearer’s payment card.

Savings Products

An account at either a bank or non-bank provider, which stores funds with the design of helping end users save money.

Loans

Microfinance, P2P Lending, Factoring, Cash Advances, Credit, Overdraft, Facility

Means by which end users can borrow money.

Investment Products

A variety of products which allow end users to put funds into investments other than a savings account.

Insurance Products

A variety of products which allow end users to insure assets or lives that they wish to protect.

Provided to Businesses and Governments

Merchant Payments Acceptance Services

Acquiring services

A service which enables a merchant or other payment acceptor to accept one or more types of electronic payments. The term "acquiring" is typically used in the card payments systems.

Supply Chain Solutions

Electronic Invoicing, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Digital Accounting Services, Business Intelligence

Services which support merchant or business functions relating to digital financial services (DFS).

Bulk Payments Services

A service which allows a government agency or an enterprise to make payments to a large number of payees, typically consumers, but can be businesses as well.

Government Payments Acceptance Services

Services which enable governments to collect taxes and fees from individuals and businesses.

Cross-border Trade Finance Services

Services which enable one business to sell or buy to businesses or individuals in other countries; may include management of payments transactions, data handling, and financing.

Use Cases

Situations in which DFS services are used.

Storing Funds

Account, Wallet

Keeping funds in secure electronic format. May be a bank account or an eMoney account.

Sending or Receiving Funds

Making and receiving payments to another person.

Domestic Remittance

P2P; Remote Domestic Transfer of Value

Making and receiving payments to another person in the same country.

International Remittance

P2P; Remote Cross-border Transfer of Value, Cross-Border Remittance

Making and receiving payments to another person in another country.

Bulk Payments

G2C, B2C , G2P, Social Transfers

Making and receiving payments from a government to a consumer: benefits, cash transfers, salaries, pensions, etc.

Paying for Purchases

C2B – Consumer to Business

Making payments from a consumer to a business: the business is the "payment acceptor" or merchant.

Merchant payment – POS

C2B, Proximity Payments

Making a payment for a good or service in person ("face to face"); includes kiosks and vending machines.

Merchant payment – Remote

C2B, eCommerce Payment, Mobile Payment

Making a payment for a good or service remotely; transacting by phone, computer, etc.

Paying Bills

C2B

Bill Payment

C2B, Utility Payments, School Payments

Making a payment for a recurring service, either in person ("face to face"), or remotely.

Tax Payment

C2G, B2G

Making a payment from a consumer to a government, for taxes, fees, etc.

Supplier Payment

B2B – Business to Business, B2G – Business to Government

Making a payment from one business to another for supplies, etc: may be in-person or remote, domestic or cross border. Includes cross-border trade.

Saving and Investing

Keeping funds for future needs and financial return.

Borrowing

Borrowing money to finance a short-term or long-term need.

Insuring Lives or assets

Paying to protect the value of a life or an asset.

Trading

International Trade

The exchange of capital, goods, and services across international borders or territories.

Roles

Entities involved in the provision of DFS products and services.

Provider

Financial Service Provider, Payment Service Provider, Digital Financial Services Provider

The entity that provides a digital financial service to an end user (either a consumer, a business, or a government.) In a closed-loop payment system, the Payment System Operator is also the provider. In an open-loop payment system, the providers are the banks or non-banks which participate in that system.

Bank

Savings Bank, Credit Union, Payments Bank

A charted financial system within a country that has the ability to accept deposits and make and receive payments into those accounts.

Non-Bank

Payments Institution, Alternative Lender

An entity that is not a chartered bank, but which is providing financial services to end users. The requirements of non-banks to do this, and the limitations of what they can do, are specified by national law.

eMoney Issuer

Issuer, Provider

A provider (bank or non-bank) who deposits eMoney into an account they establish for an end user. eMoney can be created when the provider receives cash ("cash-in") from the end user (typically at an agent location) or when the provider receives a digital payment from another provider.

Merchant Service Provider

Acquirer

A provider (bank or non-bank) who supports merchants or other payments acceptors requirements to receive payments from customers. The term "acquirer" is used specifically in connection with acceptance of card payments transactions.

Regulator

A governmental organisation given power through national law to set and enforce standards and practices. Central Banks, Finance and Treasury Departments, Telecommunications Regulators, and Consumer Protection Authorities are all regulators involved in digital financial services.

Standards Body

EMV, ISO, ITU, ANSI, GSMA

An organisation that creates standards used by providers, payments schemes, and payments systems.

Merchant

Payments Acceptor

An enterprise which sells goods or services and receives payments for such goods or services.

Mobile Network Operator

An enterprise which sells mobile phone services, including voice and data communication.

Money Transfer Operator

A specialized provider of DFS who handles domestic and/or international remittances.

Participant

A provider who is a member of a payment scheme, and subject to that scheme's rules.

Payee

Receiver

The recipient of funds in a payment transaction.

Payer

Sender

The payer of funds in a payment transaction.

End User

Consumer, Customer, Merchant, Biller

The customer of a digital financial services provider: the customer may be a consumer, a merchant, a government, or another form of enterprise.

Active User

A term used by many providers in describing how many of their account holders are frequent users of their service.

Counterparty

Payee, Payer, Borrower, Lender

The other side of a payment or credit transaction. A payee is the counterparty to a payer, and vice-versa.

Payment System Operator

Mobile Money Operator, Payment Service Provider

The entity that operates a payment system or scheme.

Processor

Gateway

An enterprise that manages, on an out-sourced basis, various functions for a digital financial services provider. These functions may include transaction management, customer database management, and risk management. Processors may also do functions on behalf of payments systems, schemes, or switches.

Aggregator

Merchant Aggregator

A specialized form of a merchant services provider, who typically handles payments transactions for a large number of small merchants. Scheme rules often specify what aggregators are allowed to do.

Agent

Agent Till,
Agent Outlet

An entity authorized by the provider to handle various functions such as customer enrolment, cash-in, and cash-out using an agent till

Super Agent

Master Agent

In some countries, agents are managed by Super Agents or Master Agents who are responsible for the actions of their agents to the provider.

Processes

Supporting processes which are necessary parts of the DFS Ecosystem

Authentication

Verification, Validation

The process of ensuring that a person or a transaction is valid for the process (account opening, transaction initiation, etc.) being performed.

Addressing

Directories, Aliasing

The use of necessary information (account number, phone number, etc.) for a paying user to direct payment to a receiving user.

Registration

Enrolment, Agent Registration

The process of opening a provider account. Separate processes are used for consumers, merchants, agents, etc.

Authorization

A process used during a "pull" payment (such as a card payment), when the payee requests (through their provider) confirmation from the payer's bank that the transaction is good.

Cash-In

Receiving eMoney credit in exchange for physical cash – typically done at an agent.

Cash-Out

Receiving physical cash in exchange for a debit to an eMoney account – typically done at an agent.

Over The Counter Services

OTC, Mobile to Cash

Services provided by agents when one end party does not have an eMoney account: the (remote) payer may pay the eMoney to the agent's account, who then pays cash to the non-account holding payee.

Posting

Clearing

The act of the provider of entering a debit or credit entry into the end user's account record.

Cash Management

Agent Liquidity Management

Management of cash balances at an agent.

Merchant Acquisition

Onboarding

The process of enabling a merchant for the receipt of electronic payments.

Know Your Customer

KYC, Agent and Customer Due Diligence, Tiered KYC, Zero Tier

The process of identifying a new customer at the time of account opening, in compliance with law and regulation. The identification requirements may be lower for low value accounts ("Tiered KYC"). The term is also used in connection with regulatory requirements for a provider to understand, on an ongoing basis, who their customer is and how they are using their account.

Risk Management

Fraud Management

The practices that enterprises do to understand, detect, prevent, and manage various types of risks. Risk management occurs at providers, at payments systems and schemes, at processors, and at many merchants or payments acceptors.

Data Protection

PCI-DSS

The practices that enterprises do to protect end user data. "PCI-DSS" is a card industry standard for this.

Customer Database Management

The practices that providers do to manage customer data: this may be enabled by the payment platform the provider is using.

Technologies

Enabling technologies used in the DFS Ecosystem

Smartphone

A device that combines a mobile phone with a computer.

Feature Phone

A mobile telephone without significant computational capabilities.

Short Message Service

A service for sending short messages between mobile phones.

Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD)

A communication technology that is used to send text between a mobile phone and an application program in the network.

Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card

SIM ToolKit, Thin SIM

A smart card inside a cellular phone, carrying an identification number unique to the owner, storing personal data, and preventing operation if removed. A SIM Tool Kit is a standard of the GSM system which enables various value-added services. A "Thin SIM" is an additional SIM card put in a mobile phone.

Chip Card

EMV Chip Card, Contactless Chip Card

A chip card contains a computer chip: it may be either contactless or contact (requires insertion into terminal). Global standards for chip cards are set by Europay, MasterCard, and Visa (EMV).

Near Field Communication

NFC

A communication technology used within payments to transmit payment data from an NFC equipped mobile phone to a capable terminal.

Secure Element

A secure chip on a phone that can be used to store payment data.

Host Card Emulation (HCE)

A communication technology that enables payment data to be safely stored without using the Secure Element in the phone.

Point of Sale Device

Terminal, Acceptance Device, POS, mPOS

Any device meant specifically for managing the receipt of electronic payments.

Encryption

Decryption

The process of encoding a message so that it can be read only by the sender and the intended recipient.

Application Program Interface

A software program that makes it possible for application programs to interact with each other and share data.

Biometric Authentication

The use of a physical characteristic of a person (fingerprint, IRIS, etc.) to authenticate that person.

Tokenization

The use of a substitute token ("dummy numbers") in lieu of "real" numbers, to protect against the theft and misuse of the "real" numbers. Requires a capability to map the token to the "real" number.

Trusted Execution Environment

A development execution environment that has security capabilities and meets certain security-related requirements.

Security Level

Security specification of the system which defines effectiveness of risk protection.

Biometric Authentication

Any process that validates the identity of a user who wishes to sign into a system by measuring some intrinsic characteristic of that user.

Blockchain

Digital currency, cryptocurrency, distributed ledger technology

The technology underlying bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies—a shared digital ledger, or a continually updated list of all transactions.

Bibliography

1. Alliance for Financial Inclusion (Mobile Financial Services Working Group) Mobile Financial Services – Basic Terminology, 2013

2. GSMA – Mobile Money for the Unbanked Glossary

3. BIS CPSS – A glossary of terms used in payments and settlement systems, 2003

4. PAFI Draft Report, September 2015

5. Level One Project – Gates Foundation 2014

6. Electronic Transactions Association – Mobile Terminology Glossary

7. Mobey Forum – Mobile Financial Terms Explained, 2014

8. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2741: Architecture of secure mobile financial transactions in next generation networks

9. ITU-T Study Group 2, Overview of Telecom Finance

[1] Mireya Almazán and Lynn Eisenhart, OTC & Mobile Money: Making Sense of the Data. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money/otc-mobile-money-making-sense-of-the-data

[2] The Helix Institute Tanzania and Uganda country reports in 2013 showed that it is common for agents to offer OTC transactions to customers, as described in more depth in this paper in later sections.

[3] See http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-accelerator-survey-pakistan-country-report-2014

[4] Mike McCaffrey and Doreen Ahimbisibwe. Digital Finance and Illiteracy: Four Critical Risks, Dec. 2015. http://www.cgap.org/blog/digital-finance-and-illiteracy-four-critical-risks

[5] This OTC matrix includes user-to-user wallet transactions where third parties who are not necessarily agents may misrepresent identity, act as ‘informal agents’ or assist the users to carry out the transaction.

[6] GSMA State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money, 2016. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/industry-data-and-insights/sotir

[7] Ibid.

[8] Mike McCaffrey, Leena Anthony, Annabel Schiff, Kimathi Githachuri, Graham A.N. Wright. Agent Network Survey: Tanzania Country Report 2013, April 2014. http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-survey-tanzania-country-report-2013

[9] Kimathi Githachuri, Mike McCaffrey, Leena Anthony, Annabel Schiff, Anne Marie van Swinderen, Graham A. N. Wright. Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Uganda Country Report 2013, Jan. 2014. http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-accelerator-survey-%E2%80%93-uganda-country-report-2013-0

[10] Aakash Mehrotra, Sheharyar Khan, Leena Anthony, and Dorieke Kuijpers. Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Kenya Country Report 2014, May 2015. http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-accelerator-survey-kenya-country-report-2014

[11] GSMA. Proportional risk-based AML/CFT regimes for mobile money, 2015. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money/proportional-risk-based-amlcft-regimes-for-mobile-money-a-framework-for-assessing-risk-factors-and-mitigation-measures/

[12] See GPFI website http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/G20%20Principles%20for%20Innovative%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20AFI%20brochure.pdf

[13] GSMA. Mobile money profitability: A digital ecosystem to drive healthy margins, 2014. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money-programme/mobile-money-profitability-a-digital-ecosystem-to-drive-healthy-margins/

[14] MicroSave. Over The Counter Transactions – Liberation Or A Trap? – Part I, 2015. http://blog.microsave.net/over-the-counter-transactions-liberation-or-a-trap-part-i/

[15] GSMA. State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money, 2016. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/industry-data-and-insights/sotir

[16] Safaricom introduced products using accounts as early as in 2009 (two years after the launch) such as Kilimo Salama, M-KESHO, however these products did not succeed and scale up.

[17] Anastasia Mirzoyants and Mike McCaffrey. The Human Touch Required to Evolve Digital Finance, Nov. 2014. http://www.helix-institute.com/blog/human-touch-required-evolve-digital-finance

[18] Isaac Holly Ogwal. The OTC Trap – Impact on the Business Case for Uganda’s Mobile Network Operators, August 2014. http://blog.microsave.net/the-otc-trap-impact-on-the-business-case-for-ugandas-mobile-network-operators/

[19] Maha Khan and Aakash Mehrotra. Agent Network Accelerator Survey – Pakistan Country Report 2014, May 2015. http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-accelerator-survey-pakistan-country-report-2014

[20] See slide 14, Pakistan Country Report, 2014. http://www.helix-institute.com/data-and-insights/agent-network-accelerator-survey-pakistan-country-report-2014

[21] MicroSave.Over The Counter Transactions – Liberation Or A Trap? – Part II, 2015. http://blog.microsave.net/over-the-counter-transactions-liberation-or-a-trap-part-ii/

[22] GSMA.State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money, 2016. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/industry-data-and-insights/sotir

[23] It should be noted that the total number of mobile money OTC users may actually be much higher, as GSMA’s figures only account for formal OTC usage that mobile money providers can track.

[24] InterMedia 2013, Bangladesh Country Survey.

[25] GSMA. State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money, 2016. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/industry-data-and-insights/sotir

[26] Anastasia Mirzoyants and Mike McCaffrey. The Human Touch Required to Evolve Digital Finance, Nov. 2014. http://www.helix-institute.com/blog/human-touch-required-evolve-digital-finance

[27] GSMA.Building digital societies in Asia: Making commerce smarter, 2015. https://gsmaintelligence.com/research/2015/11/building-digital-societies-in-asia-making-commerce-smarter/531/

[28] Branchless Banking Newsletter, State Bank of Pakistan Available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/branchless.htm

[29] The State Bank of Pakistan only reports figures back until Q4 2011, so that is as far as our analysis goes, even though EasyPaisa and Omni both launched their services the year before.

[30] The impetus for this was a government mandated SIM registration which providers used to their advantage to register people for branchless banking accounts.

[31] see the press release here. These numbers and the definition used for “Active” were confirmed to the authors by MobiCash staff. http://propakistani.pk/2015/12/11/mobicashs-active-mobile-wallet-customers-grow-to-over-500000/

[32] Mobile Financial Services data sourced from Bangladesh Bank

[33] GSMA. Mobile money profitability: A digital ecosystem to drive healthy margins, 2014. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money-programme/mobile-money-profitability-a-digital-ecosystem-to-drive-healthy-margins/

[34] Maha Khan and Mike McCaffrey. The Powerful Agents & Fractured Markets of Pakistan, June 2015. http://www.helix-institute.com/blog/powerful-agents-fractured-markets-pakistan-0

[35] Graham Wright. Over The Counter Transactions – Liberation Or A Trap? Part III, Dec. 2014. http://blog.microsave.net/over-the-counter-transactions-liberation-or-a-trap-part-iii/

[36] MicroSave. The OTC Trap – Impact on the Business Case for Uganda’s Mobile Network Operators, 2014. http://blog.microsave.net/the-otc-trap-impact-on-the-business-case-for-ugandas-mobile-network-operators/

[37] MicroSave. Over The Counter Transactions – Liberation Or A Trap? – Part III, 2015. http://blog.microsave.net/over-the-counter-transactions-liberation-or-a-trap-part-iii/

[38] See http://digitalmoney.shiftthought.co.uk/easypaisa-pakistan-a-5-year-journey-from-otc-to-digital-money/

[39] MicroSave. Over The Counter Transactions – Liberation Or A Trap? – Part II, 2015. http://blog.microsave.net/over-the-counter-transactions-liberation-or-a-trap-part-ii/

[40] Maha Khan and Mike McCaffrey. The Powerful Agents & Fractured Markets of Pakistan, June 2015. http://www.helix-institute.com/blog/powerful-agents-fractured-markets-pakistan-0

[41] Financial Inclusion Insights by InterMedia observes that users are more likely to make a transaction through OTC versus using an account, reports from Financial Inclusion Insights are available at: http://finclusion.org/reports/

[42] InterMedia (http://finclusion.org/datacenter/). Results are discussed in more detail in this section.

[43] See InterMedia at: http://www.intermedia.org/

[44] Brad Jones. The Paradox of Calling Mobile Money ‘Mobile’ in Asia, September 14, 2014. http://www.mobilemoneyasia.org/2014/09/the-paradox-of-calling-mobile-money.html